


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POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

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
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
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AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS

BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS
PH.D., LITT.D., F.R.HIST.S.



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TO
CHARLES ROSENBURY ERDMAN



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PREFACE

AT the beginning of the World War I wrote a book about the relations among the great powers during the years immediately preceding the assassination at Serajevo. "The New Map of Europe" dealt particularly with Near Eastern problems and wars and with the foreign policies of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy in the events affecting the Balkan States, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the countries on the African littoral of the Mediterranean. The purpose of the book was to attempt to explain how the relations among the great powers were vitally influenced by the conflict of interests that arose in their diplomatic and economic activities in the regions formerly under the exclusive domination of the Ottoman sultans. The reception accorded "The New Map of Europe" encouraged me to complete the survey of contemporary international relations by writing "The New Map of Africa" in 1916 and "The New Map of Asia" in 1919. The latter two volumes outlined the development of European overlordship in Africa and Asia.

None who lived in daily contact with international questions, and who was reporting from the spot wars and rumors of wars during the decade before 1914, could be satisfied with the prevalent idea that it was unnecessary to go farther back than the famous "twelve days" of diplomatic correspondence, from July 20 to August 2, 1914, to settle the responsibility for the World War. However great the guilt of the Imperial German and Austro-Hungarian governments for deliberately forcing the war upon Europe, their power was not so great that their will alone could have led us into the calamities of 1914-18. The most

bitter and unthinking partizan of armistice and peace conference days sees now that the elimination of Germany and Austria-Hungary from world politics has not brought us peace. Europe is still in arms, and the victorious powers are pitted against one another in the Near East and the Far East. Must we not admit, then, that *Realpolitik* and *Weltpolitik* are human, and not simply German, phenomena, and that they call for attention no less after our victory than before the war?

This is the justification for the study of world politics as a separate branch of political science. Anthropologists write of race; geographers of climate; economists of finance and trade and commerce; demographers of population; sociologists of living conditions; missionaries of cultural conquest in the name of religion; jurists of international law; diplomatists of the technique of dealings among nations; military experts of the conduct of wars and the rôle of armies and navies in peace and war; statesmen of the immediate and ostensible causes of war and aims of peace; propagandists of national movements and particular interests; humanists of improving world conditions; publicists of current events; and general historians set forth and interpret the activities of nations comprehensively, stressing political evolution and states of mind as well as recording events. Up to the nineteenth century the specialist in international relations is not needed. But since the birth of nationalism, the use of steam in production and transportation, and the consequent rise of world powers, he has a field of his own.

The field is difficult, however, because the problems discussed and the questions raised have been the storm center of men's thoughts for the past ten years. These problems have been approached unintelligently, and opinions have been formed without knowledge. Teachers of the historical and political sciences in American universities and colleges have had a curious experience. Their colleagues in other

departments would be astounded if professors of history and political science should presume to lay down the law to them in their particular fields. And yet professors of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, languages, engineering, chemistry, medicine, theology, and law have written books and articles and have lectured on problems of world politics, without having acquainted themselves with even the rudiments of the subject. An architect, who has created masterpieces, told me one day that a lecture I gave on African colonization was wrong from beginning to end. He could contradict none of my facts, and when I pressed him he confessed that he had never read a book on the extension of European control over Africa. "But I have been in Algiers," he declared. "And I have been in a Gothic cathedral," I answered; "but what would you think of me if I contested, without any supporting facts, your statements in a lecture on Gothic architecture?"

In attempting to put within the compass of one volume an introduction to world politics, it has been necessary to omit much of interest and importance, and to exclude, except where clearness demanded it, historical narrative. The writer confesses frankly that his sympathies are with the smaller nations in their struggles to maintain or win independence, and that he believes it is possible to use "one weight and one measure" in international relations. But he has tried to allow the facts to speak for themselves, and urges the reader to do the supplementary reading indicated for each chapter. References have been given, not as sources, but as guides to further information. In selecting them different points of view and the general availability of materials have been taken into consideration. Some books, excellent as sources, are not widely circulated, or are not written in the condensed form demanded by the general reader or student. When used as a text-book, the chapters are intended to acquaint the student with the skeleton facts upon which the lectures are based, to amplify

the lectures on certain points, and, above all, to provoke discussion. In the advanced study of political science no text-book can take the place of lectures and class-room quizzes and comment on assigned reading.

If British statesmanship and officialdom come in for a larger share of criticism in a course on world politics than those of other great powers, it is only because Great Britain is more involved overseas than any other power. I am of pure British stock, and am an intense admirer of the civilization and culture that are my heritage. My point of view is in no sense anti-British. In fact, it is peculiarly Anglo-Saxon. From our ancestors we have learned to lean backward in our desire to be fair to the other man and to put ourselves in his place. The most precious English intellectual tradition is to write with detachment and impartiality. In the atmosphere of passion and prejudice born of the war many of us departed from our moorings. But we are finding ourselves again. Facing facts and holding to common ideals of liberty and justice are the bases of Anglo-Saxon solidarity.

I can not adequately express my appreciation of the help and light in the preparation of this volume that have come to me from unknown friends in many countries. Ever since 1914 numerous correspondents have been pointing out to me errors of fact, or have entered into stimulating and suggestive discussion provoked by statements in my books and magazine articles. All this has been grist to my mill. My friends in American, British, and French universities have given me encouragement and equally helpful criticism and admonition. The opportunities for personal investigation in different parts of the world have been enjoyed through the constant and generous interest of the late James Gordon Bennett and of Mr. Rodman Wana-maker. Professor William Starr Myers, of Princeton University, and my brother, Professor Oliphant Gibbons, of the Buffalo Technical High School, read the manuscript. Pro-

fessor Frederic Austin Ogg, of the University of Wisconsin, has edited manuscript and proofs with a thoroughness for which I can not express too highly my admiration and thanks. My publishers have shown the interest and care that long years of happy association have taught me to expect from them.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Princeton, May 1, 1922

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AN INTRODUCTION
TO WORLD POLITICS

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF WORLD POLITICS

WHEN political organisms were small and communities self-sustaining, problems of government were not complicated by considerations of foreign policy. At first, travelers were killed and their possessions confiscated, unless they were stronger than those they met. On sea, men took their chances with pirates as with the weather. Until means of transportation and a guaranty of protection were furnished them, few traveled in inland countries. None traveled for pleasure, and the quest of knowledge or gold was attended by great and constant risks. Later, when means of transportation increased and regular routes were established, travelers purchased protection by paying tribute to the strong. And strength was not so much a matter of numbers and of fighting ability as of geographical position. Consequently, there was virtually no intercourse, social or commercial, between peoples of different blood, language, customs, and religion.

Before the Christian era the history of "civilization," as we understand that term, was developed in Mediterranean lands. There the three monotheistic religions originated and spread, and there the cultures, the written languages, and the social and political background of modern Europe were created. The Egyptians and Chaldeans and

Assyrians did not go far afield in their wars. The Persians and Greeks invaded each other's countries mainly as adventurous explorers. The Phoenicians and Greeks traded in the Mediterranean and founded colonies without the urge of a united racial impulse behind them. Rome did not allow Carthage to become a consolidated empire; and the Greeks, like the Italians of the Middle Ages, instead of standing together in their expansion, exhausted their energies in fighting each other. Although the Romans colonized, it was rather by taking aliens into partnership and by organizing a governmental system than by making their own race dominant. The Roman Empire was not conceived in the spirit of ruling the world for the benefit of the Italian peninsula. When they conquered the Greeks, the Romans succumbed to Greek culture, and as the empire grew, Rome itself did not remain the political, much less the economic, metropolis. There never was a Roman race in the sense that there was a Greek race and later an Arab race.

The Roman Empire had neither geographical entity nor national *foyer*. Rome did not mean a place from which a race had come and which was the heart of the nation. Possessing no common economic interests and no consciousness of oneness of blood, the peoples of the Roman Empire were easily weakened by, and then fell prey to, the migrating peoples of Europe and Asia. Our Teutonic ancestors colonized Europe by subjugating and becoming assimilated with, if not by actually exterminating, the indigenous inhabitants. As soon as new political organisms took the place of the defunct Eastern and Western empires, migration ceased. Whole races no longer passed from Asia to Europe or from one part of Europe to another. In the medieval period of European history, migratory conquests ended in every part of the continent simultaneously with the appearance of stable centralized governments. This was accomplished just in time to stem Mongolian and Semitic invaders, who attempted a new migration. Only the

Balkans, parts of Russia, and northern Africa passed under the domination of the later Asiatics.

But our ancestors, once they had settled in their new homes, still found causes for war. On the surface the wars were feudal, religious, dynastic; underneath was the conflict among large national groups in the process of formation. Leaders and peoples were instruments of irresistible currents of whose very existence they did not know. Placed within certain geographic limits and welded into groups by the growth of common economic interests, Europeans evolved different languages and characteristics, and thus became separate nationalities. Except in a few specific instances of borderlands, national evolution was more rapid and more thorough in western Europe than in central and eastern Europe.

To illustrate, a Scotchman or a Welshman may retain his pride in his blood and perhaps in his language, but he long ago became a Britisher by every instinct in his being. Proximity, development of intercourse, political equality with the once dominant Englishman, and, above all, equal economic opportunities accomplished this. The Irishman, on the contrary, separated by water from other Britishers, and as potently by different cultural and religious ideals, held in economic and political subjection to the dominant Englishman by means of a land-owning alien element and by the descendants of a colony of alien conquerors in one corner of the island, remained unassimilated. A Breton or a Provençal can be proud of his origin and can cherish the cult of his language and his local customs, but he is none the less a good Frenchman. The Breton is isolated on his peninsula from other than French influences. The Provençal is cut off by mountains from any other race that might have influenced his national self-consciousness. In this way geography has played the most important rôle in assimilation.

Border peoples in central and eastern Europe were

worked upon by, and became successively subjects of, rival national groups. In eastern Europe, where the conquerors were in the minority and of the ruling class, little attempt was made at assimilation through education or through the creation of economic interests in common and mutually realized between the conquered people and the dominant alien invaders. Long after the peoples of western Europe and, to a lesser extent, those of central Europe were freed from the menace of migratory invasions, and had been left to themselves to develop their civilization, the peoples of eastern Europe remained under Mohammedan rule or continued to be subjected to recurrent Tartar invasions. Another disruptive influence, which has persisted through the centuries and has formed a barrier from the Baltic to the Adriatic between peoples whose common blood and language would otherwise have caused them to develop a common nationality, has been the division of allegiance between the Roman and the Orthodox churches. Of the two most powerful branches of the Slavs, Poles looked to Rome and Russians to Constantinople. The Ukrainians were divided, and Serbians were separated from Croats and Slovenes.

Early in the history of modern Europe, international relations became important from an economic, as well as a political, point of view. Commerce led to the establishment of traditions and customs in the dealings among nations. These were embodied in diplomacy and international law. Treaties of friendship and commerce were sought as a means of reciprocally guaranteeing the interests of nationals. When migratory conquests ceased, when religious and dynastic wars ended, when nationalist movements reached and accepted the limits imposed upon them by geography and economics, it was reasonable to suppose that the state of peace attained within the great political organisms might be extended to the European community of nations.

But when Europeans began to trade overseas, and established colonies and companies for exploiting newly discovered regions of the world, competition gave rise to friction that would not have existed had the European nations been able to continue to find sources of prosperity within the borders of their own political jurisdictions. Wars broke out among Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French, which, although provoked by religious and dynastic questions of European origin, were complicated, extended, and prolonged because of the interests and ambitions of their governments and private companies in America and Asia. And the gains and losses to victors and vanquished have proved to be permanent, and have influenced the course of history more by the transfer of territories and privileges outside Europe than by boundary changes in Europe. That this is true is largely the result of developments of the nineteenth century. As long as sovereigns and governments fought, with mercenaries, for prizes of whose value the contending peoples were dimly if at all aware, extra-European rivalry and colonial wars did not have a profound influence upon the relations between the European peoples. A great change, however, began to take place during the Napoleonic era.

The rapid increase of population in Europe, with the accompanying over-production of manufactured articles and over-consumption of raw materials, radically changed international relations. Each nation felt compelled to shape its foreign policy according to the opportunities and necessities of acquiring beyond the confines of Europe areas for colonization and new markets. This situation, unique in history because the conditions that created it had not before existed, gave rise to a new branch of political science—world politics.

World politics is the science of government as practised in international relations, under the influence of real or fancied interests in other than neighboring countries or

those with which relations of reciprocal advantage are naturally maintained. All nations, for their security and material and moral well-being, can not detach their domestic policies from those of nations near them and with whom they do business. But when they become friends or enemies because of rivalry for political influence and economic advantages in regions where their aim is to enjoy, exclusively if possible, the fruits of economic imperialism, friends and enemies are made, not by natural affinities or by good or evil done to each other, but by considerations of world politics.

It is not impossible to build up a thesis for the beginnings of world politics in the struggle of Assyria and Egypt over Syria and Palestine, of Greece and Persia over Asia Minor, of Athens and Sparta over Sicily, of Rome and Carthage over Spain and the hegemony of the Mediterranean, and, since the era of overseas exploration, in the wars of the original maritime and colonial powers. But before the nineteenth century world politics had comparatively slight influence upon international relations. It was the introduction of steam power into industry that made overseas markets profitable, and then indispensable, to European nations. The use of steam power in transportation made it possible to carry manufactured articles to foreign markets on a large scale and to fetch raw materials and foodstuffs. To the European nations prosperity began to be dependent upon a new world-wide division of labor, in which the rôles of manufacturer, merchant, banker, and carrier were played by the European peoples.

While one may claim that international relations have always been affected by outside interests and ambitions, it was not until the nineteenth century that Europe began to exploit the rest of the world. This exploitation is a cause as much as a result of surplus population and capital. The industrial nations, finding, maintaining, and developing new markets, at the same time exported the population

and the capital that was, in part at least, due to this exploitation. European nations came more and more to vie with one another for exclusive political control of colonizing areas where white men could live. To make secure the hold on colonies already acquired, fortified ports of call were needed. Hinterland and islands were annexed, in addition, to protect the ports of call or to prevent other nations from installing themselves in near-by vantage-points. Colonies and protectorates, in turn, began to create a demand for goods and to become profitable fields for investment. This wealth had to be guarded; and, as there was no disposition to share with other nations, defense of the sources of wealth began to be a heavy tax upon those who had accumulated it.

Unless we have in mind the colonial situation in 1815, we can not rightly estimate the foreign policies of European peoples, and of the United States and Japan as well, since the rise of nationalism and steam power. We must know also how each of the European nations won and lost overseas possessions up to that time.

At the opening of the modern age, the Italians were the foremost international bankers, traders, explorers, travelers, and geographers. Italian princelings ruled over states in the Greek peninsula, and the Italian city-states controlled the trade of the Adriatic, Ægean, and eastern Mediterranean. But the Italians were not yet on the road to political unity. They fought one another up to the point of depleting their maritime strength; and, even after the Ottoman Turks began to war on Christendom, the Italians continued to undermine one another. The Turks conquered the Balkans, the Ægean islands, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, and gradually extended their power around the Black Sea and across northern Africa. The Mediterranean became and remained for several centuries an unsafe and unprofitable sea for Europeans. But half a century after the fall of Constantinople the period of world discovery and colonization began. The people who gave birth to Christopher

Columbus and many other intrepid and successful navigators had no part, except as individuals, in the expansion of Europe overseas, and their last city-state, Venice, was put out of existence by the treaty of Campo-Formio in 1797.

The Scandinavians, also, were pioneer explorers. But their political unity was broken up four years before Columbus discovered America. For two hundred years Danes and Swedes were engaged in intermittent warfare against each other. Sweden, on the whole victorious, attempted to play the rôle of a great power. She, however, did not seek an empire outside of Europe, but spent her strength, in vain, against the Hohenzollerns and Romanoffs. The Norwegians formed a union, on the basis of equality, with the Danes, which lasted until 1814, when Norway was joined to Sweden. Sweden and Norway founded no colonies. Denmark colonized Iceland, made settlements on the coast of Greenland, and took possession of three islands in the West Indies—St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. The Danish fleet was destroyed by the British at Copenhagen in 1807. Denmark never recovered from this blow, and she had no part in the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century.

Before the discovery of America and of trade routes to the east, the German cities of the Hanseatic League formed the strongest organization for international commerce. But geography and the retarded state of political development in Germany were factors against their success in competition with the merchants of countries better situated from a maritime point of view and more advanced politically. The Danish peninsula divided the coast of Germany and made a formidable, and generally hostile, barrier to egress from the communities. The Holy Roman Empire, which was the loose Germanic bond, did not include all Germans and was never interested in the future of the German people overseas. The empire lived on until 1806, and at the

peace settlements of 1814 and 1815 Prussia and Austria had no maritime interests to safeguard and no thought of the world beyond the confines of Europe.

Land-bound Russia could not take part in the discovery and development of world trade routes and colonies. Poland struggled unsuccessfully for existence, and, after having been cut off from the sea, disappeared at the end of the eighteenth century. Hungary's outlets to the sea were controlled by the Turks and the Italians. The Balkan States, which were incorporated in the Ottoman Empire during the century of the discovery of America, did not emerge from bondage until the nineteenth century. Belgium is a creation of the post-Napoleonic era.

From the beginning of the expansion of Europe to other continents, then, the way was open for the nations of western Europe bordering on the Atlantic. Geographical position had much to do with the ability of Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, and Holland to forge ahead of the other nations of Europe in their political unification. It had everything to do with their ability to follow exploration by colonization and to preëempt the extra-European world. In 1815 these five European countries of the Atlantic coast found their culture, their racial stock, and their political control well established in different parts of the world. The English, French, and Spanish spoke and spread their language and planted their political institutions in North America, the Spanish and Portuguese in South America, and the Dutch in South Africa. The Dutch, the French, and the English had footholds in Guiana in South America. All five were established in Africa. English, French, and Portuguese were in India, and Dutch in Ceylon. The Dutch had planted their flag in most of the East Indian islands, and the other four peoples were there too. The English had settled in Australia and Tasmania. It was a case of first come, first served.

But those who came first did not in every instance stay.

Among the five colonizing states there were wars, followed by changes of title, some of them of vital importance in their influence upon the history of the world. Spain and Portugal passed their zenith and became decadent before the discovery of steam power. Holland lost the mastery of the sea and her choicest colonies. France could not maintain herself against Great Britain in North America and India.

With the exception of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Florida, which Spain lost before the large movements of population from Europe to America, Spain and Portugal did not extend their dominions over regions situated in the temperate zone. Their colonies were countries to which Europeans could not transplant themselves without deterioration of stock. Instead of sending for women of their own race, Portuguese and Spaniards mixed their blood with natives, and later with negroes introduced from Africa. Spaniards and Portuguese went overseas, not to seek and establish homes in a new country, but to convert the heathen or carry away existing wealth. The Spanish gravitated to Mexico and Peru, the Portuguese to India and China and Japan, because they discovered in those countries ancient civilizations whose treasures of gold and precious stones, of silks and spices, they could seize and carry home. In the heyday of their power Spain and Portugal were represented in their colonial empires by missionaries and looters, not by colonists and traders. They had little to sell to the countries they controlled and no intention of settling them on a scale that would amount to a migration. Their acquisitions did not attract the British and French. The Portuguese were able to hold their colonies by infeodating themselves to the English from the beginning of the eighteenth century, a relationship that has not been disturbed in two hundred years.

With the exception of Louisiana, which passed from France to Spain, to France again, and finally to the United

States in 1803-04, Spain, although defeated in wars several times, managed to retain title to most of her colonies until they themselves began to break away from her.

Colonial rivalry among the other three nations was on a different basis. French, Dutch, and British staked out territories in the New World for the purpose of active colonization, and their claims overlapped. The Dutch picked out the best port on the American coast. The French, not content with Canada, attempted to extend their control over the hinterland of the North American continent from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, and included in their claims the tributaries of the Mississippi to their head-waters. By colonizing the Cape of Good Hope and by succeeding the Portuguese in Ceylon, the Dutch made a bid for control of the trade routes to the Far East and India. The French challenged the British in India.

From Louis XIV to Napoleon I, the wars by which Great Britain acquired all of France's colonial empire and a portion of Holland's arose from causes within Europe. The extension of these wars to other parts of the world was incidental,¹ and the colonial advance of Great Britain, marked by the successive treaties, can not be regarded as the fulfilment of plans and hopes of statesmen. Men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could not have realized what these gains were to mean to the British Empire. Exceptions to this general statement, however, may be taken in regard to the conquest of New Amsterdam in 1665, and to the fighting in India between the British and the French.

During the Napoleonic wars the British began to think of the advantages of a victorious peace in consolidating and

¹ The wars between the British and French in America were provoked and terminated by causes arising in Europe, with the exception of the final struggle that eliminated France from the Ohio Valley and Canada. The French and Indian War (1754-63) differed from King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1701-13), and King George's War (1744-48) in that the first fighting, and also the battles that decided the American issues of the war, occurred on American soil. However, the Seven Years' War, as it was known in Europe, powerfully influenced the fortunes of the fighting in America, and in a very real sense contributed to the disappearance of French power in America.

adding to the empire that was being built up throughout the world. The contemptuous reference of Napoleon to the British as "a nation of shopkeepers" proves that during the upheaval at the beginning of the nineteenth century considerations of world politics were entering into European diplomacy. World politics certainly influenced British naval and military activities, while continental European nations were devoting their undivided energies to keeping Napoleon in check. By the peace of Amiens, in 1802, Great Britain gave back to France and her allies a number of choice morsels that her enterprising naval officers and overseas expeditions had picked up, with the exception of Trinidad, ceded to her by Spain, and Ceylon, taken from Holland.

The battle of Trafalgar, in 1805, broke forever the sea power of France and Spain, and gave Great Britain a free hand, as far as these two countries were concerned, in the extra-European world. Never since that day have Spain and France been able to make effective resistance to the extension of British colonial power. The events of the last ten years of the Napoleonic régime played squarely into the hands of British colonial aspirations. Denmark and Holland were forced to ally themselves with France: so the British seized the Cape of Good Hope and the northern parts of Dutch Guiana permanently and destroyed the Danish fleet. Spain, although as unwilling an ally of France as other European states after 1808, suffered as much abroad as if she had been waging war voluntarily. Portugal saved her colonies by the flight of the royal family to Brazil, and by a refusal to submit to the French. The British naturally refrained from operations against African and Asiatic territories of the country that was a valuable and friendly base for them in the Peninsular War.

After the battle of Wagram, in 1809, Napoleon was at the height of his power in Europe. He was impotent, however, on sea; and in that one year Cayenne, Martinique, Senegal, and Santo Domingo were lost, and in the follow-

ing year Guadeloupe, Ile Bourbon, and Ile de France. In 1811 the British occupied Java.

During the Napoleonic wars the British greatly extended their dominions in India under Lord Cornwallis and Sir Arthur Wellesley (afterward Duke of Wellington). While the Congress of Vienna was debating, the British were fighting a war with the Ghurkas of Nepal, and the last Marhatta war took place in 1817-18. The beginning of Great Britain's west African empire was the elevation of Sierra Leone to the rank of crown colony in 1808, and the fighting with the French over Senegal and Gambia. After the settlements following the collapse of Napoleon, the British on the west coast founded Bathurst in 1816. When the British took the Cape of Good Hope they decided to get a foothold on the coast of South America opposite the Falkland Islands, where they had acquired title by agreement with Spain in 1771, but had never colonized. This would give them control of the passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, even as the Cape of Good Hope controlled the passage from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and Gibraltar dominated the strait leading from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean. An expedition from the Cape of Good Hope landed in the River Plata in June, 1806, and captured Buenos Aires. The inhabitants were required to swear allegiance to George III. The Spaniards demanded independence from all and any European sovereignty, and, when it was refused them, natives and Spaniards together revolted and compelled the British to surrender. Reinforcements arrived in 1807, took Montevideo by assault, and marched on Buenos Aires. Although the British had a large force and were well supported by the fleet, their generals lacked courage and resourcefulness. They got into a muddle and surrendered, promising to evacuate the territory of Buenos Aires and Montevideo as well. No new expedition was sent, and thus the opportunity was missed to gain in South America what had been gained in every other continent.

The transfers of title in the world outside of Europe from the middle of the seventeenth century to the end of the Napoleonic period came to be of great importance in the nineteenth century and influenced profoundly the relations among European nations from the act of Vienna (1815) to the treaty of Versailles (1919). We have not space to go into the details of the treaties of Breda (1667); Madrid (1670); Ryswick (1697); Utrecht (1713); Seville (1729); Vienna (1731); Aix-la-Chapelle (1748); Paris (1763); and Amiens (1802). But it must not be forgotten that in them we find the beginnings of world politics.

CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM AND STEAM POWER (1789-1848)

THE conception of racial or national supremacy, based upon cultural superiority and military and financial mastery, originated during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, and was developed during the period from 1815 to 1848, coincident with the birth of the sense of nationality in Europe and the introduction of steam power into industry and transportation.

There is wide difference of opinion among scholars as to the period in the development of nations when the phenomenon of national self-consciousness can first be discerned. Some historians go back in Spain to Ferdinand and Isabella; in England, to Henry VIII and Wolsey, to Elizabeth and the Spanish Armada, or to the fall of the house of Stuart; in France, to Joan of Arc and Charles VII, or Henri IV and the Guises; in Holland, to John of Barneveld; in Sweden, to Gustavus Vasa. It is generally agreed that national self-consciousness did not manifest itself in other peoples of Europe until after the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is difficult to admit, however, that a sense of nationality was in more than an embryonic state in any country before the people gained the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship. In Great Britain, as elsewhere, the realization of the responsibilities and the appreciation of the privileges of belonging to this or that political group or organization began to dawn upon the common people between 1789 and 1815, and became a part of their being between 1815 and 1848.

Before the French Revolution, international conflicts did not greatly affect the lives and fortunes of peoples

except in the localities that were the fields of battle. Even where the fighting took place, destruction was comparatively slight. The armies were small, and composed of professional soldiers. Tax levies for armaments were not so heavy as for the whims and pleasures of some dissolute monarchs. There was not the universal sacrifice involved in obligatory military service. The people were, on the whole, indifferent to the stakes of war. Victory or defeat meant so little that we frequently find nations that were enemies one year allied the next. In the century and a half preceding the French Revolution, friends changed to foes and foes to friends so often that it is difficult to keep track of the alliances. The wars were not wars of peoples, nor for objects that combatants and tax-payers understood and that they kept before their eyes as incentives and compensations for the effort they were making. Proof of this is supplied by contemporary literature. Bitterness of nation against nation, such as we are familiar with to-day, and concern for victory and for advantageous terms of peace, are lacking in chroniclers of current events from Pepys to Arthur Young.

A German king who could speak no English was called to the British throne, and he and his successors retained their kingdom in Germany. The effort made by Great Britain in the American Revolution seems now to have been greatly inferior to her resources, as does the effort of France to defend Canada in the previous war. Hessian mercenaries fought for the British in America, and there was little or no compunction in their use. Spain, France, and Great Britain did not employ their sea power to make the Mediterranean safe for their nationals against the pirates of the north African coast. The inhabitants of the Mediterranean littoral of France never expected their king to avenge the raids of the Moors. The old French nobility put personal and class interest above national feeling to the extent of leading foreign armies into their country.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man, promulgated at Paris on August 27, 1789, was the beginning of a new epoch in European history. The pendulum swung to the left and then as far to the right, reaction following anarchy. But the principles of the Revolution were written into the heart of Europe. In every European country democratic evolution took the form of national self-consciousness. France led the way. When the newly won liberties of the people were threatened, foreigners became national enemies. Defense of country was defense of liberty. The battles of Valmy and Jemmapes, in 1792, were, on the French side, battles of the French people, who fought to keep something precious, and were conscious of so fighting. During the next twenty years Europe was transformed. Wherever Napoleon went with his armies he appealed to peoples against their masters. By proclamations and emissaries, he sought to capitalize the political and economic situation in the countries of his enemies, with a view to weakening their resistance to his armies. He told subject races that the hour of emancipation from alien rule had struck and admonished peasants in economic servitude that the moment was favorable to rise up against their oppressors. Some states were forced quite against their interests into an alliance with France. For a time Napoleon fished successfully in troubled waters. Then his doctrines were turned against himself. The teaching was accepted, but not the teacher. The spirit of the France of the Revolution, communicated by French invaders to other peoples, brought about the downfall of the France of the First Empire. The battle of Leipzig, in 1813, by which the Sixth Coalition drove Napoleon back into France, was won by young Germans who reacted to and gained strength from the new nationalism, even as had the French at Valmy and Jemmapes.

Statesmen become accustomed to the sense of power. Almost invariably the leaders of nations lose in the course of time the instinct of guiding with the current of events,

which is what gives them their high position. When they think that they make the current, and that they are able to have things as they want them, the mantle passes from their shoulders. The sense of failure that usually comes to a man who has given his life to public service is attributed by himself and by his admirers to the fickleness of the people. The reason, however, is that the leader stops leading. He is afraid to follow his vision to the end. He wants to consolidate his position. He becomes an advocate of the *status quo*, or even tries to set back the hands of the clock. This was the state of mind of the men who drew up the act of Vienna in 1815. Having forced France to return to her frontiers of pre-Napoleonic days, and having bargained with one another for the spoils of victory, they decided to combine their military resources in an effort to prevent the peace of the world from being again disturbed. Frontiers were to remain as they had fixed them, and peoples were not to be allowed to change their rulers and political institutions. What the French had done during the Revolution and under Napoleon was an example of the danger to the peace of the world arising from subversive doctrines and the overthrow of existing forms of government.

In their consideration of international relations the statesmen at Vienna refused to go beneath the surface. In their minds, all that was necessary to establish an era of good understanding in Europe was common agreement among the larger states to preserve the *status quo*, territorially and politically. The larger states were to avoid falling out with one another by not having any more spoils to divide. If each state merely preserved its frontiers, the Vienna conception of the balance of power would be maintained. If weaker states were bolstered up and new political entities not countenanced, causes for conflict would be avoided.

The idea itself was not without merit. To have proposed and accepted the principles of conference and coöperation

among nations was a distinct step forward. The idea was denatured, however, by the limitation of its benefits to a favored class in a few favored nations. Its static basis, and the fact that Great Britain was already aware of the necessity of subordinating her continental policy to extra-European interests, made it impracticable. The Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria was expanded to include France when it was thought that the Bourbons were definitely reestablished on the French throne. Then five successive conferences were held, from 1818 to 1822, at Aix-la-Chapelle, Carlsbad, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, and unsuccessful attempts were made by the four powers to suppress, through joint military action, the democratic movements in Germany and Italy, to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to help Spain keep her colonies under control. Nationalism and democracy, however, working hand in hand and inseparable one from the other, were forces that could not be mastered by Metternich and his associates. They did not know how to use them. They were broken by them.

Nationalism, powerfully aided by the economic changes wrought by steam power, brought about the unification of Germany and Italy, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and the creation of the Latin American republics. With Europe as the point of departure and the chief beneficiary, the Aryan race reached out for world domination. For a hundred years the pickings were fat, and Europe multiplied and prospered. But at home the larger countries, gradually embittered against one another, in the struggle for world markets and raw materials, by the spirit of nationalism, drifted into the Armageddon of the World War.

In the decade before the French Revolution Watt and Boulton began the manufacture of steam-engines in Birmingham. Adoption of the new device for industry did not begin radically to affect production until steam power was

employed for transportation. The use of steam-driven ships began in the second decade, and of steam-engines on railways in the third decade, of the nineteenth century. Development was rapid. Between 1830 and 1840 railways became an important factor in the economic life of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the United States. France began to subsidize railway construction in 1842, Austria in 1838, Prussia and Spain in 1848, Russia in 1850, and Portugal in 1853. In south Germany, Italy, and Hungary, railway development was slow, owing to the smallness of the states. When it was realized that economic prosperity was dependent upon railway construction, and that railway construction would not advance without political unity, the unification of Germany and Italy was assured. The development of railways in Europe between 1825 and 1850 made possible the rise of industry on a large scale. For the railways brought coal and raw materials and distributed manufactured articles. Industrial workers were able to concentrate and form large centers of population; for railways transported them to their work, and carried food-stuffs to them. Steamships brought the outlying world into touch with Europe, as railways brought the countries of Europe into touch one with another.

Coal and iron became, during the period from 1815 to 1848, the greatest sources of wealth and military power. The science of war was transformed as industry and commerce were transformed. And as the two considerations underlying a nation's foreign policy are security and prosperity, statesmen had to begin to think in terms of coal and iron, of mines and factories, of railways and ships, of centers of population and coaling stations, of foreign markets and raw materials and food-stuffs. International relations had to be adapted to the new problems of world-wide contacts. Men could be taught that security and prosperity were one and the same thing, and that aggression was no longer to be defined in terms of invasion of the territory

of one's country or other physical violence, but of attack upon rights and privileges secured in any part of the world.

Expansion of the franchise, which gave the mass of the people a voice in government, made it necessary to heed public opinion. It was from these unfranchised groups who labored with steam power that the most insistent demands for suffrage came, and the earliest manifestations of public intelligence among working-men were in the factory towns. The cost of armaments and the payment of war bills had to be justified. Equally important, a willingness to fight had to be inculcated in the people. This was done by propaganda, carried on variously through the schools and newspapers. A new nineteenth-century interpretation had to be given to *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*. In the new game of world politics hereditary enemies might be allies, and dying for one's country was to be done mostly far from home. Pride and national honor were brought to the front in the teaching of patriotism. Ideals of civilization, "bearing the white man's burden," were emphasized.

But if one goes through the arguments advanced in parliamentary assemblies to win support for strong foreign policies and for military and naval expenditures, it will be seen that statesmen of the era of world politics rely largely on the fear and cupidity of their fellow citizens. We must defend this or that which we have; we must anticipate others seizing this or that; we must aid this or that country to be free, and forbid this or that country to shake off the yoke of its oppressor; we must join forces with this or that group of powers; we must extend our sovereignty or sphere of influence here or there—even though we have no direct cause for occupying this or that territory or for fighting this or that nation. Why? Because if we do not we shall be attacked, we shall lose our prestige or some possession or exclusive interest, and as a result our national security

will be jeopardized, and not only will our world markets not be increased, but we shall end by being done out of them altogether. Thus during the nineteenth century did statesmen argue, and thus arose distrust and enmity among nations, not in the old form of hatred and fighting confined to a few people, but as an entirely new sort of animosity, nations standing against nations. Looking back over the wars of the nineteenth century, we often find nations fighting, and hatred engendered, over questions in which only investors and developers and traders had a direct interest.

During the period under survey the changes in industry, transportation, and armaments were still in their infancy. The analysis just given may, therefore, seem an anticipation of conditions in the period from 1848 to 1918. But it is not. We do not need to come down beyond the generation immediately following the Congress of Vienna to find the spirit of nationalism, full-fledged, at work in international relations. Our illustrations are: the movement for independence in Latin America; the intervention of France in northern Africa; the Greek War of Liberation; and Mehemet Ali's secession from the Ottoman Empire.

When Napoleon invaded Spain, expelled the royal family, and put his brother Joseph on the throne, the Spanish colonies in America found the opportunity that many of them had long been looking for to follow the example of the United States. In 1810 Chile, Uruguay, Colombia (which then included Ecuador and Venezuela), Buenos Aires (Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia), and Mexico revolted. Peru followed in 1811. In 1813 Bolivar broke the Spanish power in South America by driving the Spaniards from Caracas, and Mexico declared her independence. These changes were not recognized by Europe, and after the restorations of 1814-15 the Holy Alliance proposed to force the colonies to return to the Spanish allegiance. How to accomplish this was debated at successive conferences, and in 1822 the

Congress of Verona decided upon joint measures, which were to be undertaken simultaneously with the invasion of Spain to restore Ferdinand VII, a mandate for which was given to France. Fortunately, Canning, who had just become head of the British Foreign Office, opposed the proposition to restore the American colonies to Spain. Without British consent an expedition was not feasible, and the plan was dropped. The difference of opinion between the continental powers and Great Britain enabled the United States to notify the nations of Europe that an attempt to extend the European system to any portion of the American hemisphere would be regarded as the "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." The weakness of Spain prevented her from winning back the colonies herself, although neither Great Britain nor the United States would have opposed her in doing so. The failure of the Verona program removed North and South America from the field of the extension of European eminent domain. It kept the United States out of world politics for more than seventy-five years. Had the members of the Holy Alliance gone to Central and South America to help Spain, they probably would have found pretexts for staying to help themselves.

For hundreds of years France did little or nothing to protect her ships and her nationals from the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean. It seems incredible that at the very time when Napoleon was going from triumph to triumph in Europe French ships were being captured within sight of the coast and occasional raids made on French soil by the inhabitants of the Mediterranean African coast. To put a stop to this and to embark anew upon France's career as a colonial power, the French entered Algeria in 1830, captured Algiers, and after seven years succeeded in taking Constantine. In 1844 they came to blows with Morocco. The beginning was made of a penetration of Africa, which in two generations brought France, at her

very door, sources of great and varied wealth, and led her by a devious route into an alliance with the country that had taken away her earlier colonial empire. The Algerian campaign had hardly been launched when the Bourbon dynasty fell. But Louis Philippe continued without interruption the colonial policy of Charles X. This showed that foreign policy was no longer a matter of dynasty, but had entered into the self-consciousness of the French people.

The Greek War of Liberation is the first chapter in a long series of attempts of the European powers, working in concert, to sacrifice the aspirations of the subject races of the Ottoman Empire to what the statesmen of these powers believed to be the particular interests of the countries they represented. When, in 1822, at the Congress of Verona, the Serbian and Greek revolts against Turkey were discussed, it was decided that diminution of Ottoman sovereignty could not be tolerated, owing to the unwillingness of any power to let any other power get control of emancipated territories. The prizes that might fall into some one's possession were so valuable that all thought it preferable to maintain the *status quo* of Turkish rule, however disgraceful and oppressive, rather than risk letting another win them.

The Serbians revolted first, in 1804, and, although they suffered from blood feuds among their leaders, and were not recognized at Vienna, Milosh Obrenovitch (successor, by assassination, of the original hero of the revolution) secured from the sultan the title of prince and partial recognition of Serbian autonomy in 1820. Because Russia backed the Serbians, Austria and the other powers opposed their pretensions. The next year the Greek insurrection broke out and spread from the Adriatic to the Ægean. For six years the Greeks fought heroically and successfully held off the Turks. Despite massacres that stirred the indignation and won the sympathy of cultured Europeans,

French and British statesmen stood out against intervention. They feared what they had feared in regard to Serbia. Serbians and Greeks belonged to the Orthodox Church, and Russia was suspected of using the national movements to extend her political influence to the Mediterranean.

Finally, when Russia declared that she would have to intervene, Great Britain and France joined to make the impairment of Ottoman integrity as slight as possible and to prevent the Russians from posing as liberators. The Turko-Egyptian fleet was destroyed by the French, British, and Russians at Navarino; when the Russians declared war against Turkey, the French sent troops to the Peloponnesus; and when Turkey yielded, her loss of territory was made as little as possible. Thessaly, Epirus, and the islands of the *Ægean*, which had given most and suffered most for the cause of independence, were left under the Turkish yoke. The kingdom of Greece was constituted under the joint protection of Russia, France, and Great Britain. The Ionian Islands had been given to Great Britain by the Congress of Vienna, and it was felt that from this vantage-point Russia could be prevented from exercising undue influence over the tip of the Balkan peninsula.

The Occidental powers and Austria were quickly confronted with a new attack upon the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Ali, an Albanian adventurer who had made himself master of Egypt after the Napoleonic invasion, gave powerful aid to Turkey in the Greek War of Liberation. After the disaster of Navarino he rebuilt the Egyptian fleet, and, dissatisfied because the sultan did not reward or properly recognize his services, he sent his brilliant son, Ibrahim Pasha, to conquer Syria. In the winter of 1831-32 Ibrahim Pasha conquered Syria, and then suddenly occupied Damascus and marched into Asia Minor. He won three battles, the last of them at Konia, north of the Taurus

Mountains, and the road to Constantinople was open. His fleet, coöperating in the Mediterranean, drove the Turks back to the Dardanelles. The Russians intervened to save Turkey, and announced their intention of sending a fleet and an army to protect Constantinople. To prevent this, the French and British also intervened, and peace was made in 1833, Turkey ceding Syria and Cilicia to Mehemet Ali for life and granting him the hereditary rulership of Egypt.

In 1839 the Turks tried to oust Mehemet Ali from Syria, and were defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Nisib. The Turkish fleet went over to the Egyptians. Mehemet Ali, supported by France, demanded of the sultan hereditary possession of all the lands under his military control. The British, suspecting France of aiming at the control of Egypt and Syria, formed an alliance with Austria, Prussia, and Russia to defend Turkey. French public opinion clamored for war. Had France been strong enough to fight, she would have done so. For the sake of peace, Thiers, who had been conducting French policy, was forced to retire and was succeeded by Guizot. Going ahead without the French, the British, Austrians, and Turks took Acre and forced Ibrahim Pasha to retire to Egypt. Mehemet Ali lost Syria and Cilicia, but was compensated in the treaty of London, which recognized the autonomy of Egypt and the rulership of the country in the line of Mehemet Ali.

The French were mollified by the return of Napoleon's body from St. Helena. The reburial in the Hôtel des Invalides was the occasion of a remarkable demonstration. The effervescence over the Egyptian dispute and the hero-worship of Napoleon showed that the French had forgotten 1814 and 1815 and were ready to build for the future upon the memory of former glories. Then they had thought of Europe; now they were thinking of the great world. Napoleon had gone to Egypt and Syria in sailing-vessels, and

the rich commercial advantage of French influence in the Near East had not then been apparent. But in 1840, with railways and steamships, with factories and coal and iron, the French began to see what was in store for the nation with a world vision. Power would bring wealth. But other European nations thought as France did. They, too, were striving for power.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF WORLD POWERS (1848-1878)

AT Paris in January, 1919, plenipotentiaries of twenty-seven states gathered to decide upon conditions of peace to be imposed upon Germany and the allies of Germany. In preliminary private conferences the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, without so much as "by your leave," organized the work of drafting the treaties in such a way as to exclude the other states from any real voice in the deliberations. "**The Principal Allied and Associated Powers** with general interests" allotted themselves two members each on every committee and on the Council, which was to be the final court of decision. "The Secondary Powers with particular interests" were granted no representation on the Council, and were told that they would have to designate five members—to represent them all together—on the committees. Despite vehement protest and sulking, this plan was carried through. The great powers had won the war and would be responsible for enforcing the peace. Therefore, it was argued, they must keep in their hands the right to decide upon the terms of the treaties and the right to interpret them afterwards.

This was not a new idea. It followed the tradition and practice of nineteenth-century diplomacy, begun at the Congress of Vienna and developed at the congresses of Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878). The only change was the exclusion of Germany and Russia and the inclusion of the United States and Japan. Because of the size of their armies and navies, and their success in using them, certain nations have long assumed the privilege of settling ques-



tions arising from war according to their own interests and at the expense alike of defeated nations, of weaker allied nations, and of neutrals. During the hundred years between the Napoleonic wars and the World War, this privilege had been gradually extended to cover every question affecting the general welfare of mankind. The world powers were alone capable of waging war; hence the peace of the world could be maintained only through agreement among themselves. The aim of diplomacy was to satisfy the world powers; the destinies of other nations and races, their liberty, their security, their prosperity, their general well-being, were subordinated to the policies and ambitions of the world powers.

The defect in the scheme lay in the inability of the world powers to satisfy one another. They fell out singly, and then sought to form combinations. From coalitions made for particular wars and terminating automatically when peace was signed, they were led into alliances contracted in time of peace to protect and advance their interests in different parts of the world. New causes for friction arose, which had little or nothing to do with the normal relations between nations.

Before 1848 the chief concern of the powers, in their relations with one another, was the preservation of the *status quo* of the act of Vienna. Monarchs and statesmen were afraid that the democratic movement, if successful in other countries, would react upon the internal situation in their own country. Neither Russia nor Austria could see new states born of the revival of subject races without feeling that the precedents shook the foundations of their own power. The breaking away of Belgium from Holland in 1830 was more than a breach of the act of Vienna. It gave hope to the partitioned Poles, and encouraged the fermentation in the Italian and Balkan peninsulas. The separatist movement in Hungary reacted almost as dangerously upon Russia as upon Austria. But after the failure of the revolu-

tions of 1848 the powers began to realize that their chief danger was from the intrigues of neighboring powers. Revolutionary movements could hardly be successful unless encouraged and supported by an interested outsider. Separatism was doomed to impotence if the nations affected were allowed a free hand to suppress it. The aid given by Russia to Austria against Hungary in 1849 was the last attempt to attain what the Holy Alliance called its main object, *i. e.*, international coöperation against subversive internal political movements.

The revolutions of 1848 were weathered everywhere in Europe except in France, where the Orléans dynasty fell and a republic succeeded in establishing effective administrative control. The French republicans, however, realized that the national interest required continuing the foreign policy of the ousted régime. Principles and ideals, in the industrial era that was just dawning, could not be subordinated to quixotic sympathy with peoples struggling for the same principles and ideals in another country. Accordingly an army was despatched to Italy, which put an end to Garibaldi's Roman republic in the late spring and early summer of 1849. It was the same test as that of 1830. The ministers of Louis Philippe did not interrupt the expedition begun by the ministers of Charles X in Algeria. Moreover, although they were in power because of a revolution undertaken in the name of liberty, they resisted every effort of generous-minded men to have France intervene in favor of the Poles. The famous response to a question asked in the Chamber of Deputies about Poland, "Order reigns in Warsaw," has never been forgotten. Convinced of the necessity of a foreign policy based on *national interest*, the French people thereafter allowed no internal disturbances or changes in government to affect the ministry of foreign affairs. Imperial or republican, clerical or anti-clerical, idealist or realist, the governments of France since 1848 have made moves and taken positions

in international politics with one purpose, to protect and increase what were believed to be the commercial interests of France abroad.

This new attitude, which is the inciting motive in world politics, entered into the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848 in Germany. The preliminary parliament in Frankfort decided to call a national German assembly for the purpose of making a constitution for a new German Empire. The troops of the German Confederation were loyal to the principle of unity. We can not understand the involved struggle in the German states, and the influences at work in the parliaments of Erfurt and Frankfort in 1850, by the sole factor of the rivalry of Prussia and Austria for hegemony. Nor can we consider the failure of the revolutionists, most of whom emigrated to the United States, as due to the single cause to which they attributed it. The triumph of reaction was temporary. The great mass of the German people did not abandon the revolution and frown upon republicanism merely because of an inherent conservatism. The new industrialism, and the vistas of opportunity opened up by the development of railroads and ocean commerce, made the Germans think of unity as the *summum bonum*. It is the commonly accepted idea that in the generation following the Revolution of 1848 a ruthless Prussia, under the direction of Bismarck, stamped out her own liberties and those of her neighbors for the glorification of a dynasty and a caste. But this does not take into account the irresistible economic current that influenced the political evolution of central Europe during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.

Unless the Germanic peoples were willing to see themselves doomed to permanent inferiority in the new Europe, they too had to unite and become a world power. Railroad construction required capital and continuity. There must be free access to coal and iron, common protection against foreign goods for the development of industries, and a

united effort to bring into the country raw materials, and to find, all over the world, markets for manufactured articles. The Germans, the peoples of the Danube, and the Italians were faced with entirely new economic conditions in the struggle for existence. There was no alternative to the formation of large political organisms.

The unification of Germany and Italy and the reorganization of the Hapsburg dominions in a dual monarchy were events beyond the power of statesmen to cause or prevent, or even greatly to control. While it is far from our intention to attribute the unifying processes in the three central European countries to conscious world policy, it is none the less true that when European powers became world powers it was inevitable that there should be a Germany, an Italy, and an Austria-Hungary. Although it is doubtful whether statesmen or people appreciated the full extent of their handicap in a world so completely transformed since 1815, they did appreciate the handicap of lack of unity upon the development of industry and transportation facilities within their own borders and with neighbors of the same blood, language, and culture. In the process of erecting political organisms that would enable the peoples of central Europe to hold their own with those of western and eastern Europe in the new era of extra-European expansion, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and Italians fought one another with the aid of the already unified powers. And during the same period the inhabitants of the United States were engaged in a deadly civil war for the same purpose of unification. The conflict between states' rights and federalism came to a head in the New World, in South America as well as in North America, during the decade when the Old World was successfully forming centralized states. The same struggle for centralization was going on contemporaneously in Japan.

Great Britain, France, and Russia were ready to meet the new conditions, and their rise as world powers was not

marked by internal or external convulsions. They were ahead of the other nations, and this advantage they kept. Ultimately they formed a natural alliance to defend against the later claimants the privileged position won through their geographical position and their earlier achievement of political unity.

The significant events in the preparation of the other great states to rise to world power may be briefly reviewed.

The German Empire was created through the activities of Prussia, who took these successive steps: (1) foundation, in 1828 and 1833, of the German customs union (*Zollverein*), which Prussia had been advocating since 1818; (2) reestablishment of the German Confederation of 1815 at Dresden in 1851; (3) war, along with Austria, against Denmark, resulting in the termination of Denmark's rights over Schleswig and Holstein in 1864; (4) alliance with the smaller north German states and Italy against Austria and the south German states, which were defeated in the war of 1866; (5) expulsion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation, followed by the incorporation of some small German territories in Prussia; (6) establishment, under Prussian leadership, of the North German Confederation, including all except four south German states; (7) war, with the aid of these south German states, against France, resulting in the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine and the creation of the German Empire in 1871.

Italy was created through the expansion of the kingdom of Sardinia and the unofficial activities (sometimes disavowed) of the revolutionist Garibaldi, involving these successive steps: (1) Sardinia, with France, fought Austria and annexed Lombardy in 1859, paying France by giving up Savoy and Nice; (2) Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, expelling their rulers, united with Sardinia in 1860; (3) Garibaldi invaded Sicily, passed to the mainland, and overthrew the kingdom of Naples, which voted to join the kingdom of Sardinia, also in 1860; (4) the kingdom of Italy

was proclaimed at Turin on March 17, 1861; (5) Italy, with Prussia, fought Austria, and won Venetia by the peace settlement in 1866; (6) the Italian government seized Rome and the papal states in 1870, when the defeat of France by Germany forced the withdrawal of French troops which had been protecting the temporal power of the papacy during all the progress of Italian unification.

Austria-Hungary was created through the expulsion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in the war of 1866. Austria had been greatly weakened by the revolutions in Bohemia, Hungary, and her Italian possessions. The Hungarian revolution was crushed with the help of Russia in 1849, but Lombardy and Venetia were lost in the wars of 1859 and 1866. When Austria lost her position in the Germanic Confederation, she was no longer strong enough to cope with the different nationalities of the Hapsburg empire. Consequently the German element had to choose between the dwindling of the empire and division of power with other races. In 1867 a compromise was made with the Hungarians, by which the empire was changed into a dual monarchy. Hungary and Austria henceforth had the same ruler, but were largely independent of each other in internal affairs. The two equal partners, in turn, were left to make what compromises or arrangements they saw fit with other racial elements within their borders. The Austrians oppressed the Czechs and Italians, but gave virtual autonomy to the Poles, abandoning to them the Ruthenians (Ukrainians). The Hungarians granted a separate diet to the Croats at Agram, but held down the Rumanians. This unique political organism could not be called a nation in the sense that Germany and Italy were nations. Its political existence seemed dependent upon the strength of Germany and the weakness of the Balkan States. But, although torn by nationalist movements, which each decade became more threatening, the polyglot dual monarchy managed to survive because of common

economic interests and the advantage to the various peoples of belonging to a strong political organism able to face the competition of other world powers and to provide industrial and transportation necessities.

When she won her independence from Great Britain, the United States was a small country along the Atlantic coast, containing less than three million population. From the point of view of political unity and of development of national sentiment, the new republic was fortunate in its cultural and linguistic unity. The earlier immigration was mostly English-speaking, and the non-British portion was of the same north European stock as the original settlers. There were no serious problems of racial and religious antagonism. But the Union was formed on the basis of a voluntary confederation of states that had retained their boundaries and had surrendered only part of their governing powers to the federal government. Chiefly because of the slavery question the states of the North and the South gradually drifted apart. Because it was not profitable, slavery disappeared in the North. In the South it seemed indispensable to agricultural development. As the country grew by penetration and settlement westward, and new states were added, in most of which the holding of slaves was against public sentiment, the South fell more and more into the minority in the confederation. Fearing being overwhelmed and being deprived of their slaves, eleven of the Southern States attempted to secede from the Union. The Northern States denied the alleged right of secession, and a war of four years followed. Great Britain and France sympathized with the South, but did not intervene. The North won, and the unity and perpetuity of the United States were finally assured in 1865.

Japan was opened to foreign intercourse and trade by the intervention of the United States. From 1854 to 1858 the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia succeeded in negotiating treaties of commerce with the "sho-

gun," whom the powers presumed to be the ruler of Japan. He was indeed the holder of secular authority, but the shogunate was a usurped position, in the hands of feudal lords. It had been held by one family for more than two hundred and fifty years, and other feudal families, who were dissatisfied, took advantage of the resentment against the shogun aroused by his yielding to foreigners to conspire against him. The result of the ratification of treaties extorted by the foreign powers was the resignation of the last shogun in 1867, and the resumption of government by the lawful sovereign, the mikado, in 1868. Civil war followed, in which the imperialists were successful. In 1871 feudalism was abolished, and Japan started upon a united political life. National self-consciousness was born of the instinct of self-preservation, and Japan began to imitate Occidental civilization in order to become a world power.

While the Germans and Italians were accomplishing their unification, and the Austrians and Hungarians were wrestling with the problem of forming a state, capable of maintaining itself as an equal among the world powers, in which the majority of the population was of other races, Great Britain, France, and Russia laid the foundations of their political influence, according to the new conception of that term, in the Far East and the Near East.

Great Britain began the policy, followed later by the other powers, of compelling China to cede territory and commercial privileges by force of arms. In 1834 Emperor Taukwang, alarmed at the evil effects of opium introduced into China by British traders from India, attempted to revive an edict prohibiting the opium trade. The moment was opportune, and no international agreement was violated, for the exclusive privilege of the East India Company had just expired. But the trade had become too profitable to lose. After several years of negotiations, the British declared war on China. The immediate cause was the refusal of the Chinese government to reimburse British

merchants for the destruction of more than twenty thousand chests of opium landed on Chinese soil in defiance of the prohibition. Great Britain demanded also that the imperial edict be revoked and that trade be continued and protected. In 1842 China was compelled to sign the treaty of Nanking, by which the island of Hong-Kong was ceded to Great Britain; five ports were opened to British trade; and an indemnity was exacted. A supplementary treaty, signed the next year, established the five per cent. *ad valorem* tariff, and forced China to admit the principle of extraterritoriality.

In 1844 the United States and France succeeded also in making commercial treaties with the unwilling Chinese. There was a scramble for trade, into which Russia, beginning to penetrate from Siberia, entered. In 1856 a small Chinese sailing-vessel, owned by a Chinese but flying the British flag, was boarded by Chinese officers hunting for pirates. Some of the crew were arrested and the flag was pulled down. This incident led to a new declaration of war by Great Britain against China, in which France joined. The Chinese fleet was destroyed in May, 1857, and Canton was captured at the end of the year. Therefore, in 1858, the Chinese signed treaties with Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, promising a measure of protection to traders and ships, which the authority of the Peking government was unable to assure. By the treaties of Tientsin in June, 1858, the number of treaty ports was increased, French sovereignty in Indo-China was recognized, and the Amur Province was ceded to Russia. When a British ambassador attempted to go to Peking in 1859, and was fired at, Great Britain and France renewed the war, marched on Peking, burned the Summer Palace, and made the Chinese ratify the treaty of Tientsin, agree to tolerate Christianity, pay an indemnity, and receive resident ambassadors at Peking. In the meantime, in 1858, to avenge the death of a missionary, the French declared

war against the king of Anam. Saigon was occupied, and Anam became French.

While Great Britain and France were fighting China, Russia succeeded in getting title to the territory north of the Amur, and when the treaties were amplified at Peking in 1860 the Russian minister, posing as the savior of China, persuaded the Chinese government to cede the maritime province, east of the Usuri River, in which Russia had already established certain "rights." In 1871 Russia began anew her encroachment upon China by announcing that she had annexed the province of Kulja in the interior "until the Chinese power should be reëstablished in that region." Eventually China ceded most of Kulja to Russia, and paid an indemnity to boot. China has not been free from foreign occupation and exploitation since her first acquaintance with Occidental civilization.

The beginnings in Japan were the same. But the Japanese reacted in a different way from the Chinese. An American fleet first opened Japan to foreign commerce in 1853.¹ The French, British, and Russians made commercial treaties in 1854 and 1855, following closely the treaty between Japan and the United States. These were broadened in 1858 to secure unrestricted commerce. In 1862 the British avenged the death of an Englishman in a brawl by bombarding Kagoshima and exacting an indemnity. In 1863 American, Dutch, and French vessels anchored in a forbidden spot at Shimonoseki. After due warning they were fired upon. This resulted in a reprisal bombardment, followed by negotiations for an indemnity. The next year Great Britain joined the United States, France, and Holland in a second bombardment, and aided in collecting a large indemnity. After twenty years, the House of Representatives, recognizing the shamefulness of the proceeding,

¹ This is the commonly accepted date, but in reality it is more correct to say that Japan began her international commercial relations as a result of the second visit of the American fleet in 1854.

returned the American portion of the indemnity to Japan. But, as we have seen, during this period the mikado was regaining his power and uniting his people around the throne. Japan rapidly became too strong to be exploited.

In the Near East the rise of world powers was marked by three wars of Russia against Turkey, in 1828, 1854, and 1877, each occasioned by the announced intention of Russia to free from Ottoman rule the Christian races subject to Turkey. The other powers, especially Great Britain, suspected Russia each time of wanting to destroy the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of gaining an outlet to the Mediterranean and becoming the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean and Persia. Both of these objects were considered by Great Britain a menace to her naval power and to India.

Of the first war we have already spoken. To prevent Russia from obtaining control of Constantinople, Great Britain and France joined with her in compelling the Turks to recognize the independence of Greece, and thus became co-guarantors with Russia of the Greek kingdom. This was accomplished at the Conference of London in 1830, which modified the terms of the treaty of Adrianople, concluded between Russia and Turkey in the previous year. In addition, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, on the Danube, were made autonomous. We have also spoken of the intervention of the powers in 1840 to prevent Mehemet Ali from detaching from the sultan the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1853 Czar Nicholas I, assigning misgovernment and persecution as the grounds for his action, demanded of the Sublime Porte that the right be granted to Russia to protect the Christians of the Greek Church in the Turkish empire. In private conversation with the British ambassador at Petrograd, the czar admitted that his object was to make Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and the Danubian principalities independent states under Russian protection. This, he

thought, would require a provisional occupation of Constantinople by a Russian army; and he intimated that Russia would not oppose the acquisition of Crete and Egypt by Great Britain. Since Napoleon III had recently come to the throne of France, and was presumably unacceptable to the British, he believed that an alliance between France and Great Britain was impossible, while Austria owed her salvation to Russia for the intervention against the Hungarian revolutionists four years earlier.

Nicholas, whose country had been the least affected in all Europe by the economic changes since his succession to the throne in 1825, did not realize how public opinion in other countries (there was little in his own) was beginning to mix business with sentiment. Neither Austrians nor Italians, although sworn enemies, could afford to allow Russia to ensconce herself in the Balkans and come down to the Adriatic. Prussia, building up the German customs union (*Zollverein*) and looking forward to the new possibilities of trade routes to the east by railway and steam transportation on the Danube, wanted no Slavic barrier between central Europe and the East. France was the traditional protector of the Catholic Christians of the Ottoman Empire, who predominated in Syria, and considered herself the custodian of the holy places in Palestine. The French had dreams also of silk and cotton and other riches in Cilicia, Syria, and Egypt. Napoleon III needed a war to establish his dynasty and to enable France to throw off the consequences of the treaties of 1814 and 1815; while Lord Palmerston made Queen Victoria see that prejudice should not stand in the way of receiving the nephew of Bonaparte and his plebeian bride.

When the Russians occupied the Danubian principalities Great Britain and France sent a fleet to the Bosphorus. After months of vain parley, the two powers declared war upon Russia, allying themselves with Turkey in March,

1854. Prussia and Austria declared that the passage of the Balkans by Russia would be considered an act of war. Nicholas withdrew his troops from the Danube, but the French and British, with several regiments of Turks, landed a large expedition in the Crimea. Prussia and Austria stationed armies on the frontier of Russia in an attitude of watchful neutrality. Cavour, prime minister of Sardinia, persuaded Victor Emmanuel I to join the alliance and send fifteen thousand men to take part in the siege of Sebastopol. After a year of costly fighting, the Crimean War ended with Russia suing for peace. Nicholas I died in 1855, and was succeeded by Alexander II.

Since it was recognized that all the powers had an interest in the Near Eastern settlement, it was agreed to make the treaty with Russia the work of an international conference, which would decide moot questions of international relations that had arisen since the Congress of Vienna. The Congress of Paris met on February 25, 1856, and included the plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, Russia, Sardinia, Austria, Prussia, and Turkey. It was the first appearance of Sardinia at the council table among the great powers. Nor had Turkey ever before been invited to sit with the European powers.

The peace of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856, restored the fortress of Kars, on the frontier of Armenia, to Turkey, and the Crimea to Russia; southern Bessarabia, the outlet of the Danube, was ceded by Russia to Moldavia, which, with Wallachia, received autonomy under the guaranty of the powers; the autonomy of Serbia was recognized; the Black Sea was neutralized, even to the war-ships and fortifications of the countries on its littoral; an international commission was created to control navigation of the Danube; and the Ottoman Empire was admitted "to participate in the public law and concert of Europe," the powers engaging collectively to guarantee "the indepen-

dence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire," and the sultan to ameliorate the condition of his subjects "without distinction of race or creed."

In three conventions annexed to the main treaty, Great Britain, France, and Russia agreed upon the neutrality of the Aland Islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, in peace and war; the six powers and the sultan reaffirmed the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire closing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to foreign ships of war, unless Turkey herself should be at war; and Russia and Turkey specified the number and armament of coast-guard ships in the Black Sea.

Shortly after the peace of Paris was signed, the seven contracting nations proposed to the other nations of the world common adherence to new rules regarding maritime international law. The declaration of Paris, signed on April 16, 1856, was the outcome of this attempt to reach an understanding upon the principles that should regulate warfare on sea. Privateering was abolished; enemy goods on neutral vessels were not to be confiscated, unless contraband according to an agreed schedule; and a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective. The United States refused to sign the declaration because it did not also forbid the capture of private enemy vessels. But many nations signed before the end of 1856, and Japan in 1886. International jurists regard the declaration of Paris as an important step forward in the progress of the "family of nations." But historians must reluctantly note that it has been violated by the signatories whenever its observance has conflicted with their interests. In the study of world politics we shall often find treaties and international conventions breaking down when put to the test. On paper many advances in the law of nations, with a view to safeguarding private property and ameliorating the conditions under which wars are fought, seem to denote a gradual advance of civilization. In practice the agreements have not

stood in the way of the nation that believed it had the force to violate them. Seventy-five years of discussion, mostly quibbling, prove that the right or wrong in the interpretation of international law has been determined, not by jurists, but by the statesmen of powers victorious in war. Since the rise of world powers these powers have rarely allowed, in their relations either with one another or with neutrals or weaker states, treaty clauses and agreements to stand between them and policies they have believed it essential to follow in order to win wars.

The Crimean War had a profound influence upon the rise of the world powers. It was the first European war fought by the British after the House of Commons became, through the Reform Act of 1832, a body in which the growing business interests had adequate representation. The bloody sacrifices of the war awakened in England a widespread interest in foreign policy and a determination to defend and extend British possessions overseas. This was shown in the remarkable response of public opinion to the challenge of the Sepoy mutiny in India during the following year, and also to the stubbornness of China about granting tolerable trading conditions to Europeans in the same year. The British were willing to fight in India and China as they had fought in the Crimea. The Congress of Paris gave Napoleon III the prestige and power he had expected from his participation in the Crimean War and prepared French public opinion for intervention in Italy three years later. Prussia delayed joining the other powers in the Congress of Paris. She came in only when she was assured that her participation would not offend Russia and that her presence was necessary if she hoped to share in what one might call the by-products of the congress.

The treaty of Paris was a factor whose importance in hastening the unification of Italy and Germany should not be underestimated. The article neutralizing the Black Sea

was fatal to the security and prosperity of Russia. It was signed under duress, and the czar's government immediately laid plans to repudiate it. Austria and France had to be weakened so that they could not a second time work with Great Britain to prevent Russia's development as a world power. During the next fifteen years this was accomplished. Germany and Italy were the beneficiaries; Prussia was the instrument. From the Congress of Vienna to the Congress of Paris, Russian diplomacy had helped Austria keep the Italian states from uniting. After the Crimean War this policy was reversed. France in 1859 and Prussia in 1866 fought Austria and made possible the unification of Italy. Russia allowed Prussia to expel Austria from the German Confederation in 1866, and refused to intervene or to intercede when Prussia and the other German states conquered France in 1870. For the second time an Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing a Napoleon, who had crossed the path of Russia, driven from his throne.

When the Germans laid siege to Paris, Russia addressed to the powers a note denouncing the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris, and declared that the czar proposed to resume his "sovereign rights" in the Black Sea. Prussia said nothing. France was preoccupied. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary were loud in their protests. But, not being willing to fight without the aid of France and at least the assurance of the neutrality of Prussia, the British and Austrians contented themselves with insisting that a change in the treaty of Paris could be made only by international consent. On March 13, 1871, the treaty of London abrogated the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris; and Russia was once more able to begin to threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The attempt to limit the world activities of a great nation by forcing a one-sided treaty upon one world power by a coalition of other world powers had failed. The other pur-

pose of the treaty of Paris, *i. e.*, to prevent the emancipation of subject nationalities in the Ottoman Empire because their freedom might lead to conflicts between the powers for commercial supremacy in the Near East, failed also.

After the Congress of Paris, Moldavia and Wallachia voted the "union of the principalities in a single neutral and autonomous state, subject to the suzerainty of the sultan, and under the hereditary and constitutional government of a foreign prince." The powers answered that the principalities must remain separate, as provided in the treaty of Paris. Moldavia and Wallachia defied the powers, and constituted the principality of Rumania in January, 1859. A native nobleman was elected prince, but in 1866 was replaced by Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a cousin of the king of Prussia. The powers refused to recognize the new sovereign, just as they had refused to recognize the union itself. But they accepted the *fait accompli*, and fifty years later, when the World War broke out, this Hohenzollern was still on the Rumanian throne.

The reforms promised when Turkey was admitted into the family of European nations at Paris did not materialize. On the contrary, misrule and oppression increased, until the breaking-point was reached in 1875, when the Balkan peoples rose in revolt. Russia again wanted to intervene, and in 1876 secured the coöperation of Austria, Germany, France, and Italy. The demands for reform were presented in what is known as the Berlin Memorandum. The British not only refused to join in the memorandum, but sent their fleet to anchor at the Dardanelles. This both prevented common pressure upon Turkey and deterred the Russians from acting independently. Desperate and left to their own resources, Serbia and Montenegro declared war upon Turkey, in aid of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians already in revolt. The Bulgarians,

who had been completely submerged by the Turks for nearly five hundred years, rebelled. Terrible massacres followed. A year of diplomatic effort was fruitless. Russia, for the third time, went to the assistance of the Balkan Christians. Rumania joined Russia. Once more the Russians took Kars, and after a long delay at Plevna they crossed the Balkans and advanced to the gates of Constantinople. The British fleet passed the Dardanelles. Parliament made a large grant, and when the Russians dictated to the Turks a drastic treaty at San Stefano on March 3, 1878, freeing the Balkan peoples, Great Britain, backed by Austria, gave Russia the alternative of war or a revision of the treaty by a conference of the powers.

The treaty of San Stefano made Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania independent, and gave them additional territory; created an autonomous Bulgaria; and stipulated definite reforms for the protection of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians in Europe and the Armenians in Asia. Russia was ceded new territories in Transcaucasia, including the port of Batum. The boundaries provided for were far from perfect, and they did not satisfy any of the Balkan peoples. But the settlement was a distinct step forward in the emancipation of Christians from Mohammedan misrule. This, however, was a secondary consideration with the British and Austro-Hungarian statesmen, who were willing to let the Christians suffer rather than run the risk of seeing the Balkans pass under Russian influence. As at the time of the Crimean War, the British Parliament was ready to fight to check the advance of the world power of Russia where it would conflict with the world power of Great Britain. Disraeli, the British prime minister, put it thus:

“You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope. . . . The relations of England to Europe are not the same as they were in the days of Lord Chatham or Frederick the Great.

The Queen of England has become the Sovereign of the most powerful of Oriental States. On the other side of the globe there are now establishments belonging to her, teeming with wealth and population. . . . These are vast and novel elements in the distribution of power. . . . What our duty is at this critical moment is to maintain the Empire of England."

In 1856 Russia, defeated in war, had to go to Paris and allow the other powers to decide upon the solution of the Eastern question according to their interests. Victorious in war, Russia hardly fared better at the Congress of Berlin. Under the guidance of Bismarck, who presided over the congress, Germany chose to stand by Austria-Hungary rather than by Russia. Without German support, Russia could not resist the other powers. Hence, her only territorial gains, outside of getting back from Rumania the strip of Bessarabia that she had been forced to cede to Moldavia in 1856, were in Transcaucasia. Rumania was compensated by being given the Dobrudja, between the Danube and the Black Sea, at the expense of Bulgaria. The independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was recognized. Bulgaria, however, was put back under the Turks, and, further, while her autonomy was assured, an artificial division was made of the territories mostly inhabited by Bulgarians. Autonomous Bulgaria was given frontiers resting on the Balkans and the Danube. South of the Balkans, the province of Eastern Rumelia was constituted, with Philippopolis as its capital—an artificial creation, wholly separated from Bulgaria, but with a Christian governor named by the sultan. Bulgaria was cut off from the Ægean Sea, and the Bulgarians and Greeks of Macedonia were returned to Turkish rule, as were the Armenians of Asia Minor, without guaranties.

The treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13, 1878. France got nothing by it. To Italy it meant a check to the pan-Slav dream of expansion to the Adriatic. Austria was

allowed to occupy, under indefinite terms, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to keep a military garrison in the Sanjak of Novibazar. Germany asked for no tangible spoils, but laid the foundations for her later friendship with the Turks and for the *Drang nach Osten*. Great Britain once more blocked Russian designs upon the Ottoman Empire and prepared the way for the occupation of Egypt, which had become essential to the British Empire—from the world-politics point of view—since the Red Sea and the Mediterranean had been connected by railway and canal. By a separate agreement with Turkey (signed on June 4), of which the other powers at first knew nothing, England was “to occupy and administer” the island of Cyprus as long as Russia kept Kars and Batum. Since Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff had already arrived at an agreement concerning Kars and Batum, of which the Turks knew nothing, the Cyprus convention, while ostensibly concluded to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, was a step toward destroying it.

The Congress of Berlin made an honest effort to find a solution of the Near Eastern question that would avoid a general European war. It was accepted that no power could keep out of the scramble for Ottoman lands, should the empire break up. There was the same anxiety as at Paris in 1856 and at Vienna in 1815 to lessen as much as possible the disturbing effect of the creation of new states in the relations between the great powers. The suspicion of interestedness and of desire to secure exclusive political, and hence economic, advantages, which was manifested against Russia after the treaty of San Stefano, became the attitude of all the powers in regard to help rendered anywhere at any time by a single power to a smaller or weaker state. The duty of the statesman, as defined in the quotation of Disraeli given above, was to think of every political event and threatened change of the *status quo*, no matter where it occurred, in the light of the interests of his own

nation. In an age of steam power and world markets geographical position and propinquity no longer justified a claim of superior or special interests of a country in the solution of political problems such as, in other epochs of history, would not have been contested. At least, the expansion of a nation to adjacent territory would not, under the earlier conditions, have led to war or the threat of war on the part of far-off nations.

With the rise of world power the field of anxious and even aggressive diplomatic activities of European nations began to cover the world. And as population and industry, military strength and wealth, did not remain the exclusive prerogative of European nations, and as the European powers continued to rival and checkmate one another, the rise of world powers in Europe was followed, in the generation after the Congress of Berlin, by the rise of world powers in America and eastern Asia.

CHAPTER IV

FRENCH COLONIAL EXPANSION (1830-1900)

WHEN we compare the treaties of Paris (1814), Vienna (1815), and Frankfort (1871) with the treaty of Versailles (1919), we realize the difference the era of world politics has made in the aims of statesmanship. The industrial era has brought us to the point of seeking exclusive advantages for our own commercial interests at the expense of competitors; hence the victors in the twentieth-century war exclude the vanquished from every privilege, political or economic, outside their own country, not hesitating even to confiscate the private property of enemy nationalists. A century ago, although France before the fall of Napoleon had already lost most of her colonial empire, she was not despoiled of everything by the victorious allies. In America she was left St. Pierre and Miquelon, valuable for fishing off the banks of Newfoundland; Guadeloupe and Martinique in the West Indies; and a share of Guiana on the northeast coast of South America. Her five colonies in India, which had been occupied by the British since 1793, were handed back to her. She was allowed to keep the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean east of Madagascar, and was confirmed in her possession of the mouth of the Senegal River in west Africa.

From 1815 to 1870, with the notable exception of Algeria, the French made little effort to rebuild their colonial empire. Algeria was conquered between 1830 and 1847. In the last years of Louis Philippe they began to stake out claims in the South Sea islands, and they made a settlement for a naval port of call at the mouth of the Gabun River

in Africa in 1845. Under Napoleon III the pacification of Algeria was continued, and contact began with the Moorish tribes. There was some activity also in Senegal, and on the coast of Somaliland Obok was purchased in 1862 as a check to the British occupation of Perim. The most important colonial achievement of Napoleon III was the foundation laid for the creation of Indo-China by intervention in Cochin-China in 1861 and in Cambodia in 1862. The extra-European activities of France before the disastrous war with Prussia were, however, mostly negative. From the time of Mehemet Ali, the French had an advantage over other powers in Egypt. They conceived and financed the building of the Suez Canal, but allowed it to pass out of their hands. They coöperated with Great Britain in fighting China, but got no tangible gain like Hong-Kong. The Crimean War brought them only trouble. They attempted to use their navy in the Persian Gulf, but did not succeed in more than postponing British control of Zanzibar and Muscat. Napoleon III intervened in Syria in 1860 and caused those responsible for the massacre of Christians to be hanged at Damascus. But he got no definite political concessions.

At Frankfort, in 1871, the victorious Germans thought only of Alsace and Lorraine. They could have compelled France to renounce her titles in Africa and Asia. But, without vision of what the next generation was going to show were the real needs of united Germany, Bismarck did not even attempt to get from France a recognition of Germany's right to expand in Africa and Asia. On the contrary, he encouraged the French to devote their efforts to the creation of a new colonial empire, and especially to extend their influence along the Mediterranean coast of Africa. The first line of activity was expected to involve the French so deeply outside Europe that they would accept as permanent the new frontier in the Vosges; the second was expected to keep open a breach with the Ital-

ians, which was already wide because of France's defense of the temporal power of the papacy.

From 1871 to 1914 colonial ambitions played a dominant rôle in the internal and international politics of the Third Republic. The destiny of France and the personal fortunes of her leaders were largely determined by overseas developments and events. Back in 1840, when Thiers gave way to Guizot because Louis Philippe decided not to fight Great Britain over the question of Mehemet Ali and Egypt, a cabinet crisis due to world politics was unique. Under the Third Republic it became a frequent occurrence. Through her colonial expansion France became the ally of her hereditary enemy, Great Britain. She built up a standing army of Africans and Asiatics to compensate for her stationary population. Most important of all, colonial wars developed a new generation of officers and kept alive the military spirit. Wealth, too, came in abundance.

The period from 1900 to 1914 enters intimately into the background of the war, and its phases are treated in separate chapters. The period from 1871 to 1900 brought the empire-building instinct of the French into play in five distinct fields: north Africa; west and central Africa; Madagascar; the Far East; and Oceania. It is necessary to comment at this point on developments in these quarters.

Algeria was completely conquered during the reign of Louis Philippe, and in 1870 native regiments fought with the French against the Germans. After that date the French endeavored to make Algeria an integral part of France. European settlers and Jews were granted French citizenship; *émigrés* from Alsace and Lorraine were given every encouragement to settle there; and the government sought to turn French colonists thither. A law enacted in 1873 evicted thousands of native proprietors from their lands. Then followed the suppression of the Moslem system of dispensing justice through kadis and the extension of the new French municipal law. This put the govern-

ment of communes into the hands of minor officials and white colonists, who became legally the masters of the destinies of the natives among whom they lived. To bring and keep colonists, partial exemption from military service and taxation was offered, and likewise the lands of dispossessed natives. This scheme of government was maintained until 1898. It was unpopular with the natives, and it failed to attract the desired colonists from France. The reforms that have brought prosperity and contentment to Algeria were not put into effect, and administrative control was not extended to the Sahara hinterland, until the end of the nineteenth century.

The conquest of Algeria was not opposed by the other powers. But when France expanded eastward into Tunisia and westward into Morocco she came into conflict with Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany, and was both the beneficiary and the victim of international intrigues that led her into the war of 1914. This was the price she paid for the possession of what Jules Ferry called the two keys of France's house in Africa.

When the French conquered Algeria they looked upon the occupation of Tunisia as a logical sequel. But after the Crimean War Turkey revived her claim of suzerainty. Napoleon III was busy with other affairs, and the British began to get control. They loaned money to the bey and built the first railroads, waterworks, and warehouses. Owing to the proximity of Malta, a British protectorate was talked about. The Italians, however, immediately after their unification, decided that Tunisia must be theirs. They competed with the British and in 1880 bought the railroad from them. From 1860 to 1880 tens of thousands of Italian colonists went to the coveted land. In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, unknown to Italy, Salisbury, with the consent of Bismarck, assured France that there would be no opposition to intervention by her in Tunisia. The French invaded the country from Algeria in 1881, occupied

Tunisia, and forced the bey to sign a treaty putting himself under French protection. After two years of fighting the French were in full control. Great Britain, followed by the other powers, accepted the *fait accompli* of the protectorate. Only the Italians, heartbroken but unable to fight the French, refused to recognize the occupation. They thereupon entered the Triple Alliance with Germany and their traditional enemy Austria, and only in 1896 was their attitude of protest abandoned. On the ground that the regency of Tunisia was a part of the Ottoman dominions, the Porte objected to the French invasion and to the proclamation of the protectorate. Turkey had no power to back her remonstrances, but she continued to make frontier troubles for the French until the Italian occupation of Tripoli thirty years later. Tunisia has prospered under French rule, and the naval base at Bizerta has given France a stronghold in the Mediterranean midway between Marseilles and Beirut.

During the conquest of Algeria the most stubborn enemy of France, Abd-el-Kader, took refuge in Moroccan territory. The encouragement thus given to the Algerians, and the desire to draw their own western boundary, prompted the French to send an army against the sultan of Morocco, who signed the treaty of Tangier in 1845. The boundary line was defined, and the sultan promised to give no further hospitality or comfort to Algerian rebels. Spain fought Morocco in 1859 and secured recognition of definite frontiers for her zone by the treaty of Tetuan in 1860. Because of British interference, both of these treaties were less drastic than French and Spaniards intended them to be.

During the entire period under survey Great Britain backed the sultan of Morocco against both French and Spaniards, and the latter did all they could against the French. Between 1471 and 1684 Tangier had belonged to Portugal, to Spain, to Portugal again, and finally to England. Owing to the mutual unwillingness of the powers

to see one another ensconced in Morocco, and especially to the determination of Great Britain, after the British seized Gibraltar, to brook no rival in the Straits, Morocco remained a No Man's Land until the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1880 a conference of the powers at Madrid agreed upon the policy of no special favors for any one power in the matter of foreign protégés, and from this time forth their representatives watched one another with a jealous eye. In 1900 France and Italy signed a secret agreement not to interfere with each other in efforts to extend exclusive economic, and later political, control over Tripoli and Morocco, and the way was opened to France in 1904 when a similar agreement concerning Morocco and Egypt was signed by France and Great Britain. The French originally planned to take all of North Africa, but in order to have Morocco they had to buy off Italy and Great Britain.

Senegal, the oldest French colony in west Africa, goes back to the days of Richelieu. St. Louis, at the mouth of the Senegal River, was settled in 1637. French claims on the Ivory Coast date from Louis Philippe, but were not made good until 1883, when the Germans began to look for colonies in west Africa. The German occupation of Togo and Kamerun stimulated British and French activity in the basins of the Congo, Niger, and Senegal. The geography of these vast territories was little known, and it was natural that explorers and traders and soldiers should cross one another's trail in staking out the claims of their respective countries. This necessitated conferences and bargaining among statesmen who knew imperfectly, if at all, the countries they were giving one another.

The ambition of France in west and central Africa was to build up an empire from the Atlantic to the Nile and from the Mediterranean to the Congo. When the work of explorers and missionaries resulted in the drawing of accurate maps and a knowledge of the tribes inhabiting the

interior, France, already mistress of Algeria, of Senegal, and of Gabun, was ready for the penetration. Dahomey was conquered in 1893. From 1881 to 1894, when Timbuktu was captured, the French, by a succession of military expeditions, brought under their flag all the vast country from the Senegal to the upper Niger. During the next four years they went from Timbuktu through Lake Chad, and from the Gulf of Guinea through the upper Congo to the head-waters of the Nile.

Agreements were signed with Portugal in 1886, with Great Britain in 1889, 1890, 1892, 1893, 1895, and 1898, and with Germany in 1897. The Anglo-French declaration of 1890 was a compromise in which Great Britain recognized French influence over the whole central Sahara and a French protectorate over Madagascar in return for French recognition of British supremacy in Zanzibar. Expeditions from Timbuktu and Dahomey converged some distance east of Lake Chad. When Major Marchand planted the French flag at Fashoda on the Nile, in 1898, French and British finally came to the verge of war.

Portuguese and Dutch were the first settlers on Madagascar, and the English tried to establish a tea plantation there in 1630. From Louis XIV to Louis XVI the French had military posts on the island and were continually fighting the natives with little success. The treaty of Paris in 1814 turned the French settlements over to the British. But in point of fact the last of them had been given up several years earlier. The British, moreover, took the Ile de France, in the Indian Ocean, from France in 1810, gave it its old Dutch name, Mauritius, and have held it ever since. From Mauritius they endeavored to secure in Madagascar the influence the French formerly enjoyed. They sent missionaries, whose teachings were accepted readily by the Malagasy. As in Japan two hundred years earlier, and for the same reason (suspicion of the motives of the missionaries), Christianity was vigorously suppressed. In

1861, after twenty-five years of non-intercourse, a change of sovereign led to the reopening of the island to European trade and missionary effort. The Malagasy refused to give the French exclusive rights, and made treaties with Great Britain and the United States as well as with France. The French persisted in their claims, and in 1883 bombarded Tamatave and landed troops. After two years of fighting, the Malagasy queen signed a treaty agreeing to a protectorate, in substance if not in name. But British opposition, which went to the extent of aiding the Malagasy government in training an army, made ineffective the privileges the French hoped to gain. In 1890 the French and British governments mutually agreed to give each other a free hand in Zanzibar and in Madagascar. In 1895 the French invaded and conquered the central provinces of Madagascar, allowing the queen, however, to continue to occupy the throne under French protection. But a rebellion in the next year resulted in the total abolition of the island's independence. The queen was exiled to Algeria, and Madagascar was proclaimed a colony of France. It took four years more to establish complete authority.

In the southeastern corner of Asia, Anam, Cambodia, Tongking, and Cochin-China were, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, independent states, with a long history behind them of fighting one another and of wars with Siam and China. The Cambodians and Anamese had successively been masters of the whole country, and had been under the suzerainty of China and Siam. They had also received and expelled the Portuguese and Dutch. So involved with claims and counter-claims is the history of the Indo-Chinese states that, as in the Balkan portions of Europe, each race could go back to a period of supremacy to establish a title; while the Siamese and Chinese, powerful neighbors, were able to claim frontiers and overlordship. Through French missionaries France was called in

to intervene in one of the wars, and in the treaty of Versailles, in 1787, the ruler of Cochin-China ceded the island of Pulo-Condore to France, and promised to assist that nation in wars against other powers, in return for French assistance in restoring and maintaining him on the throne of his country.


The successors of the king who made this treaty repudiated it and persecuted Christian missionaries and converts. This gave the French an excuse for intervening, in coöperation with the Spaniards, during the early years of the reign of Napoleon III. Until the Far East became commercially attractive to the French, and they saw the British deriving advantages from the possession of Hong-Kong, the anti-Christian attitude of the Cochin-Chinese did not trouble Paris. The treaty of Versailles slept in the archives. In 1858, when the French combined with the British against China, a Franco-Spanish fleet captured the port of Tourane. The French seized Saigon. Opposed by the Anamese, war followed with their country; and in 1862 Anam concluded a treaty with France and Spain recognizing the cession of three provinces of Cochin-China to France, promised security to French and Spanish missionaries, and agreed to pay an indemnity to the two powers.

In 1863 Cambodia accepted the protectorate of France, and in 1867 the other three provinces of Cochin-China, left to Anam by the treaty of 1862, were annexed. In the same year Siam and France signed a treaty at Paris by which the Siamese recognized the French protectorate of Cambodia in return for the two provinces nearest Siam.

The Third Republic tirelessly extended the footholds in southeastern Asia secured by the Second Empire. In 1880 China, to whom the Anamese had appealed, notified France that Tongking and Anam were states tributary to Peking. The answer of France was a military expedition to Anam, which was forced to accept the French protectorate in 1883. Against the protests of the Chinese minister in Paris, the



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French advanced into Tongking and made the king of Anam sign a second treaty recognizing a French protectorate over Tongking. This led to war with China. By the treaty of Tientsin (1885) and two supplementary agreements (1887), France exacted from China recognition of the Anamese treaties, including her possession of Tongking, a delimitation of frontier between China and Tongking, and profitable terms of commercial intercourse between China and the French protectorates. But the French found eight years of warfare necessary to subdue their new protégés.

Through the annexation of Cambodia, France became a neighbor of Siam. We can not go into the story of the long dispute between France and Siam over the boundary of Indo-China. It was an unequal contest. France did not abide by the terms of the treaty of 1867; for, since her administrative control of Indo-China was developed, she was determined to get possession of the Mekong Valley and Laos. Occasions for intervention were manufactured, and force was used. In 1893 gunboats appeared before Bangkok and threatened to bombard the city if the Siamese did not evacuate the left bank of the Mekong and the islands in the river, cede Laos to France, and maintain a neutral zone on the right bank of the Mekong and the new Indo-Chinese frontier. Siam had to agree. Great Britain intervened, not, as it proved later, to protect Siam, but to check the French advance to the frontier of Burma and to get something from Siam for herself. The Siamese frontier questions were still unsettled with Great Britain when the French secured the rounding out of their Indo-Chinese empire on the northwest by the Peking convention of 1895. The British Foreign Office protested to China that cession of territory to France in this region violated an agreement made the year before with Great Britain to the effect that no portion of the country ceded to France should be alienated to any other power "without previous

agreement with Great Britain." The British gave in for a *quid pro quo*, that is, by getting something from China themselves. The Franco-British declaration of 1896 agreed on a boundary between the "spheres of influence" of the two powers as far as the Chinese frontier. But the French did not have a free hand with Siam until the Franco-British agreement of 1904. Unopposed by any other power, France took more territory from Siam both in 1904 and in 1907.

In Oceania the Spaniards and Dutch were the only navigators to report discoveries before the second half of the eighteenth century. Between 1767, when the Society and Low Islands were discovered, and 1803, when the Loyalty Islands were reported by the British, who had just landed in Tasmania, the mapping of the south Pacific was largely done by the British, many of whose claims date from the voyages of Captain Cook. The first French expedition of importance was that of Dumont d'Urville, who surveyed the Loyalty Islands in 1827. Three years later Roman Catholic missionaries went from France to New Caledonia, whence they spread to Tahiti, the Marquesas, and other archipelagos. Everywhere British Protestant missionaries and French Catholic missionaries were at loggerheads. But the French government realized before the British government the possibilities of this remote part of the world. In 1842 a French crew secured the recognition of a French protectorate over Tahiti and the other Windward Islands of the Society group and the Marquesas. The expulsion of the British consul from Tahiti by the French led to difficulties with the British government, and to opposition by the British to the extension of the French protectorate to the Leeward group.

But in 1853 the French got ahead of the British in New Caledonia and annexed the island and its neighbor, the Isle of Pines. The London government, at that moment angling for an alliance with Napoleon III in a war against

Russia, did not protest. The Loyalty Islands, despite violent opposition on the part of British missionaries, were added to the French possessions in 1864. Following the example of the British in Australia, the French used New Caledonia for a penal station for political offenders and ordinary criminals. It was New Caledonia that received the exiles from the Paris commune. But the transportation of criminals was discontinued in 1898, and since then the white element of the population has decreased. In fact, France has done so little with New Caledonia that the Australians have looked on with envious eyes.

The native ruling family of Tahiti was dispossessed in 1880, and the island became a French colony. In 1887 the British agreed to abandon their insistence upon the neutrality of the Leeward group, which enabled the French to extend their protection over the entire Society Islands. This arrangement also gave the French control of Raiatea in the New Hebrides group. The New Hebrides were declared neutral by Great Britain and France in 1878, after missionaries of both countries had been urging annexation upon London and Paris. Lord Salisbury, desiring to have the good-will of France at the Congress of Berlin, refused to go farther than a policy of mutual abstention. But a convention of 1887 established a condominium which was confirmed by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. Owing to their position on the route to North America and Asia, the New Hebrides, however, became a source of friction. New Zealand and Australia, especially the latter, protested violently at London against the agreements of 1878, 1887, and 1904.

At the beginning of the twentieth century France, like Great Britain, was in an advantageous position to maintain and extend her world power. In fact, the two nations were in a class by themselves as regards the size, the distribution, and the potentialities for naval and military power, for trade and investment development, of their over-

seas possessions. Russia, the only other great colonial power, came nowhere into rivalry with France. But France and Great Britain had conflicting aims throughout the world. Great Britain's control of the seas made compromises advisable at Paris. The alternative of war would have meant a loss of everything except Algeria, and perhaps even of that. The Third Republic extended France to the southern Pacific, Madagascar, and southeastern Asia, but in so doing made her dependent upon the mistress of the seas. The Entente Cordiale grew out of the colonial development of France in the first thirty years of the Third Republic.

CHAPTER V

BRITISH COLONIAL EXPANSION (1815-1878)

OF the leading powers at the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain alone attached importance to questions outside of Europe. The Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria did not appeal to her. Since Cromwell inaugurated the aggressive foreign policy of England, changes in the governments and boundaries of European states have alarmed British statesmen to the point of war or threats of war only when the upsetting of the balance of power to the benefit of one country made the aspirant to domination in Europe a challenger of England's sea power and a rival of England's trade. When the object of intervention was attained, the British withdrew from active participation in continental affairs and let allies and enemies work out their own salvation in post-bellum reconstruction. The precedent and traditions of earlier interventions were followed after Vienna.

During the momentous years from 1789 to 1815 Great Britain won by conquest Ceylon, Trinidad, Malta, a part of Guiana, St. Lucia, the Cape of Good Hope, Seychelles, Mauritius, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha. The first settlement in Australia was made at New South Wales in the year before the French Revolution, and Tasmania was settled in 1803. As we have already seen, the conquest of India was pressed vigorously from 1801 to 1817. In 1815 Nepal, although retaining its independence, was brought under British influence.

From 1815 to 1878 the growth of the British Empire was rapid. Except in India and China, it was not a period of conquest. Wars were fought only to protect claims al-

ready staked out and in the process of development and to prevent other powers from menacing the British imperial trade routes by land or sea. Military prowess played its part, but the "native wars" had no effect upon the relations of the British with the continental powers. In Europe Great Britain's interests led her to play a negative rôle in international diplomacy from the Congress of Vienna to the Congress of Berlin. Among themselves the powers could do as they pleased. The veto of Great Britain was heard in international councils only when questions of overseas policy arose. For example, British statesmanship opposed the scheme of the Holy Alliance to help Spain win back her American colonies in 1822-23; Russia's intention, without consulting the other powers, to aid the Greeks in 1825 and the Turks in 1833; France's encouragement of Mehemet Ali in 1839-40; Russia's second attempt to emancipate Ottoman Christians, in 1853-55; and Russia's third attempt to emancipate Ottoman Christians, in 1877-78. With Russia and France—the only other powers that showed marked colonial activity—Great Britain came into occasional diplomatic conflict; and from Denmark and Holland titles were acquired on the west African coast.

The development of the British Empire in the two decades of the Napoleonic wars was due only in part to the factors mentioned before—geographical position, a lucky start all over the world, and the advance by a hundred years, in political unification, over rivals. There are other causes, material and moral, for the unique place in the world of the British Empire. The British had coal at tide-water. Their brains and energy were responsible for the adaptation of steam power to industry and transportation. They were master mariners. They won fairly the supremacy of the sea. But, most important of all, they were willing to expatriate themselves, not only to fight and die for their country, but to settle and develop the overseas territories to which they took title. The study of world

politics leads us to put emphasis upon the obvious and least admirable factors in colonial expansion. We deal with international relations, which means the study of diplomacy, of chicanery, of hypocrisy, of violence. Because we have as yet learned no other way, might invariably goes before right in international affairs. Among nations, the influence of a country is in proportion to its strength, and in intercourse with non-European races the British have been the most successful in the methods that all modern powers have used when they had the chance. But, as we shall see, the British continued to hold their own, and to extend their empire, after the other nations of Europe entered the colonial field. In the supreme test of the World War their titles were nowhere surrendered or transferred. Supremacy of the seas and military strength alone could not have accomplished this. From the beginning of her colonial expansion, England sent abroad colonists and administrators who were willing to cast in their fortunes with the new territories to which they went.

In the period under survey there evolved in the British Empire four distinct types of possessions: (1) territories situated in the temperate zone, where settlers from Europe were able to found new nations of Aryan stock; (2) territories where Europeans already lived or to which Englishmen and Scotchmen emigrated in sufficient numbers to become the controlling element politically and economically; (3) protectorates and dependencies; and (4) isolated footholds, ports or islands, valuable only as coaling stations on trade routes. In the first category we have in the overseas expansion of Europe a renewal of movements of population such as had not taken place in the world since our ancestors came to Europe from Asia; in the second, a speedily checked effort at extensive colonization, but no abandonment of existing settlement, because opportunities arose of production for export to Europe; in the third, a form of extension of European eminent domain which

would never have become profitable save for the new conditions in industry and transportation of the nineteenth century; and in the fourth, a means of protecting and facilitating communications with colonies.

Queen Elizabeth's first patent to Sir Walter Raleigh permitted British subjects to accompany him to America, "with guaranty of a continuance of the enjoyment of all the rights which her subjects enjoyed at home." Although this may have meant only the assurance of non-forfeiture of citizenship through residence abroad, it was interpreted by Anglo-Saxon settlers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to mean the right to carry with them wherever they went the privilege of self-government. Great Britain learned a lesson in the loss of the American colonies by the treaty of Paris in 1783. When the process of demanding responsible government began to repeat itself in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the colonies were allowed to federate and form self-governing dominions. New political units thus arose, bound to the mother country by ties of their own volition. The white man's countries of the British Empire, in turn, on the ground of prosperity as well as security, became interested in colonial expansion in their own parts of the world, and in the importance of the control of the trade routes leading from them to the mother country.

The War of 1812 proved the attachment of Canada to Great Britain. North of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence, the English-speaking colonies had no desire to join the United States. The boundary between New Brunswick and Maine, which led to frontier disturbances in 1839, was settled by the Webster-Ashburton treaty in 1842, while the Oregon treaty fixed the boundary with British Columbia in 1846. Serious and sustained friction between the United States and Great Britain over Canada has never arisen. Fishing and boundary disputes have always been

adjusted by arbitration, and the overwhelming inferiority of the Canadians in numbers, coupled with the good-will between the two peoples, has made unnecessary the military and naval guarding of the frontier. Trade questions have been decided directly between the United States and Canada, even when negotiations were carried on through London. After a rebellion, in 1840, responsible government was granted to the Canadian colonies, and in 1867 Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia were confederated as the Dominion of Canada. In the same year the United States, by purchasing Russian America and forming it into the territory of Alaska, got ahead of the British on the Pacific coast. The Hudson's Bay Company territory was ceded to Canada in 1870, and from the lower part of it Manitoba was formed. British Columbia joined the Dominion in 1871, stipulating that a railway should be built at government expense to the Pacific coast within ten years. Prince Edward Island entered in 1873. Newfoundland, the oldest British colony, with her dependency Labrador, has remained outside.

South Africa passed through a century of varying fortunes under British rule before a union of colonies could be formed and given self-government. In Canada the French remained chiefly in the province of Quebec, and were soon outnumbered elsewhere by the English-speaking elements. In south Africa the Dutch colonists, called Boers, were mostly irreconcilable, and when British settlers came in considerable numbers these Boers began to trek into the interior. In the great trek of 1836 to 1840 they passed over the Orange and Vaal rivers. They also went up the east coast and wrested part of Natal from the Zulus. As Natal lay along the coast, the British refused to admit the possibility of an independent Boer state in that quarter. In 1843 Natal was proclaimed British territory and erected into a colony. In the interior, however,

the Boers were able to create two republics, the Orange Free State in 1854 and the Transvaal Republic in 1858. Expansion northward from the Cape, strengthened by immigration, took the British into the interior and along both the Indian and Atlantic coasts. Boers and British alike had troubles with the natives. A Kaffir war in 1851, in which the Hottentots joined, took two years to crush. In 1865 part of Kaffraria became British; two years later twelve islands off Angra Pequena were annexed; and in 1871 Basutoland and the southeastern part of Bechuanaland were added to the Cape territory. In 1878 Walfisch Bay, the best harbor in southwest Africa, together with a few miles of the coast, was annexed. Believing that the Transvaal Boers, after an exhausting war with the Zulus (in which the British themselves were engaged), were too weak to maintain their independence, Disraeli ordered the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. But the Boers showed surprising strength and the British gave up the project for the time being. In America, English and French and Spanish had armed natives against white men in colonial wars. The overwhelming disproportion of numbers made the use of blacks too dangerous in the struggles between Boers and Britons.

The British title to Canada and South Africa is based upon conquest from other European peoples that had made prior settlement and whose colonists had to become British subjects. In both dominions the descendants of the original colonists retained their mother tongue, and, although accorded the privileges of English institutions, the most precious of which is self-government, French and Dutch did not become assimilated. Through their ecclesiastical organizations they maintained their schools, and thus kept alive their culture. In neither case, however, was their lack of assimilation due to an effort on the part of the country of their origin. In the nineteenth century, in so far as France and Holland were concerned, the French

Canadian and Boer questions did not enter into international politics.

Australia and New Zealand are British by right of discovery and settlement. The British went to New South Wales in 1788; began to colonize Tasmania, the island south of Australia, in 1803; established missions in New Zealand in 1814; colonized west Australia in 1829 and south Australia in 1836; and began to settle in New Zealand in 1840. The climate of New Zealand is favorable to European colonization. The great obstacle was the hostility of the Maoris, whose treatment of shipwrecked sailors in the early days made them a terror to the white man. Missionary work was remarkably successful, and it led to the taming of the natives to the point where colonization was not opposed by arms. On the contrary, a group of native chieftains gave the islands to the queen of England in 1840. A Maori war broke out in 1864, and it took five years to restore peace.

The development of colonization in Australia did not carry the British far into the interior of the continent. Except in certain places along the coast, only the southeastern corner of the country is sufficiently cool and fertile for European settlement. But where white men could live the natives made virtually no opposition, and the process of colonization was rapid. Melbourne was founded in 1835. Victoria and Queensland were separated from New South Wales in 1851 and 1859. The discovery of gold in 1851 aided decidedly in attracting colonists, and both Australia and New Zealand were brought nearer to London by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the laying of a cable in 1872. Responsible government was granted to New Zealand in 1852, and to the Australian colonies beginning in 1855. No other power has ever tried to gain a foothold on the Australian continent or in New Zealand. Small groups of islands around the colonies were annexed from time to time, with the aid of the home government.

But in no case during the period under survey did Australia or New Zealand cause friction among the great powers.

Most of the possessions of the second category belonged to the British through conquest or settlement before the French Revolution, or became definitely British through the conventions and treaties of 1814 and 1815, and already contained a European element in their population, which was thus in each instance compelled to transfer its allegiance. At the time of the founding of the colonies that later became the United States, the British also settled Barbados, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, and most of the Leeward Islands. To their West Indian possessions the other Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, Tobago, and Trinidad were added by conquest during the wars with France and Spain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. Christopher, and Nevis, originally colonized by the British, were given to France in 1632 and won back by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Jamaica, one of the most notable colonies of the second category mentioned above, was conquered from Spain in 1655. From the treaty of Vienna to the treaty of Berlin, Great Britain came into conflict with no other power, and laid the foundation of no future quarrel, by reason of her crown colonies, in which British planters and traders did not rely upon diplomatic intervention for their prosperity or security. The possession of the island colonies of this type was not a factor of moment in international relations.

The colonial acquisitions and the development of titles, which brought Great Britain into antagonism with other world powers, belong to the third and fourth categories and fall within the world politics period of history. It is not always possible to distinguish between possessions of the third and fourth categories. Gibraltar, key to the Mediterranean, and Malta, which enables Great Britain to

play a decisive rôle in Near Eastern events, were demanded as rewards in the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and the treaty of Paris, 1814, for strategic reasons. Other bases, like Hong-Kong, which gives Great Britain a privileged position in the Far East, belong to the third as well as the fourth category.

In tracing the expansion of the British Empire from 1815 to 1878, after we have considered the groups of colonies in temperate climates that federated and became self-governing dominions, British colonial activity must be treated from the dual point of view of creating and stimulating overseas markets and the carrying trade and of protecting the markets and the merchant marine. For themselves first, and then for the colonies peopled by the overflow of population from England and Scotland, the British sought security and prosperity. In buttressing the British Empire and gaining control of trade routes to all parts of the world, they took what they wanted, or thought they needed, in Asia and Africa, and opposed by diplomatic pressure and by force the expansion of every other European power where they felt that this expansion would jeopardize their plans for strengthening and adding to the empire. The dominant considerations were India and the trade routes from England to India, from England to the other colonies, and from the other colonies to India.) If we bear these facts in mind, we shall be able to discern the motives and course of empire-building and of British participation in international affairs.

Bombay was ceded by Portugal in 1661, and Madras, which the French held for a brief period in the middle of the eighteenth century, became definitely British in 1748. Bengal was built up by bits until virtual sovereignty was established by the conquest of Clive in 1765. We have already spoken of the energy and successes of the British in India during the Napoleonic era. The conquest of the central provinces was completed in 1817. Between 1825

and 1852 Assam, Punjab, and Burma were added to British India. The Great Mogul surrendered the sovereignty of Delhi in 1832. The conquest of Ajmir-Merwara was completed in 1818; of Coorg in 1834; and of Oudh in 1856.

In 1857 the mutiny of the Sepoys at Meerut and the rising of the Mohammedans at Delhi caused a radical change in the relations between Great Britain and India. Since the days of Queen Elizabeth the expansion of Great Britain in India had been a commercial enterprise under the control of a chartered corporation known as the East India Company. The fiction of the Mogul Empire had been preserved. After the siege and capture of Delhi, in the summer of 1857, it was necessary to depose and banish the Great Mogul. The establishment of another sovereignty was imperative. Then, too, the maintenance and expansion of British influence in India demanded sacrifices and the assumption of responsibilities beyond the ability of the East India Company. The Afghan War, the Second Burmese War, the Crimean War, and the Sepoy Rebellion proved that. The possession of India was beginning to involve the British in international complications with which the government alone was in a position to cope. In 1858, therefore, the government of India was transferred to the British crown and a viceroy was appointed. After twenty years, the queen of England was proclaimed Empress of India, on January 1, 1877.

In speaking of the British attitude towards the problems raised by the treaty of San Stefano, we quoted Disraeli's explanation of why British foreign policy had to adapt itself to the situation created in Asia by the queen's new responsibilities. In reality the policy went back to the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, and the proclamation of January 1, 1877, was the logical result of an evolution that had begun in Asia with the last Mahratta war in 1818. India could be made secure only by control of the land and sea approaches to the Indian peninsula. The settlements

after the downfall of Napoleon had given Great Britain Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Ceylon. The Ionian Islands were ceded to Greece in 1863, but Cyprus was occupied in 1878. Owing to changed conditions through the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez in 1869, Cyprus had become a vantage-point of importance. But Disraeli had already taken another step to control the new route to India by purchasing the Khedive Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal Company in 1875.

In the regions between Egypt and India, the British had been working with admirable foresight and energy for half a century before the Suez Canal was cut. Control of the Red Sea was secured by the occupation of Aden in 1839, and in the following year the East India Company preempted the opposite African coast by binding the native chiefs to a promise not to enter into treaty relations with other powers. To neutralize other European influences the British were led to declare war against Abyssinia in 1868. The king was killed and his heir taken captive to England, where he died. In 1873 the sultan of Zanzibar made a treaty with the British, and in 1877 London recognized Egyptian jurisdiction over Somaliland, provided that no territories of Egypt "be ceded on any pretext whatever to a foreign power."

The occupation of Aden was preceded and followed by diplomatic activity, made possible through coöperation of the navy, around the Arabian peninsula. The first treaty of peace with Arab chiefs of the Persian Gulf was made in 1820. It was reaffirmed in 1853, and in 1861, despite the violent protest of Turkey, the sheik of Bahrein put himself under British protection. In 1854 the sultan of Muscat ceded the Kuria Muria Islands, and in 1876 the sultan of Kishin gave Sokotra to the British. In all agreements with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf chiefs there was the same clause, namely, that no treaties, concessions, or

negotiations be entered into with any European power other than Great Britain without the consent of the government of India. When Napoleon III was at the height of his power, in 1862, Great Britain agreed with France to respect the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar. But eleven years later the sultan of Muscat accepted a British subsidy, and Zanzibar eventually came under British protection. The government of India was virtually master of the Persian Gulf, and had extended its influence along the Arabian sea-coast of Persia before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The effort to shut Russia off from the Indian Ocean and from the countries contiguous to India required two serious wars with Afghanistan, in 1839-42 and 1878-80; a war with Persia in 1856-57; the extension of British control to the northwest frontier; and the establishment of a protectorate over Baluchistan. In the campaign of 1839 against the Afghans the British felt that it was necessary to protect the flank of their expedition by seizing Kalat. A treaty was signed with the khan of Kalat in 1840 and renewed in 1854 and 1876. The first was simply a defensive treaty, the second an offensive and defensive alliance, with a subsidy for the khan, and the third allowed the British the right of intervention and gave them the northeastern corner of Baluchistan, where Quetta became a strong fortress, linked with Karachi by rail, to serve to watch the future relations between Afghans and Russians.

On the eastern side of India the British began to extend their influence in 1824 by invading Burma, which was finally annexed after the capture of Rangoon in 1852. The leasing of the island of Singapore from the sultan of Johore in 1824 was a master stroke of far-sightedness. When Hong-Kong was added sixteen years later by conquest from China, the British had laid the foundation for unrivaled naval and mercantile supremacy from England to the Far East, both by the Mediterranean and by the Cape

of Good Hope. The various sultanates between the end of the Malay peninsula and Burma were gradually incorporated in the British Empire by treaties with the Malay sovereigns and Siam. Along the sea route, the Andaman Islands were annexed in 1858; Labuan was occupied, despite the protest of Spain and Holland, in 1847; and a foothold was obtained on the northern tip of Borneo in 1878 by a treaty between the Labuan Trading Company and the sultan of Sulu.

On the northern side of India the British secured the right to maintain a resident in Nepal by the treaty of Segowlie in 1815, and Ghurkas had been recruited for the Indian army. In 1864 eleven provinces of Bhutan were annexed to Bengal, and in the following year the Bhutan government accepted a subsidy from Calcutta. It has been under virtual British control ever since. Attempts were made to open up trade between India and Tibet in 1872 and 1873. But, as Tibet belonged nominally to China, an agreement was made at Chefoo in 1876 between China and Great Britain for exploration in this country, in which the British greatly feared the penetration of Russian influence. Tibetan fanaticism prevented British and Russians alike from exploration and propaganda. The remoteness of the country made conquest by arms impracticable.

The development of Australia and New Zealand, the founding of British Columbia, the increasing importance of Hong-Kong and Singapore, and especially the invention of marine telegraph communication, caused the British to realize, during the last decade of the period under survey, the advisability of the extension of their sovereignty over islands in the Pacific. The convention of London, in 1814, had left the East Indies to the Dutch, and the Philippines had not been taken from Spain. British exploration, notably the voyage of Captain Cook, did much to make the Pacific islands known to Europe. The first actual British possession in the Pacific was Pitcairn Island, annexed in

1838. A naval captain hoisted the British flag over the Hawaiian Islands in 1843, but the act was disavowed by London. A foothold was secured on the south coast of New Guinea, owing to proximity to Australia, in 1846, and the earlier settlers of New Zealand gathered in the islands in their general neighborhood. Until the era of cables, however, nobody was much concerned about the more remote Pacific archipelagos, whose exploitation would bring little profit.

The first important step in the extension of the British Empire to Oceania was the annexation of the Fiji Islands in 1874. France, who had just begun active empire-building in Indo-China, had been picking up Pacific islands since 1840. The French were well established in New Caledonia and the South Sea islands. In the year following the British *coup* in the Fijis, the British and French began to colonize—or, rather, to pay attention to their missionary work—in the New Hebrides. John Paton, a Scotch missionary, proposed to make the New Hebrides British in 1877. But the French protested. On the other hand, the British were able to take advantage of this claim and others that they were willing to forego, to secure international assent to the annexation of Union, Ellice, Gilbert, southern Solomon, and other groups, over which they had discovery and trading claims that had never been pressed. The agreement of 1877 established the British Empire on a wide and firm basis in the mid-Pacific.

In the earlier days, before the interior of Africa was explored and before the great value of African raw materials became apparent, the British did little to extend the colonies which they had acquired on the way to the Cape of Good Hope. But their activities along the west African coast, in connection with the suppression of the slave trade, accomplished valuable foundation work for the future. We have already seen how Sierra Leone was made a crown colony in 1808, and how the transfers of territory at the

end of the Napoleonic wars led to new frontiers for Gambia and the founding of Bathurst in 1816. The French withdrew from Gambia finally in 1857, but without a definite delimitation of frontiers. In the meantime France was developing the Senegal settlements that had been returned to her in 1817. In 1831 British explorers and merchants began to discover the potentialities of the Niger Valley. The Gold Coast forts were taken over by the crown in 1843, Danish rights were acquired in 1850, and Dutch rights in 1871. This led to the Ashanti War in 1873-74, when the king was compelled to acknowledge Great Britain's supremacy on the coast. Lagos Island was seized in 1861, and the United Africa Company was founded in 1879, with the object of developing British trade at the expense of less united rivals. It was just in time to get ahead of the Germans and French, the latter backed by their government.

British enterprise in the interior of Africa also prepared the way for the expansion of a later period. Livingstone discovered Lake Nyasa in 1859, and Stanley reached Uganda in 1875. The African Lakes Corporation was founded in 1878. The first maps of these regions were hardly drawn when British missionaries, who had been working successfully in Zanzibar, penetrated the African continent. At the same time Baker and Gordon, in the employ of the Egyptian khedive Ismail, explored, fought for, and established administrative control over the Sudan. These activities were to bear fruit for Great Britain later.

In America, the three colonies taken from Holland on the South American coast, south of Venezuela, were organized into British Guiana. With the remainder of the Dutch possessions and French Guiana beyond, this constituted the only European title on the continent of South America. The boundary on the north with Venezuela had never been definitely settled, and after eighty years it almost brought Great Britain into conflict with the United States. A sev-

enteenth-century settlement of British log-cutters on the west coast of Central America had an indefinite political status until 1860, when Great Britain surrendered a part of her claims there to the republics of Honduras and Nicaragua. British Honduras was declared a colony under the governor of Jamaica in 1862, and was made a crown colony in 1870. Owing to Britain's large interests in the West Indies and the Caribbean Sea, the Foreign Office had, for a long time before the final Honduras settlement, been claiming virtually all of the Nicaraguan coast. When the United States was negotiating for canal rights, made important by the annexation of California in 1848, the vague British claims had blocked her effort. The British were in possession of a settlement called Greytown, which was at the mouth of the San Juan River, the proposed Atlantic terminus of the canal. This *de facto* advantage was given up when the United States agreed, in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, to renounce exclusive control over the canal; not to fortify it; to neutralize it; to maintain equal tolls for all nations; and not to colonize in, or establish a protectorate over, or make an exclusive alliance with, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any other Central American state. When the American Civil War broke out Great Britain agreed with France and Spain to intervene in Mexico. But Great Britain and Spain withdrew when France declared war upon Mexico in the following year.

Our summary of British colonial expansion from 1815 to 1878 has tended to be a mere chronicle of events, with a monotonous succession of names and dates. Limitation of space has compelled us to resist the temptation of trying to explain the cross-currents of opinion in England concerning colonial expansion. The building up of the British Empire, as we have traced it, was not accomplished without opposition, or with any universal expectation of the results that have actually crowned the work of the empire-builders. For some years before the Crimean War, and with in-

creased energy after the blunders and sacrifices of the Crimean expedition, the Liberals of the Manchester school advanced the thesis that self-governing institutions in the colonies were a preliminary to separation. Why should the English people consent to an almost endless succession of colonial wars to add to the empire? And why should this incessant activity overseas be allowed to disturb Great Britain's friendly relations with the continental European powers? In their opposition to the new economic imperialism, the Liberals did not sound the humanitarian note alone. They questioned the value to the United Kingdom of colonial expansion, and they believed that the world-encircling structure, built at so great a cost, would not prove durable.

On the other hand, while British statesmen were using diplomacy and force to defend and develop old rights and acquire new ones, they were able to point out to the British people moral and material progress in the relations of Great Britain with the ever-expanding possessions in all parts of the world. Slavery in the colonies was abolished in 1834; the old navigation laws were repealed in 1849; differential duties in favor of colonial products were removed in 1860; and the Royal Colonial Institution was founded in 1868.

The new impulsion to British imperial development came with the increase of influence of Benjamin Disraeli, later Lord Beaconsfield. As early as 1866, two years before his first premiership, Disraeli said that England was now "more of an Asiatic than a European power." He emphasized—as did Joseph Chamberlain thirty years later—the glorious future of the British Empire if it were held together as a political system and extended in such a way that it would function to the advantage of all its parts the world over. In 1872 Disraeli declared that "no minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our colonial

empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this island." Believing that the privileges of empire were worth the responsibilities, as prime minister Beaconsfield assumed the responsibilities. His successors could not get away from them.

CHAPTER VI

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH POWER IN THE NEAR EAST (1878-1885)

DURING the nineteenth century was developed the British policy of becoming mistress of every approach to India by land and sea. In point of fact, the policy was largely unconscious and instinctive. But the result was as logical an evolution towards a goal as if every step had been thought out. In tracing British colonial expansion from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the Congress of Berlin (1878), we have shown how British diplomacy, backed unhesitatingly by force whenever necessary, endeavored to safeguard India and to gain a monopoly of the routes to India. The method was threefold: (1) to secure sovereignty over vantage-points on mainland or islands, strategically placed for dominating ocean thoroughfares and for coaling stations and naval bases; (2) to extend political and economic control over the countries bordering on India and those through which any other European power might reach waterways leading to India; and (3) to frustrate the attempts of other European powers to secure preponderant political influence or economic position in any country bordering on India or along the water routes to India.

Prior to the Congress of Berlin, British statesmen had believed that the negative method of forbidding others to trespass was the best means of safeguarding the approaches to India in the Near East. In eighty years their efforts to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had produced two wars and two threats of wars. France was fought in Egypt at the beginning of the century, and the

British were ready to enter into another war with her at the time of Mehemet Ali's second attack upon Turkey in 1839-40. Russia was fought in the Crimea in the middle of the century, and the British were ready to enter into another war when the czar's ministers imposed the treaty of San Stefano upon Turkey in 1878.

During the two decades between the Congress of Paris, which followed the Crimean War, and the Congress of Berlin, which followed the Russo-Turkish War, changes in the political aspects of the Near Eastern question made it advisable to abandon the tactics of merely opposing the intrigues of continental European powers in the Ottoman Empire and its dependencies. British public opinion, susceptible to the appeal of suffering humanity to the point of overthrowing a cabinet, was becoming less credulous of Turkish promises to reform. When the Crimean War was fought it was believed that Turkey had not been given a chance to show how she could behave in her relations with her Christian subjects. But the revelations of Turkish massacres in the Balkans in 1875-76, which Mr. Gladstone capitalized in his opposition to the foreign policy of the Disraeli cabinet, proved to Conservative and Liberal statesmen alike the impossibility of continuing the unconditional championship of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the sultan's dominions.

Whatever treaties might say concerning the suzerainty or sovereignty of the sultan, it was clear that the Balkan peoples were no longer to be checkmated in their struggles for independent national existence. The Balkan peoples belonged to the Orthodox Church, and part of them were of Slavic blood. The Congress of Berlin had revised the treaty of San Stefano, which proposed to create a Bulgaria that would include a large part of Macedonia and Thrace; but nothing could take away from Russia, so British statesmen felt, the advantages of kinship and common religion enjoyed in the Balkans.

The treaty of Berlin was a setback for Russian aspirations in the Balkans. But it did not deprive Russia of any material portion of her territorial gains at the expense of Turkey in Asia. By article LVIII Russia secured the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum, and thus came into possession of northern Persia's trade route to the outer world. Control of Batum made feasible, too, railroad development into central Asia, which would bring Russia to the frontiers of Afghanistan.

The Suez Canal created a new problem for British diplomacy. When Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had obtained a concession for the canal from Said Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, failed to secure the necessary confirmation of the sultan of Turkey, he realized that the British were intriguing against him. He went to London to induce the British government to withdraw its opposition. Lord Palmerston told him that the canal was a physical impossibility, that if it could be dug it would injure British maritime supremacy, and that the proposal was a device for French interference in the Near East. Despite British hostility and the refusal of London bankers to coöperate in financing the project, de Lesseps carried it to a successful completion. The canal was opened in 1869, and within a few years it became self-supporting. In 1875, by excellent statesmanship taking advantage of a lucky opportunity, the British government purchased the shares of the Egyptian khedive and became the largest stockholder in the Suez Canal Company. The new trade route through Egypt and the Red Sea suddenly increased immeasurably the importance of the Near East in British imperial policy.

To recapitulate, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 the traditional British policy of supporting the integrity of the sultan's dominions was abandoned because: maintenance of the old policy had become a serious political risk for a cabinet; tangible compensation must be sought within the Ottoman Empire to offset the Russian influence

in the Balkans and the Russian menace in central Asia; and the Suez Canal, which in a few years had become a vital artery to the British Empire, must be brought under British military control.

The consolidation of British power in the Near East, which resulted in checking Russian penetration into Armenia and Afghanistan and in ousting French influence from Egypt, was accomplished by the Cyprus convention, the Second Afghan War, and the military occupation of Egypt. The Cyprus convention was a defensive alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. Although signed on June 4, 1878, nine days before the Congress of Berlin met, it was not communicated to the powers until after their representatives had begun the work of revising the treaty of San Stefano. The convention contained only one article, which read:

“If Batum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of further territories of H. I. M. the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join H. I. M. the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

“In return, H. I. M. the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the Government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories. And in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagements, H. I. M. the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.”

In an annex, added July 1, 1878, the permanency of the British title was made more definite by the provision “that, if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England and the Convention of June 4, 1878, will be at an end.”

Of course, it was known that the Russians had no intention of giving back to Turkey the territories mentioned in the convention and its annex. The Cyprus convention was an acknowledgment of the abandonment of the policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and it substituted the policy of compensation, which was in the next generation to become the accepted rule in dealing with China and any other state unable to defend itself. A European power protests against the violation of a weak state's territorial integrity by another European power; but, unable or unwilling to prevent it, the protesting power makes an academic profession of the intention of protecting the despoiled state, in return for which it receives some other portion of the victim's territory.

Following the Cyprus convention, Great Britain had to compensate France for the extension of British power in the Mediterranean. This was done by an agreement between Salisbury and Waddington, who represented France at the Congress of Berlin, that Great Britain's occupation of Cyprus would be accepted by France and France would be given a free hand in Tunisia. This policy, also, was to become common usage in world politics. Powers would accept as accomplished facts—*faits accomplis*, in the language of diplomacy—acts of aggression against weak states, in return for the assurance that similar acts contemplated by them would not be opposed.

Because Afghanistan does not belong geographically to the Near East, and because British diplomacy and military intervention in Afghanistan, as well as in Persia and the Persian Gulf, has been managed from India, little if any mention is made of this country in books dealing with the Near East. The jurisdiction of the government of India has been extended as far west as Aden, at the entrance of the Red Sea.¹ But it is difficult to exclude Afghanistan

¹ For this reason, during the earlier stages of the recent World War, the military operations of the British in Mesopotamia were directed from India.

from a survey of the development of British power in the Near East. This is especially true of the years immediately following the Congress of Berlin. Afghanistan affected Persia, and Persia affected Turkey. Along the line from the Balkans to the Himalayas the relations between Great Britain and Russia must be studied as a whole.

Hence we find that when the British stopped the Russians at the gates of Constantinople and held up the execution of the treaty of San Stefano, the Russians sent an envoy into Afghanistan to make a treaty with the amir. The rivalry between Great Britain and Russia for the control of Afghanistan, which had begun forty years earlier, was not discussed at the Congress of Berlin. The British refused to allow the status of Afghanistan to become an international problem and contended that the Afghans, because their country bordered on India, must ally themselves solely with Great Britain. In November, 1878, when a British envoy sent to the amir for the purpose of concluding such an alliance was turned back at the frontier, the British declared war and invaded Afghanistan.

After a vigorous winter campaign the invaders were able to put upon the throne at Kabul one of the amir's sons, who signed a treaty transferring parts of the provinces bordering on India to Great Britain, and agreeing to place in the hands of the British government the entire control of his foreign relations. To prevent future Russian intrigue, the new amir was compelled to accept a permanent British legation at Kabul. The Afghans, however, murdered the British envoy, with his staff and escort. The war began again, and the British occupied Kabul. Another member of the ruling family, who had been in exile, was induced to return to Kabul, and was made amir in return for the recognition of Britain's exclusive right to control the foreign affairs of Afghanistan. British troops, however, had to be used until the end of 1881 to defend the new amir, in a civil

war that proved long and costly, against other claimants to the throne.

Public opinion in England had hailed Lord Beaconsfield as a statesman who won great advantages without bloodshed through the revision of the treaty of San Stefano and the Cyprus convention, and then turned against him within two years after the ratification of the treaty of Berlin. For British diplomatic and military prestige had suffered a severe blow in south Africa. In 1879 the Zulus completely defeated a British army and the Boers refused to accept the annexation of the Transvaal. Beaconsfield had also to shoulder the burden of the unsatisfactory Afghan war, with its repeated surprises and reverses. He went out of office in April, 1880, after an electoral campaign in which Gladstone, referring to Cyprus and the Transvaal, said: "If those acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they were obtained by means dishonorable to the character of our country."

For a second time Gladstone succeeded Beaconsfield. During the six years (1874-80) that Gladstone sat on the Opposition front bench, he had consistently criticized the foreign policy of Beaconsfield. He had denounced economic imperialism, deplored the use of British troops in Asia and Africa, declared that the methods of British diplomacy were un-English, and reiterated in and out of Parliament his belief that it was bad morals as well as bad business for a free people like the British to endeavor to take away the freedom of other peoples. And yet, as prime minister, Gladstone found that, irrespective of what he might say in speeches, he was powerless to limit or arrest the extension and consolidation of Britain's overseas empire. His great Liberal following supported him and kept him in office until 1885. It gave assent in press and Parliament, and from pulpit and platform, to the prime minister's Golden Rule idealism: in foreign policy, only what

was right was wise! Nevertheless this sentiment did not translate itself into a reversal of the foreign policy that had been denounced. On the contrary, the Foreign Office continued to use the army and navy, as before, to maintain the existing British possessions and spheres of influence, and even to add to the empire.¹

The Egyptian national debt was begun by Said Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, who borrowed from London bankers a little more than \$16,000,000, at a discount of twenty per cent. Said, and his nephew Ismail, who succeeded him in 1863, found it easy to float loans through European bankers at ruinous rates like this. Some of the money was spent on public works (contracts were often awarded, without competitive bidding, to the financial groups that loaned the money), but much of it was squandered. It took only twenty years for Egypt to become bankrupt. In 1875 Ismail Pasha had to sell out everything he owned to satisfy his creditors, and in this way the British government secured his Suez Canal shares for a cash payment—none of which went to Egypt—that was scarcely more than the premium paid to London bankers for the first small Egyptian loan. In 1876, to assure the payment of interest to European bondholders, international control was established over most of the revenues of Egypt. Later in the same year the British and French established a dual control of Egyptian finances. The railroads and the port of Alexandria were internationalized.

Khedive Ismail in 1879 attempted to rid Egypt of foreign intervention and was promptly deposed. France and Great Britain put his nephew Tewfik Pasha on the throne,

¹ During the second Gladstone ministry the Afghan and Boer wars were continued; Lord Salisbury's encouragement to France to invade Tunisia was not repudiated; British power was firmly established in Cyprus; the North Borneo Company was given a royal charter; Basutoland and Bechuanaland were placed under British protection; Tembuland was annexed; and the British government adopted as bellicose an attitude towards Russian aggression on the Afghan frontier in the early spring of 1885 as it had done towards the Russian advance on Constantinople under the Beaconsfield ministry.

and reëstablished the dual control. In 1882 the Egyptians revolted against the conditions under which they were living. They were led by agitators to believe that the misgovernment and heavy taxation from which they were suffering were due to the intervention of Europeans, who alone were enjoying the benefits of the new canal, of the railroads, and of the commerce of Alexandria. Egyptian labor and Egyptian money had dug the canal, built the port, and made the railroads. Arabi Pasha, leader of the anti-foreign movement, compelled the khedive, who had no force to oppose him, to make him a member of the cabinet. A massacre of foreigners in Alexandria on June 11, 1882, led to a bombardment of the port by the British fleet. The French fleet, which had come to Alexandria simultaneously with the British, refrained from taking part in the demonstration.

Pressure was brought to bear upon the sultan of Turkey, suzerain of Egypt, to send troops there to put down the insurrection. If the anti-foreign movement was successful, European concessions and investments, not to speak of the interest on the national debt, would be made valueless. When the sultan refused, the British government invited France, and then Italy, to take part in a military expedition "to restore the khedive's authority." France and Italy declined. A strong British force was landed in the Suez Canal. The Egyptians were routed at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, 1882. Arabi Pasha was deported to Ceylon. The British authorities assured the khedive that they wanted only to restore order by means of making secure an Egyptian government under the control of the khedive.

The military occupation was announced to the people of Egypt as temporary, and the promise was given that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as tranquillity was reëstablished. Similar assurances were given to the sultan by the British ambassador at Constantinople, and to the European powers by the British Foreign Office. Gladstone

informed Parliament that there was no intention to remain in Egypt, because this "would be absolutely at variance with all the principles of Her Majesty's government and the pledges we have given Europe." A year later Gladstone told Parliament that the British government deplored the talk in political and colonial circles about holding Egypt. While explaining that circumstances did not permit the immediate withdrawal of the army of occupation, he declared that the idea of staying in Egypt was repugnant to the government. He concluded his speech with the following statement against the agitation to hold Egypt:

"We are against it on the ground of the interests of England; we are against it on the ground of our duty to Egypt; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe."

Gladstone undoubtedly believed what he said. He needed to give this assurance especially to the French, who, although it was their own fault that they had not participated in the suppression of Arabi Pasha's revolt, were loud in their condemnation of what they called British hypocrisy and a scheme to annex Egypt. The assurances of Gladstone did not satisfy the French government, which protested formally against the abolition of the dual control by the khedive in January, 1883. For twenty years the French made trouble for the British in Egypt and encouraged the nationalist movement. After having financed and dug the canal and having for over half a century enjoyed a privileged position, the French could not reconcile themselves to seeing others reap where they had sown. The occupation of Egypt turned France against Great Britain in every part of the world, and it was not until 1904 that the French

government, in exchange for a free hand in Morocco, acknowledged the new *status quo* on the Nile.

The occupation of Egypt greatly increased British interest in the problem of the Sudan and made possible the developments that fifteen years later brought fame to Kitchener and added a million square miles to British holdings in Africa. From the southern border of Egypt to the equator, the country containing the Nile, to its headwaters in Lake Albert Nyanza, is now called the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This vast territory, which owed only a nominal allegiance to Turkey, was brought under Egyptian rule by Mehemet Ali, who gave the country an outlet to the Red Sea by leasing from the sultan the ports of Suakim and Massawa. The authority of the successors of Mehemet Ali was contested by the Sudanese, however, when an attempt was made to break up the slave trade. From 1869 to 1882 five European soldiers of fortune played the principal rôles in the Sudan, as employees of the khedive. Baker and Gordon, the former of whom had a Hungarian wife, were Englishmen of energy and ability and of unusual personality. Schnitzer (Emin Pasha) was a German naturalist, Rudolf Slatin an Austrian in his early twenties, and Romolo Gessi an Italian. These men were remarkably successful in military expeditions and in extending an administrative control really more their own than that of their employer. Gordon, the commanding figure after the retirement of Sir Samuel Baker, was an officer in the British army, and entered the service of the khedive with the consent of his government.

The Arabi Pasha revolt in Egypt occurred at the same time as an uprising against the Egyptian government in the Sudan. Mohammed Ahmed, a holy man who felt that he had been insulted by some official, proclaimed himself the successor of the Prophet, or Mahdi. As Cairo was impotent, with the larger part of its army preparing to oppose British intervention, no troops could be sent to put down

the movement, which was spreading like wild-fire. After they entered Cairo the British failed to pay attention to the Sudan insurrection. Only after some months did the Gladstone government agree to allow an Egyptian army, under the command of a British officer, Colonel Hicks, to move against the Mahdi. Hicks was defeated and killed in November, 1883, and the next month the Mahdi captured Slatin in Darfur. This led the Gladstone ministry to decide that Egypt must evacuate the Sudan. The British were unwilling to aid in the pacification of the Mahdi, and financial interests vetoed the spending by the Egyptian government of the large sums that a military expedition would have demanded.

Public opinion in England, however, quickly realized that this entailed a responsibility for the safe withdrawal of Egyptian officials and their families, and of military garrisons still resisting the Mahdi. General Gordon, whose earlier exploits in the Sudan and elsewhere had fired the imagination of the English, was intrusted with the task of an honorable evacuation, that is, of seeing that none should be left behind at the mercy of the Mahdi. Gordon arrived in Khartum in February, 1884. He succeeded in getting out most of the women and children before the lines of communication with Egypt were cut. From March, 1884, to January, 1885, Gordon, besieged in Khartum, held out against the Mahdi. Although powerful influences in press and Parliament were clamoring for immediate intervention of a British army, for some months nothing was done to send him relief. On January 28, 1885, when the British column reached Khartum, they found that the town had been captured two days earlier and its garrison killed. There was nothing to do but retire.

The death of Gordon made a lasting impression in England. Owing to the uncertainty of the British position in Egypt, nothing was done immediately to avenge him. More than a decade later, when the temporary occupation had

continued long enough to become a *fait accompli*, economic as well as political considerations compelled the British government to turn its attention to the pacification of the Sudan. What these considerations were, we shall see later. But, in the minds of the British people, their title to the Sudan, even though they were not in actual possession, could not be contested by any other European power.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION (1879-1908)

RADETSKY, in his memoirs, summed up the attitude of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire in words that give the key to the Eastern question during the nineteenth century:

“Owing to her geographical position, Russia is the natural and eternal enemy of Turkey. . . . Russia must therefore do all she can to take possession of Constantinople, for its possession alone will grant to her the security and territorial completeness necessary for her future.”

Three times during the century Russia endeavored to destroy the Ottoman Empire so that she might gain control of the exit to the Ægean Sea and extend her sphere of influence to the Adriatic through the Balkans and to the Mediterranean through Armenia. In each of the three wars—1828-29, 1854-55, 1877-78—Turkey was saved by the intervention of other European powers.

The most consistent opponent of the Russian ambition to expand at the expense of Turkey was Great Britain. In every crisis in the Near East, British statesmen opposed Russian policy. They were determined not to have the Russian navy in the Mediterranean, and they feared that the interest of Russia in the oppressed Christian subjects of Turkey was political rather than humanitarian. But they had to reckon with public opinion at home, which was loath to see Britain, in defense of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, stifling the aspirations of the Balkan peoples, and subjecting the Armenians and other Christians of Asiatic Turkey to servitude and the danger of mas-

sacre. Hence the British government kept insisting that Turkey treat fairly the non-Moslem elements of the empire.

France and Austria also attempted to prevent any aggrandizement of Russia in the Balkans and Armenia, and to thwart the various efforts made by the Muscovite government to secure special privileges within the Ottoman Empire. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century France had enjoyed the position of protectress of the Catholics under Turkish rule, and had been able to use the rights granted her in treaties to spread the French language in Turkey through the schools of religious orders. The cultural hold of France on the Ottoman Empire promoted commerce, and the French government was suspicious of the rise of nationalism among the Christians of Turkey, most of whom belonged to the Orthodox Church. Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbians, Montenegrins, Greeks, and Christian Arabs professed the same faith as the Russians, while most of the Armenians belonged to an independent church more closely affiliated with the Orthodox than the Roman communion. The triumph of nationalism among the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, seemed bound to work to the disadvantage of France and the advantage of Russia.

Austria's interest in the Ottoman Empire was, like the interest of Russia, that of a neighboring state which hoped to benefit territorially through the weakness of the Turks, but, if that were impossible, was determined that the other neighbor should not profit. The Balkan part of the Eastern question became a struggle between Russia and Austria for political control, or, if that could not be achieved, for paramount interest in the Balkan peninsula. The revolt of the Balkan peoples against Turkey, furthermore, created a unique danger for Austria. The Hapsburg empire contained a large element akin in blood to one of the Balkan peoples and affiliated with them in language and history. In the duel Russia made use of this weapon to destroy the

Hapsburg empire. Austria attempted to minimize the danger, and was led from one diplomatic move to another until she finally decided to stake the existence of the empire in an effort to wrest the weapon of Serbian nationalism from Russia's hands.

The Eastern question had long been a dominant factor in disturbing international relations before Italy and Germany completed their unification and became great powers. During the period of unification in Italy Cavour joined Great Britain and France in the Crimean War and sent an army from Piedmont to aid the western powers in defending Turkey from Russia. Cavour wanted to gain for Piedmont the right of representation in the international conference that would follow the war, and he looked forward to an alliance with France against Austria. But then, and later, the Italians realized that Russian control of the Slavs of the Balkans would be scarcely less dangerous to their future than Austrian control; hence they followed the policy of helping neither antagonist against the other. Most Italian statesmen, however, have shown the same disinclination to allow Russia to become a Mediterranean power as have British and French statesmen. Owing to the geographical position of Italy, also, they have felt that their security and their commercial interests were best served by opposing the aspirations of the Balkan peoples, especially those of Greece.

The entrance of Germany into Balkan politics, which occurred during the period under survey in this chapter, caused a metamorphosis in the Near Eastern policies of the powers. The changes in diplomatic combinations were gradual, and in some measure due to influences and the evolution of interests that had little to do with the Near East. But from 1878 to 1914 the outstanding new factor in the Near Eastern question was Germany, infeodating Austria to herself, and then rapidly and thoroughly penetrating the Balkan peninsula and Asiatic Turkey, and be-

coming the mistress, politically and economically, of Constantinople, with control of land trade routes east and west. The development of Germany's *Drang nach Osten* we shall describe elsewhere.¹ What we need to bear in mind here is only that its success materially strengthened Austria-Hungary against Russia and led Great Britain, France, and Italy to abandon the old opposition to Russia on the ground that, of two dangers and two evils, Russia at Constantinople was the lesser.

The two Balkan wars, in 1912 and 1913, are commonly supposed to have reopened the question of the succession of the Ottoman Empire, and to have substituted Germany for Great Britain as defender of the sultan's dominions. These wars, however, were the consequence of the decisions made at the Congress of Berlin. For, aside from Russia (and possibly Germany), none of the powers realized the impossibility of putting into execution the treaty of Berlin, which presupposed what did not and could not happen: (1) a regenerated Turkey, developing into a modern European state, or, failing that, a neutralized Turkey, in which no powers would gain advantages over the others; (2) adequate protection for Christian minorities, assured by the joint diplomatic pressure of the Berlin signatories; and (3) complete control by the powers over the relations of the Balkan states with one another and with Turkey.

On the eve of the war with Russia a remarkably astute ruler ascended the throne of Turkey. Sultan Abdul Hamid II was past master in playing the game of world politics. He realized that the powers were suspicious of one another in regard to every proposal for the solution of any Near Eastern problem, because their rulers and statesmen were thinking of foreign policy in the terms of making investments and selling goods. He knew how to take advantage of the constant pressure of bankers and merchants upon the foreign ministries of the powers. Therefore, whenever

¹ See pp. 202-206.

joint action was threatened he played each power in turn against the others, and whenever it was necessary to avert wrath or bid for support he frightened or cajoled or bribed the powers singly. Sometimes he went too far, but even then his genius made capital out of errors.

With a view to giving the Beaconsfield cabinet, which was supporting him against Russia, something to point to in answer to Gladstone's denunciations of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, a few months after his accession, gave his people a constitution which, if put into operation, would have brought Turkey into the family of European nations. When Beaconsfield had done all he could to soften for Turkey the terms of victorious Russia, and had been paid by the virtual cession of Cyprus, the sultan blandly suspended the constitution, and sent its author, Midhat Pasha, to exile and death. From this time on until the Revolution of 1908 Abdul Hamid ruled as a despot. Foreigners in Turkey were protected from most of the injustices of arbitrary rule and enjoyed security of life and property because of the capitulatory régime.¹ Ottoman subjects, on the other hand, although the powers had reserved in the treaty of Berlin the right of joint intervention to defend them against pillage and massacre, were unable to help themselves

¹ "Capitulations" is a term used to denote the special privileges granted by treaty to foreigners in Oriental countries. Capitulations originally provided only for the creation of legal machinery for non-Moslems of foreign origin resident in a country whose laws were theocratic. The jurisprudence of Mohammedan lands makes no provisions for non-Moslems. In the Ottoman Empire the early sultans solved this problem by recognizing their Christian and Jewish subjects as separate nations (*millets*), and by granting their hierarchies the authority to exercise administrative and judicial control in matters affecting their own peoples which Mohammedan jurisprudence did not cover. Europeans, having no religious courts in the empire (because they were of different branches of the Christian religion), were allowed to be under the jurisdiction of their consuls and live under the laws of their countries of origin. In addition, to encourage intercourse with Europe, the sultans allowed foreign traders immunity from taxation. This extra-territoriality, first conceived of as a convenience and granted by the Turks of their own free will, developed in the nineteenth century into a means of putting Turkey under foreign control. The capitulatory régime, in the era of world politics, has been extended to other Asiatic countries. The Japanese did not tolerate it long; but it has been used with great success to render China and Siam powerless to resist encroachments upon sovereignty.

when the Turks oppressed them. Only Moslems were recruited for the army, and Christians were forbidden the possession of firearms. Only Moslems could hope for justice in law-courts. Having neither physical nor legal means of making secure life and property, it was natural that, when the constitution was suspended, subject Christian (and in some cases non-Turkish Moslem) elements of the Ottoman Empire should invoke outside aid in their distress.

Concessions and trade kept the powers from intervening effectively to make living conditions tolerable for the subject peoples of the empire. This was a violation by the signatories of the treaty of Berlin of the article inserted to meet Russia's argument, that revision of the treaty of San Stefano for the benefit of Turkey was handing back several million defenseless Christians to the mercies of the Moslem despot. But the responsibility of the European statesmen was greater than simply failure to live up to obligations. Not only did they refuse to help the victims of Abdul Hamid, but by diplomatic action and by force they attempted to thwart the efforts made by the Ottoman subject peoples to rid themselves of the sultan's tyranny, whether by insurrection or by securing the coöperation of their more fortunate kinsmen who already enjoyed independence or autonomy.

After the treaty of Vienna the opposition of the powers to movements for independence in the Balkans could be regarded as consistent with a general European policy. Reactionary continental statesmen feared the effect of changes in political institutions or in the territorial *status quo* because nationalist and democratic movements anywhere in Europe were bound to have a repercussion in their own countries. Between 1815 and 1878 Europe underwent profound changes. But the natural fruition of nationalist movements did not take place in the Balkans. Political considerations that had in large part to do with questions

outside the Balkans led the powers to interfere in the struggles for freedom and the political evolution of Ottoman subject peoples. Greece was created without Epirus, Thessaly, and the larger Greek islands. Moldavia and Wallachia were forbidden to unite. Serbian and Montenegrin frontiers were drawn arbitrarily to the exclusion of tens of thousands of kinsmen left under Ottoman rule, and the suzerainty of the sultan over all the states except Greece was insisted upon. By defying the powers, progress in statehood was gradually made. But each independent action on the part of the Balkan peoples precipitated an international crisis.

At the congresses of Paris and Berlin the representatives of the Balkan peoples were excluded from the deliberations, and the treaties were written without considering the wishes or interests of Greeks, Serbians, Rumanians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Albanians. What advantages they received in these treaties were for the most part merely the recognition by the powers of accomplished facts. During the generation that followed the Congress of Berlin the liberated portions of Balkan peoples were constantly at loggerheads with Turkey and with one another over the misrule in and the eventual inheritance of the wide band of territory from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, which had been left without conditions to the sultan. Greece had an additional cause for unrest and quarrel in Ottoman treatment of the Cretans, who had begged at Berlin to be incorporated into Greece. No less after the treaty of Berlin than before were the Balkans a seething volcano, ready to break out into a war that would involve Europe.

One of the principal reasons for the intervention of Great Britain to revise the treaty of San Stefano had been the fear that Russia would control the new state of Bulgaria, which was created by that treaty with generous frontiers, including most of Macedonia and extending to the Ægean

Sea. While the treaty of Berlin at last recognized the independence of Montenegro and Serbia and the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in the independent state of Rumania, Bulgaria was granted only autonomy and was given frontiers that, like those of Greece, excluded a large part of the Bulgarian population of European Turkey. And, in order to make Bulgaria still weaker, the territory granted autonomy was divided into two separate provinces, as had been done in Rumania's case by the treaty of Paris. But, just as the Rumanians disregarded the treaty of Paris and proclaimed Moldavia and Wallachia one state, the Bulgarians waited only seven years after the treaty of Berlin was signed to confront the powers with the *fait accompli* of the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria.

During these seven years, however, the shoe had shifted to the other foot. What Great Britain had expected had not happened. The Bulgarians, displaying a remarkable aptitude for government and a spirit of independence from foreign control, refused to make their country a vassal of Russia. Accordingly, seeing in Bulgaria not an outpost of Russia but a barrier against Russian penetration of the Balkans, the British did not disapprove of this defiance of the treaty of Berlin. On the other hand, Russia, having found that she could not control Bulgaria, opposed the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. And thus the two powers quite reversed their attitude upon a question over which they had nearly fought only a few years before.

Russia now urged the sultan to send an army into Bulgaria. Abdul Hamid hesitated. The Gladstone ministry had just fallen, but advices from London indicated that Gladstone, who was committed to the policy of withdrawal from Egypt, would be returned to power provided he was not handicapped with the problem of Turkey disturbing the peace. Abdul Hamid felt also that it was poor policy for Turkey to follow Russian advice and be identified with a Russian point of view, especially in the matter of a coun-

try that he knew was lost to Turkey. Serbia, misinformed as to Turkey's intentions, declared war on Bulgaria. The Serb invasion, however, was quickly met and driven back by the Bulgarians, who in turn invaded Serbia. Finally Austrian intervention saved Serbia; and peace was restored by the sultan's agreement to recognize Prince Alexander of Bulgaria as governor-general of Eastern Rumelia.

Russia made one more effort to control Bulgaria. A conspiracy was organized against Prince Alexander, who was overthrown and compelled to abdicate. Through the efforts of the prime minister, Stambuloff, however, Russian influence was successfully resisted, and an Austrian officer, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, grandson of Louis Philippe of France and closely allied to the British royal family, was chosen as ruler. For more than twenty years parties hostile and friendly to Russia alternately dominated Bulgarian political life. But, although the Russian party was in power at different times (once through the assassination of Stambuloff), Russia never succeeded in using Bulgaria to further her schemes against Austria and Turkey. Hence Russia turned to Serbia and encouraged the Serbians to hope for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. This policy made Serbia and Bulgaria deadly enemies; for they both laid claim to the major portion of Macedonia and worked against each other to obtain the succession of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Under Prince Ferdinand, Bulgaria became a prosperous country and developed a strong army. In 1908, taking advantage of the revolution in Turkey, Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria, and was crowned czar at Tirnovo.

The treaty of Berlin gave to Austria the administration of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the military occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar. These territories were in the northwestern corner of the Balkan peninsula, south of Croatia and separated from the Adri-

atic by the narrow strip of the Dalmatian coast. Like the Croats and Dalmatians, the Bosnians and Herzegovinians, although partly Mohammedan, spoke the Serbian language and were an essential part of the Greater Serbia that was the goal of the Serbian nationalists. Their attribution by the powers to Austria-Hungary was a severe blow, which time only aggravated. Russian agents fanned the flames of discontent and used the decision of Berlin to demonstrate to the Serbians the necessity of an intensive propaganda in Macedonia, which had now become for Serbia the path to the sea.

In 1908 Austria-Hungary, believing that the Young Turk Revolution would jeopardize her hold on Bosnia and Herzegovina, notified the other signatories of the treaty of Berlin of the annexation to the Hapsburg empire of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 1885 and 1903 Serbia was cursed with dynastic conspiracies and scandals, which culminated in the assassination of the king and queen and the return to the throne of the rival dynasty in the person of King Peter Karageorgevich. It is profitless to go into this disgraceful history other than to mention that Austrian and Russian diplomacy utilized the peripetia of the court drama to influence Serbian foreign and economic policies. After the double assassination, only Russia and Austria-Hungary recognized the new king. A year later France, Germany, and Italy sent back their ministers to Belgrade. Great Britain, however, refused to resume diplomatic relations with Serbia until 1906.

The San Stefano treaty gave Greece nothing, and included within the proposed frontiers of Bulgaria large portions of Macedonia in which the Greeks claimed to have a substantial majority of the population. At Berlin the Greeks fared better than the other Balkan nations; a rectification of frontier was promised them, which, had it been made in accordance with the definite assurances given by Lord Salisbury, would have righted the wrong done the

Greeks of the mainland half a century earlier in the settlement after the war of independence. Turks and Greeks appointed a joint commission, as the treaty provided; but Abdul Hamid scored his first diplomatic victory in a long series of successful evasions of obligations. Although the commission had meetings on the ground and in Constantinople, the Turks refused to consider ethnographic and geographic facts. The Greeks appealed to the powers, who referred the question for settlement to their ambassadors at Constantinople. Virtually the same line from the *Ægean* to the *Adriatic* that had been suggested two years earlier at Berlin was decided upon. Abdul Hamid, relying for support upon Austria-Hungary and Italy, declared that Turkey could not acquiesce in the loss of Epirus and Thessaly. Secretly, however, the sultan intimated that he would yield most of the Greek claims in Thessaly if Epirus remained Turkish. This suited the two great powers bordering on the *Adriatic* whose strategic interests were in conflict with the proposal to extend northward the coast-line of a state already in possession of the *Ionian Islands* and suspected of being infeodated to British foreign policy.

Although the Greeks mobilized their army, the boundary dispute did not end in war. A compromise was effected by an international commission that gave Greece most of Thessaly and left to Turkey most of Epirus. Thus were planted the seeds of one of the most troublesome boundary questions of the Balkans, which for thirty years made bad blood between Turkey and Greece and since 1912 has embittered the relations between Greece and Albania. From the point of view of the wishes and interests of the peoples concerned, the Epirotes had the same right to be united with Greece as the Thessalians. They were sacrificed to world politics, and have given the powers that sacrificed them trouble ever since.

The increase of Greek territory by fourteen thousand

square miles and of the independent Greek population by three hundred thousand was, however, a notable victory for Hellenism, and it added to the little kingdom sorely needed agricultural lands. On the other hand, the maritime Greeks, like the Epirotes, failed as completely as in former international conferences to realize their ambitions. The Greeks of the mainland were hopelessly intermingled with Moslem and rival Christian elements in the territories to which they laid claim. But in the islands they possessed an overwhelming majority. From Mitylene to Rhodes, the islands off the coast of Asia Minor (with the exception of Samos, which had enjoyed autonomy since 1835) were given no privileged status in the Ottoman Empire. When Cretans tried to plead their cause at Berlin, they were not listened to. The Cypriotes were transferred from Turkey to Great Britain without being consulted. They knew nothing of the diplomatic deal of which they were the object until English soldiers arrived to take possession of the island.

Aside from Thessaly, Greece gained one advantage from the revision of the treaty of San Stefano from which later she was to benefit far beyond the dreams of the most ardent pan-Hellenists: Macedonia was prevented from becoming an organic part of Bulgaria. By the creation of a Slav state extending from the Balkans to the Ægean, Russian statesmen wanted to make sure of a permanent barrier to shut off the Greeks from Thrace and Constantinople. The history of the Balkan States since their emancipation shows that they know how to rid themselves of troublesome minorities. Had the treaty of San Stefano been executed, Hellenism would have largely disappeared from Macedonia, except, perhaps, in two or three coast cities. When the powers placed Macedonia back again under the Turks, all the Christian elements were condemned to another generation of misrule. But the Greek element at least could still cherish the hope, which the treaty of San Stefano would

have destroyed, of Macedonia's inclusion in a new Byzantine Empire.

Because of conflicting aims in Macedonia, the emancipated Balkan peoples, who had previously used all their strength against the common Mohammedan oppressor, added as a dominant influence in foreign policy hatred of one another to hatred of the Turks. If the Turks were to lose what was left of their dominions in Europe, each Balkan state determined to have the lion's share. In justification of their claims to Macedonia, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria adduced the same arguments—possession in the past, economic and strategic necessity, and a majority in the population. A balance-of-power theory was developed in Balkan diplomacy, and each little state became insanely jealous of an increase of the territory of any other. We have seen how Serbia, after the proclamation of the union of Eastern Rumania with Bulgaria, attacked Bulgaria. Greece also was eager to march against Bulgaria; but, as she had no common frontier with Serbia or Bulgaria, the Greeks could not get at the Bulgarians without invading Turkish territory.

Until the end of his reign Abdul Hamid exploited the consequences of the Serbo-Bulgarian War by encouraging the bitter rivalry of Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks in Macedonia. Over Epirus bad blood existed between Greeks and Albanians. In the northern and northeastern parts of Albania Turkish officials managed to keep Montenegrins, Serbians, and Albanians at one another's throats. By granting Rumania the right to establish a branch of her national church among the Kutzo-Wallachians (a small but scattered mountaineer element in Macedonia which spoke a Rumanian dialect), all the Balkan states were now brought into the cockpit. European Turkey touched the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea; separated Greece from the other Balkan states; had a common frontier with Austria and Hungary and coasts only twelve hours by sea from Italy and Russia; and

the railroad to Constantinople was an essential link in Germany's communications with the Orient. With seven distinct elements of the population pitted against one another, within twenty years of the signing of the treaty of Berlin European Turkey had fallen into a state of anarchy.

In these troubled waters Russia and Austria-Hungary fished. Macedonia was called "the danger zone of Europe" and its sovereign "the sick man of Europe." But when Greece went to war with Turkey over the Cretan question, the powers were not yet grouped into alliances that would make a European war inevitable. They were able to intervene jointly to save Greece after her defeat without getting into difficulties with one another. Common pressure was exercised on Bulgaria and Serbia. Despite the activity of its agents, who played the principal part in the Serbian propaganda in Macedonia, the Russian government advised the Serbian government to remain on friendly terms with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The Russian efforts seemed to be directed particularly to advancing the Serbian propaganda in Macedonia at the expense of the Greeks.

Between 1898 and 1902 the situation in Macedonia became intolerable. Russia was not in a position to make a bid for exclusive control of Macedonia, either by negotiations with Turkey or through Serbia and Bulgaria. She felt that Great Britain was watching for an opportunity to attack her, and her expansion in the Far East demanded all her attention and energies. She therefore joined with Austria in an ultimatum to Turkey. A memorandum of reforms that the two powers had had under consideration ever since 1897 was presented to the sultan in February, 1903. But Abdul Hamid replied that he had already begun to apply a similar program; and then engineered a series of insurrections to demonstrate the necessity of keeping large armed forces in Macedonia. Public opinion in Europe was fooled, and Abdul Hamid put down the in-

surrections with great cruelty. Russia and Austria-Hungary, however, persisted, and on October 9, 1903, they told the sultan that he must agree to what is known as the Mürzsteg program of reforms, which were to be put into effect under the supervision of agents of the two powers and enforced by a reorganized gendarmerie commanded by an Italian officer. The reforms proved a farce. But the powers did not come to a parting of the ways in regard to Macedonia until after the defeat of Russia in the Far East. Then Russia, having settled her differences with Great Britain, turned her activities once more to the Balkan peninsula and threatened to disturb the plans Germany had been making to bring the Ottoman Empire, in its entirety, into her economic sphere of influence.

Of the six powers, Germany was the one that figured least in international rivalry over the succession of Turkey, in concerted diplomatic and naval actions to coerce Turkey, and in frontier and treaty disputes with Turkey. Russia and Austria-Hungary were leaders in the Balkan intervention; Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy were involved in the long-drawn-out Cretan question; Russia, Great Britain, and France were the "protecting powers" of Greece; Great Britain and France intervened in Egypt; Russia made diplomatic representations in favor of Serbia, of Bulgaria (at times), and of the Armenians; France was defender of the interests of the Catholics of the empire, and public opinion in England forced Great Britain to take a stand more than once in behalf of the Armenians; Great Britain detached from the Ottoman Empire Cyprus and Egypt, and Russia a part of Armenia; Great Britain, France, and Italy had frequent disputes with Constantinople over frontier questions in Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Sudan. When Abdul Hamid was compelled to accept foreign control over a portion of the revenues of the state, by the creation of the Ottoman public debt, Great Britain and France were the principal powers interested. We have

traced the development of German influence in Turkey elsewhere.¹ But, in view of the later triumph of German diplomacy at Constantinople, it is interesting to point out that Germany, in her dealings with Abdul Hamid, profited by the fact that her general foreign policy did not cause constant friction with Turkey—a handicap that the other powers suffered.

In dealing with the powers Abdul Hamid took full advantage of the various conflicting interests in their world politics, which prevented them from combining to dictate how he should run his empire. The powers drew up definite programs of reforms, upon the adoption of which they insisted in joint notes; together and singly, they warned Abdul Hamid to keep order in Macedonia, to stop bullying the Cretans, and to refrain from massacring the Armenians. But only when an international financial interest was at stake were their ultimatums and naval demonstrations effective. Abdul Hamid could not afford to offend the bankers. To withstand political and humanitarian demands, however, he was in a splendid position. It was not until the closing years of his reign that Great Britain compounded her colonial rivalries with France and Russia. But even after the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907,² and after the disappearance of Abdul Hamid from the scene, British statesmen hesitated to use force against Turkey, whose sultan was the khalif (successor of the Prophet), to whom seventy million Mohammedans of India owed spiritual allegiance.

We can not enter into the Cretan question, which involved four of the powers with Turkey and Greece during most of the period under survey; nor into the Armenian question. The failure of European diplomacy to reconcile Ottoman and Greek interests in Crete with the aspirations of the

¹ See pp. 202-206.

² For the former agreement see pp. 191-194, and for the latter pp. 180-182.

Cretans, and to prevent the wholesale massacre of Armenians in Asia Minor and Constantinople, demonstrated the inability of the powers to act in concert for the solution of the Near Eastern question, and the impotence of humanitarian considerations, however great, to influence the course of world politics. Because Armenia's natural wealth and geographical position are not important enough to be vital factors in international diplomacy, statesmen have given attention to the Armenians only during the brief periods when public opinion has been aroused by the stories of atrocities. When indignation died down the Armenians were ignored. The Cretan trouble did not bring the powers into conflict. Its bearing on world politics is limited to the influence it had upon Greece's rôle in expelling Turkey from her European provinces.

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIAN COLONIAL EXPANSION (1829-1878)

FROM the beginning of the formation of the Russian Empire the Muscovite government made no distinction between Europe and Asia. There was simultaneous expansion in all directions towards the open sea. Consequently, the additions to the empire were always in contiguous territory. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian expansion was not, strictly speaking, colonial, but was rather the natural, automatic development of a unitary, political empire. The Russians did not assimilate other peoples when they incorporated them. They were not feeling the urge of emigrating to escape overpopulation, or of developing new lands and exploiting alien peoples to secure raw materials or to provide markets for their surplus production. In order to understand the radical difference between Russia as a world power and the other world powers, we must bear these facts in mind.

The treaty of Paris, in 1856, sought to impose upon Russia conditions that, if persisted in, would have prevented her normal economic evolution. Russian foreign policy had to adapt itself to the rules of the new game of world politics. But the Muscovite government enjoyed advantages that enabled it to play a more independent rôle than the other powers in international relations. The empire was self-supporting, virtually immune from invasion, and not vitally affected by sea power; and its rulers did not have to take into consideration the pressure of public opinion.

In the Near East and the Far East alike, the position of Russia was different from that of other European powers. The Balkans, Turkey, China, and Japan were

neighbors. Long before there was a Near Eastern question, or a Far Eastern question, to disturb the relations among the European powers and change their attitude toward one another, the Russians had been building up their empire at the expense of the Turks and Persians, and had been in conflict with the Chinese and Japanese over commercial and strategic problems. These did not affect the Occidental powers until the new conditions in industry and transportation led them to seek far-off markets.

Siberia was an integral part of the Muscovite empire for more than a century before the Russians reached the Black Sea or were firmly established on the Baltic. The Cossacks founded Tobolsk in 1587, and Muscovite authority was extended beyond Lake Baikal in 1640. The Russians entered the basin of the Amur River in 1650, and signed with China the treaty of Nertchinsk, fixing the Russo-Chinese boundary, in 1689. In 1492, only twelve years after control in Russia passed from the Tartars to the Russians, Georgia first appealed to Moscow for assistance against the Persians and Turks.

Five years before the French Revolution the Crimea was ceded by Turkey to Russia, and during the Napoleonic era Russia incorporated Finland, the Aland Islands, Courland, and Bessarabia. Georgia was annexed in 1801, and by the treaty of Gulistan, in 1813, Persia ceded to Russia Caucasian territories that had been contended for among Persians, Turks, and Russians for several generations.

In the northern Pacific the Russians gained their first foothold in 1636 and arrived at the mouth of the Amur in 1644. Behring Strait was discovered by the Cossack Dejneff in 1648, and Russian claims were established over Kamchatka and Alaska before the end of the seventeenth century. The Russians first came into contact with the Japanese in the Kurile Islands; on many of them they set up pillars of occupation, which the Japanese promptly

destroyed. In 1807 Sakhalin Island was occupied by the Russian navy. Three years later the Russian vice-admiral in charge of the expedition to explore and claim the Kurile Islands was made prisoner by the Japanese, who released him in 1813 only after he formally renounced, in the name of his government, the Russian claim to Sakhalin and the Kurile group.

A knowledge of these facts is essential to the study of Russian expansion in the nineteenth century. We need to bear in mind that wars with Turkey and Persia were a natural part of the process of creating the Russian Empire; that the push toward the sea began when Russia began; that Siberia was not an acquisition by a state already formed, but an original and component part of it; and that Russia was the first European power to come into contact and conflict with China and Japan. After steam power changed international relations other European states united to prevent a further extension of Russia at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and to enter into trade relations with China and Japan. This brought Russia into opposition with other European powers over questions that had not up to this time been raised in European affairs, questions that did not have to do with the direct relations between Russia and the Occidental states, questions that Russia felt were of right matters to be decided between her and her Oriental neighbors.

In the Near East Russia awakened the suspicions and the fears of Great Britain, France, and Austria by her sponsorship of the cause of the Christians in the Balkans; of Great Britain and France by her desire to control the Baltic and Black seas; of France by setting up a claim to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, which conflicted in Syria and Palestine with the political and commercial advantages enjoyed by France through being protector of the Catholic Christians; of Austria by the inten-

tion attributed to Russia of reaching the Adriatic; of Great Britain by the menace to India arising from penetration into central Asia.

The last advance Russia was able to make in the Near East without interference from the other powers was in the wars with Persia and Turkey during the first decade of the use of steam power in transportation. Complaints against the Russian methods of administering the countries ceded by the treaty of Gulistan led Persia to renew the war for the Caucasus in 1826. After two years of fighting, Persia signed the peace of Turkmantchai, abandoning to Russia the provinces of Erivan and Nakhitchevan and agreeing to pay an indemnity. In the same year Russia turned her arms against Turkey, crossed the Balkans, and dictated peace in Adrianople in the spring of 1829. The treaty of Adrianople was a fitting complement to that of Turkmantchai, and it aroused as much anxiety in Austria as the treaty with Persia had aroused in Great Britain. Three years earlier, by the convention of Akerman, the Sublime Porte had granted the Serbians autonomy and had recognized what amounted to a Russian protectorate over Serbia, and also over Wallachia and Moldavia. These arrangements were now specifically confirmed. Further, Turkey assented to the extension of Russian sovereignty over the tribes in the Caucasus whose allegiance Persia had renounced, and agreed to waive all her own claims.

It remained for Russia to make the inhabitants of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia accept her sovereignty. For thirty years she was never without a war on her hands somewhere between the Caspian and the Black seas. Not until after the Crimean War did she push the pacification of these territories with such vigor that the resistance of the Mohammedan tribes was broken. Between 1859 and 1864 her administrative control was definitely established in a region that rapidly became one of the richest of the empire. Along the Caspian coast around Baku the develop-

ment of the oil-fields made this conquest one of world-wide importance, to which the Occidental powers were never reconciled. Most of the Circassians emigrated to Turkey. At Paris, in 1856, Russia was compelled to give up her expansion southward along the Black Sea and her demand for Kars. But at Berlin, in 1878, the other powers, content with blocking her in the Balkans, agreed to the annexation of Kars, Bayazid, Ardahan, and Batum. This gave Russia a strategic frontier against Turkey, and a port and railway terminus on the Black Sea, which the development of the Baku oil-fields made necessary.

The treaty of Paris neutralized the Black Sea and took away from Russia the mouth of the Danube by depriving her of a portion of Bessarabia, together with her rights of intervention in Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Fourteen years later, when Russia realized that the balance of power in Europe was changed by the German defeat of France, she denounced, on October 31, 1870, the Paris stipulations as to the neutrality of the Black Sea.¹ The treaty of Berlin in 1878 recognized this act, and also gave back the Bessarabian territory lost after the Crimean War. From 1878 until 1918, when the Entente gained control of the Bosphorus, Russia maintained a fleet in the Black Sea and strong fortifications on the littoral. In 1886 the free port stipulation of the treaty of Berlin was repudiated.

After the Crimean War the Russians began to expand into central Asia from the north by way of the steppes and from the west by way of the Caspian Sea. The Transcaspian Province was built up largely of territory taken from Khiva, and it brought the Russians to the frontier of Persia. Farther east, Syr Daria was detached from

¹ Great Britain and France were determined also to render Russia powerless in the Baltic Sea. To this end, the treaty of Paris provided for the neutralization of the Aland Islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In the autumn of 1914 Russia violated this provision of the treaty of Paris also, and did not answer the protests of Sweden, for whose benefit the original stipulation was supposed to have been made.

Bokhara after the Holy War of 1866. Tashkend was captured in 1865, and Alexander II created the government of Turkestan in 1867. This brought the Russians to the frontier of Afghanistan, and was the beginning of a new source of friction between Russians and British, in which Persians and Afghans became the victims. The khan of Khiva acknowledged the supremacy of the czar in 1870, and Bokhara became a vassal state of Russia in 1873.

The intervention of Great Britain and France to save Turkey in 1854 and the attitude of Italians, Germans, and Austrians, were taken to heart by the czar and his ministers, who realized that all of the powers stood between them and the Mediterranean. The decision to colonize eastern Siberia, where up to this time only convicts had been sent, followed immediately. In 1855 began the new movement of Russian colonization to the Pacific coast, which had been renounced in the Chinese treaty of 1689. By the treaty of Nertchinsk, Russia had promised China to abandon her advance along the Amur. Taking advantage of the embarrassment of China, who was struggling with the demands of the British and French, Russia now, however, disregarded the old treaty and sent peasants all along the river under the protection of Cossacks. Great progress was made between 1855 and 1858, when Russia joined Great Britain and France in forcing China to sign treaties whose advantages were unilateral.

But we must go back to the decade preceding the Crimean War for the first steps in the renewal of Russian activity in the Far East. The treaty of Nanking in 1842, following the Opium War, gave Hong-Kong to Great Britain and opened up for foreign trade four treaty ports besides Canton. The United States, France, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway secured treaty rights between 1844 and 1847; while an imperial rescript of December 28, 1844, permitted the propagation of Christianity, which had been suppressed in 1724. These encroachments alarmed and

stimulated the Russian government. There was fear that the missionaries and traders of western Europe would quickly appropriate everything in sight, and this apprehension was confirmed by the cruises of British and French squadrons in north Pacific waters for several years before the Crimean War. The intervention of the United States and the western European powers in Japan also demanded attention. In the interior of Asia, Russia was the neighbor of China, with boundaries settled by treaties in 1689, 1727, 1768, and 1792. These regulated the traffic across the frontier and gave certain rights to the Orthodox Church. In the north Pacific up to this time only the Japanese had staked out claims rivaling those of the Russians.

Russia's answer to the treaty of Nanking was the Kuldja convention, concluded in 1851 for the regulation of trade on the Mongolian frontier—a settlement which gave Russia a pretext for annexing most of Kuldja thirty years later. In 1851 also, Nikolaevsk, at the mouth of the Amur, was founded and fortified, and two other posts on the sea-coast were established in 1853. In the same year the Russians put garrisons in the southern part of Sakhalin Island, near one of which coal was discovered.

With this start, they were ready to take diplomatic steps when the psychological moment should arrive. This moment came with the Second Anglo-Chinese War. China had protested against the violations of the ancient treaty concerning the Amur. But her hands were tied with the Taiping Rebellion, and when Great Britain and France again started hostilities in 1857 Russian diplomats were able to sympathize with China. Had Russia not also been the victim of Anglo-French aggression, and had she not been forced to conclude a humiliating treaty the previous year? The treaty of Aigun, May 29, 1858, recognized the north bank of the Amur to the sea as Russian, and gave Russia the reversion of rights—ahead of any other foreign power—over the territory between the Usuri and the sea. Two

weeks later the Russians were the first signatories of the Tientsin treaties, which the British, French, and Americans had drafted to impose upon China in the opening up of trade. When the French and British renewed the war and marched on Peking, the Russian envoy, who had stayed with the Chinese, became the mediator for China. The British and French were dumfounded when they discovered that on November 14, 1860, three weeks after they had secured new treaties, with additional advantages, from China at the point of the sword, and after a costly expedition, a Russo-Chinese treaty gave Russia, who had not fought at all, the rich territory of Primorskaya, between the Usuri River and the Pacific. This valuable acquisition, which became the maritime province of Siberia, contained a great harbor that had been discovered and named by the French in 1852 and renamed and partly mapped out by an English squadron in 1855. The Russians rebaptized Victoria Bay. It became Peter the Great Bay, and in 1861 Vladivostok was founded.

The Russian government was not unmindful of the necessity of treating with Japan, which was just entering into world affairs. A Russo-Japanese treaty was signed in 1856, dividing the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan and declaring Sakhalin neutral. But after the establishment of Vladivostok the Russians became worried by the anomalous status of the latter. They were afraid that the island would be occupied by another European power, or that Japan, at the instigation and under the influence of some other power, would disregard the treaty provisions of 1856 and fortify the island. Accordingly in 1862 Russia suggested to Japan the joint occupation of the island, but demanded the lion's share. Japan's counter-offer to divide was not accepted, and in 1865 Russia proposed to give her share of the Kurile Islands in exchange for the whole of Sakhalin. In 1867 a curious convention was signed acknowledging the common right of occupation, wherever it

was made effective by colonization, but with no delimitation of zones. The Russians, not having sufficient colonists, merely staked out claims. The Japanese followed suit. This unsatisfactory arrangement was abandoned in 1875, when Japan agreed to the proposal of 1865, ceded Sakhalin to Russia, and took in exchange the remainder of the Kurile Islands. In the meantime Russia sold her rights on the American coast to the United States in 1867.

Sakhalin was essential for the freedom and protection of the new port of Vladivostok. But Russia recognized from her experience in the Crimean War the futility of remote island and overseas possessions for a nation that could not hold its own against naval powers. Even under the new conditions of world politics, the colonial expansion of Russia was to follow the old policy of the growth of the Russian Empire—no jumps, but simply the addition of contiguous territories. The political foundations were laid before 1878. It required only railways to knit together the empire, and to bring into touch with and under the effective administrative control of Petrograd and Moscow, an easily defended empire of boundless wealth.

CHAPTER IX

CONSOLIDATION OF RUSSIAN POWER IN THE FAR EAST (1879-1903)

THE dominions of the Romanoffs in Europe and Asia grew by expansion in every direction from Moscow. In seeking outlets to the sea, the Russians made no jumps; hence the land over which their flag waved in 1914 was all contiguous territory. They added neighboring countries and subjected neighboring races until they were masters of the largest continuous empire the world has ever known. Their political aggrandizement outward from Moscow was a consistent forward march toward the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, the Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic Sea, the *Ægean* Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. Before the World War the first three of the eight possible outlets had been reached and made secure. To reach the others Russian foreign policy ran afoul of Italy and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, of all the great powers in the Ottoman Empire, of Great Britain in Persia and Afghanistan, of China and Japan in the Far East. Its final success depended upon the collapse of Turkey, the limiting of Great Britain's influence in the countries surrounding India, and the partition of China.

Up to the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the efforts of Russia were directed principally against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. She tried to become the dominant power in the Balkans, to control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and to encroach upon Asiatic Turkey by extending her empire south of the Caucasus. Distance made political and economic expansion in Asia as yet more or less impracticable. Russia became a rival with

whom Great Britain had to reckon, a despoiler of China, and an enemy of Japan, only when soldiers and colonists followed the extension of her railway system. When the Russian rail-heads arrived at the frontiers of Persia and of Afghanistan, Great Britain prepared to fight. When the Trans-Siberian Railway reached the Pacific, war between Russia and Japan was inevitable.

In studying the expansion of Russia across Asia, however, we need to have before us a meteorological map of the continent. The Trans-Siberian Railway had to be kept as far south as possible, for two reasons: to avoid cold and snow, enemies of steam transportation; and to traverse territories whose development by colonists would make the construction of the railway financially practicable. It was considerations of climate, also, that, once the project of linking the Pacific with Moscow was adopted, led to the policy of political expansion southward. The vast stretches of Siberia, already owned by Russia, were of no value for the railway's maintenance; to make the project pay, branch lines had to be run towards Persia, India, and China. We must not fall into the error of regarding Russian foreign policy in Asia, after the conception of the Trans-Siberian Railway, as simply a policy of intrigue against Great Britain in India and of wanton land-grabbing in China. The commerce of Persia and Afghanistan, of Tibet and Mongolia, were factors of importance; northern Manchuria was the logical route to Vladivostok; a branch south from Mukden to Dalny would give an ice-free terminal port and add to the railroad's revenue; an extension to Peking would follow of itself.

After the Congress of Berlin the Russians were unable to realize their aspirations in the Balkan peninsula. Constantinople had eluded their grasp. No European power, not even France, was willing to support Russia in an aggressive Near Eastern policy. After the disappointment of failing to dominate, politically and economically, infant

Bulgaria, Russian statesmen limited their efforts to check-mating any extension of Austrian influence in the Balkans. They were glad to sign an agreement with Austria-Hungary for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula, and six years later to join that power in presenting the Mürzsteg program to the signatories of the treaty of Berlin as a means of solving the Macedonian problem. This enabled them to concentrate all their efforts upon expansion in Asia.

When the secret treaty of Skiernevice was signed in 1884, Czar Alexander III refused to agree to the suggestion of Bismarck that the stipulation of benevolent neutrality should hold good in the event of two of the powers in the Dreikaiserbund (league of three emperors) being at war with a power outside the group. Although he was willing to enter into the treaty with a view to protecting Russia against an attack by the Triple Alliance, he thought that it was not to the interest of Russia to see France crushed again. When the treaty expired in 1887, he refused to renew it. France was thus saved from a continuance of complete isolation by Russia's anxiety over a further shifting of the balance of power in Europe through the permanent weakness of France. He did not mean to encourage France in an aggressive policy towards Germany. But as Russia needed French financial support for her railway projects, especially in Asia, he agreed to reassure France to the extent of entering into a military convention, which was ratified shortly before his death. When Nicholas II succeeded to the throne in November, 1894, the understanding became an alliance. Nicholas had no quarrel with Germany and did not intend to be drawn into one. Nor did he look for political aid from France in Russia's Far Eastern policy. But he did have to secure French capital for the Trans-Siberian Railway and its ramifications, and he realized that, once enormous sums

of French money were tied up in Russian schemes, France would not join other powers in opposing Russia, even though she could not be counted upon to support her.

Between 1895 and 1905 the railway mileage in the Russian Empire was almost doubled. Considerably more than half of the new mileage was in Asiatic Russia. Its construction completely changed the political and economic history of the empire. The first section of the Trans-Siberian Railway, from Chelyabinsk to Omsk, was opened in December, 1895. During the next seven years all the connecting links (except around Lake Baikal) were completed and a number of branch lines built. Vladivostok was joined to Moscow by a railway line five thousand miles long, a thousand miles of which were in Chinese territory. It was originally intended to build the Trans-Siberian Railway entirely on Siberian territory, and by 1898 the rails had been pushed five hundred miles north from Vladivostok to join the line coming from the west. But the cost, in view of engineering difficulties and the impossibility of ever counting upon more than a scant population, was prohibitive. This led to the Manchurian short cut and the war with Japan.

When we consider how essential to the success of the Russian railway projects was the right of way across northern Manchuria, the determination of Russia not to allow Japan to remain on the continent after her victory over China is understood. Students of European imperialism understand also the chain of events that put Russia in the place from which, by insisting upon the modification of the treaty of Shimonoseki, she had ousted Japan. Vladivostok and the thousand miles of railway in China had to be protected.

It would not do to allow a Japanese naval base at Port Arthur, as that would facilitate landing a Japanese army; *ergo*, a naval base must be established where

the potential enemy wanted one. The naval base must be connected with the railway by a branch line for use in case of siege. It would not pay to build the line for strategic purposes alone; *ergo*, a commercial port and mining concessions must also be thought of. Additional justification was found in the fact that Vladivostok was ice-bound (or at least ice-impeded) in winter. A simple right of way across northern Manchuria, therefore, easily developed into successive demands at Peking for Russian control of all Manchuria, including the Liao-tung peninsula. Once committed to this policy, Russia felt that she could not stop with Manchuria. A naval base in Korea became necessary.

From the Russian point of view, every move seemed a reasonable corollary to necessary railway-building. From the Japanese point of view, however, Russian activity was rapidly creating a situation in which Japan would either have to accept the exclusive control of Russia in Manchuria (and eventually in Korea), protected by Russian naval supremacy in Japan's own waters, or else fight Russia.

For five years after she, with the help of France and Germany, robbed Japan of the fruits of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia made her advances cautiously. But when the Boxer Rebellion threw China into anarchy, her full plans began to come to light. France, Germany, and Great Britain had now become accomplices in the spoliation of China, and were in no position to oppose Russia openly, either at Peking or by direct diplomatic representations at Petrograd. The United States would go no farther than words. The Chinese government was corrupt and passive. Alone Japan faced the test that would determine whether she was to become a great power or a vassal state like the other countries of Asia.

Russian statesmen acted imprudently. Had they been content to restrict Russian activities to Manchuria, they

could have postponed, if not averted, the conflict with Japan. In securing the long lease of Port Arthur and the concession to extend a branch of her railway into the Liao-tung peninsula, Russia was not menacing Japan more than were the other three powers who were partners in encroaching upon Chinese sovereignty. Great Britain, for one, had signed a sphere-of-influence agreement with Russia. Germany was acting in the Shantung peninsula as Russia was acting in the Liao-tung peninsula. France was now the open ally of Russia. All four powers had leased ports which, in their hands, were a menace to Japan. Japan could not fight all the powers, and her diplomatic position would have been precarious had she declared war on Russia for what was happening in China. It was common sense for the Russians to wait before provoking Japan until they had completed their Asiatic railway system and had tested it for military purposes. But, instead of making haste slowly, they tried to do everything at once.

In March, 1900, occurred the first of the events that compelled Japan to issue her second challenge to Europe.¹ It was announced that Russia had secured a concession for exclusive settlement at Masan-pho, the finest harbor of Korea, and the promise of the Korean government not to cede the island of Koji, off Masan-pho, to any foreign country; and the Petrograd government forthwith declared its intention to make Masan-pho a winter harbor for war-ships. Had Masan-pho become a naval base, Russia would have dominated the passage from the Japan Sea to the Yellow Sea. Japan sent an ultimatum to Korea, demanding that the concession be canceled, and after a year of bickering the matter was temporarily settled by a grant of concessions at Masan-pho to both Russia and Japan. At the same time, a joint Korean-Japanese company secured a concession for a railroad from Seoul to the port of

¹ See Chapter XII.

Fusan, which is near Masan-pho, and which the Japanese knew they could develop in such a way as to control Masan-pho.

The second attempt of Russia to enter Korea occurred in 1903. Inspired by the example of France in Siam, where a lumber concession in the Mekong Valley was being successfully followed up by administrative control of both banks of the river, Russia established a settlement at Phyong-an Do, on the Korean side of the Yalu River. The Korean government protested. The Russian minister replied that a settlement at Phyong-an Do was necessary for developing a timber concession granted in 1896. The Koreans rejected this interpretation. There was nothing in the terms of the concession about a settlement. The Russian minister then tried to force Korea to sign supplementary clauses to the original concession, legalizing the occupation of land at Phyong-an Do. Seconded by Great Britain and the United States, Japan backed up the Korean protest.

Here the fatal weakness of the Korean government became evident. It was the same kind of weakness that was leading to the partition of China. Afraid of provoking resentment, and unwilling to take either side, Korea sought a solution in inaction. She neither insisted upon the Russians leaving nor signed the supplementary clauses. To get even with Japan, Russia instigated the Korean government to protest against the issue of notes by the Japanese bank at Seoul, the first and only banking enterprise in Korea. The Japanese bank-notes were declared illegal. No steps were taken, however, to prevent their circulation. None could accuse the Koreans of partiality. Unable to defend their own interests, and unwilling to take sides, they simply put up their country as a prize to be fought for and won by the strongest.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, Russian foreign policy

in the Far East led from Vladivostok to Korea and Liao-tung. In 1894 Japan fought China to keep Russia out of Korea, and as a result of her victory took Liao-tung, although she was not allowed to keep it. In 1904 Japan fought Russia to keep Russia out of Korea, and again took Liao-tung. Both wars were caused by the inability of Korea to maintain her independence and of China to maintain her sovereignty.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN'S FIRST CHALLENGE TO EUROPE: THE WAR WITH CHINA (1894-1895)

ACCIDENTALLY discovered by the Portuguese about the middle of the sixteenth century, Japan became a field for missionary propaganda, and during almost a hundred years, from 1542 to 1637, had trade and cultural relations with Europe. For more than fifty years Portuguese Jesuits and traders enjoyed a monopoly. But at the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish Franciscans, operating from the Philippines, began to enter the field. The eyes of the Japanese were opened as to the significance of the propaganda by the frank statement of the captain of a wrecked Spanish galleon, who thought to intimidate the natives when he declared:

“Our kings begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer missionaries who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made suitable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest.”

When the Spaniards attempted to get a foothold, an edict expelling missionaries, promulgated in 1587 but only mildly enforced, was invoked to save the country from the peril of foreign domination. But Jesuits and Franciscans returned in disguise, and massacres of Christians followed. It took forty years to extirpate Christianity. To accomplish this, all intercourse with Europe had to be stopped. From 1639 to 1853 trade relations with the outside world were entirely severed.

When, through the inevitable development of world trade

as a result of the revolution in transportation and industry, the Asiatic coast of the Pacific began to be more frequented by the ships and traders of the Occident, it was impossible for Japan to preserve her isolation. Russia was pressing on China from the north and Great Britain and France from the south. In the course of time one of the three powers would certainly have seized a foothold on Japanese islands in its struggle against the others for commercial mastery of the Far East. The United States, however, anticipated this extension of European eminent domain.

The development of the whaling industry in Alaskan waters resulted in frequent shipwreck of Americans on Japanese islands, and the first visits of American ships to Japanese ports were to secure the release of American sailors and to return Japanese seamen shipwrecked on our own Pacific coast. In 1846 two American war-ships anchored off Uraga, and Commodore Biddle made an official overture for trade relations. The refusal was categorical, and the commodore did not insist.

The acquisition and rapid development of California, following close upon the failure of Commodore Biddle, prompted a second and more insistent overture. Commanding a squadron of four war-ships, Commodore Perry appeared in Uraga Bay in 1853. He brought a letter from President Pierce, and said that he would return for an answer. By the time he came back, in February, 1854, the Japanese had made up their minds to abandon the policy of non-intercourse, because they were convinced that it could not be maintained. Perry had made a profound impression. He had uttered no threats; but when he returned with ten ships instead of four, the Japanese realized that if they did not sign a commercial treaty voluntarily they would be forced to do so.

Now that international relations had become a world necessity, Japan could not remain aloof. Even if she could have lived on without foreign commerce, her islands lay

along one of the world's great trade routes. Questions arose as to lighthouses, the charting of straits, open ports for coaling and refuge against storm, neutrality in the event of war. And behind loomed the great issue of a recognized international status for Japan in order to prevent conflicts in the political and commercial rivalry of the Occidental powers in the Far East.

It took nearly fifteen years for the Japanese to reconcile themselves to the presence of foreigners and the penetration of Occidental civilization. The treaties negotiated by the United States and the European powers were not accepted immediately. In unison and separately, the powers made naval demonstrations, and twice there were bombardments. The Japanese finally accepted the new order, not because they had become convinced of the superiority of our ways over theirs, but in self-defense.

Japan began the deliberate process of Occidentalizing herself in 1866. The result has been unique and startling—unique because Japan kept her independence, startling because she has turned the tables on us and is beating us at our own game. The aim of the European powers and the United States in the development of world politics is the extension of political control to secure markets and investment or colonizing areas.¹ Until we confronted the new Japan, we assumed that the modern world order necessitated the political and economic subordination to the white race of all other races. Where exclusive control by one Caucasian race was denied by other Caucasian races, wars were fought or threatened, and international diplomacy arranged spheres of influence. During the past fifty years Japan succeeded first in eluding Caucasian overlordship, and then in setting herself up as one of the great

¹ We must remember that if the United States lays claim to a more altruistic foreign policy than the other powers, it is because our entry into world politics came much later than that of European states. The reasons for this are explained in Chapter XLVI. With surplus capital to invest and overseas trade to develop, where temptations have confronted us our policy has been different only in degree from that of the other powers.

powers whose claims could not be ignored in the delimitation of spheres of influence.

Consequently, in the study of world politics we must make a place for Japan among the world powers. She can not be considered in a category apart from the rest of us. Her international relations have followed the same evolution, have been inspired by the same motives, have been guided by the same laws, and have displayed the same phenomena. Japan's foreign policy, like that of European powers, is explained by the instinct of self-preservation and the belief that prosperity depends upon a place in the sun secured by the exploitation of alien races through the use of force.

Japan had a long struggle, however, to free herself from the infringements upon her sovereignty established by the original treaties with the United States and the European powers. During her first thirty years of contact with the world she allowed foreigners capitulatory rights similar to those enjoyed by Europeans and Americans in other Asiatic countries. Originally, judicial and fiscal autonomy and extra-territoriality within prescribed areas had been as necessary for foreigners in Japan as in other countries where laws and customs were widely divergent from those of the Occident.

But when Japan became what we call a civilized nation, with a judicial system like ours, and when the Japanese government was in a position to assure the protection of the rights of foreigners in every part of the country, the continuance of the capitulatory régime served only to work against the interests of the Japanese in their own land. In 1878, contingent upon similar action by the other powers, the United States agreed to the abolition of special privileges for Americans. Not until 1894, however, following eleven years of constant negotiations, were the old treaties finally abrogated. Immediately after Japan became mistress in her own house and was received by the other powers

on a footing of equality, she issued her first challenge to the doctrine of European eminent domain.

The peninsula of Korea juts out from the mainland of Asia towards Japan between the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea. The Japan Sea is as important to Japan as is the North Sea to Great Britain. The Yellow Sea is as important to China as is the stretch of the Atlantic between Boston and Newport News to the United States. Korea has been called a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. This expression is no exaggeration. Were Korea in the hands of any European power, the menace to Japan would be as the menace to Great Britain of Belgium in the hands of Germany. A European power ensconced in Korea could separate Japan from China and control the outlet of northern China to the Pacific.

For many centuries Korea, like Japan, was a closed country. Attempts of missionaries and traders to penetrate the peninsula were successfully resisted. Japan was open to foreign influence several decades before the Koreans were forced to allow foreigners to settle in their country. This fact alone frustrated the complete triumph of European eminent domain in Asia. For when the Koreans were called upon to incur the fate of other weak and backward Asiatic nations, the Japanese had become strong enough to have a foreign policy of their own and to anticipate the ambitions of European imperialism. The fear that Russia or Great Britain would get control of Korea led Japan to interfere in the internal affairs of the "hermit kingdom," to fight two costly wars, and finally to annex the whole peninsula.

Between 1876 and 1892 the ports and interior of Korea were opened to foreign settlement, trade, and missionary effort by treaties with Japan, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary. Immediately diplomatic agents of the powers began the traditional game of intriguing for exclusive concessions

and political influence. As elsewhere in Asia, their efforts were powerfully helped by civil war and administrative anarchy, which they encouraged as much as they could. Plots were hatched in foreign legations, and unsuccessful revolutionaries found refuge in the legations. Under cover of the political instability of the first decade of Korea's entrance into the family of nations, the European powers tried to secure concessions for naval stations and to block the efforts of others in this direction. Japan championed complete Korean independence and opposed every scheme of Europeans to install themselves in the peninsula. When they saw that they could accomplish nothing against Japanese influence at Seoul, the powers remembered that China was the suzerain of Korea. Chinese statesmen were susceptible to suggestions from all sides that they assert the rights of China in Korea; and, through fear and distrust of Japan, the Koreans were betrayed into the fatal mistake of playing up to China against Japan.

In May, 1894, the situation that had been developing for years came to a crisis. The Korean government appealed to China for aid in putting down a serious insurrection. Without asking the coöperation of Japan, China sent to Seoul two thousand soldiers. This was a denial of the claim of equal interest in Korea, which Japan had been emphasizing for some years. Hence, on June 9, Japan landed an army of twelve thousand in Korea, and then proposed to the Korean government the adoption of a program of reforms essential to the maintenance of Korean independence.

A new era was beginning in the history of the Far East. In their relations with each other, Japan and China had come to the point where they would have to adopt a common policy in regard to European influences or become enemies. Against the protests of Japan, China had been granting concessions to the great powers that threatened to put the Far East under European control. The weak-

ness and corruption of Chinese statesmen were compromising the interests of Japan as well as the interests of China. Russia, for instance, had been given by China a strong foothold on the coast of the Japan Sea north of Korea. The Japanese did not propose to permit Chinese suzerainty in Korea to balk their efforts to prevent the granting of concessions to European powers in the peninsula between the Yellow Sea and the Japan Sea. Japan invited China to join in helping Korea carry out the reasonable and practicable program of reforms suggested. The answer of China was to advise Korea to reject the Japanese proposal.

On July 23 Japanese troops seized the palace at Seoul and made the king prisoner; and on August 1 both China and Japan declared war. The operations lasted, on land and sea, from September, 1894, to March, 1895, and ended in the complete defeat of China. This was the first manifestation to the world of Japanese military and naval power. On April 17, 1895, by the treaty of Shimonoseki, China acknowledged the independence of Korea, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liao-tung peninsula to Japan, and agreed to pay an indemnity of \$158,000,000.

Aghast at the success of Japan and determined to prevent a rival from entering where she aimed to rule, Russia asked the great powers to intervene to preserve the balance of power in the Far East. France and Germany answered favorably.¹ The three powers, posing as defenders of the integrity of China, threatened Japan with a new war unless the territory ceded by China on the mainland was relinquished. Japan had to bow to superior force and gave up the Liao-tung peninsula. In return, China agreed to pay additional indemnity to the amount of \$22,000,000.

Although the Japanese felt very bitterly over the loss of the principal fruits of victory, the intervention of the

¹ The British Foreign Office and the government of India were developing a new case of nerves in regard to Russian penetration in Asia, and began at this time the new leaning in Far Eastern policy that led seven years later to the alliance with Japan.

three powers would have made for peace had the motive behind it been what it was professed to be. Soon, however, the Japanese found that China had granted a railroad concession to Russia in northern Manchuria, and had ceded territory to France in the Mekong Valley. In addition, both powers obtained concessions of land at Hankow; Russia was assured of the reversion of Port Arthur, which she was to help fortify; and France was given important railroad and mining rights in the southern provinces of China. And Russia became the guarantor of a loan floated in Paris to pay the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity. Two years later, in 1897, Germany received her reward in the Shantung peninsula.¹

When the Japanese saw that the European powers themselves were ready to resort to force to exploit China and to prevent Japan from sharing in the exploitation, they realized that they would have to prepare for a test of arms with the European powers or become, in relation to Europe, as other Asiatic nations were. They could not fight against the united white race. They must seek an occasion to attack the Caucasian nations separately, and, if possible, be allied in the future wars with some of their rivals while they were eliminating others from the Far East.

The intervention of Russia, France, and Germany robbed Japan of the Liao-tung peninsula and made certain another and more difficult war within a few years. Yet it brought her distinct advantages. She had become a factor to be reckoned with in international politics. She had asserted her determination to play an important rôle in China, and had won the unquestioned right to be a partner on an equal footing with the other powers in any joint intervention in Chinese affairs. In annexing Formosa and the Pescadores she had removed the danger of an enemy naval base on her routes southward and westward, the two important lines of communication with the rest of the

¹ See pp. 142, 200-202, 319.

world. The immediate objective of the war was won. China was eliminated from Korea, and Japan no longer had to watch intrigues at Peking in connection with the ambitions of foreign powers in the peninsula.

The Japanese went ahead with the program of reforms originally proposed to be undertaken jointly with China, and Korea began to adapt herself to the necessary conditions of existence as a modern state. If the use of an army and a fleet by the Japanese was a revelation to Europe, the work of Japanese counselors in Korea during the months following the war gave the spectacle of a new and disquieting stumbling-block in the path of European Far Eastern ambitions. The Japanese demonstrated that they had been studying the constructive side of European civilization no less carefully than military and naval matters.

Excellent and wise in conception as were the Japanese reforms, the application of them was resented by a high-spirited people. The Koreans felt that they were being made to bear the burden of the disappointment and bitterness of the Japanese, who had built high hopes upon the victory over China. Moreover, Russia had not withdrawn from the struggle for the control of Korea. She was quick to take advantage of the growing hatred against Japan, which, on October 8, 1895, culminated in the storming of the palace and the assassination of the queen by a mob of Japanese partizans, among whom were Japanese soldiers. The king took refuge in the Russian legation. Encouraged and powerfully aided by Russia, he not only reëstablished the absolutist régime and abolished the reforms, but assumed the title of emperor. At the close of the century international intrigue in Seoul was worse than before the Sino-Japanese war. Several powers again vied with one another for concessions and privileges. But, with China eliminated, the competition for control soon narrowed down to a duel between Korea's other neighbors, Russia and Japan.

CHAPTER XI

THE ATTEMPT TO PARTITION CHINA (1895-1902)

THERE is a parallel between the situation in the Near East after the Russo-Turkish War and that in the Far East after the Sino-Japanese War. In 1878 Great Britain intervened in the Near East to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, menaced by the treaty of San Stefano. Russia, exhausted by her effort and unable to fight another war, agreed to the revision of the treaty by the Congress of Berlin. As a reward for her aid, Great Britain took Cyprus from Turkey, and shortly afterwards ensconced herself in Egypt. In 1895 Russia, France, and Germany intervened in the Far East to defend the integrity of the Chinese Empire, menaced by the treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan could not undertake another war, and had to yield. Russia and France immediately, and Germany two years later, made China pay a larger price than the loss of the Liao-tung peninsula would have been.

In fact, if we leave France and Germany out of the reckoning and consider only what Russia's share in the intervention cost China, we find that China had to borrow with a Russian guaranty the money to indemnify Japan for releasing the Liao-tung peninsula. The compensation for the guaranty was a railway concession in northern Manchuria. Within very few years Russia was in possession of northern Manchuria and had taken Japan's place in Liao-tung besides; and China owed Russia several times the amount she had paid to get Russia to prevent Japan from doing what Russia did. Great Britain's aid to Turkey was the beginning of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Russia's aid to China was the beginning of the

partition of the Chinese Empire. One feels that a weak state would do well to give Æneas's answer to the proffered aid of a great power: "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*"

The intervention of the powers proved more disastrous to China than to Japan. For Japan, it was a temporary setback. In China, it was the entering wedge of spoliation for both Russia and the other powers. The surrender of Chinese statesmen to the rapacious demands of the European powers led directly to the Boxer Rebellion, which, in turn, gave the powers an excuse for trussing China more completely.

Great Britain was invited to aid in modifying the treaty of Shimonoseki, but took no part and gave the Russians no encouragement. The British were not on friendly terms with Russia and France in Asia, and they had been quick to grasp the significance of the naval and military prowess shown by Japan. There was no reason for antagonizing the Japanese in a matter in which they had little interest. The Germans showed less political acumen. They, too, had no motive comparable to that of Russia in preventing the execution of the treaty. But Kaiser Wilhelm's obsession of "the yellow peril" led them into an unnecessary joint action with Russia and France. The Germans offended the Japanese for nothing. With the French it was different. The Quai d'Orsay was preparing a political alliance with Russia, and outstanding negotiations concerning the frontiers of Indo-China with Siam and China made it a wise move to put Peking under obligations to Paris.

For half a century before the Sino-Japanese War, Great Britain, France, and Russia had been preying upon China. After 1895 Japan and Germany determined to get a share of the loot. The ambitions of both of these late-comers might have been thwarted had the other powers been content to maintain the *status quo*. But no power was willing to become the sponsor of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty.


On March 1, 1894, an Anglo-Chinese treaty, fixing the Burma boundary, transferred to China territory east of the Mekong River, with the stipulation, however, that it should remain under Chinese sovereignty. This was Great Britain's answer to the Franco-Siamese treaty of the previous year, by which France had extended her Indo-Chinese frontier to the Mekong. But the plans of the British miscarried. On June 20, 1895, China signed with France a treaty that was the beginning of a long series of European depredations. The territory lately acquired from Great Britain was now turned over to the French, together with mining concessions and railway rights in the Kiangsi and Yunnan provinces. Serious anti-foreign uprisings took place, directed against missionaries because they happened to be the only foreigners scattered in the interior.

Great Britain protested against the Franco-Chinese treaty on the ground that it was a violation of the Anglo-Chinese treaty. But instead of insisting that France should give up what she had received, and standing behind China in a policy of special privileges for none and equal opportunity for all, the British forced China to "make compensation" by agreeing to a further extension of the frontiers of Burma. And on January 1, 1896, Great Britain and France signed an agreement primarily concerning Siam, but introducing the principle of spheres of influence in China. These negotiations initiated a policy in regard to China that has been continued up to the present time. The great powers, including Japan, have pressed at Peking claims for territorial rights and concessions of every sort, and when the claims conflicted have settled their difficulties by negotiations with one another in which China, the party chiefly interested, has had no part. The Shantung clauses of the treaty of Versailles were not a new departure in Far Eastern diplomacy, but conformed to a policy that began when the treaty of Shimonoseki was revised.

From 1896 to 1899 the great powers worked feverishly to

establish political and economic control over China. On September 8, 1896, the Chinese-Russian agreement, signed at Peking, gave Russia the right to build the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria, and, in clauses that were afterwards made more sweeping, virtually turned over northern Manchuria to that power. On November 14, 1897, a German fleet entered Kiau-chau, on the Shantung peninsula; a Russian fleet entered Port Arthur, on the Liao-tung peninsula, on December 18, 1897. In March, 1898, China leased Kiau-chau to Germany for ninety-nine years and Port Arthur to Russia for twenty-five years. The German lease carried with it a sphere of influence and railway and mining concessions, while the Russian lease made Port Arthur a closed naval base and gave Russia the right to connect the leased territory with the Trans-Siberian Railway in Manchuria. In April, China leased to France Kwang-chau for ninety-nine years, with railway concessions. On June 9 Great Britain secured a lease of mainland territory adjoining Hong-Kong, and on July 1 China agreed to let Great Britain have Wei-hai-wei, on the north shore of the Shantung peninsula, for as long as Russia occupied Port Arthur. Italy came into the game at the beginning of 1899 with a demand for a lease of a bay on the coast of Chekiang Province, with hinterland concessions; but, as the Italians did not have naval forces adequate to make good their demand, China was in this case able to refuse.

The danger of wars among the powers over encroachments on Chinese sovereignty was avoided by reciprocal arrangements which they were able to work out. On April 25, 1898, Russia agreed to recognize Japan's paramount interest in Korea in return for Japan's acceptance of the Russian naval base at Port Arthur. A year later, April 29, 1899, Russia and Great Britain decided upon spheres of influence in China. Russia promised not to seek conces-



sions in the Yangtze Valley, which meant central China, and Great Britain agreed to abandon to Russia everything north of the Great Wall.

Along with the treaties and agreements by which control of territory passed out of Chinese hands, loans and concessions further weakened China and paved the way for partition. Railway and mining concessions were granted to French, Belgian, British, Russian, German, and American companies. These arrangements offered limitless opportunities for interference and brought the people of many localities into conflict with the foreigners. The Chinese government was forced into the position of having to take sides against its own subjects in defense of foreigners who were shocking the sensibilities and sometimes disregarding the rights of the Chinese. At the same time, the Chinese were for the first time in their history beginning to feel the burden of taxes collected for the benefit, as they saw it, of foreigners. China borrowed abroad large sums in gold to pay the costs of the war with Japan and to meet the Japanese indemnity. In 1898 she owed nearly \$265,000,000 to foreigners, all contracted within four years, with interest payable in gold. The loans were secured by customs receipts, over which Europeans were given control.

While the spoliation of China was rapidly progressing, the United States suddenly became a colonial power with special interests in the Far East. The American people thought of the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, only in terms of a victory in the war they were fighting, and did not realize what it meant to fall heir to Spain's largest Pacific possession. In fact, even after the treaty of peace with Spain was signed, few Americans understood that the United States had become a world power. Public opinion was not ready to back an aggressive American foreign policy. This fact, known to European statesmen, prevented our State Department from registering an emphatic

protest and from assuring China that the United States would back her in refusing to yield to the European demands.

Secretary Hay, however, did the best he could under the difficult handicap of American apathy and indifference. On September 6, 1899, he addressed an identical note to Great Britain, Russia, and Germany—and later to France, Italy, and Japan—asking them to agree to the principle of the “open door” in China. Under the interpretation of the open door to which he demanded assent, no power could claim an exclusive sphere of influence; the Chinese tariff was to continue in full force throughout the empire and to be administered by Chinese officials; and all nations were to be treated on a footing of equality in port dues and railway rates, irrespective of special agreements entered into between China and any other power or between any two powers.

In their answers the powers approved the American position and stated that it was their own. But none of them would bind itself explicitly to the open door. To keep the door open would have required a show of force, leading perhaps even to the use of force. American interests were not sufficiently important to warrant more than an academic statement of our position. Meanwhile the greed, brutality, and hypocrisy of concession-hunters, officially backed by their respective governments, further aroused the resentment of the peace-loving Chinese and prepared the way for the Boxer Rebellion. In the mad struggle for leases and spheres of influence, Peking became a storm center of international politics, with each power pitted against the others. In this imbroglio Japan, following European methods, became a powerful factor, disturbing the combinations that had up to this time been purely European. Occasions for friction were increased. The Japanese had originally interested themselves in China to protect Japan and make Asia safe for the Asiatics; but now

Japanese capitalists and government officials were yielding to the temptation to despoil China for profit.

At this juncture two forces arose to prevent the partition of China, or at least the further impairment of Chinese sovereignty and the economic exploitation of the country by foreigners.

The first of these was the ferment of dissatisfaction among the Young Chinese, belonging to the official and commercial classes in the ports, who had come under the influence of Western education and who realized that the strength of Japan as opposed to the weakness of China lay in Japan's successful adaptation of Western civilization. The Young Chinese believed that their country could be saved from humiliation and slavery by the spread of Western education and by adopting Occidental methods. As these things could be learned only by more intimate contact with Occidentals, they opposed neither missionaries nor concession-developers, and regarded treaty ports and foreign-built and foreign-run railways as necessary evils—to be endured until the nation was transformed. To rid the country of European influence and domination meant that there must be reforms in the administration, a stronger army and navy, a national spirit created through schools and newspapers, and eventually the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty with its military and civilian officialdom, which was always susceptible to the bribes of foreign legations.

The other force was the spirit of reaction dominating those who wanted to see China undisturbed by Occidental influences. The reactionaries were not interested, as were the Young Chinese, in a strong and united China holding her own with the great powers by adopting and developing the sources of strength of the modern state. They hated the foreigners because they instinctively felt that foreign control not only would provoke a movement of regeneration in China, but would also limit and destroy their power and

privileges. The effort for reform inaugurated by the Young Chinese in 1898 caused them as much alarm as the encroachment of the European powers and Japan. The reactionaries prevailed over the Young Chinese because they were able to make use of a powerful agency to arouse the hatred of the common people.

The war with Japan led to the foundation, in 1895, of a secret anti-foreign society, I-Ho-Chuan ("the righteous harmony fists"). The members of this organization, called Boxers by missionaries and newspapers, were deceived by the ritual of initiation into believing that they were made invulnerable to swords and bullets. Gathering in Taoist and Buddhist temples, they swore to drive the foreigner and his religion out of China. The movement spread rapidly in the northern provinces, and was helped by the affairs of Kiau-chau, Wei-hai-wei, and Port Arthur. The building of railways and the development of mines by foreigners, and the creation of concession settlements in ports and railway centers, fanned the flame of hatred.

In 1899 Yu-Hsien, founder of I-Ho-Chuan, became governor of the province of Shantung. Attacks upon foreigners began almost immediately. The murder of English missionaries in Shantung brought forth a strong protest from the British, French, German, and American ministers. In spite of promises from the empress-dowager, who was all-powerful, that the guilty parties would be punished, outrages and murders became more frequent, both in Shantung and in Chih-li, the province in which Peking is located. In March, 1900, another protest of the ministers, this time with the addition of the Italian minister, resulted in the appointment of Yuan-Shih-Kai as governor of Shantung, with orders to suppress the Boxers and an imperial rescript to the governor of Chih-li denouncing by name the Boxer Society.

The empress-dowager soon showed that she was hand in glove with the Boxers. She secured from the emperor a

decree in which he stated that because of bad health he could not have a son, and he asked the empress-dowager to select a successor to the throne. She named Pu Chung, son of Prince Tuan, who was a patron of the Boxer Society, and the headquarters of the movement were established in his palace.

A Boxer proclamation was issued denouncing the emperor and the mandarins as incompetent and corrupt, and declaring:

“Foreign devils have come with their doctrine of Christianity. Converts to their own Catholic and Protestant faiths have become numerous. These churches are devoid of human principles and full of cunning. They have attracted the greedy and avaricious as converts to an unlimited degree. They practise oppression and corruption until even the good officials have become covetous of foreign wealth and are servants to the foreigners. Telegraphs and railways have been established; foreign cannon and rifles manufactured; railway engines and electric lamps the foreign devils delight in. . . . The foreigners shall be exterminated; their houses and temples shall be burned; foreign goods and property of every description shall be destroyed. The foreigners shall be extirpated, for the purpose of Heaven is determined. A clean sweep shall be made. All this shall be accomplished within three years. The wicked can not escape the net of destruction.”

Prince Tuan made clever use of the discussion in European parliaments and press, which spoke openly of the partition of China. In the successful encroachments of France, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, and in the demand of Italy, which had been put forward at Peking in a brutal and undiplomatic manner, he had full proofs of European intentions. Circulars were sent to the provincial governors announcing the approaching massacre of foreigners; for the prince made no effort to conceal his intention of seizing the foreign ministers at Peking and holding them as hostages until Europe consented, in his own words, to treat China “as a sealed book.”

The Boxer uprising, whose imminence and seriousness the powers had failed to appreciate, broke out in Peking on June 13, 1900. The railway connecting Peking with Tientsin was literally torn up, and the telegraph-poles were sawed off close to the ground. All foreign property in Peking was looted. Bodies were taken out of the graves in the foreign cemeteries and burned. For several days Prince Tuan and other members of the imperial family directed a massacre in which thousands of native Christians were slain and which ended in a fire that burned the principal shops of Peking.

Rescue parties sent out by the legations saved several hundred women and children who had escaped death by hiding, and the foreigners in the city and refugees from the surrounding country were received in the legations. On June 19 the foreign ministers were informed that the powers were at war with China, and that they must leave within twenty-four hours or the government could not be responsible for their safety. As it was impossible to start without knowing what means of transport were available and what measures had been taken to escort the foreigners to the coast, the ministers asked to be received by Prince Tuan to arrange for the departure. No reply came. The next morning, after a meeting at the French legation, they decided to go in a body to make representations to the government. On the way the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, was murdered by a Manchu official in full uniform. The Chinese authorities told the ministers that they could give no guaranty of escort to Tientsin.

For nearly two months about six thousand foreigners and Christian refugees, of whom more than half were in the grounds of the British legation, defended themselves against the mob and against government troops. When it became known that an inter-allied relief column was approaching Peking, a decree was issued ordering the foreign ministers to be conducted safely to the coast, "in order

once more to show the tenderness of the Throne for the men from afar." But the foreigners preferred to trust to their own resources. On August 11 government troops began to bombard the British legation. The relief column reached Peking on the afternoon of the 13th, just two months after the uprising started. It was none too soon.

The relief of Peking was an international operation. A first attempt with small forces from the war-ships of different navies failed. On June 17 the international fleet had to fire on and capture the Taku forts. Then Tientsin was occupied. There was no news from Peking, and it was feared that all the Europeans had been massacred. The Russians had only four thousand troops within reach, and the British three thousand. Two thousand Americans were despatched from the Philippines and eight hundred French from Indo-China. The Germans, Austrians, and Italians had virtually no free effectives. Japan was called upon to save the day. She contributed ten thousand troops, half of the force that finally set out from Tientsin on August 4. It took nine days to reach Peking, and the losses of the international army were severe. On the morning after the entry into Peking, the empress-dowager and the imperial court fled to the province of Shansi, in the interior. But resistance continued, and the imperial city was not surrendered until August 26.

After the relief of Peking the international troops continued to increase in number, and under the command of Count von Waldersee the military occupation of the province of Chih-li was organized. There were divergent views among the powers as to the attitude to adopt. Russia had agreed to the expedition only to relieve the legations, and, considering all of China north of Peking within her sphere of influence, she proposed to the associated powers the immediate evacuation of Peking. Japan supported this proposal because the continuance of European intervention was prejudicial to her interests. The Japanese felt, too,

that delay in reëstablishing the Chinese government in Peking was enabling the Russians to fasten their grasp on Manchuria. They were wild with apprehension over the news from this province, where the Russians had taken advantage of the Boxer troubles to bring in large forces, attack the Chinese troops, and intrench themselves in Mukden, looting the palace and massacring civilian Chinese. All the powers were afraid that Germany would seize the opportunity to extend her influence from Shantung into Chih-li.

These jealousies made acceptable the proposal of the empress-dowager, through Li Hung Chang, to conclude peace on the basis of an indemnity and reaffirmation or modification of old commercial treaties in return for the cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Despite the insistence of Russia and Japan, the other powers refused to agree to evacuate Peking and Tientsin until peace was signed. On the contrary, they reinforced their contingents so that not all of the cards should be in the hands of these two nations.

Several months were spent in debate, and finally, on December 19, a joint note was sent to the Chinese government setting forth the demands agreed upon. The stipulations were: apology at Berlin by an imperial prince for the murder of the German minister; reparation to Japan for the murder of the chancellor of her legation; punishment of Princes Tuan and Chuang, and of other instigators and leaders of the Boxers; erection of expiatory monuments in foreign cemeteries where tombs had been desecrated; permission to maintain permanent legation guards at Peking; razing of forts at Taku and between Peking and the sea, and military occupation by international troops of the Tientsin-Peking railway line; assurance that provincial governors would be held personally responsible for violation of the treaty and for future anti-foreign outbreaks; revision of commercial treaties; reform of the palace sys-

tem of government at Peking; modification of court ceremonial for the reception of foreign ministers; and payment of indemnities to governments, corporations, missionary bodies, and individuals.

The peace protocol was signed at Peking on January 14, 1901. But when the conference began between the foreign ministers and the government to arrange for putting the terms into effect, Li Hung Chang realized the lack of agreement among the powers. There was no solidarity in the negotiations. In private interviews he was able to secure a betrayal of the general interest of all by making an appeal to the special interests of each. Russia was willing to encourage Chinese resistance to the punishment clause in return for additional advantages in the Manchurian treaty that she was then negotiating at Peking. Other powers, also, gave secret instructions to their ministers not to press claims for punishment too vigorously. Political and commercial considerations prevented insistence upon measures that would have been constructively helpful to China and that would have helped her to profit by the lesson of the Boxer Rebellion.

On the other hand, all the powers except the United States were united in demanding exaggerated indemnities. By becoming creditors of the Chinese government they hoped to gain further economic advantages and to have means of keeping the country in tutelage. China was thus saddled with a debt whose principal, with interest at four per cent., amounted to nearly one and one half billion dollars. The amortization was to be completed in forty years. The legation compounds in Peking were united and surrounded by a loopholed wall, and China had to agree to the permanent maintenance of this fortress by legation guards. On September 17, 1901, Peking was evacuated. The court returned on January 7, 1902.

While the negotiations were in progress Great Britain and Germany signed an agreement to observe a common

policy in China. They promised to sustain the open door in every part of China where they exercised power, and not to "make use of the present complication" to obtain for themselves territorial advantages. But they agreed that in case another power obtained territorial advantages as a result of the Boxer Rebellion they would "come to a preliminary understanding as to steps which may have to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China."

The participation of Germany in suppressing the Boxers received more attention from the world than its importance warranted. The murder of Baron von Ketteler was ample justification for Germany's particular interest in the expedition to Peking. But Germany had only a handful of soldiers available, and the appointment of Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to command the international army was due, not to German pressure or intrigue, but to the hopeless jealousy among British and Russians and Japanese. Japanese and Russians vetoed each other, and the British were heavily involved in the Boer War. Unable to send many troops and fearful of a Russian or Japanese occupation of Peking, the British government suggested the appointment of a German in the hope that the kaiser would send a large force. He did. By the end of November Germany had twenty thousand men in China. The official statement issued by the German government was dignified and reserved. It was declared that the army to be sent to China would be composed entirely of volunteers, that the purpose was to rescue Europeans in Peking and exact retribution for the murder of Baron von Ketteler and other atrocities, but that the partition of China was against German policy. It was the kaiser whose theatrical pronouncements discredited the German effort. He never lived down the speech in which he expatiated upon Attila and the Huns.

On March 15, 1901, Chancellor von Bülow told the Reichstag that some powers pursued commercial interests and

other powers played politics in China. Germany, he declared, was in the first category, and for this reason the Anglo-German agreement had been signed with the hope of maintaining the integrity of China as long as possible. The wording of the agreement showed that it had no reference to Manchuria, where there were no German interests worth mentioning. "As regards the future of Manchuria, really, gentlemen, I can imagine nothing which we regard with more indifference. But it is our interest to see, in close coöperation with other powers, that China does not unduly diminish her resources until her debts are paid." The words of the German chancellor sum up tersely the cynical attitude of European statesmen towards China.

Liberal circles in Great Britain felt during the siege of the legations that the delay in going to the relief of Europeans in Peking was due to the unwillingness of the other powers to allow the Japanese or the Russians to save the day. Clearly the risk was run of sacrificing helpless women and children to diplomatic considerations. The full extent of the immorality and lack of chivalry of international diplomacy was demonstrated when Indian troops, who had been despatched to protect foreigners in Shanghai, had to stay on their ships until a certain proportion of French and German troops landed.

The tendency to lay the blame for the Boxer uprising at the door of Germany because she had seized Kiau-chau, and thus to exculpate the imperialism of the other powers, did not enter into the minds of the statesmen of the day. Speaking in Parliament on August 2, Sir Edward Grey declared that "the idea that China was ripe for partition and that any liberty could be taken with her was the main fault of the present trouble." Mr. Broderick followed with a high tribute to Count von Waldersee. He said that England's interests were often found to be running side by side with those of Germany, that the government welcomed German intervention, and that he hoped that "as

good comrades, Germany and England might advance together again, certainly to victory, and, let us all trust, also towards the strengthening of the ties between that great nation and ourselves."

Not content with permission to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria, or even with economic and political control of the portion of Manchuria through which the railway ran, Russia wanted all Manchuria and the Korean and Liao-tung peninsulas. By secret negotiations with Li Hung Chang, Russia secured—in addition to the railway from Mukden to the tip of the Liao-tung peninsula and the Port Arthur and Dalny concessions—land for a settlement at Tientsin, on the left bank of the river Pei-ho, opposite the British concession. This led to similar demands from the other powers, and Tientsin, the port of Peking, presently became a center of international rivalry, with the powers fighting for lands and wharves with complete disregard of Chinese sovereignty.

Instead of withdrawing her troops from southern Manchuria and the province of Chih-li, Russia, through Li Hung Chang, tried in 1901 to negotiate a separate treaty with China. Some of the powerful mandarins, backed by public opinion in Peking and encouraged more or less openly by Great Britain and Japan, opposed the Russian demand, whereupon Russia presented the proposed treaty as an ultimatum, with a date fixed before which the terms must be accepted.

The demands were as follows: civil administration in Manchuria to be restored to China, but China to accept the assistance of Russia in keeping order, and Russia to maintain a military force for the protection of the Manchurian Railway; no munitions of war to be imported and no military force to be kept in Manchuria without Russia's consent; no foreigners except Russians to be employed in organizing land and sea forces in north China; Chinese officials in Manchuria and Liao-tung who should prove ob-

noxious to Russia to be dismissed; the district of Kin-chau, at the northern end of the Liao-tung Gulf, to pass under Russian administration; no mining or railway concessions to be granted to foreigners in Manchuria, Mongolia, or Turkestan; indemnity for injury to Russian interests and for Russian expenses in Manchuria arising from the Boxer troubles; the damage caused to the Manchurian Railway to be compensated by a new concession or modification of the old one; and a Russian railway connecting the Manchurian Railway with the Great Wall. These arrangements were tantamount to Russian control from Petrograd to Peking.

At first, China resisted; and after the protocol to settle the Boxer affair had been signed Russia presented a new project very similar to the ultimatum. At this juncture Li Hung Chang died. But the Russian troops remained in Manchuria, and Russia was in a position to exercise the rights that China refused to grant. The Trans-Siberian Railway was completed in November, and the Russians prepared Dalny as the terminus of the Liao-tung branch. In defiance of China and the powers and in violation of their rights, the Russians also remained in occupation of the treaty port of Niuchuang.

In January, 1902, Great Britain and Japan informed China that they would not assent to the concession of exclusive rights to Russians in Manchuria; and several weeks later the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which promised the integrity and independence of China and equal trade opportunities for all, was made known to the world. The United States also protested vigorously at Petrograd and Peking, and was assured that equal commercial rights would be maintained within the "Russian zone." The same assurance was given to Great Britain and Japan. France did not ask for it; nor did Germany. It was no secret that French capitalists expected to draw the biggest portion of the profit from Russian exploitations in Manchuria. And Germany intended to watch closely every step in Russian

encroachment. Any additional privilege granted to Russia in Manchuria would be regarded as an excuse for demanding the same privilege in Shantung.

A Russo-Chinese agreement was signed on April 8, 1902. Russia promised to withdraw her troops from Manchuria within eighteen months, to restore the entire Manchurian Railway to China, to intrust the guarding of the railway to Chinese troops, and to consider Manchuria as "an integral portion of the Chinese Empire." On the other hand, China was to put the executive control of the railway into Russian hands, and to grant no concessions for other railway construction in Manchuria without the consent of Russia. This was what the world at first knew. Russia had also asked for secret clauses, accompanying the agreement, by which China would grant exclusive railway and mining exploitation in Manchuria to the Russo-Chinese Bank. But these clauses were discovered by the other powers, and the convention was signed without them.

The railway to the tip of the Liao-tung peninsula was completed at the end of July, 1903. But during its construction Russia made excuses for failing to withdraw troops from Manchuria, and tried to get China to agree to their retention and also to close Manchuria, including Liao-tung, to foreign trade other than Russian. Instead of evacuating Manchuria on October 8 (the limit of the period allowed), she held military and naval manœuvres at Port Arthur, and on October 28 reoccupied Mukden with strong forces. Admiral Alexieff gave the excuse that Russia had found it impossible to "extend civilization in Manchuria" without administering the country. At the same time reports reached the outside world that the Russians had erected forts in northern Mongolia and were sending their agents, commercial and political, into that province. Russian engineers were also surveying a railway route there.

Once more, as at the time of the Russian menace to Korea, China was at the parting of the ways. Yuan-Shih-

Kai, who came to the front as new commander-in-chief of the Chinese army, declared for a policy of *rapprochement* with Japan. He tried to get Peking to see that Russia might fight for Manchuria. By declaring war on Russia and inviting the coöperation of Japan, China could anticipate Japanese action and save Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula. Yuan-Shih-Kai was not listened to. European representatives at Peking, while opposing Russia and each other, worked against an agreement between the two Oriental states.

The result of failure to follow Yuan-Shih-Kai's advice has been constant antagonism between China and Japan, whose real interests on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War were identical. Chinese statesmen failed to see that by siding with Japan China might have defended her territorial integrity and her sovereignty against all foreign encroachment. While Japan engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, China remained neutral, suffering the ignominy of neutrality with all the inconveniences of belligerency. In Manchuria the inhabitants saw their homes destroyed, their possessions subjected to requisition, and civilians forced to work for both armies. Japanese and Russians lived on the country, and finally made peace with each other, disregarding China and dividing between themselves one of her largest and richest provinces.

CHAPTER XII

JAPAN'S SECOND CHALLENGE TO EUROPE: THE WAR WITH RUSSIA (1904-1905)

HAD Russia limited her activity in the Far East to Manchuria, Japan probably would have waited longer to issue her second challenge to Europe. For the long lease of Port Arthur and the concession to connect the main line of the Manchurian Railway with the Liaotung peninsula were Russia's share in the partition of China agreed upon by four European powers. Japan could not fight them all, and Russian aggression, if it had stopped in Manchuria, could hardly have been regarded by Japan as more menacing than that of the other powers. Although the fortification of Port Arthur was a direct challenge to Japan, the Japanese saw that the European powers, who had united to prevent them from getting a foothold in China, were not effectively opposing the ambitions of Russia. Even Great Britain, Japan's new ally, had recently entered into a spheres-of-influence agreement with Russia, leaving to the Russians all of China north of the Great Wall.

But when Russia, after completing the Trans-Siberian Railway, made a settlement on the left bank of the Yalu River, in Korean territory, and secured a concession from Korea for a naval base at Masan-pho, a port opposite Japan, the Japanese had to choose between fighting Russia or allowing Russia to become the dominant power in the Far East. The second alternative was never entertained for a moment. During the decade that followed the war with China, the Japanese strained every nerve in preparing to expel Russia from China, Manchuria, and Korea.

They consented to stupendous financial sacrifices to build up their army and navy. In realizing that military strength could not be developed apart from industrial and commercial growth, they followed the example of Germany.

In June, 1903, General Kuropatkin, Russian minister of war, visited Tokio as the guest of the emperor. He was given a friendly reception. Japanese statesmen insisted strongly upon the desire of Japan to prevent war. The tone of the Russian press, also, was moderate and friendly. But while the Russians were prodigal with assurances of admiration and friendship for Japan, words were not translated into actions. Russia continued to occupy Phyong-an Do on the Korean side of the Yalu River, to fortify Port Arthur, and to build up a Pacific fleet. The encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the provinces north of Peking were more alarming than ever.

On August 12, 1903, the Japanese ambassador at Petrograd presented a proposal for arranging the mutual interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese demanded the fulfilment of the agreement Russia had signed with Japan in 1898, by which both powers recognized Korea's independence. But at the same time Japan desired Russia to recognize the Japanese agreement with Korea of the same year, which granted Japan preferential rights for railway construction. For several months there was a deadlock in the negotiations. A conference was held in Tokio in October between the members of the Japanese cabinet and the Elder Statesmen. The latter urged the cabinet to make all possible concessions to Russia.

But public opinion in Japan was thoroughly aroused. It was felt that an indefinite continuation of negotiations would simply mean allowing Russia more time to strengthen her naval and military position in Liao-tung and Manchuria. The proposal of the Elder Statesmen that Japan limit her demands to a pledge from Russia to respect

both the sovereignty and the integrity of China and Korea was considered as a makeshift to put off the evil day. The Japanese cabinet summoned Russia to recognize the independence and integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires; to admit Japan's special interests in Korea in return for Japan's admission of Russia's special interests in Manchuria; and the mutual declaration of equality of opportunity for Russia and Japan in concessions and trade in both Manchuria and Korea. November passed without an answer from Russia.

On December 5 the Japanese diet met and voted confidence in the cabinet only with the stipulation that immediate action be taken. The emperor addressed the diet in person on December 10, declaring that his ministers had shown prudence and circumspection in the negotiations to protect the rights and interests of Japan. The diet unanimously replied that the cabinet was temporizing at home and neglecting opportunities abroad. The emperor dissolved the diet. It could not be concealed, however, that Russia had sent an unsatisfactory reply and that the Russian military authorities were pouring troops into Manchuria. The Japanese press called upon the government to declare war.

On December 21 Russia was asked to reconsider her reply. The answer, received on January 6, demanded recognition by Japan of Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula as outside the Japanese sphere of interest, and consented not to interfere with the enjoyment by Japan and other powers of treaty rights acquired within Manchuria. The establishment of foreign settlements in the province was, however, excepted; and Japan was informed that if a neutral zone were established, it must be on the Korean side of the Yalu River alone, and that Japan must promise to refrain from using any part of Korea for strategic purposes. With the single modification that she was willing to pledge herself not to act in advance of any

other power in regard to settlements in Manchuria, Japan rejected the Russian proposals. Japanese statesmen may have hoped for a further reply and new proposals from Russia. If they did, they were disappointed. On the other hand, Russian statesmen did not seem to regard their silence as making war inevitable. They affected astonishment in Petrograd when, on February 6, the Japanese minister demanded his passports.

A Russian official *communiqué*, given to the press on February 9, also asserted the surprise of the Russian government at the events immediately following the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Japan. The Russians tried to make it seem that they had no intention of entering into war with Japan, and that Japan was the aggressor. The Russian note said that the army in Manchuria numbered barely one hundred thousand. But a nation pursuing an imperialistic policy should never be surprised if another nation prefers to declare war rather than to accept a change of the economic and political *status quo* in territories where that change affects security and economic prosperity.

The day after the Japanese minister left Petrograd, Admiral Uriu appeared before the port of Chemulpo and ordered a Russian cruiser and a Russian gunboat to leave the harbor within twenty-four hours. The commanders of French, British, American, and Italian war-ships in the port protested, but to no avail. By refusing to receive the protest, Admiral Uriu signified to the powers the disappearance of the last vestige of their tutelage over Japan. A new "great power" had been born in the decade following the Sino-Japanese War. If Europe and America needed a demonstration of this unpalatable fact, they were not to wait long. The two Russian war-ships made an attempt to escape. Not succeeding, they returned towards the port and sank themselves in shallow water. On the same day the main Japanese fleet attacked the Russian

fleet outside the harbor of Port Arthur, inflicted considerable damage, and forced the Russians to withdraw under the protection of the guns of the fortress. For two months Admiral Togo kept the Russian fleet busy by repeated and daring torpedo-boat attacks. He was unsuccessful, as the Americans had been at Santiago, in trying to bottle up Port Arthur by sinking ships at the mouth of the channel. But he kept firing into the harbor and prevented the Russians from coming out. On April 13 the Russians lost two battle-ships by running into a mine-field. The Vladivostok squadron had succeeded in making a few raids in the Japan Sea, but failed to interrupt the transport of the Japanese army into Korea.

The Japanese navy controlled the sea absolutely throughout the war. Russia attempted only once to challenge this control, which made possible the use of the Korean peninsula as a base for attacking the Russians in Manchuria. The Russian fleets in the Baltic and Black seas, comprising thirty-six vessels, were sent out to the Far East in the early spring of 1905. The Japanese annihilated them.

In the meantime, by brilliant campaigning the three Japanese armies defeated the superior Russian forces in the Shengking Province, northwest of Korea. Port Arthur was captured after heroic assaults on January 1, 1905. In March the Russian army met disaster in the battle of Mukden, largely through the skilful use by the Japanese of their artillery. So signal was the defeat that the Japanese might easily have captured the entire Russian forces, had they not themselves been exhausted after three weeks of continuous marching and fighting. These victories, followed by the total destruction of Russian sea power, raised the morale of both civilian and military Japan to the highest pitch.

But the Japanese were not in an enviable position for forcing the end of the war on land. They captured the island of Sakhalin in July and sent two armies to invest

Vladivostok. Further military operations might, indeed, have led to a second Mukden. But would it have been worth while to make a new effort in Manchuria without the certainty of winning a decision? The fall of Vladivostok might have proved as indecisive, from a strategical point of view, as the fall of Port Arthur. Japan controlled the sea. The capture of another seaport would not have brought the Russians to the point of capitulation. Even if they were driven out of Manchuria and the maritime province as well, the Russian armies would still have been a menace. The fact that Russia's lines of communication were direct lines by land, over her own territory, has always had to be faced by the Japanese, in peace as in war. The Russian government, on the other hand, did not want to risk losing Vladivostok and the entire maritime province, when there was little hope of turning the fortune of arms in Manchuria. Petrograd was also on the verge of an internal revolution.

As both sides were in a mood for peace, and were willing to compromise rather than continue a costly war in which further advantages for Japan or retrieving of fortunes for Russia seemed improbable, an overture of mediation from President Roosevelt met with success. Fighting in Manchuria ceased at the beginning of summer, and on August 9 the Japanese and Russian plenipotentiaries met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Among their stipulations, the Japanese demanded a pecuniary indemnity and the cession of Sakhalin—two points on which the Russian plenipotentiaries did not have power to yield. After a fortnight of debate, during which all the other conditions were agreed upon, Russia consented to compromise by ceding the southern half of Sakhalin, while Japan waived her claim to an indemnity. The treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, was ratified in October by both countries.

In the treaty Russia recognized Japan's paramount in-

terests in Korea; transferred to Japan her lease of Port Arthur and all concessions, establishments, and railway and mining rights in the Liao-tung peninsula and southern Manchuria; ceded the southern half of Sakhalin; and granted fishing rights to the Japanese in the Pacific waters of Russia. There was a reciprocal undertaking to evacuate Manchuria and restore to China sovereign rights throughout the province; also to give up prisoners and pay the expenses of their maintenance during the war. An additional provision regulated the strength of the military forces Russia and Japan were to keep in Manchuria to protect the railways and other concessions.

When the terms of the treaty were made public, the Japanese people, who naturally considered themselves the victors in the war, were deeply disappointed. Riots broke out in Tokio and elsewhere. In particular, the people felt that the waiving of an indemnity was putting upon them the financial burden of a war they had not sought. They did not see why Russia should be allowed to retain any interests in Manchuria and be left in undisturbed possession, without restrictions, of Vladivostok.

It soon came to be admitted, however, that the prolongation of the war for the sake of an indemnity might have meant throwing good money after bad. As for Sakhalin, Vladivostok, and northern Manchuria, the compromise led to the establishment of friendly relations with Russia. In the minds of Japanese statesmen there was no longer reason for fearing Russia or considering Russia an enemy after that power had been expelled from Korea and the Liao-tung peninsula and had agreed to divide Manchuria.

The moderation shown by the Japanese at Portsmouth was as good politics as was their forbearance during the negotiations preceding the war. In the fulfilment of the aspiration of Japan to be the dominant power in the Far East, the expulsion of Russia from Korea and the sea-coast

of China was the first point gained. None could deny the legitimacy of the aspiration—if Japan were going to use her power to protect other Asiatic nations against Europe, as the United States was doing in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine on behalf of other American nations. Japan would recover from the strain of 1904 and 1905, and would again feel herself strong enough to hold her own against Europe. Then, at the first good opportunity, would come the turn of the European powers to be ousted from China.

CHAPTER XIII

THE REVIVAL OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM (1895-1902)

THE expansion of Great Britain has not been accomplished without bitter opposition on the part of a considerable element in the British electorate. More than once a general election has been influenced by the polemics of the Little Englander group of thinkers and politicians. Gladstone and many of his Liberal supporters were avowed anti-imperialists. And yet, Liberal governments did not, on coming into power, discard the foreign policies they had attacked when out of office. We have already seen how during Gladstone's second premiership (1880-85) Egypt was occupied, North Borneo acquired, the British New Guinea Company formed, and protectorates proclaimed over vast territories in different parts of Africa.¹ Gladstone returned to power for a few months in 1886, and for a fourth time from 1892 to 1894. In the intervals Lord Salisbury was premier. The Liberal government did not fall for more than a year after Gladstone's last resignation. In the summer of 1895 Lord Salisbury formed his third cabinet, and he directed the destinies of the British Empire throughout the period under survey.

During the decade of Liberal and Conservative ins and outs (1885-95) the Irish question and other domestic policies had held the floor. Public opinion was indifferent, if not actually hostile, to imperialism. The Conservative party was changing and the Liberal party was being disrupted under influences and because of issues other than those that had ordinarily divided sharply the followers of Gladstone and the followers of Disraeli. For all that, the

¹ See pp. 69, 78-79, 89-95.

empire did not cease to grow. Protectorates were established over the Niger coast, Zanzibar, Pemba, and Uganda; while in India Sikkim was acquired, and in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, Sokotra, Sarawak, British New Guinea, and the Solomon and Gilbert Islands were brought under the British crown. The nation, however, knew little or nothing of these additions to the empire, and as none of them involved the country either in a conflict with any other great power or in a colonial war, the Foreign Office was not called upon to submit its activities to the approval or disapproval of Parliament. It is only when foreign policies, which for years may have passed unobserved, begin to demand large financial appropriations or have led to trouble that the people are aware of the responsibilities assumed in their name.

The third Salisbury ministry marked the full and final coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Unionist parties. The leader of the latter party, Joseph Chamberlain, became Lord Salisbury's colonial secretary. Long before the split between Gladstone and Chamberlain, Gladstone had spoken of his president of the Board of Trade (this was the portfolio held by Chamberlain in the second Gladstone ministry) as his only jingo member. Chamberlain believed in the imperial destiny of Great Britain, and became a powerful influence in shaping foreign policies aggressively at a time when many statesmen and publicists believed that the honor and interests of Great Britain demanded casting off some of the existing colonial burdens rather than assuming additional ones.

During the first year of the new ministry war was twice narrowly averted—with France over Siam and with the United States over Venezuela. For the moment Asia and South America held secondary places in British foreign policy, whose immediate interest was the consolidation and extension of the African colonies. The Siamese question was complicated by the fact that Russia and France were

forming an offensive and defensive alliance, and Great Britain did not relish a war with two powers in Asia simultaneously with the development of a crisis in South Africa. And it was not good statesmanship to come to blows with the United States over the Monroe Doctrine, the maintenance of which was far from disadvantageous to British interests in America.¹

It is impossible to present within brief compass a clear picture of the revival of British imperialism under the third Salisbury cabinet by following chronologically the military and diplomatic moves by which Great Britain outdistanced her rivals. We must, therefore, consider successively the Far East, west Africa, the Sudan, and south Africa.

In the Far East British encroachment upon the sovereignty of China and Siam through Burma, and French encroachment through Tonkin and Anam, brought the two European powers to the verge of war.² Each feared that the other was going to annex Siam, and the British were afraid that the French, not content with Tonkin, would attempt to annex the rich Chinese province of Yunnan as they themselves had annexed Burma. To avoid war, the Anglo-French agreement of January 5, 1896, provided for the neutralization of the valley of the Menam and its tributaries and for the recognition of territories to the east as French and to the west as British spheres of influence.

Difficulties with France on the southern frontier were no sooner settled than Great Britain had to face a new situation arising in the Far East through the efforts of other powers to gain naval bases and spheres of influence in China and to extend their sovereignty over Pacific islands. Up to this time France and Russia had been her only rivals. But the Sino-Japanese War gave Formosa to

¹ See pp. 341-343.

² See pp. 61-62, 186, 192.

Japan in 1895, and the Spanish-American War gave the Philippines to the United States in 1898. The weakening of China brought Russia into Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula in 1896, and Germany into the Shantung peninsula in 1898. The elimination of Spain gave Germany the Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne Islands (with the exception of Guam) in 1899. At this time British statesmen were not greatly alarmed at the appearance of the United States and Germany as factors in Far Eastern affairs. These two powers had not yet begun extensive naval-building programs. But Russia, financed by France, was beginning to construct a formidable navy and was pushing her railways into Manchuria, thus simultaneously (as the British thought) threatening the British supremacy on the sea and their privileged commercial position in China.¹

Two agreements were signed with Germany. By the first, on November 14, 1899, Great Britain renounced all rights over the two largest Samoan islands in favor of Germany and over the other islands of the group in favor of the United States. This agreement, which gave in exchange the right to Great Britain to annex the Tonga (Friendly) Islands, was ratified by the United States in January, 1900. As a warning to Russia, the British and Germans signed an agreement on October 17, 1900, pledging themselves mutually to maintain the territorial integrity of China and the "open door." But this agreement can be interpreted only as an effort to cry quits when the two powers realized that further impairment of Chinese sovereignty would be to their disadvantage. France in

¹ On December 13, 1897, Russian war-ships entered Port Arthur. The lease of territory to Russia on the Liao-tung peninsula was the beginning of the scramble for leases at Peking. It marked the beginning, also, of Great Britain's huge naval-building program, two years before Kaiser Wilhelm, at the launching of the *Wittelsbach* in July, 1900, declared that "the ocean is indispensable to German greatness." It is clear to the reader of the annual parliamentary debates over the budget that when they began their great naval expansion in 1898—and for some years later—the British had in mind Russia and France as the potential enemies of the British Empire.

Indo-China and Russia in Siberia had bases from which to operate in their predatory diplomatic activities, while Japan was steadily growing stronger.

Great Britain and Germany were not in a position to convince either China or the other powers of their good faith in issuing this warning. For both had participated in the attempt to partition China, and they were not willing to listen to the suggestion of the United States that the best way to bring about peace in China after the Boxer Rebellion and to help in the rehabilitation of China was to restore what they had taken and to refrain from exacting a heavy Boxer indemnity. British statesmen had not intervened at Peking to prevent the leasing of bases on the Liao-tung peninsula to Russia and on the Shantung peninsula to Germany. Instead of protesting, they demanded compensations, and forced China to give to Great Britain Wei-hai-wei on the Shantung peninsula and a lease of the mainland opposite Hong-Kong to boot. France condoned these depredations by compelling Peking to give her a lease at Kwang-chau Wan on the Lien-chau peninsula. The growing power of Russia, and especially the naval bases of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, induced the British to encourage what they knew to be the ambition of Japan—the elimination of Russian naval and political power in the Pacific. To this end an alliance was signed on January 30, 1902, which pledged Great Britain to come to the aid of Japan should France join Russia in the event of a war between Japan and Russia.¹ This alliance, which has been twice renewed and is still in force, was invoked against Germany in 1914.²

The third Salisbury ministry carried on wars in west Africa, the Sudan, and south Africa; each of which re-

¹ See p. 136, footnote.

² See p. 318. The four-power pact, adopted by the British, Japanese, French, and American delegates at the Washington conference, is popularly supposed to have superseded the alliance, but it has not yet been definitely abrogated. Both in London and Tokio there is difference of opinion as to the status of the Anglo-Japanese alliance after the ratification of the four-power pact.

sulted in annexation of territories, consolidation of titles already acquired, administrative reorganization, and a sweeping extension of effective administrative control. Before 1895 Great Britain was only potentially the predominating power in Africa. After 1902 she had become so in fact. The effort was costly in human life and treasure. Had France and Germany been on friendly terms it could not have been accomplished and would have resulted in a European war. But the cards lay right for Great Britain and she played them well. Out of these seven years of almost constant fighting emerged West Africa, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Union of South Africa.

West Africa consists of four territories—the Gambia colony and protectorate, the Sierra Leone colony and protectorate, the Nigeria colony and protectorate, the Gold Coast colony and Northern Territories protectorates. Ashanti, which is technically a colony, is attached to the Gold Coast.¹ Until the end of the nineteenth century the boundaries of the colonies were not definitely established, and the native chieftains of the hinterland acknowledged British suzerainty not at all or fitfully. It was only when France and Germany began to explore the head-waters of rivers and to stake out vast regions of the interior, which had not hitherto been mapped, that Great Britain felt the necessity of insisting upon boundary conventions. This meant negotiations with the French and German governments, and at the same time punitive expeditions to secure the submission of tribes over whom suzerainty was claimed.

In regard to the frontiers of Gambia and Sierra Leone there had been boundary conventions with France in 1882, 1889, and 1891. In 1889 the second convention had given the general lines, and these had been corrected in 1891. But further exploration and the development of colonial ambitions made necessary an exact setting down of what had been in large part guess-work. The fourth Anglo-

¹ For the earlier history of the British west African colonies see p. 79.

French boundary convention, in 1895, marked the beginning of an effort to delimit the frontiers. In Sierra Leone the boundary with Liberia was first established in 1902, and in Gambia the final settlement of the limits of French and British authority was reached in 1899. The British were compelled to exert themselves to render the agreement effective. A portion of the hinterland was annexed to the colony in 1901, and the rest was gradually "pacified" during the first years of the twentieth century.

In the Gold Coast and in Nigeria boundary agreements had to be made with the Germans as well as the French. These agreements were concluded at different times between 1889 and 1906. The most important ones for the Gold Coast were the Anglo-French convention of 1898 and the Anglo-German convention of 1899, while Nigeria settled most of her difficulties with France in 1904 and with Germany in 1902. The arrangements with France in 1898 and with Germany in 1899 were followed by definitive annexation of Ashanti. The king had been deposed in 1896. A rebellion was crushed in 1900, and Ashanti was annexed to the British crown in 1901. The most important step in the extension of direct British sovereignty over west Africa was made after the narrow escape from war with France. The vast territories of the Royal Niger Company were taken over by the British government in 1899 and 1900.

The reconquest of the Sudan, whose evacuation in 1885 had been a great blow to British prestige,¹ was possible only when Lord Cromer made Egypt's revenues exceed her expenditures and when Lord Kitchener got an Egyptian army into good fighting shape. Not before then could the argument be used in press and Parliament that Egypt herself would contribute substantially in men and money to an expedition against the Mahdi, who had been supreme

¹ See pp. 93-94.

ruler of the Sudan ever since he had killed General Gordon. For years Lord Cromer skilfully introduced and emphasized in his annual reports the necessity of the reclamation of the Sudan. Never could there be security in upper Egypt until the Mahdi's dervish hordes were crushed. Never would irrigation projects on a large scale be justifiable until the head-waters of the Nile were under Anglo-Egyptian control. Never would the African slave traffic be stopped until the region from Wady Halfa to the equator was policed by Europeans. Common humanity and moral responsibility (arising from the fact that Great Britain controlled Egypt and was also neighbor on the south to the Sudan by reason of the Uganda protectorate)¹ demanded that Great Britain undertake the pacification of the Sudan. Because of the dervish cruelties and misrule the native population was rapidly dying out. Last of all, from the point of view of European prestige in Africa, the Italian defeat at Adowa must be counteracted.²

Owing to the stupendous task of establishing and making secure lines of communication, which necessitated the construction of railway and telegraph lines across the Nubian Desert, more than two years elapsed between the invasion of the Sudan in March, 1896, and the final defeat of the Mahdi at Omdurman, near Khartum, on September 2, 1898. General Kitchener was raised to the peerage and became a national hero. The victory over the Mahdi, won in a battle in which forty thousand dervishes were crushed at the cost of less than five hundred killed in the Anglo-Egyptian

¹ Working through missionaries and their converts, the French and British governments made claims and counter-claims to Uganda for many years after the country was first opened up. In 1890 the German government acknowledged the territory as British, though the French continued to oppose British pretensions. In 1894 Uganda (until then called the kingdom of Buganda) was declared a British protectorate. But not until the reconquest of the Sudan was completed and the French were checked at Fashoda was France willing to recognize that the hope of adding these territories to her African empire was definitely dispelled.

² See Chapter XIX.

army, captured the imagination of the public. The British began to believe that they were the people of destiny chosen to carry the "white man's burden."

The intensity of this sentiment was evidenced a few weeks later when Kitchener arrived at Fashoda, six hundred miles south of Khartum on the White Nile, and hoisted the British flag beside the French flag, which had been planted there by Captain Marchand on July 10. The British refused to recognize the right of prior occupation, and the French had to choose between war and withdrawal. As France could get no help from Russia,¹ the Marchand expedition evacuated Fashoda in December, 1898, despite the opposition of a large section of the French press, which clamored for war. The Fashoda incident, bitter humiliation as it was for France, had the wholesome effect of making French statesmen see that it might be possible as well as wise to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain over moot colonial questions. A precedent had been established in the settlement of the Siamese and Nigerian boundary disputes. The delimitation of zones in the Sudan, in March, 1899, was a step towards the arrangement concluded five years later by which Great Britain and France gave each other a free hand respectively in Egypt and Morocco. The two nations were able to make successive diplomatic compromises because each had something that the other wanted with which to bargain. Germany, on the other hand, when her imperialism came into conflict with the imperialism of Great Britain and France, was invariably in the position of a claimant, not of a bargainer.

The reconquest of the Sudan brought under British con-

¹ The Franco-Russian alliance did not bind Russia to support France in a war arising from colonial questions, and fought outside Europe. The motives that led Russia to ally herself to France were frankly confessed: Russia was interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe (see p. 124); and she was glad to have access to the French market for loans under favorable auspices. So clearly understood was the exclusion of extra-European wars from the field of the alliance that France's neutrality in the Russo-Japanese war, six years after Fashoda, was never questioned.

trol the head-waters of the Nile and an important part of the littoral of the Red Sea. Great Britain became a neighbor of Abyssinia on the west as well as on the south and northeast. France's dream of controlling a belt of Africa straight across the continent from Senegal on the Atlantic to Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden was destroyed, while Great Britain's dream of a similar band from north to south—the Cape-to-Cairo “all red route”—was immeasurably advanced. The most important result of the exploit of Kitchener, however, was the change in the attitude of the British government towards its position in Egypt, which naturally followed the occupation of nearly a million square miles of Africa south of Egypt and the source of Egypt's water supply. A convention was signed at Cairo on January 19, 1899, between the British and Egyptian governments, providing for joint administration of the Sudan. Who should have title over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in case Great Britain evacuated Egypt, was not mentioned.¹

The revival of British imperialism once more brought to the foreground the south African as well as the Sudanese question. The policy of Gladstone in abandoning the Sudan was reversed when the reconquest of the Sudan was decided upon. Similarly, the solution adopted by Gladstone in adjusting the relations of the British Empire with the Boers, *i. e.*, rescinding the Transvaal annexation proclamation of 1877 and recognizing the independence of the Transvaal in 1881, was not considered definitive, especially in view of the facts that since Gladstone's time the British had begun to develop the vast resources of south central Africa and that gold had become an important product of the Transvaal. Bechuanaland, to the west of the Transvaal, had been made a protectorate in 1891, and Matabele-

¹ This thorny question has always been a source of difficulty in Anglo-Egyptian relations, especially when it came to the point of discussing the terms on which Egypt should be given her freedom. The rights of Egypt in the Sudan were not defined by the report of the Milner commission in 1921, nor by the proclamation of the British government in February, 1922, by which the Egyptian Free State was created.

land, to the north, in 1894. The value of the regions north of the Transvaal (now known as Rhodesia) was becoming apparent. Only the two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, stood in the way of the development and consolidation of British power.

On the last day of December, 1895, Doctor Jameson, administrator of Matabeleland, made a raid upon the Transvaal in order to compel President Krüger to yield to the demands of foreigners resident in the Transvaal. An uprising at Johannesburg had been planned with the connivance of Premier Rhodes of Cape Colony. The raid failed, Jameson and his companions were handed over to the British government by President Krüger for trial, and Rhodes was forced to resign. But the punishment meted out to the raiders for the breach of international good faith was very slight, and Jameson and Rhodes were regarded by British public opinion as not having been guilty of a dishonorable act. On the contrary, the Jameson raid reopened the question of the independence of the Boer republics. Had they the right to block the path of progress?

Like every other quarrel, there were faults on both sides, and the aggressors made out a good case against their victims. But while war was brewing, and during the three years that it lasted, many Englishmen denounced the policy of their government and the brutal methods of making war that the British were compelled to adopt in order to break down the protracted resistance of their enemies. The Anglo-Boer War began in 1899, and soon proved to be a formidable military task, involving an effort far beyond the calculations of the statesmen and generals who decided that the Boers had to be coerced. The Boer element in Cape Colony sympathized with the burghers of the republics, and the first English armies sent against President Krüger met with disaster. Even after two years of fighting, when the Boers were overwhelmed by numbers and had come virtually to the end of their resources, they kept

up a guerrilla warfare that proved expensive to the British. On August 7, 1901, Lord Kitchener issued a drastic proclamation announcing the annexation of the Orange Free State and the "late South African Republic," and declared that he was "determined to put an end to a state of things which aimlessly prolonged bloodshed and destruction and inflicted ruin upon the great majority of the inhabitants, anxious to live in peace and to earn a livelihood for themselves and their families."

Ten thousand Boers were holding in check a British army of more than two hundred thousand. Kitchener was compelled to establish concentration camps, in which there was a frightful mortality of women and children, and to extend the area of "pacified" territory by means of a chain of blockhouses. Only by this means could the Boers be brought to surrender. It took almost a year, however, of systematic starving and smoking out before the burghers, facing annihilation, surrendered unconditionally. In May, 1902, the Boers agreed to the treaty of Vereeniging, by which the Transvaal and the Orange Free State burghers recognized Edward VII as their lawful sovereign and surrendered their independence, with the guaranty that they should be allowed to retain the use of their language and not be subjected to any special tax to defray the expenses of the war.

The Boer War aroused bad feeling against Great Britain, especially in Holland and France. But the wisdom and magnanimity of the conquerors soon convinced the world that the British intended to treat the Boers fairly and to give them equal rights with themselves in south Africa. This generous policy made possible the rapid healing of war wounds and the accomplishment of the object for which the war had been fought—the consolidation of south Africa as a white man's land under the British crown.

CHAPTER XIV

PERSIA AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1907

RUSSIAN penetration southward on both sides of the Caspian Sea was at the expense of Persia. The provinces of Transcaucasia, containing the world's richest oil-fields, were taken from that country in war. Most of the Transcaspian Province, especially the part of it across which runs the railway from the Caspian Sea to central Asia, was similarly wrested from her. Persia is one of the highways to the open sea of Russian dreams. It was natural that Russian imperialism, when other outlets were temporarily or permanently blocked, should try to travel by the Persian road.

Because Persia lay on one of the routes to India, Great Britain, on the other hand, regarded this country as within her sphere of influence. We have seen how, in 1854 and 1878, the British prevented the Russians from reaching the Mediterranean through Turkey. The same general policy of being ready for war to check Russian expansion southward was followed also in Persia and Afghanistan. Great Britain fought two wars for the control of Afghanistan, and by naval activity that was never relaxed at any time in the nineteenth century she brought and kept the Persian Gulf under her influence. Turkey and France experienced the veto of England on the littoral of the gulf and of the adjacent Arabian peninsula. When Russia began to build railways to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, Persia became the principal field in which Great Britain and Russia opposed each other's ambition to dominate Asia. The twentieth century opened with Teheran as the center of British and Russian diplomatic intrigue.

Between 1872 and 1890 twelve railway promotion groups received concessions from the Persian government. The Reuter group started to construct a line from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. A French project to connect Tabriz with Trebizond on the Black Sea was underwritten by Paris bankers. But in 1890 Russia, simply to frustrate the plans of the British and the French, secured from the Persian government the exclusive right for twenty-one years to build railways in northern Persia. Russia did not even survey railway routes. She did nothing herself, and prevented others from giving Persia the indispensable factor of economic progress that virtually every country in Asia was developing through European capital. Invoking the excuse of Persia's backwardness and administrative anarchy, for which Russian diplomacy was largely responsible, Russia attempted to bring the country definitely within her sphere of influence.

Since the Persians were powerless, Russia would have succeeded had she not made the mistake of trying to extend her political and commercial influence to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, which the British considered exclusively theirs. In 1900 the Transcaspian Railway completed its branch from Merv to the Afghan frontier, and Russian emissaries and traders began active penetration of Afghanistan. In 1901 Russian diplomacy interfered in the British intrigue to detach Koweït from Turkish suzerainty and, when this failed, challenged Great Britain's claim to supremacy in the Persian Gulf. A steamship line from Odessa to Persian Gulf ports was established in February, 1901; Russian war-ships cruised in the gulf; and Russian agents purchased land in the islands and at Bender-Abbas. As Great Britain's title to close the Persian Gulf had no foundation in treaties or international law, Russia had to be stopped indirectly. In 1902 Great Britain made an alliance with Japan, who was preparing to attack Russia.

But the defeat of Russia in the Far East led only to the

redoubling of efforts to open a way to the sea through Persia. Despite British protests and threats, a Russian consulate was established at Bender-Abbas. The Russian Loan Bank secured the veto power over future foreign loans for seventy-five years, and the Persian government began to pay back the Anglo-Persian loan of 1892 with money borrowed from Russia. Neither of the powers was able to oust the other. But each was able to prevent the other from developing concessions or following up advantages. And as both powers refused to allow Persia to seek money elsewhere, railways remained unbuilt and the country fell into anarchy.

A British commercial mission sent to study conditions in 1906 recommended the division of the country into spheres of influence. It was obvious to business men in England and India that the intrigues and counter-intrigues of legations and consulates were ruining the hopes of getting financial benefit from trade privileges and concessions. Germany, too, by building the Bagdad Railway and threatening to invade the financial and commercial field, made British merchants feel that a three-cornered fight would be less profitable than dividing with Russia and keeping Germany out. Anglo-French relations had changed, and Russia was the ally of France. Russian officialdom was more tractable than before the events of 1904-05. Great Britain and Russia got together as Great Britain and France had done.

On September 24, 1907, the Anglo-Russian convention was communicated to the ambassadors of the powers in Petrograd. In the preamble the signatories affirmed their intention to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia and to allow (this is the word in the text) equal facilities for trade to all nations. But the convention went on to say that, owing to the proximity of Persia to their own territories, Great Britain and Russia had "special interests." The first article defined the Russian zone, the

second the British zone, the third a neutral zone; the fourth confirmed the existing mortgages of Persian revenues, and the fifth established the mutual privilege, "in event of irregularities," of instituting control over the revenues in the respective zones. A letter from Sir Edward Grey to the British ambassador at Petrograd, published simultaneously with the convention, announced that the Persian Gulf lay outside the scope of the understanding, but that the Russian government had agreed during the negotiations "not to deny the special interests of Great Britain in the gulf."

Great Britain and Russia established a new internal and international status for Persia without considering the interests or consulting the wishes of the Persians. And, as in the case of the series of agreements from 1890 to 1904 between Great Britain and France, the other powers were notified after the event. In 1890 the two Occidental powers gave each other *carte blanche* in Zanzibar and Madagascar, and in 1904 in Egypt and Morocco. There was no agreement among the powers beforehand, and the people and the rulers most vitally concerned were not notified. In virtually every instance of conventions to settle colonial rivalries, the compromises, which profoundly affected the destinies of Asiatics and Africans, were made for the mutual advantage of the "high contracting parties" and to the detriment of the countries whose political and economic status was changed.¹

The Anglo-Russian convention was conceived and put into force at a time when Asia was undergoing experiences similar to those that Europe experienced in 1848. After the Russo-Japanese War a wave of national feeling swept over Asia, and in every country there was a movement to estab-

¹If one believes in the *Übermensch* theory he will challenge this statement. If there are two moralities, one for Europe and America and the other for the rest of the world, it may be argued that Asiatic and African peoples receive ample compensation for being deprived of political and economic independence in the benefits they get from material and moral contact with our superior civilization.

lish democratic institutions and throw off foreign control. The two aims went together. Xenophobia has always been a phenomenon of agitation for self-government, and from Runnymede to the Italian Risorgimento the rallying cry has been the same: "Out with the foreigners!" Civil war is another phenomenon of democratic evolution. Russia and Great Britain played one Persian party against another, and seized the opportunity offered by the constitutional movement to occupy with armies the zones they had allotted to themselves.

Having thus installed themselves in their zones, the two powers sent a joint note to the Persian government, declaring that they would refuse to sanction loans from other powers if these loans involved the granting of concessions to any other powers or their subjects "contrary to Russian or British political and strategic interests." Persia refused to accept this, or indeed to recognize the Russo-British protectorate in any way; whereupon Petrograd and London warned the other powers and international financial circles against lending money to or seeking concessions from Persia.

In answer to British complaints that order was not being preserved along the trade routes of southern Persia, the Persian government said that money was necessary to reorganize and maintain the gendarmerie. The British and Russian governments not only refused to lend the money, but kept in their own hands the revenues accruing in the zones occupied by them—the richest parts of Persia, including all the customs—and prevented Persia from raising a loan at Paris or Berlin. Persia was rendered powerless to take measures to restore peaceful conditions. This gave the Russians a pretext to send more troops into northern Persia; while the British informed the Persian government that the state of anarchy in the south necessitated British intervention to police the trade route from Bushire to Shiraz and Ispahan.

Left to herself, Persia made an effort to strengthen the central administrations. Frenchmen were employed in the ministry of justice and of the interior. Swedish officers were engaged to reorganize the gendarmerie. To free the finances from European political intrigue, Persia turned to the United States. Our government was willing to suggest names of experts, but not to give diplomatic backing to any mission that might be chosen. It was indicated to Persia that Americans who went to Teheran, although they had virtually been nominated by our State Department, were to be private citizens on a mission that did not involve the Washington government.

Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, a former government official in the Philippines, was intrusted with the task of managing Persian finances. Considering that he was in the service of an independent state to work for the interests of that state, Mr. Shuster did not recognize the Anglo-Russian convention.¹ The Russians, therefore, demanded his dismissal, under threat of occupying Teheran. Sir Edward Grey explained to the House of Commons that the interests of Great Britain dictated the support of the Russian ultimatum. When a member asked, "How about the interests of Persia?" Sir Edward was silent. The Persian parliament rejected the ultimatum, but, under pressure from the Russian and British ministers, it was prorogued, and the American mission had to leave.

The Anglo-Russian expulsion of Mr. Shuster, on December 24, 1911, ended for nine years the independence of Persia. Money now had to be borrowed from Russia and Great Britain, from whom it had to be begged in small sums at high interest. Banking operations were exclusively in the hands of Russian and British banks, in which customs receipts had to be deposited. Although her nat-

¹ There were, of course, several specific acts on the part of Mr. Shuster that offended Russia and demonstrated the American expert's intention to disregard the Anglo-Russian convention. The story is told in Mr. Shuster's book, "The Strangling of Persia."

ural wealth was great and her public debt small, Persia was reduced to a state of financial slavery. The two "protecting powers," furthermore, defeated every project of financial, military, and economic reform. From 1900 to 1914 the railway mileage of Asia was quadrupled, and the consequent marvelous increase in economic prosperity was shared by every country except Persia, where no railways were built. Every effort made by Persians along the lines other countries were following—extension of popular education, improvement and consolidation of fiscal systems, working out and testing of democratic institutions—was opposed and defeated by the country's masters, with the tacit consent of the other powers.

The importance of the Anglo-Russian convention is twofold. Germany found herself shut out from another field of expansion, and was stimulated to fresh effort to extend her influence in Turkey. In Persia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, Great Britain and Russia were able to bury their animosity and to compromise their conflicting interests throughout the world. The coöperation of British democracy and Russian autocracy in a war against Germany was made possible. For Great Britain was relieved of anxiety concerning India, and Russian statesmen were, in return, encouraged to begin the diplomatic negotiations that resulted in the abandonment by Great Britain of opposition to the eventual Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. The Anglo-Russian agreement was a necessary corollary to the Anglo-French agreement in laying the bases of the Triple Entente.

CHAPTER XV

EGYPT, MOROCCO, AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904

ALTHOUGH British and French had fought side by side against Russia in the Crimean War, forty years after Waterloo, during the reign of Napoleon III, there was in England little love for France. For the Second Empire prospered. Especially in the Near East, the two Occidental powers were commercial rivals, and France was accumulating too much surplus capital for investment abroad to avoid the adoption by her government of a foreign policy that frequently seemed aggressive in the eyes of the British Foreign Office. Hence it was not surprising that public opinion in England was sympathetic with Prussia and her allies in the war of 1870, and that the defeat of France and the incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine in the new German Empire were hailed by the British with quiet satisfaction. Queen Victoria's ministers and the international traders and bankers of London were only human in rejoicing in the setback to French political and financial prestige throughout the world.

During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, which were the first generation of the Third Republic, constant friction disturbed the relations between London and Paris, due to the fact that French statesmen and bankers were seeking in Africa and Asia opportunities for investment and compensation for the prestige that had been lost in Europe. We have seen how France went to China, Madagascar, the Pacific islands, and northern and western Africa to develop titles that (with the exception of Algeria) were scarcely more than footholds, but that offered opportuni-

ties to expand into contiguous territories. These colonial activities brought France into diplomatic conflicts with Great Britain in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. Moreover, France allied herself with Russia, Great Britain's other colonial rival. Germany, on the other hand, was not during these decades in a position to contest the expansion of the British Empire, as were France and Russia, and, although a *Weltpolitik* had been launched, it had little support from the German people and so was not a menace to the British.

The theory advanced during the recent World War, that peoples understand each other, form alliances, and fight side by side because they have common ideals and are inspired by a common desire to defend civilization, is difficult to uphold in the light of history, even of the most recent history. The facts of Anglo-French relations prove that the Entente Cordiale is the result of a realization of common interests, which came when the statesmen of the two nations concluded that the prosperity and increasing power of Germany were more to be feared by both Great Britain and France than the prosperity and power of each were to be feared by the other.

In the New Hebrides,¹ in the extension of the frontiers of Burma and Indo-China,² in Egypt,³ in Morocco, in Arabia,⁴ in the conquest of Madagascar by the French⁵ and of the eastern Sudan by the British,⁶ differences of opinion had more than once brought the two nations to the verge of war. The most serious questions, because they were the most vital, were those of Morocco and Egypt. It was logical, therefore, that the agreement that sealed the Entente Cordiale should be based upon a sweeping compromise regarding Egypt and Morocco—a compromise of a nature to assure public opinion in both countries that there was a genuine *quid pro quo*.

¹ See page 63. ² See pp. 61-62, 168. ³ See p. 92. ⁴ See p. 75. ⁵ See p. 59.

⁶ See p. 174.

From the days of Mehemet Ali, France regarded Egypt as a country in which French culture and French investments were to predominate. Despite the veto of the British government and London bankers, a French company secured a concession for the Suez Canal, and financed and carried through the project. Six years after the canal was opened the British government became the controlling stockholder. When the Egyptian treasury fell behind in interest payments on the national debt, France and Great Britain established a joint financial control. But Great Britain alone occupied Egypt and took over the administration of the country. The original occupation could not have been considered trickery or unfairness to France; for London had invited Paris to take part, first, in bombarding Alexandria, and, second, in landing troops. What rankled in the minds of the French was the continued occupation of Egypt, carrying with it sole British administrative control. British statesmen had assured France and the other powers that the occupation was to be temporary and would not infringe upon the rights and privileges of the sultan of Turkey, of the European powers, and of the Egyptian government.¹

Time did not reconcile the French to the *fait accompli* of the British occupation. The loss of Egypt (for it was so regarded) came up frequently in the Chamber of Deputies, and the statesmen who had allowed Great Britain to act alone and those who had not brought pressure to bear later to oust the British found the Egyptian question a vulnerable place in their political armor. Among the French people it was felt that British control of the canal and the seizure of Egypt were the result of France's weakness after the war of 1870, of which the British had taken unfair advantage.

Nominally Egypt was an autonomous *vilayet* (province)

¹ For a discussion of Great Britain's pledges see pp. 91-92, 505-507.

of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by a khedive (viceroy). The relations between Egypt and other nations had been established by treaties with Turkey. Europeans and Americans enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory régime, as in Turkey. Their interests were looked after by consuls-general in Cairo, exercising diplomatic functions, and by consuls and consular agents in other cities. Justice was administered by consular courts and mixed tribunals of European and Egyptian judges. The Egyptian debt was under international control, and representatives of the powers supervised the expenditure of revenues affected to pay the interest on the debt.

The government of the khedive was carried on by a ministry, with a premier, as in European states; but, as in Oriental states, the khedive kept legislative authority in his own hands. His national council and national assembly were advisory bodies, possessing only such authority as he was willing for them to have.

Practically, Egypt was quit of Turkish control with the payment of a tribute and the flying of the Turkish flag. After the British occupation the ruler of the country became the British consul-general, who governed through advisers in the different ministries. For the sake of form, the diplomatic agents of other countries looked upon the khedive as ruler of Egypt, and carried on negotiations with the khedive's ministry. In fact, all matters were decided at the British agency. The khedive was a figure-head and his ministers were figure-heads. The final authority was the British cabinet, to whom the consul-general made an annual report. Great Britain's position in Egypt was maintained by a garrison in the Cairo citadel, and by control of the Egyptian army through British officers, who held the principal commands.

This situation was possible only through the impotence of Turkey, the acquiescence of the powers, and the willingness of the British to live under the outward semblance

of Egyptian authority.¹ To remain in Egypt, it was necessary for the British to keep Turkey and the powers from interfering and to prevent a movement on the part of the khedive and the educated Egyptians to take back into their own hands the control of the country.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century educated Egyptians began to conspire against the British occupation. British rule had brought prosperity and tranquillity; but there were no evidences of carrying out the promises to leave Egypt. On the contrary, the reconquest of the Sudan seemed to indicate that the British intended to make Egypt a colony or a protectorate. Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who had succeeded to the throne in 1892, sympathized with the nationalists, and declared that material blessings, however great, could not compensate any people for the loss of the privilege of managing their own affairs. One can hardly blame him for not appreciating his benefits as much as his benefactors did, especially as it was constantly in his mind that, although they were doing well by Egypt, they were inspired, not by love for Egypt, but by the fact that their country had decided that it was to her own interest to remain in Egypt in order to keep control of the Suez Canal.

Abbas Hilmi was too completely at the mercy of Lord Cromer, the British consul-general, who could have deposed him in a minute, to side openly with the nationalist movement; and the agitators were not a serious menace until they began to receive outside encouragement and financial aid. Mustafa Kamel, leader of the nationalist movement, imbibed his democratic notions, and conceived the idea of a free Egypt, in Paris, where influential Frenchmen saw in him the best sort of firebrand to throw into

¹ The British military and civilian officials in Egyptian government service wore the fez and styled themselves "servants of the khedive." The ruler was given the same symbols of respect that other sovereigns enjoyed, and the British applied to the court chamberlain for "an audience of his Highness," and, when they received it, courtesied to the khedive as they would to their own king.

Egypt in revenge for the attitude of Cromer and Kitchener at Fashoda.¹ Although intellectually limited, Mustafa Kamel had enthusiasm, magnetism, and the gift of public speaking—qualities that the demagogue must have. He could be inspired and directed by French journalists working discreetly behind the scenes.

At the end of 1899 Mustafa Kamel returned to Cairo from Paris, and gathered around him a group of influential and thoughtful people whom he could never have attracted if French intrigue had not been at work. Mustafa Kamel was the showy façade of the movement. But the British knew that behind him stood a new group of whom he was not the leader. They knew also that French brains and money were responsible for the foundation of the Arabic newspaper *Lewa*, which within a year became the most widely circulated journal in Egypt. The nationalist movement organized a propaganda, through the local Moslem clergy and the *Lewa*, which reached the *fellahin* (peasants).

Mustafa Kamel and his associates thought that giving their propaganda a religious character was essential to its success; but in doing this they brought about its failure. Indeed, the nationalist movement, originally launched by the French to make trouble for the British, actually prepared the way for the Anglo-French understanding. Mustafa Kamel's speeches and writings in Egypt and the Young Egyptian congresses in Switzerland caused alarm among far-seeing French statesmen, who saw in pan-Islamism menace to their own colonial interests. From the moment of its birth the Egyptian nationalist movement was a boomerang to the French. Launched to hit the British in Egypt, it bid fair to hit every European power that held Mohammedans in subjection, but especially the French themselves in north and west Africa. The most bitter Anglophobes began to feel the necessity of a colonial agree-

¹ See p. 174.

ment with Great Britain. Through the nationalist movement, however, they had proved what mischief they were capable of causing, and made British statesmen feel that it would be worth while to make concessions to France elsewhere in order to call off the efforts to undermine Great Britain's position in Egypt.

The part of Africa nearest Europe and America, and adjoining the highly developed colony of Algeria, was, at the opening of the twentieth century, the most backward, the most unknown, the most inaccessible. On account of the rivalry of the powers, Morocco had remained outside all European spheres of influence. The powers most interested in whatever changes were to be made in the political status of this Moorish corner of Africa were, because of propinquity, France and Spain. The ambition of France was to round out her north African empire by extending her protectorate over Morocco, as she had done over Tunisia two decades earlier. Spain, whose foothold on the Moroccan coast dated back to the sixteenth century, had never succeeded in extending her influence over the hinterland, and did not possess the strength either to intimidate the Moors herself or to help them resist French pressure.

Germany and Great Britain worked together to block the French. Both powers were influenced by trade considerations, and Great Britain, in addition, did not like the idea of French control over territories opposite Gibraltar. The British were more vigorous than the Germans in their determination to prevent France from repeating what she had done in Tunisia. The British contended that the independence of the shereefian empire must be upheld at all costs. What Emperor William said at Tangier in 1905, and what the German press wrote during the crises of Algeciras and Agadir,¹ is substantially what has been said in more than one speech from the throne of Queen Victoria

¹ See Chapter XVII.

and what the British press wrote up to the time of the bargain with France.

During the five years preceding the agreement of 1904 France, thwarted at Fashoda and converted to the necessity of a constructive and logical African program, began an effort to secure the Moroccan "key to her house." The German legation was a very poor second to the British legation in opposing French attempts to gain control of the Moroccan army, to obtain harbor and mining concessions, and to secure a rectification of Algerian frontiers. The French began to realize that, while they might successfully combat German intrigue, there was no hope of doing anything in Morocco without the consent of the British. France had a sincere desire and a very good reason for wishing to see peace and order and economic prosperity brought to Morocco. But the Anglo-German policy paralyzed every effort of Moroccan and French authorities to improve political and economic conditions in the north-western corner of Africa. The British minister, advising the sultan of Morocco as a friend whose interests he had at heart, urged him to resist French advances and combat French influences. Immediately after the agreement of 1904 was signed, he told the sultan that he must do what the French said. The British minister at Teheran acted in the same way with the Persians in regard to Russia before and after the agreement of 1907.

The three documents embodying the agreement between Great Britain and France, in which Egypt and Morocco were the principal pawns, were published in Paris on April 8. France recognized Great Britain's predominant position in Egypt and promised not to raise again the question of the temporary character of the British occupation. In return, Great Britain recognized the special interests of France in Morocco and promised to place no obstacles in the way of French intervention to maintain order and assist the sultan in reforms. France agreed to treat British

commerce in Morocco on equality with French for thirty years and not to annex or erect fortifications in the neighborhood of the Straits of Gibraltar and to prevent any other power from doing so.

The secondary adjustments or compromises were: (1) France abandoned the right of landing and drying fish on the shore of Newfoundland, granted by the treaty of Utrecht in 1714, in return for the cession of territory at the mouth of the Gambia River and of the Los Islands in west Africa and the rectification of the frontier in Algeria which would give France a direct route to Lake Chad without passing through the desert; (2) while disclaiming any intention of annexing Siamese territory, French influence was recognized as predominant in the valley of the Mekong and British in the valley of the Menam; (3) Great Britain abandoned her protests against French tariffs in Madagascar; (4) a joint commission was to be created for administering the New Hebrides Islands.

The agreement contained five secret articles, not made public until 1911, and then only because there was a widespread suspicion in England that they committed Great Britain to a defensive alliance with France. But these articles provided only for judicial and financial questions and for contingencies that might arise in connection with Spain's hold on the coast opposite Gibraltar.

Germany felt that, as Great Britain and France did not own Egypt and Morocco, it was impossible to admit the right of British and French statesmen thus to dispose of these important countries, protecting themselves at the expense of other powers as well as of the peoples whose destinies they were arranging without consulting them. The agreement of 1904 brought Great Britain and France together, and in the end made them allies against Germany. For, as far as Morocco was concerned, Germany refused to admit that the agreement possessed international validity.

Germany attempted to prevent France from occupying Morocco. Great Britain sided with France. Public opinion was aroused, in France and Great Britain against Germany, and in Germany against Great Britain and France, over a question that in reality affected, even indirectly, only a small number of their respective subjects.

CHAPTER XVI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK (1883-1905)

ON the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II said: "May our German Fatherland become one day so powerful that, as one formerly used to say, *Civis romanus sum*, one may in the future say only, *Ich bin ein deutscher Bürger*." This statement revealed a lack of appreciation of the difference between the Roman and the nineteenth-century European ideas of citizenship. The apostle Paul had no Latin blood in his veins, had never been to Rome,¹ and what non-Jewish culture he had imbibed was Greek and not Latin. Roman citizenship was a patent, like a title of nobility, conferred upon people throughout the empire for services rendered or as a matter of policy. The Roman Empire was a system of government, based upon the idea of a dominant caste, not of a dominant race. The accident of being born of certain blood and in a certain place did not of itself entail exclusive rights and privileges and opportunities of exploiting the inhabitants of other countries.

Throughout the centuries of overseas expansion the European nations followed exploration with missionary propaganda and conquest. It was natural that peoples who found themselves, by reason of military strength, knowledge, and financial resources, enabled to impose their will upon weaker nations should begin to believe in the superiority of their blood and civilization. But gradually the European nations came into conflict with one another outside Europe, and fell to using non-Europeans and non-

¹ At the time Paul invoked his citizenship as a protection (cf. Acts xxii: 25-29). It was undoubtedly this incident that the kaiser had in mind.

Christians against each other. These practices, which were in reality the original challenge to the pretension of Europe to the right of eminent domain in the other continents and which gave non-Christians a right to question the sincerity of missionary propaganda, had already been adopted in the colonial wars of the eighteenth century. Therefore, in the struggles that succeeded the French Revolution, the new conception of nationality bred among the rival peoples of Europe the tendency to adopt the *Uebermensch* theory in their relations with one another. In the next generation universal military service and the glittering reward of great economic prosperity involved whole peoples in the bitterness of international rivalry, and they succumbed to the temptation of seeking by force the aggrandizement of their particular nations throughout the world.

When Wilhelm II ascended the throne modern political Germany was in her eighteenth year and her first colonies were in their fifth year. The *Weltpolitik* (world policy) of Germany was largely a development of the thirty years of his reign. The kaiser was the product of the era in which he ruled. Noisily aggressive as it was, we must judge his leadership in the light of the situation in which Germany found herself.

After the successful war of 1870, united Germany entered upon the greatest era of industrial growth and prosperity that has ever been enjoyed by any nation. Not even the United States, with the help of emigration and of new territories to open up, could boast of a development in productive activities and means of communication comparable to that of Germany. In old central Europe cities sprang up almost overnight; railways and canals were built until the empire became a network of steel and of inland waterways; mines and factories sprang into being; the population increased more than fifty per cent. in forty years. Germany began to look to the extra-European world for markets. She was reaching the point where her productivity exceeded

her power of consumption. Where could she find markets for the goods? German merchants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread abroad the idea that there was a world equilibrium, as important to the future of the nations of Europe as was the European equilibrium. Germany, becoming a competitor, saw that the prosperity of Great Britain was due to trade, and that the security and volume of this trade depended upon colonies.

The first instance of the awakening on the part of the German people to a sense that there was something that interested them outside of Europe was the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji Islands, with which German traders had just begun to build up a business. Because the infant empire was engaged in its struggles with the church and socialism, and the relations between the Reichstag and the Bundesrath were still in an experimental stage, Germany was not in a position to adopt a vigorous foreign policy or to seek her share of the world by taking what Great Britain and Russia and France had not yet taken. But the Germans began to feel that in the future Germany ought to be consulted concerning the further extension of the sovereignty of any European nation over any part of the world then unoccupied or still independent of foreign control.

German trade, at the very moment when it was beginning to seek world markets, was confronted by the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882, the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and Russian, French, and British dealings with China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, and the peoples of central Asia. The educated and moneyed classes in Germany started an agitation to impress upon the government the necessity of entering the colonial field. When Bismarck had successfully concluded the critical struggle with the socialists, the decks were cleared for action. In 1882 a Bremen trader, by treaties with the native chiefs, gained control of the Bay of Angra

Pequeña on the west coast of Africa. For two years no attention was paid to this treaty, which was a private commercial affair. In 1884, shortly after the occupation of Egypt, a dispute arose between the British authorities at Cape Town and Herr Lüderitz, the owner of Angra Pequena. Bismarck saw that he must act or the old story of British sovereignty would be repeated. He telegraphed to the German consul at Cape Town that the imperial government had annexed the coast and hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio.

From 1884 to 1886 other annexations in Africa and the Pacific were made. The east coast of Africa, north of Cape Delgado and the River Rovuma, and Kamerun and Togo, on the Gulf of Guinea, were put under the German flag. In the Pacific Kaiser Wilhelm's Land was formed of a part of New Guinea, with some adjacent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands were gathered in. Since those early years of feverish activity there were no new acquisitions in Africa, other than the part of the French Congo ceded to Germany in 1912 "as compensation" for the French protectorate over Morocco. In the Pacific, in 1899, after the American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne groups were added by purchase from Spain, and two of the Samoan islands were allotted to Germany by an arrangement with Great Britain and the United States.

The four colonies in Africa and the groups of Pacific islands were of little intrinsic and of no strategic value. The very fact that they had remained without European masters until the eighties of the nineteenth century was proof that they were comparatively worthless and that none of them contained a harbor capable of being converted into a naval base. Even the Pacific islands acquired from Spain were left-overs that the United States had not cared to take in the treaty following the Cuban War. The Afri-

can colonies made Germany a neighbor of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Until a few years before the World War the Belgian Congo enjoyed an international status, and was controlled by a private company under King Leopold and not directly by the Belgian government. The parts of the Congo Free State touching the German colonies were simply interior jungle-land, of which Germany already had more than she could develop. The little Spanish colony bordering on Kamerun was of no importance. The adjacent French and British colonies in west Africa and the British possessions in southwest and east Africa offered no possibility of German expansion.¹ Consequently it was difficult for the young colonial party to awaken enthusiasm for overseas possessions that were unattractive for large capital investment, for trade development, or for colonization. Moreover, as occasions for friction with other powers did not exist, these colonies afforded to "greater Germany" advocates no opportunity to foster a jingo spirit.

In studying the *Weltpolitik* it is essential to emphasize the fact that the colonies acquired between 1883 and 1888 were a deterrent rather than a stimulus in creating and maintaining a current of public opinion for the support of an aggressive foreign policy. Very few Germans took an interest in the colonies, which were regarded as an expensive luxury; and in the Reichstag and the press events such as the Herero War in southwest Africa were used successfully to discredit the colonial ventures of the government.² Not until after the first Moroccan crisis, when the

¹ Germany's sole chance for an attractive and interesting colonial development lay in the acquisition of a part or all of Portugal's colonies. The two largest of these lay to the north and south respectively of German Southwest Africa and German East Africa. For the Anglo-German *pourparlers* to divide the Portuguese colonies, see p. 475.

² The Herero War, begun in the autumn of 1903, did not end until 1907; but the events that aroused the greatest criticism in Germany, and indeed in other countries, occurred in 1904. General von Trotha, whose cruelties had given rise to sharp debates in the Reichstag, was recalled in 1905, before the colonial question became a campaign issue.

colonies were more than twenty years old, did the German people elect a Reichstag committed to the political support and financial development of the colonies.

The Germans realized that they had to take the world as they found it. It was futile to hope to build up a world empire by colonizing unoccupied territories in the temperate zone. There were none. As for establishing their protectorate over weaker nations, the Americas were excluded by the Monroe Doctrine, and Great Britain, Russia, and France had anticipated them in the worth-while parts of Asia and Africa. China could be further despoiled only by acting in concert with the other powers. The Ottoman Empire alone offered to a great power the possibility of securing predominant influence. Beyond taking a share of the loot in China and attempting to get the upper hand in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, Germany could hope for no more than to keep open doors for her commerce by opposing the efforts of other powers to gobble up the few African and Asiatic countries that retained a semblance of independence. The possibilities for Germany were, therefore: (1) getting a foothold in China; (2) becoming the predominating power in the Ottoman Empire; and (3) thwarting French ambitions in Morocco and British and Russian ambitions in Persia. The other phases of the *Weltpolitik* were: (1) to find a means by which Germans who went abroad to live would not lose their loyalty to the fatherland; and (2) to build up a merchant marine and a navy for its protection.

In China, where all the acquisitions of European powers were of comparatively recent date and were still being extended, Germany believed that she had the right to expect to gain a position equal to that of Great Britain at Hong-Kong, of France in Indo-China, and of Russia in Manchuria. She maintained that it was as necessary for her to have a fortified port to serve as a naval base in the Pacific for her fleet as it was for the other powers, and that by

securing a foothold on the Chinese coast she would be in a position to get her share of the commerce of the Far East. From 1895 to 1897 Germany carefully examined different points that might serve for the establishment of a naval and commercial base. At the beginning of 1897 a technical mission was sent out to China whose membership included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel. This mission reported in favor of Kiau-chau on the peninsula of Shantung. As the other powers were preying upon China, Germany knew that none of them would be foolish enough to put in question their own titles by opposing her scheme openly. She knew also that there would be no concerted diplomatic support of China in resistance to her demands. For France and Russia were on bad terms with Great Britain, and they had been partners with Germany in compelling Japan to revise the treaty of Shimonoseki two years earlier.

The murder of two missionaries in the interior of the coveted province on November 1, 1897, gave Germany her chance. War-vessels landed on the peninsula troops who seized Kiau-chau and Tsing-tau. By a treaty signed on March 6, 1899, Kiau-chau with adjacent territory was leased to Germany for ninety-nine years. The German capital and commerce were given preferential rights on the peninsula, together with a concession of the immediate construction of a railway and exclusive mining privileges along the railway line. Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung, with its forty million inhabitants, was converted into a German sphere of influence.

When Germany leased Kiau-chau, she solemnly declared that the port would be open—*ein frei Hafen für alle Nationen*. But Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go back on her word. In 1906 she conceived a clever scheme by which the Chinese duties were to be collected within the German sphere in return for an annual sum of twenty per cent. of the total customs receipts of the Tsing-

tau district. In this way she more than reimbursed herself—at the expense of the Japanese—for the generosity displayed in allowing German goods to be subject to the Chinese customs.

During the fifteen years of German control the leased territory and the concessions in the interior of Shantung brought rich material returns to Germany. Kiau-chau was the only overseas enterprise that paid. But the Japanese felt that the naval base was as much of a menace to them as Port Arthur in Russian hands had been, and there was no doubt that Germany was a more formidable commercial competitor than Russia. Great Britain also felt that the presence of Germany on the coast of China was a potential menace to her trade and maritime supremacy. Russia and France in the Far East she had not feared so greatly. While the immediate result of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, concluded three years after the lease of Shantung to Germany, was to make possible the attack of Japan upon Russia, it ultimately enabled Japan to drive Germany also from a base in China dangerously near her own coast.

The most feasible aspect of the *Weltpolitik* was the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey. The colonial ventures in Africa and Asia—notably at the time of the Herero War and the Boxer Rebellion—were bitterly opposed by many Germans, and never succeeded in firing the imagination of the people. But the Germans have always been under the spell of the Mediterranean. Greece and Bible lands and the countries of Islam attract northern peoples in a peculiar way. The *Weltpolitik*, at work in the Ottoman Empire, received a popular indorsement that in time was extended to other foreign policies. The minarets of Constantinople and Damascus and Bagdad, glistening in the sun, Jerusalem the golden and Mecca the mysterious, the islands of the Ægean and the deserts of Arabia, camels and carpets, Harun al-Rashid and Suleiman the magnificent—as a reader of the “Thousand and One Nights” would

fancy them—here we have the psychological background of the *Drang nach Osten*. Germany's "push to the East" was inspired by more than simple economic necessity, and it gradually grew into a movement that the Germans believed to be a matter of national honor as well as of national prosperity.

The certainty of economic success helped to make worth while the political effort of the German statesmen, who knew that their goal could be achieved only by attaining control of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States. Great Britain had an unobstructed path to Turkey by sea. Russia was a neighbor of Turkey. Predominant influence in the Ottoman Empire would be advantageous to Germany only if she were able to assure herself of a land route to Turkey that could not be cut by her enemies. Hence, in considering the *Weltpolitik* in Turkey, we must include the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Balkan States, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States, Austria-Hungary and Russia, and Russia and the Balkan States. Unless she backed Turkey against the Balkan States and Austria-Hungary against Russia, her position in Turkey was worth nothing to Germany.

In 1888 a group of German financiers, underwritten by the Deutsche Bank, secured the concession for a railway line from Ismid to Angora in Asia Minor. The construction of this line was followed by concessions for an extension from Angora to Cæsarea and a branch from the Ismid-Angora line running southwest from Eski Sheir to Konia. The extension to Cæsarea was never made. That was not the direction in which the Germans wanted to go. The branch became the main line. Thus was born the Berlin-Bagdad-Bassora "all rail route." The Baltic Sea was to be connected with the Persian Gulf. The Balkan peninsula was to come under the influence of Austria-Hungary, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia of Germany. The south Slavs and the peoples of the Ottoman Empire were to be

dispossessed.¹ Russia cut off from the Mediterranean, Germany at Constantinople, France checkmated in Syria, and Great Britain in Mesopotamia and Egypt—this was the pan-Germanic conception of the *Bagdadbahn*.

The first railway concession granted to the Germans in Asia Minor coincided with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who in the next year (1889) made his first visit to Sultan Abdul Hamid. In 1898 a second visit was made, followed by a pilgrimage to the Holy Land; and this resulted in the granting of an extension of the original Eski Sheir-Konia concession to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. This revelation of Germany's ambition led to international intrigues and negotiations for a share in the construction of the line through Mesopotamia, and Germany had to accept international participation in financing the project.

Russia did not realize the danger of German influence at Constantinople or foresee the eventualities of the German "pacific penetration" in Asia Minor. She adjusted the Macedonian question with Austria-Hungary at Mürzsteg in 1903 in order to have a free hand in Manchuria. Active opposition to Germany in the Near East was not begun by Petrograd until after Russian ambitions in the Far East had been shattered through the war with Japan.

The situation was different with Great Britain. The menace of the German approach to the Persian Gulf was brought to the attention of the British Foreign Office before the Boer crisis became acute, and it was noted that, while Germany had sent engineers along the proposed route of her railway, she had neglected the fact that the sheik of Koweït, who ruled the projected terminus on the Persian Gulf, was virtually independent of Turkey. In 1899 Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian Gulf, signed with the sheik of Koweït a secret convention that assured to the latter "special protection" if he would make no

¹ Ernst Haeckel actually prophesied this in a speech in 1905 before the Geographical Society of Jena.

cession of territory without the knowledge and consent of the British government. Some months later, when a German mission, headed by the kaiser's consul-general at Constantinople, arrived in Koweït to arrange the concession for the terminus of the *Bagdadbahn*, they found a recalcitrant sheik who refused to recognize the sultan's authority. A Turkish war-ship arrived. But British war-ships and blue-jackets upheld the independence of Koweït. This event was the beginning of a series of conflicts in foreign policies that changed the British and German peoples from friends to foes.

From 1888 to 1905 the increase of German economic interests in the Ottoman Empire was rapid. But, as we have seen in the case of Koweït, politically Germany did not have things her own way. British opposition developed in regard to other concessions in Mesopotamia, and the attempts of German merchants and shippers to get a share of the river traffic and of the ocean freights from Bassora were bitterly resisted.

From Mesopotamia to Persia was but a step. Germany began to think about railways and banks and markets in the shah's dominions. It was to her interest that Persia remain independent, so that she could get a share of concessions and trade. But, rather than let Germany in, Russia and Great Britain made an agreement to divide Persia into spheres of influence.¹ In Morocco, the only other independent Moslem country, Great Britain worked with Germany for some years to prevent France from monopolizing the country. But the British so greatly feared the growth of German commercial activities in the Near East that they decided to compound their colonial rivalry with France, and this necessitated abandoning opposition to France in Morocco.² During the first decade of the twentieth century Germany found her influence in the Ottoman

¹ See Chapter XIV.

² There were, of course, other important considerations that made advisable the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. See Chapter XV.

Empire limited by the diplomatic manœuvres of other powers, and saw fail her attempt to prevent Morocco and Persia from being included in the spheres of influence of rival powers by agreements made among themselves, to which Germany was not a party and for which she received no compensation.

German statesmen did not give up their efforts to find "a place in the sun." But they began to pay more attention to strengthening the cultural bonds between the fatherland and Germans in exile; to liberating merchants and manufacturers from dependence upon foreign carriers for goods and raw materials; and, above all, to developing an army and navy that would give Germany the prestige and power she missed through her lack of extensive colonial dominions, well distributed along trade routes and varied in potential wealth.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FRANCO-GERMAN DISPUTE OVER MOROCCO (1905-1911)

IN the decade from 1904 to 1914 Morocco was "taken over" by France, but not until Europe had been led from one international crisis through another to the catastrophe of a world war.

Unless the nature of sovereignty in the shereefian empire is kept in mind, one can not understand recent events in Morocco. There are three differences between the Moroccan conception of the state and ours: (1) The sultan's authority depends upon his recognition by other religious chiefs who are, like himself, descendants of the Prophet. There is a traditional right of blood but not of primogeniture. (2) The state is not a geographical conception. The sultan rules over tribes, not over territories. (3) Some of the tribes have never recognized the sultan's authority. Morocco is divided into two distinct camps: the Makhzen (tribes that recognize the sultan's authority) and the Siba (tribes that are not vassals of the sultan). The Makhzen and the Siba are neighbors in every part of the country.

Since there is no united people under a ruler who has administrative control of definitely delimited territories, we see how absurd were the Anglo-German contention that Morocco must not "lose her independence," and the French contention that the sultan was responsible for the actions of all the tribes within the region our maps call Morocco. Before the British made the agreement of 1904 with France, the sultan could play off one power against another, and his anomalous "government" was allowed to exist. When France got a free hand, and Great Britain stood behind her

by preventing Germany from assuming the traditional rôle England herself had been playing, the sultan was brought face to face for the first time with the necessity of representing geographical Morocco. He was asked to accept responsibility for and to act in the name of tribes that had never recognized his or his ancestors' authority.

The Moroccan crisis began in 1901 with the occupation by French troops of the oasis of Twat, on the northern edge of the Sahara Desert in the undefined hinterland between Morocco and Algeria. The French were planning to establish lines of communication across the Sahara to their colonies of the Niger and the Senegal. These lines had to be protected from raiding tribes. It was also necessary, owing to the rapid development of Algeria and Tunisia, to bring under administrative control the Algerian hinterland. The French attitude towards Morocco was logical and not unreasonable. What France asked for she had the right to expect—that the sultan of Morocco should exercise authority over the tribes that were threatening the security and disturbing the prosperity of Oran, the Algerian province bordering on Morocco, or should refrain from opposing France in taking the necessary military measures to reduce the Moorish tribes to order. The French declared that if Morocco meant a definite geographical territory the Fez government was responsible for what happened in that territory. If the sultan made the plea that he was responsible only for the acts of the Makhzen (*i. e.*, the submitted tribes), France was not attacking his sovereignty or his government when she punished the Siba (*i. e.*, unsubmitted tribes) and occupied their lands.

The difficulty of France lay not so much with Abdul Aziz and his native advisers as with the British and German ministers at Tangier, and Kaid Maclean, the instructor-general of the Moorish army, a Scotch adventurer subsidized by the British Foreign Office. As long as these three men kept telling Abdul Aziz that it was his duty and right

to reject the French thesis, France could be put before the world—even before her own people—in the light of an aggressor, trying to bully the sovereign of the one remaining independent Mohammedan state of Africa. The agreement of 1904 eliminated the British, left the French and Germans direct antagonists, and deprived the sultan of his most powerful support against France.

A mission was sent at the beginning of 1905 to Fez to urge upon the sultan a scheme of reforming Morocco, in which France would be the adviser and “elder brother” of the sultan. The Berber tribes, incensed against France for having extended her aggression from Twat into the Figig region, refused to obey a summons from Abdul Aziz to attend a divan to “discuss the French proposals.” They warned Abdul Aziz against listening to the treacherous words of the infidel. Most of the religious and tribal chiefs, however, assembled at Fez. The divan, like all Oriental assemblies, was convoked for the purpose of assenting without discussion to the conclusion put before it by the government.

At this moment occurred the first German intervention. Germany was not a party to the Anglo-French agreement. She had no reason, then, to give up suddenly, as Great Britain had done, her interest in preserving the political and territorial integrity of Morocco. On March 31, 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm landed at Tangier, sent greetings to Abdul Aziz, and let it be known that he regarded Morocco as an independent country and intended, in spite of the English defection, to continue to support the sultan against intrigues that were threatening to destroy him and his country. The kaiser’s visit to Morocco was for only two hours, but it gave Abdul Aziz and his ministers courage to resist the demands of the French mission. On May 28 the sultan formally rejected the French proposals, referring to the decision of the divan as the ground of his *non possumus*.

The government of the Makhzen, accepting the suggestion of the German minister, proposed an international conference of all the powers to decide upon the status of Morocco before the world. The British Foreign Office refused to accept the conference unless France were willing. M. Delcassé strongly advised the French cabinet to refuse the proposal for a conference, *no matter what might happen*. His colleagues, however, fearing a war with Germany, for which they were not prepared and on an issue that was not clear to their own electorate, much less to the world, could not bring themselves to follow the foreign minister's advice. M. Delcassé resigned. This was the beginning of the actual gathering of the war clouds that were to break a decade later.

The conference was first set for Tangier, after long negotiations between the powers and Morocco. During these negotiations Abdul Aziz borrowed two and a half million dollars from German financiers, and gave to German contractors the concession for harbor work at Tangier. Bu Hamara, a pretender, continued his war against the sultan, and it was believed that he might—perhaps with the connivance of the Makhzen—make some *coup* that would upset European calculations before the conference met. The Oriental delay of the Moors caused the postponement of the conference, and Bu Hamara's activity a change of its place of meeting.

On January 17, 1906, a conference of European states, to which the United States of America was admitted, met at Algeciras to decide the international status of Morocco. For some time the attitude of the German delegates was uncompromising. They maintained the kaiser's thesis as set forth at Tangier: the *complete* independence of Morocco. But they finally yielded, and acknowledged the right of France and Spain to organize in Morocco an international police.

The convention was signed on April 7. It provided for:

(1) police under the sovereign authority of the sultan, recruited from Moorish moslems, and distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish and French officers, placed at his disposal by their governments, to assist the sultan; (3) limitation of the total effective of this police force from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, of French and Spanish officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and non-commissioned thirty to forty, appointed for five years; (4) an inspector-general, a high officer of the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of the sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State Bank of Morocco, in which each of the signatory powers had the right to subscribe capital; (6) the right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build upon it, in any part of Morocco; (7) France's exclusive right to enforce regulations in the frontier region of Algeria and a similar right to Spain in the frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the public services of the empire from alienation for private interests.

Chancellor von Bülow's speech in the Reichstag on April 5, 1906, was a justification of Germany's attitude. He declared that the policy of Wilhelmstrasse had been far from bellicose and that Germany's demands were altogether reasonable. The time had come, declared the chancellor, when German interests in the remaining independent portions of Africa and Asia must be considered by Europe. In going to Tangier and in forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the principle that there must be equal opportunities for Germans in independent countries, and had demonstrated that she was prepared to enforce this principle.

When one considers the remarkable growth in population and the industrial and maritime evolution of Germany, this attitude can not be wondered at, much less condemned. Germany, deprived of fruitful colonies by her late entrance among nations, was finding it necessary to adopt and uphold the policy of trying to prevent the pre-

emption, for the benefit of her rivals, of those parts of the world that were still free.

Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of loyalty towards the convention of Algeciras. However much may have been written to prove this loyalty, the facts of the few years following Algeciras are convincing. After 1908 Spain, provoked and led on by the tremendous expenditures entailed upon her by the Riff campaigns, began to consider the region of Morocco in which she was installed as exclusively Spanish territory. French writers have expended much energy and ingenuity in proving the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce loyally the decisions of Algeciras. But there has never been a moment that France did not dream of the completion of the vast colonial empire in north Africa by the inclusion of Morocco. It has been the goal towards which all her military and civil administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been working. To bring about the downfall of the sultan's authority, not only press campaigns were undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier was allowed to go on unchecked until military measures seemed justifiable.

In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco did their best to bring about another intervention by Germany. Their methods were so despicable and outrageous that they had frequently to be disavowed officially. In 1910 the German Foreign Office found the claims of Mannesmann Brothers to certain mining privileges invalid because they did not fulfil the requirements of the act of Algeciras. But the Mannesmann mining group, as well as other German enterprises in Morocco, were secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they could for the French while defending the authority of the sultan. The Casablanca incident is only one of numerous affronts that the French were asked to swallow.

In the spring of 1911 it was realized everywhere in Europe that the sultan's authority was even less than it had

been in 1905. The Berber tribes were in arms on all sides. In March accounts began to appear of danger at Fez, not only to European residents, but also to the sultan. The reports of the French consul, and the telegrams of correspondents of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming. On April 2 it was announced that the Berber tribes had actually attacked the city and were besieging it. Everything was prepared for the final act of the drama.

A relief column of native troops under Major Brémont arrived in Fez on April 26. The next day, an urgent message for relief having been received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Brulard started for the capital with another column. Without waiting for further word, a French army, which had been carefully prepared for the purpose, entered Morocco under General Moinier. On May 21 Fez was occupied by the French. They found that all was well there with the Europeans and with the natives. But, fortunately for the French plans, Muley Hafid's brother had set himself up at Mequinez as pretender to the throne. The sultan could now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself under the protection of the French army. Morocco had lost her independence.

Germany made no objection to the French expeditionary corps in April. She certainly did not expect the quick succession of events in May that brought her face to face with the *fait accompli* of a strong French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at Berlin that the fiction of Moroccan independence had been so skilfully terminated, France was asked "what compensation she would give to Germany in return for a free hand in Morocco." The *pourparlers* dragged on through several weeks in June. France refused to acknowledge any ground for compensation to Germany. She maintained that the recent action in Morocco had been at the request of the sultan and that it was a matter entirely between him and France.

Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary. On July

1 the gunboat *Panther* went to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To Great Britain and to France, the despatch of the *Panther* was represented as due to the necessity of protecting German interests, seeing that there was anarchy in that part of Morocco. But the German newspapers, even those that were supposed to have official relations with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if a demand for the cession of Mogador or some other portion of Morocco were contemplated. The chancellor explained to the Reichstag that the sending of the *Panther* was "to show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side."

But in the negotiations through the German ambassador in Paris it was clear that Germany was playing a game of political blackmail. The German Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco to concessions in central Africa. On July 15 it asked for the whole of the French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation in Germany's favor of France's contingent claims to the succession of the Belgian Congo. The reason given for this demand was that if Morocco were to pass under a French protectorate it was only just that compensation should be given to Germany elsewhere. France, for the moment, hesitated. She definitely refused to entertain the idea of compensation as soon as she had received the assurance of the aid of Great Britain in supporting her against the German claims.

On July 1 the German ambassador had notified Sir Edward Grey of the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir "in response to the demand for protection from German firms there," and explained that Germany considered the question of Morocco reopened by the French occupation of Fez, and thought that it would be possible to make an agreement with Spain and France for the partition of Morocco. On July 4 Sir Edward Grey, after a consultation with the cabinet, answered that Great Britain could recognize no

change in Morocco without consulting France, to whom she was bound by treaty. The ambassador then explained that his government would not consider the reopening of the question in a European conference, that it was a matter directly between Germany and France, and that his overture to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the nature of a friendly explanation.

Germany believed that the constitutional crisis in Great Britain was so serious that the hands of the Liberal cabinet would be tied, and that they would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at the moment when they themselves were being so bitterly assailed by the most influential elements of the British electorate on the question of limiting the veto power of the House of Lords. It was in this belief that Germany on July 15 asked for territorial cessions from France in central Africa. Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen and that there was every hope of success.

But the German mentality has never seemed to appreciate the frequent lesson of history that the British people are able to distinguish clearly between matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly assailed as a traitor to his country because he advocates certain changes of laws, a British cabinet minister can still be conscious of the fact that his bitterest opponents will rally around him when he takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy. This knowledge of admirable national solidarity enabled Mr. Lloyd George on July 21, the very day on which the king gave his consent to the creation of new peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at a Mansion House banquet, to warn Germany against the danger of pressing her demands upon France. The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify and strengthen resistance.

Since the visit of the kaiser in Tangier in 1905, the British people had come to look upon Germany, instead of upon France or Russia, as the next enemy. They felt that Germany, by the creation of the "High Seas Fleet," was pre-

paring for war. In the competitive building of naval war-vessels the British knew that they were bound to fall behind if they attempted to carry out their "two keels to one" policy. A feeling of public sympathy for France, which the press had been fostering ever since the consummation of the agreement of 1904, was strengthened by the unsuccessful attempt, made in 1908, by British statesmen to come to a naval agreement with Germany, on the basis, of course, of the acknowledgment of British supremacy. Taxes due to the race in naval building were increasingly heavy, and British public opinion had begun to regard France as a friend to be cultivated and supported against Germany.

But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Throughout August and September Germany blustered and threatened. In September events happened to embarrass Russia and tie her hands, as in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 1905. Premier Stolypin was assassinated at Kiev on September 14; the United States denounced her commercial treaty with Russia because of the question of Jewish passports; and the Shuster affair in Persia was occupying the serious attention of Russian diplomacy. Had it not been for the loyal and scrupulous attitude of the British government towards Russia in the Persian question, Germany might have been tempted to force the issue with France.

German demands grew more moderate, but were not abandoned. For members of the House of Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal party, began to put the British government in an uncomfortable position. Militarism, entangling alliances with a continental power, the necessity for agreement with Germany—these were the subjects that found their way from the floor of the House to the public press. A portion of the Liberal party that had to be reckoned with believed that Germany ought not to have been left out of the Anglo-French agreement. So serious was the dissatisfaction that the government deemed it necessary to make an explanation to the House. Sir

Edward Grey explained and defended the action of the cabinet in supporting the resistance of France to Germany's claims. The whole history of the negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was published for the first time, and it was seen that this agreement did not commit Great Britain to backing France by force of arms.

Uncertainty of British support made France consent to treat with Germany on the Moroccan question. Two agreements were signed. By the first, Germany recognized the French protectorate in Morocco, subject to the adhesion of the signers of the convention of Algeciras, and waived her right to take part in the negotiations concerning Moroccan spheres of influence between Spain and France. On her side, France agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and to refrain from any measures that would hinder the legitimate extension of German commercial and mining interests. By the second agreement France ceded to Germany, in return for German cessions, certain territories that were added to southern and eastern Kamerun, and that brought the Kamerun frontier in two places to the Congo River. It was a "mutilation," as the French called it, of their equatorial Africa.

There was a stormy parliamentary and newspaper discussion, both in France and Germany, over these two treaties. None was satisfied. The treaties were finally ratified, but under protest.

In France the ministry was subject to severe criticism. There was also some feeling of bitterness—perhaps a reaction from the satisfaction over Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech—in the uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed by the November discussions in the House of Commons. This uncertainty remained, as far as French public opinion went, until Great Britain actually declared war upon Germany in August, 1914.

In Germany the Reichstag debates revealed the belief

that the Agadir expedition had, in the final analysis, resulted in a fiasco. An astonishing amount of enmity against Great Britain was displayed. It was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech against Great Britain, and denounced the pacific attitude of the German government, in the Reichstag session of November 10, that the crown prince made public his position in German foreign policy by applauding loudly.

The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected Morocco, resulted in the establishment of the French protectorate on March 30, 1912. The sultan signed away his independence by the treaty of Fez. Foreign legations at Fez ceased to exist, although diplomatic officials were retained at Tangier. France voted the maintenance of forty thousand troops in Morocco "for the purposes of pacification." The last complications disappeared when, on November 27, a Franco-Spanish treaty was signed at Madrid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were defined and both states promised not to erect fortifications or strategic works on the Moroccan coast.

The aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany was an increase in naval and military armaments, and the creation of a spirit of tension that needed only the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire to bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and Gaul.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION AND ITS REACTIONS

(1908-1911)

ON July 24, 1908, Sultan Abdul Hamid was compelled by the defection of his army to yield to the demand of the Young Turks to resuscitate the constitution of 1876, which had been in abeyance for more than thirty years.¹ In their movement for constitutional government the Young Turks worked against insuperable odds until they were able to win over to their cause high officials, civilian and military, by demonstrating that the continuance of despotic and irresponsible government would entail the speedy disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Like all other Oriental countries, Turkey was being preyed upon by the powers, for the simple reason that misrule and corruption made her too weak to resist political intrigues and economic pressure from outside that were gradually diminishing her authority and sovereignty. The Young Turks argued that representative government, and that alone, would bring about the regeneration of their country. The salvation of Turkey, they declared, depended upon instilling into the various elements of the empire the belief that a constitutional régime, in which all would have a voice, meant security of life and property and economic well-being for all.

The idea was excellent, and all Europe hoped that it would work out successfully. The greatest danger to the peace of Europe had been a weak Turkey, unable to take care of herself, and it was assumed that a strong and pros-

¹ See pp. 100-101.

perous Turkey, able to resist all aggressors and pay her obligations, would remove from international relations trouble-breeding problems. No European statesman believed that his country would ever be allowed by the other powers a free hand to dominate and exploit Turkey. Therefore complications and embarrassments arising from the constant demands for intervention by bankers and humanitarians to protect investments and oppressed Christians could be avoided if Turkey reformed herself and became a constitutional state. The failure of the Young Turk régime can not be laid at the door of European statesmen, who had every reason for wanting the experiment to succeed.

But the heritage of the past was too strong to be overcome. The Young Turks had to bear the consequences of the policies of the old régime, and of their own folly in assuming and acting upon three false assumptions: (1) that the parts of the empire that had freed themselves from the control of Constantinople or had never been governed except nominally by the sultan would surrender their privileged position for the as yet unproved benefits of the constitution; (2) that a Mohammedan theocracy could be reconciled with European political and judicial institutions; and (3) that the Turkish element would continue, under the changed conditions, to be able to dominate the other elements.

From the first day of the revolution the Young Turks announced their intention of doing away with the agreements and decrees by which outlying provinces had been granted autonomy or were temporarily administered by other powers. Since Turkey now had a constitution, which guaranteed equal rights to all, there could be no valid excuse for a special status for any part of the empire, and so all provinces would be expected to return to the "mother country" and resume their old place in the Ottoman family. This policy would mean the restoration to Turkey of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar by Austria-

Hungary, of Cyprus and Egypt by Great Britain; the loss by the Cretans of their virtual independence; and would bring into question the autonomy of Bulgaria. The Young Turks did not have to wait long to discover that the resuscitation of the constitution, thus interpreted, meant the opposite of what they had planned. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had been holding since the Congress of Berlin; Bulgaria proclaimed her independence and Prince Ferdinand was crowned king at Tirnova, seat of the ancient Bulgarian czars; and the Cretan assembly decreed the union of Crete with Greece and took the oath of allegiance to King George. Although there was some effervescence in Cyprus, its object was annexation to Greece and not return to Turkey; while the Egyptians made it clear that their movement to free themselves from Great Britain was not to be interpreted as a desire to be reunited with the Ottoman Empire.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although a violation of the treaty of Berlin, was not vetoed by the great powers. They accepted the *fait accompli*. The Turkish government received only non-committal responses from the other signatories of the treaty. Russia, the most interested power and the traditional champion of the Balkan Slavs, had hardly recovered from the war with Japan and internal political disturbances. France was at the moment preparing to violate another international agreement, the convention of Algeciras. Italy was making her plans for doing in Tripoli what Austria-Hungary had done in the two Balkan provinces. Great Britain was afraid to hale Austria-Hungary before an international conference for fear that the question of Egypt might make possible an embarrassing *tu quoque*. Had Russia insisted upon a conference, as Germany did two years earlier in the case of Morocco, Italy and Germany (the former because the annexation cut off the Serbians from the Adriatic and the latter because it created a situation advantageous

to her *Drang nach Osten*) could not have been relied upon to take a stand against their partner in the Triple Alliance.

Turkey found herself isolated, no power being willing to support her demand upon Austria-Hungary to restore Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a brief period of wild agitation, during which Austro-Hungarian goods and ships were boycotted in Turkey,¹ the Sublime Porte agreed to take a cash payment for the two provinces. Serbia was not so easily appeased. Bosnia and Herzegovina not only lay between her and the sea, but were inhabited by people of Serbian blood and language, who had an essential place in her dream of Greater Serbia. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina fanned the fires of Serbian nationalism, which burned harmlessly for several years until the Balkan wars and the recovery of Russia made them blaze into a European conflagration.²

Like the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the proclamation of the complete independence of Bulgaria had international importance beyond merely confirming a long established *de facto* situation. Bulgaria, freed of all technical restraints and master of her railways, immediately developed a military strength that alarmed Rumania and made Serbia and Greece feel that Bulgaria had become a more serious and formidable rival for the devolution of Macedonia. Independent Bulgaria gained immeasurably in prestige in the eyes of Macedonians. In many districts communities that, hitherto, had been uncertain whether to pose as Bulgars or Serbs now saw in Bulgaria their hope

¹ Most of the red fezes worn by Ottoman subjects were of Austrian origin. In their first anger the Turks destroyed these, tearing them from their heads and trampling on them in the bazaars. But they soon found that they could get new ones only by buying from Vienna, which meant that the boycott created a market for more fezes, to the profit of the Austrian manufacturers!

² The Hapsburg heir was assassinated by a Serbian student during an official visit to the capital of Bosnia. The assassin belonged to a secret Serbian society, the Narodny Obrana, whose propaganda in the Serbian-speaking provinces of the Hapsburg empire was believed by Vienna statesmen to threaten the existence of Austria-Hungary.

of redemption from the Ottoman yoke. In 1913, and again in 1915, this fact profoundly influenced the course of European history.

Long before the Young Turk Revolution, the three Mediterranean naval powers, Great Britain, France, and Italy, together with Russia, had been striving by diplomacy and force to prevent the union of Crete with Greece. In their effort to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the great powers had failed to stifle the aspirations of the Balkan peoples. But because Crete was an island, and a few war-vessels could do the trick, Crete was the victim of the desire of the powers to demonstrate to Turkey that they were her friends. After the revolution of 1908 the four "protecting powers" did not change their inhibitory policy towards Crete. The decree of union with Greece was vetoed, and when the Greek flag was hoisted by the Cretans under the leadership of Venizelos, their principal insurgent leader, the four powers made a naval demonstration and landed marines.¹ Their consuls at Candia informed the Cretans that their governments were resolved to maintain the rights of Turkey and to prevent Crete from joining Greece.

The persistence of the powers in this policy convinced Venizelos that Crete could be freed only by making Greece strong enough to defy Turkey, in coöperation with the other Balkan states. All these states, since the failure of the Mürzsteg program,² in view of the attitude of the powers towards Crete, had given up hope of substantial aid from any of the powers in protecting and eventually emancipating numbers of their people who were still under Ottoman rule. When we consider the rôle of Venizelos in the wars that followed, we realize the importance of the

¹ This had been done before. For a full account of the successive Cretan revolutions and the relations of the protecting powers with the insurgents, the Sublime Porte, and Greece, see my "Venizelos" (in *The Modern Statesmen* series), pp. 12-83.

² See pp. 110, 248-249.

Cretan imbroglio among the events leading up to the World War.

The assumption of the Young Turks that a constitutional régime entailed the abolition of a special status or of privileges for every element in the empire resulted in the immediate loss of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, and hastened the severing of the bonds between Constantinople and Crete, Cyprus, Egypt, and Tripoli. It also led to rebellion among Albanians and some of the Arabs, and disaffection among Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and the rest of the Arabs. The Young Turk movement resulted in the alienation of territories to win back which it was launched, and it led to hopeless antagonism instead of harmonious coöperation between the Turkish and non-Turkish elements of the empire. Albanians and Arabs, although largely of the same religion as the Turks, were not assimilated with their conquerors, and over large portions of Albania and Arabia the sultans had never been able to secure for Constantinople the recognition of any other than religious authority.

The tribes were left to themselves, and the Turks wisely refrained from collecting taxes or insisting upon military service, and did not extend administrative control except in large cities along waterways and in ports. The constitutional Young Turks attempted to do what the autocratic Abdul Hamid had never dared to do. They called upon Albanians and Arabs to pay taxes and join the army, and, when they refused to do so, sent expeditions to put down the rebellions they themselves had provoked. Between 1909 and 1912 the Ottoman government was drained financially and militarily by its attempt to compel the Albanians and Arabs to accept the full responsibilities of Ottoman citizenship under a constitutional government.

In logically following the same policy, the Greeks, Armenians, and Syrians were asked to surrender the special status granted them at the time of the Ottoman conquest.

Owing to fundamental differences between Mohammedan and Christian institutions, the Ottoman sultans of the period of conquest recognized the Christians as separate *millet*s (nations), with a certain degree of autonomy under their clergy. Questions of inheritance, property, marriage and divorce, education, and legal disputes between Christians were left to be settled among themselves. Upon the payment of a head-tax Christians were exempted from military service. All these privileges the Young Turks determined to abolish, and expected the Christians to yield, on the sole ground that constitutional government made their continuance unnecessary and impossible.

Had the Young Turks been willing to establish a genuine constitutional government, on the model of European states, they would have been justified in asking for the surrender of both *de facto* and *de jure* privileges or exceptional situations. But their idea of constitutional government was modified by the assumption that the new political institutions did not necessitate the surrender either of the *Shari'a* (Mohammedan jurisprudence) or of Turkish hegemony in the empire. Mohammedan law made no provision for non-Moslems, and long experience had taught that while the *Shari'a* was enforced no code of civil law could be devised that would provide for the needs of Christians and at the same time guarantee them equal justice.

The elections to the first parliament, repeated in the second and third parliaments, demonstrated that the Turks were determined to have a majority, irrespective of the numbers and geographical distribution of other peoples in the empire, whether Moslem or Christian. The political history of Europe shows that by restrictions in the electorate and by skilful gerrymandering it is possible for a dominant class or racial element to maintain itself. But this element must be superior in virility, wealth, intelligence, and background of capabilities, if not in number, to

the other elements. The Turks had been predominant in their heterogeneous empire up to the nineteenth century by force and during the nineteenth century by the aid of European powers. Albanians, Arabs, Syrians, Greeks, and Armenians outnumbered the Turks, and, if fair elections had been held, would have been able to control the parliament. This danger was immediately sensed by the Young Turks, who used their hold on the central government at Constantinople and on the army to build up a despotism worse than that of Abdul Hamid.

From 1908 to 1911 Turkey was ruled by a secret organization, called the Committee of Union and Progress, which contained only a handful of non-Turks. This committee ran the parliamentary elections and dictated every policy of successive cabinets. By a fanatical effort to make Turkish the language of the administration of local government and courts throughout the empire, and by asserting the right of Turkish nationalism to be regarded as synonymous with Ottoman nationality, the Young Turks aroused a counter-nationalism among Albanians, Arabs, Syrians, Greeks, and Armenians.

These movements in turn forced the Near Eastern question once more to the front among international problems. The massacre of thirty thousand Armenians in Cilicia and northern Syria in the spring of 1909 caused a revival of the demand of the humanitarians, especially in England, that the powers fulfil their obligation under the treaty of Berlin and compel the Turks to institute serious administrative reforms in the *vilayets* (provinces) inhabited by Armenians. Russia began to dream once more of Constantinople. Germany was able to increase her economic hold on Turkey by representing herself as the disinterested defender of Islam against the rapacity of the other European powers. Italy saw that she would have to act quickly in Tripoli or lose her hope of annexing that province. Albanian nationalism, which had never before manifested

itself as a unifying force, began to worry the Adriatic powers, Italy and Austria-Hungary, and Albania's covetous neighbors, Greece and Serbia. Most important of all, the danger to Hellenism throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to all the Christian peoples in European Turkey, drove into one another's arms, for common action against Turkey, the Balkan peoples, whose animosities and rivalries Abdul Hamid had known so well how to exploit.

CHAPTER XIX

ITALIAN EXPANSION IN AFRICA (1882-1911)

ITALY, like Germany, did not achieve her political unity until the new impulsion given to the overseas expansion of Europe by the development of steam power in industry and transportation was half a century old. The most promising fields for colonization had been preëmpted. The titles to the most conveniently and strategically placed ports in Africa and Asia were already acquired by other powers, especially Great Britain. This was true even in the Mediterranean. Great Britain was not at all, and France only partly, a Mediterranean country, while Italy was wholly a Mediterranean country. And yet, when the Italians began to think of Italy as a world power, they had to face and make the best of a situation in the Mediterranean that was disadvantageous to their unhampered political and economic development. France held Corsica and Great Britain Malta. The British controlled the passage from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Possession of Algeria gave France a great start in African colonization.

As if this were not enough, the efforts of Italian statesmen to find a place for Italy in Africa were met by a further drastic increase of the hold of Great Britain and France upon the Mediterranean. In 1878 the British occupied Cyprus, and in 1882 they entered Egypt and became masters of Italy's only other outlet to the world. The greatest blow to Italy's colonial ambitions, however, was the signature of the treaty of Bardo, on May 12, 1881, by which the bey of Tunisia accepted the protectorate of France. Only twenty-four hours earlier the French minister of foreign

affairs, at the instance of Premier Ferry, had assured the Italian ambassador in Paris that France "had no thought of occupying Tunisia, or any part of Tunisian territory, beyond some points of the Kroumir country." Indignation and disappointment drove Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Shortly after the French occupied Tunisia, she became a member of the Triple Alliance, to which she remained faithful until after the outbreak of the World War.

The extension of French political control over Tunisia has always rankled in the minds of the Italians, and the resentment is still keen forty years after the event. A few months before the French invasion, the Italian government had purchased from an English company, at eight times its value, the only railway in Tunisia. Large numbers of Italians were settled there, while France could lay claim to very few nationals.¹ Tunisia was the most promising and most logical colonizing possibility that Italy ever cherished. Moreover, its proximity to Sicily, at the narrowest part of the Mediterranean, made its possession appear to be of great importance for the security of Italy. Italian writers denounced the conversion of Bizerta into a naval base by the French as a menace.

The first foothold in Africa was secured on the Red Sea coast at a time when Egypt was just becoming the center of acute international rivalry. The port of Assab was occupied in 1880, to make effective a title granted by the local sovereign to an Italian merchant ten years earlier. The British and the French, who were at loggerheads in Egypt, resented this intrusion, and made Italy promise not to fortify Assab or even keep a garrison there. When the affairs of Egypt reached a crisis in the early summer of

¹ Even after forty years of French occupation the Italians are by far the largest foreign element. Exact figures can not be given, for the French authorities make a distinction between Italians and "Anglo-Maltese," while among the French are included a large number of native Jews. From the official census, however, it is safe to say that in 1922 there are more than three Italians to every Frenchman in Tunisia.

1882, Assab was proclaimed an Italian crown colony. Italy, like France, was invited by Great Britain to take part in the armed intervention in Egypt. She refused, and, when the British acted alone, Italian diplomacy asserted itself at Cairo to encourage resistance to Great Britain's staying on indefinitely and consolidating the hold her army gave her upon Egypt and the canal.

When the British decided to abandon the Sudan, they encouraged the Italians to extend their zone of occupation northward along the Red Sea to Massawa, which was seized by an Italian expeditionary force in February, 1885. Only the fall of the Gladstone government prevented the further extension of the Italian occupation to Suakim. Salisbury reversed the decision to withdraw the Anglo-Egyptian troops from this port. But there was no opposition to the Massawa adventure, because it was natural for the British to prefer weak and inexperienced Italy to Russia or France in the neighborhood of the Sudan. It was common knowledge that both Paris and Petrograd planned to use Massawa as a base for intrigues in the Sudan by which to embarrass the British and that they would attempt to establish a protectorate over Abyssinia.

For several years the Italians had a free hand in their dealings with Abyssinia. Intervening in dynastic wars, they successfully backed Menelek against another claimant. In return for recognition as emperor, Menelek agreed, in September, 1889, to a treaty by which frontier territories were ceded to the Assab colony and the foreign relations of Abyssinia were put in the hands of the Italian government. Italy notified the powers that Abyssinia was an Italian protectorate. The British government discounted the ability of the Italians to exercise influence in Abyssinia, and willingly admitted the Italian contention that Abyssinia was within the Italian sphere of influence, in return for Italy's promise not to penetrate the Sudan but to

recognize British rights in the upper Nile. The Italian Red Sea coast territories were consolidated into the crown colony of Eritrea.

To the east and south of Abyssinia, the triangle between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is inhabited by Arab tribes, which have largely succeeded, as have similar tribes of the Arabian peninsula opposite, in holding their own against all European comers. In the Gulf of Aden, France and Great Britain held parts of Somaliland. The French colony of Djibouti prevented the extension of Eritrea southward to the entrance of the Red Sea. Beyond Djibouti, to the east, lay British Somaliland. But the Italians were allowed to occupy the long strip of land on the Indian Ocean from Cape Guardafui south to the river Juba, which formed the northern boundary of British East Africa. The crown colony of Benadir was established, and gradually treaties with Somali sultans brought Italy to the frontier of Abyssinia on the southeast as well as on the north.

Alarmed by Italian demands, constantly reiterated, for boundaries that would rob Abyssinia of valuable territory, and by the pretension of Italy to stand between Menelek and relations with the other powers, the emperor refused to recognize the Italian protectorate. After a long period of fruitless negotiations, the Italians decided to use force. They invaded Abyssinia, and were defeated by Emperor Menelek in a decisive battle before they had penetrated very far toward the capital, which they believed they were going to reach without great effort. The costly battle of Adowa caused a revulsion of feeling in Italy against colonial ventures. March 1, 1896, marked the destruction of the prestige of Italy in Africa, and it has never been restored. The backward peoples of Africa accept as a matter of fact the superiority of Great Britain and France. But, because they do not consider that the Italians fight

better than themselves or are able to make use of greater resources, Italy is not, in their eyes, on the same footing as the other leading European powers.

By the treaty of Adis Ababa, October 26, 1896, Italy was compelled to renounce her claim to a protectorate and her right to delimit boundaries according to her own pleasure. As an added humiliation, she agreed to pay an indemnity of two million dollars in exchange for the release of the large number of prisoners that had been taken by the Abyssinian army. But in 1900 Menelek, who was never unreasonable in his dealings with the powers, tacitly allowed Italy to occupy a part of the high plateau, which had been one of the causes of the dispute; for without this rectification of frontier Eritrea could not have been developed into a colony that would be of any value to a European power.

The desire to extend into every sphere of colonial activity the spirit of their agreement of 1904, and to secure the tacit acceptance of the other powers to articles of the agreement where they might possibly be able to upset the compromise or complicate its execution, led Great Britain and France to negotiate a number of supplementary agreements. Among these was the Abyssinian convention of December 13, 1906, to which Italy adhered. The independence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia were guaranteed by the three powers, who promised mutually to respect the sovereign rights of the emperor. No concessions were to be granted to one power prejudicial to the interests of the other two.

No matter what internal complications might arise in Abyssinia, intervention was forbidden unless the three powers agreed to coöperate in sending troops and was to be limited to the protection of the legations and the

⁴ To have a clear idea of how Abyssinia is landlocked by French Djibouti, British and Italian Somaliland, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and Italian Eritrea, reference must be made to the map.

lives and property of foreigners. The railway line from Djibouti¹ to Adis Ababa was to be owned by a French company, but equal privileges over the line and at the port were promised to the subjects of the other two powers. The railways that might be built west of Adis Ababa were to be constructed by Great Britain, and the line from north to south connecting the two Italian colonies by Italy. Great Britain was to be allowed a railway through Abyssinia from her Somaliland protectorate to the Sudan. Any of the contracting powers could veto any agreement made by one of the others with Abyssinia, should the power judge the agreement harmful to her interests.

This convention, like many others that have been signed by particular European states concerning African and Asiatic political and economic matters, has neither national nor international sanction. Turkey, Persia, Morocco, Egypt, China, and Siam have had the same experiences as Abyssinia. Their present and their future have been tentatively disposed of without consideration for either their wishes or their interests. Nor have such conventions, as a general rule, been submitted for discussion and approval to the parliaments of the nations that have made them. The countries concerning which they have been made are the victims of their negative character; for the dog-in-the-manger attitude of the signatory powers prevents normal economic development. The worst feature of these conventions is the injury they do to nations that were not a party to them, and were not consulted in their making, nor sometimes even informed of their existence. Suddenly these outside nations have found themselves confronted with a *de facto* situation, with no legal or moral sanction, established contrary to their interests.

The revenues of Eritrea have never equaled the expenditures for civil administration. Italy has had to make good a substantial annual deficit, and pay the charges of a considerable military force besides. Owing to the intracta-

bility of the native sultans and the success of the Mullah Mohammed in defying the British in the neighboring colony, the Italian Somaliland protectorate has meant only trouble. But the Benadir colony in the south, organized and developed on sound lines since 1908, is a good market for cotton cloth and other manufactured products, and the Italians get commission and transportation profits out of a growing export cattle trade.

After the bitter disappointment on the confines of Abyssinia, Italy began to concentrate her energies on Tripoli, the last Ottoman possession in Africa, which Italian statesmen had always looked upon as an eventual compensation for the loss of Tunisia. When the Anglo-French agreement of 1899, delimiting spheres of influence in the Sudan, gave the whole of the Sahara to France, including the oases of the desert hinterland of Tripoli, Turkey and Italy were greatly agitated. The possessor and the self-appointed heir both felt that this agreement disregarded their rights, and that Great Britain had compensated France for denying her access to the Nile Basin (this was just after the Fashoda incident) at their expense.

Nowhere is the duplicity of European diplomacy more strikingly revealed than in the negotiations of Italy with France and Great Britain concerning Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century. The French and British ambassadors at Constantinople assured the Sublime Porte of their affection and loyalty, and the British and French governments assured the Turkish ministers at London and Paris of their determination to uphold the doctrine of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But at the time these professions of loyalty and friendship were made they were placating and bribing Italy. Secret agreements were made with France in 1901 and Great Britain in 1902 in which the reversion of Tripoli was promised to Italy in return for her acceptance of the bases on which the British and French were negotiating a settlement of their rivalries, *i. e.*, British

possession of Egypt and French possession of Morocco. Italy also agreed to coöperate with the other two powers in drafting an Abyssinian convention. A policy of "pacific penetration" was begun by the Italians in Tripoli, which might have been successful in detaching the last African province from the Ottoman Empire but for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

CHAPTER XX

THE REOPENING OF THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION BY ITALY (1911-1912)

LONG before any tangible step had been taken towards the unification of Italy, Mazzini in exile said, "North Africa will belong to Italy." The dream of a new Punic conquest was not realized. While Italy was still too weak to attempt to thwart their plans, Great Britain and France occupied Egypt and Tunisia, penetrated the Sudan and the Sahara, and, deciding to compromise rather than fight, divided north Africa from Morocco to Lake Chad and the head-waters of the Nile. All that was left outside the Anglo-French spheres of influence were Abyssinia, with strips of adjacent Red Sea and Somaliland coast, and the Turkish province of Tripoli.¹ Italy was allowed two African colonies, on the Red Sea and in Somaliland, but, after one attempt had ignominiously failed, was forced to agree with Great Britain and France to abstain from seeking again to seize Abyssinia.

Under the Franco-Italian agreement of 1901 it was understood that if France should ever extend her protectorate over Morocco, Italy would have what was left of the Ottoman dominions in Africa, excluding, of course, Egypt. Italy, on her side, recognized the validity of the Anglo-French partition of the Sudan, and promised not to take the Turkish view of the extent of the hinterland of Tripoli.²

¹ The district of Benghazi (Barca), between Tripoli and Egypt, was placed under separate administration, depending directly upon the Sublime Porte, in 1875, forty years after Tripoli was proclaimed a *vilayet* (province) of the Ottoman Empire. Although Benghazi had nearly as many inhabitants as Tripoli proper, it was still, at the time of the Italian conquest, commonly spoken of as a part of Tripoli.

² As early as 1892 France and Turkey had arrived at an understanding concerning the boundary line between Tripoli and Tunisia, from the Mediter-

The "right" of Italy to Tripoli was recognized by Great Britain, with reservations as to the eastern frontier of the eventual colony, later by the international conference of Algeciras in 1906. These diplomatic understandings meant simply that the other powers would not seek concessions or special privileges in Tripoli and that they would not oppose a transfer of the *vilayet* from Turkey to Italy. There was no promise of support for any demand Rome might make upon Constantinople.

The economic conquest of Tripoli was cleverly conceived and was faithfully tried out. Branches of the Banca di Roma were established at Tripoli and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days of imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to develop the agricultural and commercial resources of the country. The natives were encouraged in every enterprise, and they became—in the vicinity of seaports and trading-posts, at least—dependent for their livelihood on the Banca di Roma. Heavily subsidized Italian steamship lines maintained regular and frequent services between Tripoli, Benghazi, and Derna, and Tunis and Alexandria. The admirable Italian parcels post system (one of the most successful in Europe) extended its operations into the hinterland and captured the ostrich-feather trade. The Italians began to talk of making secure the routes to Ghadames, Ghat, and Murzuk, and of establishing in the interior postal and banking facilities that these regions could never hope to have under Turkish administration. It was planned to begin railway construction as soon as Italian capital was available.

The Constantinople revolution of July, 1908, changed the situation. The indolent and corrupt officials of Tripoli

ran to the oasis of Ghadames, but they had never agreed upon the southern boundary of Tripoli. Turkey was not a party to the Anglo-French agreement of 1899. Because of the importance of keeping open a path to central Africa through the Senussi tribes for the furthering of his pan-Islamic propaganda, Abdul Hamid had refused to accept the French idea of a sphere of influence, and Turkish troops were disputing the extension of French military occupation up to the time of the Italian invasion of the province.

and Benghazi, whose attention had been turned from Italian activities by Italian gold pieces, were replaced by members of the Union and Progress party.¹ The new officials may have been no better than the old ones; for executive ability is not inherent in the Turkish character. But they were men who had passed through the fire of persecution and suffering for love of their fatherland, and its renascence was the supreme thing in their lives. Their ambition and enthusiasm knew no bounds.

One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks when they saw what Italy was doing. It is easy enough to say that they should have immediately reformed the administration of the country and have given the Tripolitans an efficient government. But reform does not come in a twelve-month, and the Young Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss of Tripoli. They took the only means they had. Italian enterprises began to be obstructed, troops were sent to extend the military frontiers into the Sudan, and the fanatical Moslem tribes of the interior were brought into closer touch with the Ottoman khalifate.

Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as her colonial plans had been destroyed in the previous decade. Representations at Constantinople were without effect. It was a fruitless diplomatic task to persuade Young Turkey that Ottoman officials in Tripoli and Benghazi should be forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian "peaceable conquest." The economic fabric in Tripoli, so carefully and patiently constructed, seemed to have been for nothing. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 Austria-Hungary had taken a fresh step, after thirty years, in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.² No power

¹See p. 226.

²The earlier steps, after the formation of the concert of European powers, had been the creation of Greece by the protocol of 1830; the cessions of territory to Russia in 1829 and 1878; the independence or autonomy of the Balkan peoples recognized in the treaty of Paris, 1856, and the treaty of Berlin, 1878, and special conventions arising from these treaties; the alienation of Cyprus in 1878, and the occupation of Egypt in 1882 by Great Britain.

had successfully protested, and the Turks had not been able to make reprisals. By not seizing Tripoli in the summer of 1908 Italy let pass a golden opportunity of committing her contemplated highway robbery without resistance on the part of her victim. But the crisis could not be precipitated. Public opinion, wary of colonial enterprises since the terrible Abyssinian disaster, and opposed to the imposition of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared to sustain the government in a hostile action against Turkey.

In January, 1911, the Italian press began to publish articles on Tripoli, dilating upon its economic value and vital importance to Italy if she were to hold her place among the great powers and maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Every little Turkish persecution—and there were many of them—was made the subject of a front-page news item. The Italian people were worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli but elsewhere the Young Turks were showing contempt for Italian officials and for the Italian flag. A sailing-vessel was seized at Hodeida in the Red Sea; the incident was magnified. An American archæological expedition was granted a permit to dig in Tripoli; a similar permit had been refused to Italian applicants, and the newspapers pretended that the Americans were really prospecting for silver-mines, whose development would mean disaster to the great mines in Sicily. French troops reached the oasis of Ghadames; the hinterland of Tripoli was threatened by the extension of French administrative control into the eastern Sahara. At this moment the reopening of the Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave Italy the incentive and encouragement to show her hand.

In September the press campaign against the treatment of Italians in Tripoli became incessant and violent. On September 27 the first of the series of ultimatums that brought all Europe into war was delivered to the Sublime Porte. Italy gave Turkey forty-eight hours to consent to

the occupation of Tripoli, promising on her side to maintain the sultan's sovereignty under the Italian protectorate and to pay into the Ottoman treasury an annual subsidy. Two classes were called out, General Caneva embarked his troops upon transports that had already been prepared, and the Italian fleet proceeded to Tripoli.

Simultaneously with news of the declaration of war Constantinople learned that the first shots had already been fired. On September 29, without notification of hostilities or other warning, the Italian fleet attacked and sank Turkish torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of the Adriatic. The next day Italian war-ships opened fire upon Tripoli. The forts were dismantled and the garrison driven out of the city. On October 5 Tripoli surrendered. The expeditionary corps disembarked on the 11th. Troops landed at Derna on the 18th. The next day Benghazi was captured at the point of the bayonet, and on the 21st Homs was occupied.

The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli on the 23d. While the Italian soldiers were in the trenches they were fired upon from behind by Arabs, who were supposed to be non-combatants. The Italians put down this move from the rear with ruthless severity, shooting and cutting down men, women, and children. Horror was excited throughout the world by the stories of this repression. Details of Italian cruelty were emphasized, and little mention was made of the provocation that had led to the massacre. The French and English newspaper campaign against Italy was as violent as it had been against Austria in 1908. The act of piracy of which Italy had been guilty was denounced, and no terms were spared in casting opprobrium upon the Italian army. The indignation of newspaper correspondents was undoubtedly sincere. But there was also the interested motive: the British and French press featured these stories to embarrass and discredit imitators in empire-building and colonial rivals. Italy had experi-

enced this kind of thing before, at the time of her tragic Abyssinian adventure. Belgium was experiencing it in central Africa.

Despite the conspiracy behind the lines, the attempt of the Turks and Arabs to retake Tripoli failed, and a second attack on October 26 proved equally unsuccessful. On the other hand, when the Italian army started to take the offensive on November 6, progress beyond the suburbs of Tripoli was found to be impossible. Without roads and railways the Italians could not make use of their artillery and their superior numbers. They were safe only as far as the guns of the war-ships protected them. This was true of each landing force. The inhabitants of Tripoli and Benghazi, and not the small and poorly equipped Turkish forces, successfully resisted the Italians, and let Italy in for a long and costly guerrilla war which has now entered its second decade.

On November 5, 1911, the Italian parliament voted the annexation of Tripoli and Benghazi. None of the powers refused to accept the *fait accompli* or even to protest against it. France and Great Britain proclaimed the neutrality of Tunisia and Egypt, but were lax in its enforcement; from both sides of the frontier volunteers and ammunition poured into Tripoli. Great Britain took advantage of the situation to extend the Egyptian boundary westward. Italy did not dare to contest the claims advanced for Egypt by Great Britain, knowing well that Anglo-Egyptian officials had it in their power to wreck Italian aspirations simply by closing their eyes to gun-running from the Red Sea to the Tripolitan hinterland.

The Turks, not having control of the sea and being barred from sending an army across Egypt, were incapable of making a military move to recover the invaded provinces or to punish the invader. Their effort was limited to stirring up and organizing the Arabs. General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning of February, 1912, and told

the cabinet that unless the Turks consented to withdraw their military leaders and to cease their religious agitation it would take months to get a start in Africa (three months had already passed) and years to complete the pacification of the new colonies. The question was, how could Turkey be forced to recognize the annexation decree? There was neither profit nor glory in a war with Turkey. The Italian fleet could not be kept under steam indefinitely. The Turkish fleet did not come out to give battle, and the Italians were immobilized at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Italian commerce in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean was at a standstill. Upon Italian imports Turkey had placed a duty of one hundred per cent. Where, outside of Tripoli, was the pressure to be exercised?

Italy had promised before the war started that she would not disturb political conditions in the Balkan peninsula. The alliance with Austria-Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic. A naval offensive in the *Ægean* would open up international complications of a kind that, owing to her proximity to and economic rivalry with Greece, Italy was particularly anxious to avoid. In fact, it was for this reason that the Italian government had acted in harmony with Great Britain, France, and Russia in preventing Crete from repudiating Ottoman suzerainty. But public opinion in Italy was becoming restless. Were the Italians to burden themselves with heavy taxes by prolonging the war in order to spare the feelings of the great powers? Had Russia hesitated in the Caucasus? Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt? Had Austria-Hungary hesitated in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Italy was at war with Turkey. She had control of the sea, and her government's hand was forced to risk precipitating a European war by a popular clamor that would not be gainsaid. In April, after six months of a war that was no war, Italy came to the point where she felt she must cast all scruples to the winds. A direct attack upon Tur-

key was decided upon, and the action was taken that brought Balkan ambition to a ferment and caused the kindling of the European conflagration. On April 18 Admiral Viala bombarded the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles and the port of Vathy in Samos. Four days later Italian marines disembarked on the island of Stampalia. On May 4 Rhodes was invaded, a battle occurred in the streets of the town, and the Turks were driven into the interior, where they surrendered on the 17th. The other ten islands of the Dodecannese, at the mouth of the Ægean Sea, were occupied. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at its center, which had been arrested at San Stefano in 1878, began again.

Turkey responded to the bombardment of the forts by closing the Dardanelles, and to the occupation of Rhodes by expelling Italian subjects. All Europe was disturbed by the holding up of more than two hundred merchant-vessels at Constantinople. Protests were in vain. Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance had been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet would not be repeated. Little had been gained as far as hastening peace was concerned. Because she knew well that any vital action, such as the bombardment of Saloniki or Smyrna or the invasion of European Turkey by way of Albania or Macedonia, would bring on a general European war, and that Italy was unwilling to assume this responsibility, Turkey remained passive and unresisting. She felt, rightly, that the Italians would fail to put an end to a guerrilla warfare that had the oases of the desert as a background.

As early as June, Italian and Turkish representatives met informally at Ouchy, Switzerland, to discuss bases for putting an end to a war that had degenerated into an odd *impasse*. Italian commerce was suffering and Italian war-ships were in need of the dry-dock. Although Turkey could no longer prevent the conquest of Tripoli and Ben-

ghazi, Italy believed that the absence of Turkish leadership in keeping the tribes in the interior stirred up, and the cessation of propaganda against the occupation on the ground of religion, would help greatly toward the pacification of the provinces. A new Albanian revolt, which had assumed alarming proportions, made Turkey anxious for peace. She was uncertain also of Italy's attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans. Unofficially, Italy had let it be known that there was a limit to patience, and that a declaration of war against Turkey by the Balkan States would find Italy, despite European considerations, in alliance with them against her. In reality the Italian ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done their best to keep Greece and Bulgaria from taking advantage of the situation. This had been especially true during April and May, the period of Italian activity in the *Ægean*. On August 12 negotiations were begun at Ouchy between duly accredited plenipotentiaries, and after six weeks a draft of a treaty was prepared, which was accepted by Turkey under pressure of the new war in the Balkans. On October 15, 1912, the treaty of Lausanne (as it is generally called) was signed.

Nothing was said in the instrument about a cession of territory, and Turkey was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest. But Italy bound herself to assume Tripoli's share of the Ottoman public debt, and Turkey granted complete autonomy to Tripoli. The important clause of the treaty was the mutual obligation to withdraw the Turkish army from Tripoli and Benghazi and the Italian army from the islands of the *Ægean*. But the latter was to be contingent upon the former. It was easy enough for the Italians to quibble later about the meaning of "Turkish." As long as there was opposition to the Italian pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish. Italy said that the holding of the Dodecannese was to bring pressure to bear upon the Turks to prevent sending aid and encouragement

to the Tripolitans. As long as any Arab held the field against the Italian army, it was claimed that Turkey had not fulfilled her part of the obligation. At the moment of signing the treaty Turkey was willing to have the Italians stay in the southern islands of the Ægean, trusting to fortune to get them out later. For otherwise the Dodecannese would have fallen into the hands of the Greeks at the outbreak of the Balkan War and would have been irrevocably lost.

The annexation of Tripoli did not materially affect the development of international politics in Africa. Great Britain and France had already agreed upon their spheres of influence, and the new Italian possessions had no unsettled boundaries as far as the neighbors were concerned. Thus there was no cause for friction among the powers interested in north Africa, and no modification of policies was demanded. In Europe, however, the attack of Italy upon Turkey led directly to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire. It raised among the powers the questions they had agreed not to discuss. When it was discovered that Turkey was being driven by her former subjects from her European provinces and from the Ægean islands, there arose what statesmen had feared—a series of differences that proved impossible of peaceful solution.

CHAPTER XXI

INTRIGUES OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE BALKANS (1903-1912)

THE first manifesto of the Young Turks against the absolutist régime was made in June, 1900, and was followed by a second stronger demand for reforms a year later. The persecution of Armenians, however, continued, and to the count against Abdul Hamid were added massacres and a state of anarchy that seemed to have been deliberately encouraged in European Turkey. In November, 1901, the sultan received a warning that caused him to be more amenable to the suggestions of the powers. In the course of a dispute over claims and French religious orders, France had broken off diplomatic relations with Turkey, and had not hesitated to go to the length of making a naval demonstration in the *Ægean* Sea and seizing the island of Mytilene in order to bring the Sublime Porte to terms. From no other power did Turkey receive encouragement to reject the French ultimatum. Germany was in the midst of an industrial depression and Great Britain had not yet reached the end of the Boer War. In 1902 Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy joined to insist upon the withdrawal of the Ottoman garrison from Crete, and in December of the same year all six of the powers told Abdul Hamid that the administration of Macedonia must be radically improved.

Abdul Hamid realized that while he could ignore the notes of the powers protesting against the Armenian massacres, as he had always done, since only humanitarian interests were involved, he did not hold the same trump cards as formerly in regard to other questions. Because

Russia and France were now allies, Russia no longer backed him in refusing to recognize the right of France to protect the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain, too, was drifting into an understanding with France that would logically be followed by an understanding with Russia; while Germany, who was replacing Great Britain as Turkey's friend and defender, did not possess the naval strength or the opportunities to stir up colonial difficulties that had made it a life-saving pastime for the master of Yildiz Kiosk to set off Great Britain against Russia and France.

Most important of all, the preoccupations of Russia in the Far East had brought together the Romanoff czar and the Hapsburg emperor in a definite agreement concerning Balkan affairs. At first, when an Albanian uprising was added to the Macedonian revolt to throw all European Turkey into confusion and bloodshed, Vienna and Petrograd united, on February 21, 1903, to proclaim Austro-Russian hegemony over the *vilayets* of Saloniki, Monastir, and Kossovo. This plan was impossible of realization, not only because of its inherent impracticability, but also because of the opposition of the other powers. It was too much to expect either that Austro-Hungarians and Russians would be able to work together harmoniously in the establishment of virtual condominium over the three provinces, or that the other four powers could agree to let them have an opportunity to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence. Germany made no move on one side or the other of the Macedonian question, just as in the Cretan question she had not supported Greeks, Cretans, Turks, or the powers. Great Britain and France recognized the special interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans, and were willing that these two powers should be the "mandatories" of Europe in suggesting and supervising the reforms, but they wanted a part in their execution. Italy insisted that Albania be excluded from the regions in which

Austria-Hungary and Russia were to be given a privileged position. A glance at the map shows the reason why.

Czar Nicholas and Emperor Franz Josef met at Mürzsteg, and agreed upon a scheme of reform, called the Mürzsteg program, which was approved by Great Britain, France, and Italy. They recommended that the Ottoman governor, especially appointed for the purpose of putting into execution reforms,¹ should be assisted by a Russian and an Austrian, and that a gendarmerie, recruited in Macedonia, should be organized under the command of a foreign general and a staff of foreign officers. Each of the five powers was to have supervision of a district. This last provision indicated the fatal weakness of the scheme. It was a compromise between the powers, dictated by considerations that had nothing to do with the problem the Mürzsteg program was supposed to solve, and thus it became merely another chapter of failure in the story of European diplomacy in the Near East.

From the moment that Abdul Hamid found himself compelled to accept the policing of Macedonia by European officers, he set to work to make their task impossible. An agreement was soon reached between Hilmi Pasha, the Ottoman governor, and Austro-Hungarian agents in Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were weak the Turkish officials and the Austrian emissaries encouraged the Bulgarian propaganda. Where the Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed immunity. Where the Serbians were weak, the Serbian propaganda made great strides with the connivance of the Turkish government. The European gendarmerie was powerless to struggle against Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues. The Turks wanted to keep Macedonia, the Balkan States wanted to wrest it

¹ In the autumn of 1902 Abdul Hamid, thinking to anticipate the demands of the powers, elaborated his own program of reforms, and sent to Saloniki Hilmi Pasha, one of his most astute servants, who was to reestablish order in Macedonia "by assuring security of life and property and impartial justice to all elements of the population."

from Turkey, each intending to get the lion's share; and Austria-Hungary, whose existence under the form of a dual monarchy was dependent upon the inability of the Serbians to lead a movement for the emancipation of the Jugo-Slavs, aimed to keep Macedonia as it was—a breeding-ground for hatred among the Balkan peoples.

Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of subsidizing bands of armed men who imagined that they were fulfilling a patriotic duty by forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant peasants, most of whom did not know or care to what "nation" they belonged. The methods and actions of the different bands were the same—pillage, incendiarism, and assassination. When Christian propagandists let them alone, the Macedonians had to endure similar brutal treatment from Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery.

In order to give the "reforms" of the program of *Mürzsteg* a chance, Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade ostensibly withdrew their active support of the bands. The Macedonians themselves were opposed to the partition of their country, and asked for its autonomy under a Christian governor and with the guaranty of the powers. But Greece and Serbia were afraid that this would mean a repetition of the history of Eastern Rumelia, *i. e.*, eventual union with Bulgaria. This was in itself a confession of the preponderance of the Bulgarian element in the province. The powers rightly suspected that if Macedonia became a united and prosperous country, Austria-Hungary and Russia would come to blows over its future.

After her disasters in the Far East, Russia returned to the intrigues of the Balkans. Because she could not control Bulgaria, and because the fostering of Jugo-Slavic nationalism seemed to furnish an opportunity for political and economic penetration to the Adriatic Sea, and at the same time raised a formidable barrier against Austrian penetration to the *Ægean* Sea and the German dream of

linking Berlin with Constantinople and Bagdad, Russian diplomacy encouraged the pan-Serbian movement.

When the Young Turks got control of the Ottoman government in 1908, a serious effort was made to reestablish Turkish authority in Macedonia and Albania. Austria-Hungary immediately annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria proclaimed her independence. Realizing that their conflicting ambitions and their secret commitments were leading them to a war for which none of them was prepared, the statesmen of the powers decided upon a "hands off" policy in European Turkey, believing that the Young Turks might possibly solve the problem. After all, it was better to have the sultan of Turkey become again the effective ruler of Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania than to prepare for and wage the inevitable war that would follow the aggrandizement of the Balkan States and the divergent ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia. Great Britain and France, whose principal interests lay in other parts of the world, were sincere in this belief, as was Germany, who felt that the dismemberment of Turkey would work to the disadvantage of her plans in the Near East. But Russia and Austria-Hungary remained suspicious of each other, and Italy could not make up her mind which was the lesser evil—the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence in the Adriatic or the success of the Jugo-Slavic aspirations, behind which stood Russia. She could only adopt a policy of watchful waiting, and hope to avoid both evils.

This situation might have lasted indefinitely, had not the Young Turks failed to establish constitutional government and had not the four "protecting powers" (Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy) refused to cease opposing the union of Crete with Greece. The attempt of the Young Turks to found the constitutional régime upon the bases of Turkish domination and the abrogation of the special religious and political privileges of non-Turkish

elements led to a renewal of persecution and massacre in Macedonia and to annual revolts in Albania.¹ The negative policy of the protecting powers in Crete caused a tension in Greco-Turkish relations that made the Greeks see the necessity of a Balkan alliance.² The Balkan States, despite their own differences, formed a coalition against Turkey and took the solution of the Macedonian question into their own hands. The war of Italy against Turkey and the revolts of Albanians and Arabs so weakened the Ottoman military and naval power from 1910 to 1912 that the Balkan States were tempted to seize the opportunity to attack their common enemy.

Italy did not encourage them to follow her example, and the other powers were equally unwilling to countenance war in the Balkans. But when Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro decided that peace could be preserved only by the actual application under sufficient guaranties of sweeping reforms in Macedonia, and appealed to the powers to indorse their demand for a provincial Macedonian assembly, a militia recruited within the province, and a Christian governor, European diplomacy once more failed. The great powers, as usual, tried to carry water on both shoulders. Blind to the fact that inaction and vague promises would no longer keep in check the neighbors of Turkey, they urged the Balkan States to refrain from "being insistent" and pointed out to Turkey the "advisability" of making concessions. The Turks did not believe in the genuineness of the Balkan alliance. Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had consideration for the threats or promises or offers of assistance of the powers.

When the Balkan States mobilized at the end of September, 1912, and not until then, the powers realized that they were losing control of the situation. The question of reforms in Macedonia had been so long their prerogative, and they were so accustomed to count upon the little Balkan

¹ See pp. 224-227.

² See p. 223.

peoples to remain weak and divided, that they refused to believe that promises and threats would not prevent war. On the morning of October 8 the ministers of Russia and Austria-Hungary, acting in the name of the six great powers, handed in at Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje the following note:

“The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan States:

“1. That the powers condemn energetically every measure capable of leading to a rupture of peace;

“2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 of the treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand, in the interest of the populations, the realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the powers for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms;

“3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification in the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey.

“The powers will make collectively to the Sublime Porte the steps which the preceding declaration makes necessary.”

The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus and Egypt, the Armenian massacres, Mytilene and Müritzsteg, the Bagdad Railway, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tripoli and Rhodes, haunted this declaration and made it impotent, honest effort though it was to preserve the peace of Europe. It was thirty-six years too late. Although the powers were not aware of it, the Balkan States had become strong enough to dispense with Europe; on the other hand, Turkey was far weaker than they believed her to be. European diplomacy in Crete and Macedonia had demonstrated to the Balkan peoples the hopelessness of expecting relief for their suffering from Europe. It was natural that they

should repudiate the arguments that European statesmen used to justify temporizing with and condoning the crimes of Turkey. "If we attempt to solve the Near Eastern question by emancipating the Christian subject races, we know that we shall fall out with one another, and thus precipitate a European war," argued the great powers, "and is it not better for a few people to be the victims of Turkey than to have all Europe on fire?" The "few people" of the Balkans were unwilling to continue to be the vicarious sacrifice to the exigences of world politics any longer than they had to be. The great powers always thought of the consequences to themselves rather than to others when they adopted their policies. It was human nature that the Balkan States should do the same.

CHAPTER XXII

THE BALKAN WAR AGAINST TURKEY (1912-1913)

THE possibility of a Balkan alliance depended upon Greece. For, no matter how large and powerful an army Bulgaria and Serbia might raise, the coöperation of the Greek navy, which would prevent the use of the Ægean ports of the Macedonian littoral for disembarking troops from Asia, was essential to success. Railways from the interior of Asia Minor had Smyrna as their terminus, and from the interior of Macedonia, Saloniki. The two ports were only twelve hours apart. The armies of the Ottoman Empire were large and were reputed to be well trained and equipped with modern artillery. If Turkey were allowed the opportunity of mobilizing and transporting her Asiatic forces, the military position of the Balkan States, even if initial victories were won, would become precarious after Turkey brought up her reserves. When the Greeks, despite their fears for the future of Macedonia, were converted to the idea of an alliance with the Slavic Balkan States, discussion of an ultimatum to Turkey, backed by the threat of military action, became practicable. It is not too much to say that the attitude of the Young Turks towards Crete and their boycott of Greek commerce were factors directly responsible for the downfall of the empire.

The Balkan premiers arrived at an agreement for common diplomatic and military measures against Turkey without having settled their own differences. There was no understanding as to the future of Thrace and Albania and as to the partition of Macedonia in event of driving the Turks out of Europe. Greece and Montenegro did not conclude treaties with Serbia and Bulgaria. The only defi-

nite agreement concerning territorial settlements was between Bulgaria and Serbia; but even in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty a large and important zone was left to arbitration. It was the best that could be done. The Balkan statesmen decided that it was wise to defer discussion, remembering that

“The man that once did sell the lion’s skin
While the beast lived, was killed with hunting him.”

None of them, in fact, believed that the lion could be killed, and they all hoped to avoid war. But Turkey acted so tactlessly and stubbornly in the summer of 1912 that public sentiment in the four countries compelled the carrying out of plans that had been made only tentatively and for the purpose of exercising diplomatic pressure.

Massacres at Ishtib and Kotchana inflamed the Serbians and Bulgarians. The perennial Albanian uprising, which the Turks tried to render impotent by arousing religious fanaticism, caused persecutions of Greeks, Montenegrins, and Serbians.¹ All the Christians of European Turkey were goaded to desperation by the colonization in their midst of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina² and by the fact and methods of conscription for the Ottoman army. The demand for intervention on behalf of Macedonian and Epirote Christians became irresistible when the people realized that their statesmen had actually worked out a plan for military coöperation. Had the ministries re-

¹ The Albanian insurgents pillaged the frontier towns of Montenegro and the districts of western Macedonia, which they had invaded with the object of driving back the Turks. In September they were in virtual possession of Uskub, an important city on the Vardar River, through which passed the railway from Nish to Saloniki. The idea of a strong and independent Albania was as alarming to the Montenegrins and the Serbians as its alternative—success of the Young Turks in reëstablishing effective control of the European *vilayets* west of the Vardar.

² Like the Boers at the advance of the English, the fanatical elements of the Mohammedan population were in the habit of “trekking” from the provinces that passed under Christian control. The *muhadjirs* (refugees) were naturally filled with hatred for Christians and believed that where Mohammedanism still prevailed they had the right to oust the Christian population, taking their lands and homes and possessions.

mained advocates of peace, they would have fallen. The only hope for preserving peace would have been a conciliatory attitude on the part of Turkey. When the great powers presented their joint note on October 8, the opportunity for mediation had passed.¹

Montenegro responded to the overtures of the powers by declaring war immediately. After five days, which, in view of public opinion, was as long as they dared wait, the Balkan premiers notified the powers that their offer to take in hand Macedonian reforms was unacceptable. The next day, October 14, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria issued an ultimatum that made the world gasp.

Turkey was given forty-eight hours to agree to (1) the autonomy of the European provinces under Christian governors; (2) the occupation of the provinces by the allied armies while the reforms were being applied; (3) the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of mobilization; (4) immediate demobilization of the Ottoman army; and (5) a pledge that the reforms would be effected within six months. The Ottoman ministers at Belgrade and Sofia refused to transmit the ultimatum. The minister at Athens tried to detach the Greeks from the alliance by agreeing to recognize the annexation of Crete to Greece and promising an autonomous government for some of the *Ægean* islands. But the Montenegrins had been fighting for a week and had scored initial successes. On the 15th hostilities began on the Serbian frontier. The Bulgarian and Greek armies were being assembled for the invasion of Thrace and Macedonia. Three days later Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia, though she still cherished the hope of buying the neutrality of Greece. As soon, however, as Greece learned of the action of the Sublime Porte in regard to Serbia and Bulgaria, the Ottoman minister in Athens was handed his passports.

The Bulgarians crossed the Turkish frontier on October

¹ For the text of this note see p. 252.

19. Within two weeks they had invested Adrianople, had routed the Turks at Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas (this battle lasted three days and was fought by 350,000 combatant troops, almost evenly divided), and were pursuing the Turks to the gates of Constantinople. During the same fortnight the Ottoman forces in Macedonia were as decisively defeated by the Serbians at Kumanovo on October 22 and by the Greeks at Yanitza on November 3. During November the Turkish armies were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari, with no hope of making successful sorties. Except at Constantinople, they were besieged and could hope for neither reinforcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was master of the Ægean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in the Dardanelles. All the Ægean islands, aside from those occupied by Italy, were in the hands of the Greeks.¹ There had been less than six weeks of fighting. The Balkan allies had swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe and the military prestige of Turkey had received a mortal blow.

The conditions of the armistice, signed on December 3, were an acknowledgment of the *débâcle* of Turkish military power in Europe. The most humiliating stipulation was that the Bulgarian army outside Constantinople should be revictualled by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople, while that fortress remained without food. By agreement with her allies, Greece refused to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be represented at the peace conference. The allies felt that the state of war on sea must continue, to prevent Turkey during the armistice from bringing to Europe the army corps of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia; and Greece, in particular, was determined to run no risk in connection with the Ægean islands. The plenipotentiaries were to meet in London.

¹ At Chios the Turkish garrison retired to the mountainous center of the island and was able to hold out until January 3.

The delegates of the Balkan States insisted upon the surrender of Adrianople and the other fortresses that were still holding out, and the cession to the allies of the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to Midia on the Black Sea, and of all the Ægean islands. After a vain attempt to save something from the wreck by dividing the allies and securing the intervention of the powers, the Turkish government decided to yield. A telegram was sent to London, authorizing the Turkish commissioners to sign the preliminaries of a peace that would mean the elimination of Turkey from Europe, with the exception of a strip of coast along the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus. But the next day, January 22, 1913, a *coup d'état* at Constantinople, engineered by Enver Bey, a hero of the revolution of 1908,¹ overthrew the government. Nazim Pasha, minister of war and generalissimo of the Ottoman army, was assassinated, and Kiamil Pasha, the grand vizier, was exiled. The new government, headed by General Mahmud Shevket Pasha, revoked the authorization to sign peace on the terms laid down by the allies.

On January 29 the allies denounced the armistice and hostilities reopened. From a military point of view, the only hope of the Turks lay in advancing from Constantinople or Gallipoli to the relief of Adrianople. There was much talk of a great offensive movement, but no serious attempt was made against the army besieging Constantinople, while an attack upon the Bulgarians at Bulair, where the Gallipoli peninsula joins the mainland, ended disas-

¹ After the revolution Enver Bey was given the post of military attaché at Berlin. When Italy attacked Turkey, he returned and went to organize the resistance in Tripoli. The misfortunes of the opening weeks of the Balkan War gave him the opportunity to come to the front as leader of the jingo and extreme nationalist element of the Young Turk party. Mahmud Shevket, whom he made premier through his *coup d'état*, was, like himself, an advocate of an alliance with Germany.

trously. The Greeks captured Janina on March 5, and the Bulgarians and Serbians took Adrianople by assault on March 24 and 25. Scutari in Albania surrendered to the Montenegrins on April 22. In Europe the Ottoman flag had ceased to wave, except at Constantinople and Gallipoli. The war was over, whether the Young Turks would have it so or not.

The great powers were willing to act as mediators. But the Turks refused to discuss the terms of peace until after the fall of Janina and Adrianople, and the Balkan States rejected the demand of the powers that the status and frontiers of Albania and the disposal of the *Ægean* islands be left to them. They wanted to know what the powers had in mind in regard to the Albanian frontiers, and they did not see why the powers should claim any rights in the *Ægean* islands. The powers also, in the interests of holders of Turkish bonds, insisted that an indemnity be waived and that the allies assume a portion of the Ottoman debt, as Italy had done in the treaty of Lausanne, adjudged on the basis of the size and resources of the territories annexed by each of them.

Notes were exchanged among the chancelleries until April 20, when the Balkan States finally agreed to accept mediation of the powers. After all, the victory had been far more complete than they expected, and, although they felt that the interference of the powers would inevitably lead to difficulties, they could not afford to hold out longer. Differences among themselves were threatening to destroy the united diplomatic front which till now they had been able to maintain with as much success as their military front. Negotiations were resumed in London on May 20, and ten days later the peace preliminaries were signed. The sultan of Turkey ceded to the sovereigns of the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the Enos-Midia line, and the island of Crete. The future of the other islands

of the Ægean Sea was left to the great powers, and to them also was intrusted the task of creating an Albanian state and determining its frontiers.

These terms were almost identical with those rejected by the Young Turks in January. The war had been renewed in the hope that the allies would turn their arms against each other. This did happen, but not until Turkey had been disposed of.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BALKAN TANGLE (1913-1914)

IF the great powers were unprepared for the succession of Balkan triumphs in October and November, 1912, the allies were more astonished at what they had been able to accomplish. Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas gave Thrace to Bulgaria. Kumanovo opened up the valley of the Vardar to Serbia. The Greeks were able to march to Saloniki without serious opposition.

The victories of the Serbians and Greeks, won with comparative ease, were to the Bulgarians a calamity that overshadowed their own magnificent military successes. They had spilled much blood and wasted their strength in the conquest of Thrace, which they did not want, while their allies—but rivals—were in possession of Macedonia, the *Bulgaria irredenta*. To be investing Adrianople and besieging Constantinople, cities in which they had only a secondary interest, while the Serbians attacked Monastir and the Greeks were settling themselves permanently in Saloniki, cities of their hearts' desire, was the irony of fate. Others were reaping, the Bulgars naturally felt, the fruits for which they had made by far the greatest sacrifice. Macedonia, and not Thrace, was the country that they had taken arms to liberate. The Ægean Sea, and not the extension of their Black Sea littoral, formed the substantial and logical economic background to the appeal of race that led them to insist so strongly that they had the right to gather under their sovereignty all the elements of the Bulgarian people.

Moreover, most of the men who had incited Bulgaria to fight Turkey and had contributed so greatly to her suc-

cesses were of Macedonian origin. The Bulgarians are a peasant people attached to the land. When the treaty of Berlin restored Macedonia to Turkey, but left the other portions in the Bulgaria of the treaty of San Stefano autonomous, it was natural that the military and civilian officials of the new principality should be recruited largely from Macedonian refugees, who, having abandoned their land, sought as a means of livelihood military or government service. All their lives they had been looking forward to the union with the mother country of the regions from which they came. After the striking victories of the Bulgarian armies, there was a moment of insanity when they saw the dreams of a lifetime about to vanish.

But the Greeks and Serbians felt the same way about the same places. Populations had been intermingled for centuries. At some time in past history dynasties of each of the three peoples had ruled over exactly the same territory. Greece and Serbia, not less than Bulgaria, were able to evoke historical memories of Macedonia. These memories had been enhanced and exaggerated by the recent decades of rivalry, and it is impossible to overestimate the bitterness that had been engendered by the bloody propaganda of the Macedonian bands.¹

During the trying period of negotiations in London the jealousies of the allies had been awakened one against another. Between Greeks and Bulgarians friction had begun from the moment that the Greek army occupied Saloniki. Between Serbians and Bulgarians relations did not become strained until Serbia saw her way blocked to the Adriatic by the decision of the powers to create a free Albania. Then Serbia began to insist that the treaty of partition that she had signed with Bulgaria could not be carried out. According to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, central and western Macedonia were divided into three zones, the middle one alone being reserved for arbitration in case

¹ See p. 248.

of disagreement. But Serbia claimed that Bulgaria had Thrace, with an outlet to the Ægean Sea in eastern Macedonia, while the intervention of the powers, which had not been foreseen in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, would, if it were carried out literally, leave no appreciable gains for Serbia. She insisted, therefore, upon referring to the arbitration of the czar of Russia the whole question of partition and not simply that of the intermediate zone. In this contention Serbia had the support of Greece, who did not care to see the Bulgarians in occupation of a strip of territory separating Serbia from Greece and dominating both countries through the possession of Monastir.

In the middle of June, 1913, it was announced that Greece and Serbia, to thwart the Bulgarian aspirations, had concluded an alliance for ten years. Bulgaria declined to send delegates to a conference proposed by Premier Venizelos for the purpose of arranging the new frontiers amicably, but did agree to meet Serbia and Greece in a conference at Petrograd in response to a moving appeal from Czar Nicholas. Notwithstanding this arrangement, which would have avoided a fratricidal war, the Bulgarian general staff yielded to pressure of the Macedonian party, and a general attack without declaration of war, or even warning, was launched on June 29. There was no direct provocation on the part of Bulgaria's allies, and General Savoff, who gave the order, explained that he was not beginning the war but was merely trying to occupy as much territory as possible in the contested regions before Russia or the other powers intervened. He aimed to cut the communications between the Greeks and Serbians and to throw an army suddenly into Saloniki.

No diplomatic action followed the treachery of the Bulgarians. The surprise attack failed, and Bulgaria was compelled to face a new war. Within two weeks the Bulgarians found themselves driven back to their old boundaries on the Macedonian and Serbian fronts. Only the

mountainous character of the country saved them from being routed. In the middle of July the Serbians crossed the western frontier of Bulgaria and on July 23 invested Widin. Bulgaria might have rallied and might have rewon a part of the contested territories from Greece and Serbia. But the invasion of Bulgaria by Rumania made her situation hopeless.

Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the military power of Bulgaria, and, although she did not join in the war against Turkey, she had notified Bulgaria in January that she must have compensation to offset the increase in territory of her neighbor in Thrace and Macedonia. She asked Bulgaria for a cession of territory from the Danube at Silistria to the Black Sea, in order that she might have the strategic frontier which the Congress of Berlin should have given her when she was awarded the Dobrudja, without her consent, in exchange for Bessarabia. As Rumania had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, and had never received any reward for her sacrifices, while the Bulgarians had done little to win their own independence, the demand for a rectification of frontier was historically reasonable. Since Rumania had admirably developed the Dobrudja, and had constructed the port of Constanza as her railway terminus on the Black Sea, the demand was justified from an economic standpoint. In April the Bulgarians gave up Silistria with ill grace, but refused to yield the small strip of territory from the Danube to the Black Sea asked for by Rumania. It was a fatal political mistake. On July 10 Rumania declared war and crossed the Danube. Five days later the seaport of Varna was occupied. The Rumanians began to march upon Sofia. Fighting for life against the Serbians and Greeks, the Bulgarians had no army to oppose the Rumanian invasion.

It would have been easy for the Rumanians to occupy Sofia and wait there for the Greek and Serbian armies to arrive. The humiliation of Bulgaria could have been made

complete. But Rumania had intervened for a limited objective, and when that was attained it was not to her interest to aid in the aggrandizement of Serbia and Greece. She was thinking of the balance of power in the Balkans; hence she brought strong pressure to bear upon both sides for the conclusion of an armistice.

On August 1, after the plenipotentiaries had assembled at Bukharest, an armistice was signed. The Bulgarian delegates had to come to an understanding with each ally separately. Consequently the important decisions were made in committee meetings. The general assembly had little else to do than to ratify the concessions wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents. By the treaty of Bukharest on August 10, 1913, Bulgaria abandoned most of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, including the valley of the Vardar and the ports of Saloniki and Kavala on the Ægean. The cession of the triangular strip of territory in the Dobrudja brought the frontier of Rumania very near to Varna, Bulgaria's port on the Black Sea. While Bulgaria was fighting the other Balkan states, a Turkish army had reoccupied most of Thrace, including Adrianople, and there was no way of expelling the Turks. This left to the Bulgarians only a narrow strip down to the Ægean Sea, with the single port of Dedeagatch, the railway to which at one point crossed the frontier claimed and occupied by Turkey. In all the territories ceded by Bulgaria to her enemies, the majority of the inhabitants were Bulgarians—or were believed to be so by themselves as well as by the Bulgarians. The punishment was undoubtedly well deserved, but a situation was created that maintained the old causes of friction among the Balkan peoples. The treaty of Bukharest was not a real peace, but was an armed truce, and it proved as disastrous to the reëstablishment of good feeling and settled political and economic conditions in the Balkan peninsula as had the treaty of Frankfort, forty years earlier, in western Europe.

Of the intrigues of the powers at Bukharest during the conference much has been written but little is actually known. The aggrandizement of Greece was viewed with alarm by Italy and of Serbia by Austria-Hungary; Rumania, on the other hand, was presumably an outpost of the Triple Alliance; the breach with Bulgaria was looked upon as a blow to pan-Slavism; and the partial recovery of Turkey was gratifying to Germany.

The modifications of the treaty of London, by which Turkey got back most of Thrace, were arranged in a Turko-Bulgarian treaty, which was not submitted to the powers or to the other Balkan states for their approval. Greece also was compelled to enter into negotiations with the Sublime Porte, separately and without the intervention of the powers, to settle a number of questions not covered by the treaty of London, especially in regard to the Ægean islands. A satisfactory settlement between Greece and Turkey had not been reached when the World War broke out. Nor had Greece succeeded in arriving at an agreement with Italy concerning the future of the Dodecanese, which Italy continued to occupy on the ground that the terms of the treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) had not been fulfilled.

The most perplexing Balkan question, however, was that of Albania, her status and her frontiers. By the treaty of London the Albanian question, including the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania, had been left to the great powers. In 1815, when the map of Europe was being remade by the Congress of Vienna, Albania did not command attention. It was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and the political changes of the nineteenth century, which made Albania an international question, had not yet occurred. Italy was not unified. The upper part of the Adriatic Sea was wholly in the hands of Austria. Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the Serbians had not risen in rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. There were no Italian, Hellenic, and Slavic questions to disturb


Austria in her peaceful possession of the Adriatic Sea. But when the union of Italy had been accomplished, and Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece were independent political units, what was going to happen to Albania became a question of prime importance in international relations.

Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should not get a foothold in Albania, and Italy had the same determination in regard to Austria-Hungary. But both wanted to keep the Slavs from reaching the Adriatic, and Italy was anxious to prevent the extension of the Greek littoral northward by the annexation of northern Epirus to Greece. Instead of following the example of Russia and Great Britain in Persia and establishing spheres of influence, the two Adriatic powers agreed to support the Albanian national movement as the best possible check upon Serbian and Greek aspirations. The agreement stood the strain of Italy's war with Turkey, and, largely owing to fear of Russia and pressure from Germany, of the war of the Balkan States with Turkey. But Italy and Austria-Hungary let it be known to the other powers that if the Ottoman Empire in Europe disappeared, there must be an independent Albania.

The dictum was accepted in principle. No nation wanted to fight over the question of Albania. Russia could not hope to have support from Great Britain and France in imposing upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a Slavic outlet to the Adriatic; neither France nor Great Britain wanted the Russians to get to the Mediterranean. The harmony among the powers on the Albanian question was shown in the warning given to Greece and Serbia during the peace negotiations with Turkey, and stood the severe test put upon it by the Montenegrin occupation of Scutari. Serbia, yielding to the intimation from Russia that her claim on northern Albania would not be allowed by the powers, had withdrawn her troops from the siege of Scutari and had abandoned all points within the regions she real-

ized would be given to the state that the powers intended to create. It was when Serbia saw the hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in Albania that her attitude toward fulfilling the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty became uncompromising. The blocking of Serbia's outlet to the Adriatic by the powers led inevitably to the war between the Balkan allies.

With Montenegro the situation was different. She had no hope of compensation elsewhere. She had sacrificed a fifth of her army in the attacks upon Scutari, which seemed to her the only reward that she was to get out of the war with Turkey. There was little harm that the powers could do to her. King Nicholas had precipitated the Balkan War against the advice of the powers, and on April 1, 1913, he refused to obey their command to raise the siege against Scutari. The powers were compelled to make a show of force. Little Montenegro, with her one port, received the honor of an international blockade. On April 7 an international fleet, under the British Admiral Burney, blockaded the coast from Antivari to Durazzo. But the Montenegrins, although deserted by the Serbians, maintained their circle around Scutari, twenty-five miles inland from the blockading fleet. On April 23, after the Balkan War was finished, Europe was electrified by the news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari to Montenegro. It was announced at Vienna that Austro-Hungarian troops would cross the border from Bosnia into Montenegro if the Montenegrins did not immediately withdraw from Scutari. This action would certainly have brought on the European war, for, had it been consummated, Russia would have declared war upon Austria-Hungary. But, largely through the influence of his son-in-law, the king of Italy, King Nicholas decided before it was too late to deliver Scutari to the powers. On May 5 the Montenegrins withdrew, and ten days later Scutari was occupied by detachments from the international squad-



ron. The blockade was raised. The peace of Europe was preserved.

The treaty of London put Albania into the hands of the powers. The northern and eastern frontiers had been settled by a promise made to Serbia in return for her withdrawal from the siege of Scutari. But the southern frontier was still an open question. Here Italy was as much interested as was Austria-Hungary in the north. With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would not agree that the coast and the mainland opposite should also be Hellenic. The Greeks, on the contrary, declared that the littoral and hinterland, up to beyond Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus and was inhabited principally by Greeks. It should therefore revert logically to Greece. The Greeks were occupying Santi Quaranta. They claimed the right of extending their frontiers as far north as Argyrokastron. But they consented to withdraw from the Adriatic coast, north of and opposite Corfu, if points equally far to the north were left to them. An international commission was formed to delimit the southern boundaries of Albania, but its task was never satisfactorily completed.¹

The new state, foster-child of all Europe, had indefinite boundaries; each guardian was jealous of the others; and its neighbors were waiting only for a favorable moment to partition it. Inhabited by two races and divided between Christian and Moslem tribes, the country was unable to form a government whose authority would be acknowledged by all. San Giovanni di Medua, the port of Scutari, was occupied by the Montenegrins. From the citadel of Scutari flew the flags of the powers. Less than a year

¹ A decision was rendered by the commission, and Greece agreed to accept it. The Epirotes, however, refused to become Albanians. There was an uprising, marked by massacres, which showed that religious, and not national, feeling was at the bottom of the troubles, and in 1915 Greek troops returned to defend the "provisional government" against Mohammedan Albanians. In the Balkan campaigns of the World War Italy managed to get military control of the disputed region and agreed to withdraw only on condition that northern Epirus be mostly attributed to Albania. This action, which was really a confirmation of the commission award of 1914, was taken in the autumn of 1921.

before the nations of Europe were at one another's throats, the powers had believed they could avoid the war by an international occupation of Scutari. It was the last step in the series of concerted actions by which diplomacy attempted to save the peace of Europe. There was little, however, that the powers, even if united, could do for a country without a national spirit and a national past. The existence of nations in our day is due to the will of the people rather than to the unifying qualities of a ruler. If common ideals and a determination to attain them are lacking, there is no foundation for nationhood. The creation of independent Albania by the ambassadors of the powers at London was regarded by them as a necessity. It was none the less a makeshift. Had the Albanians done their part and shown the desire to unite and to take upon themselves the responsibilities and the inhibitions of citizens of a country, the makeshift might have developed into a new European state. As it turned out, Albania could not help being a fiasco.

Among the many candidates put forward for the new throne, Prince William of Wied was finally decided upon. He was a Protestant, and could occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic subjects. He was a German, and could not be suspected of Slavic sympathies. He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan powers. Prince William had a short and unhappy reign. Lost in a maze of bewildering intrigues, foreign and domestic, the ruler of Albania saw his prestige, and then his dignity, disappear. He never enjoyed any real authority. He had been forced upon the Albanians, and was soon in the midst of insurrections. Although they remained at Scutari, the powers did nothing to support Prince William or to prevent the lapse into anarchy of the state they had called into being.

The outbreak of the European war in August, 1914, enabled the powers to withdraw gracefully from Albania. Their contingents hurriedly abandoned Scutari and sailed for home. The French did not have time to do this; so they went to Montenegro. The catastrophe, which they had sought to prevent by creating Albania, had fallen upon Europe. There was no further need for the powers to bother about the fortunes of Prince William and his subjects. Italy alone was left with hands free. But as long as Greece kept out of the war Italian interests were not at stake. Without support and without money, there was nothing left to Prince William but to get out. And he did.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AGAINST THE CENTRAL EMPIRES (1914)

WHEN Austria-Hungary annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose administration had been intrusted to her by the treaty of Berlin, the German ambassador at Petrograd did not hesitate to warn Russia that Germany stood behind the Dual Monarchy. Three years later, in 1911, when France extended her protectorate over Morocco, the British ambassador at Berlin communicated to Germany the full text of a speech by Mr. Lloyd George in which it was affirmed that Great Britain stood behind France. In neither instance was there a precise statement to the effect that the warning power intended to fight to defend the power in whose behalf the warning was issued. But it was easy to see that the exigencies of world politics were bringing together into opposing groups five of the great powers. Austria-Hungary and Russia were rivals for predominant influence in the Balkans. Germany felt that she could not afford to see Russia attack Austria-Hungary. France was bound to come to the aid of Russia in case Germany intervened in an Austro-Russian war. On the other hand, Germany, poor in colonies and late in beginning to exercise political and economic influence outside Europe, found herself, the moment her opposition to the continued aggrandizement of her rivals began to count for something, confronted by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

In 1908 Russia was not prepared to push her championship of pan-Serbianism to the point of starting a war with Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina, for that would have involved Germany against her. In 1911 Ger-

many was unwilling to go to war with France over Morocco as there was a prospect of Great Britain aiding France. One of Germany's allies, Austria-Hungary, did not have any personal interest in a Germanic solution of the Moroccan question, while Germany, because of her *Drang nach Osten*, did have a powerful reason for favoring the Austro-Hungarian solution of the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And her other ally, Italy, was bound by treaty not to oppose the extension of the French protectorate over Morocco, this promise having been obtained by France in return for the latter's acknowledgment of Italy's right to Tripoli.¹ Neither crisis had at stake enough of vital importance for any of the powers to assume the responsibility of precipitating a European war.

Between 1911 and 1914 Balkan developments had become increasingly alarming for Austria-Hungary. Serbia, victorious in two wars, had grown amazingly in strength and prestige. A pan-Serbian secret society, the Narodny Obrana, was carrying on an active separatist propaganda, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Istria. In these provinces of the Dual Monarchy most of the inhabitants spoke Serbian and belonged to the same south Slavic stock as the inhabitants of free Serbia. Disliking the Austrians and hating the Hungarians, who had long been ruling them as a subject race, the populations of these regions were worked upon by the propagandists to look forward to the creation of a national life, which would be possible only by the union of all the Serbian-speaking peoples. Owing to the numbers and the geographical position of the south Slavs, it was evident that the success of the Narodny Obrana would mean the disruption of the Hapsburg empire and the interposition of a barrier between Austrians and Hungarians and the sea.

German statesmen and German public opinion believed that the maintenance of the Hapsburg empire, with an out-

¹ See pp. 234, 236.

let to the Mediterranean at Trieste and Fiume and a foothold in the Balkan peninsula sufficient for the protection of its tenure on the Adriatic coast, was vital to the security and prosperity of the German Empire. France and Russia were offensive and defensive allies; Great Britain possessed the supremacy of the sea; Italy was an uncertain friend; therefore it seemed to the Germans that complete encirclement could be avoided only by the preservation of the Dual Monarchy. It was an economic as well as a military necessity for Germany that the Dual Monarchy continue to exist without diminution of territory. Germany's lines of communication with the Mediterranean and Constantinople passed through Vienna and Budapest. The route to Turkey was becoming as important for the Germans as the route to India had long been for the British; and the Germans had made up their minds that any effort to undermine Austria-Hungary would have to be checked, even if it meant war.

On June 25, 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II inspected the British fleet, which was at Kiel for the celebration of the reopening of the canal. Three days later the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, who were visiting Serajevo, capital of Bosnia, were assassinated by a member of the Narodny Obrana. The Austro-Hungarian government decided to take measures to put an end to pan-Serbian propaganda, using the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne as the occasion and justification for bringing pressure to bear upon Serbia to discountenance the nationalist agitation in the Serbian-speaking provinces of the Dual Monarchy.

It was recalled that the Serbian minister at Vienna had made, on March 31, 1909, the following formal declaration to the Austro-Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs:

"Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions at which the powers are

going to arrive in reference to article 25 of the treaty of Berlin. Following the advice of the powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the trend of her present policy towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations."

The press and public opinion in Austria-Hungary, during the four weeks following the Serajevo assassination, claimed that Serbia had broken this promise, and that the unrest in Bosnia, of which the murder of the archduke was the culmination, was due to the instigation of the officials of the Narodny Obrana and to secret agents, whose headquarters were at Belgrade and whose activities the Serbian government in effect encouraged because it had not prevented them. But not until the evening of July 23 did Europe realize that Austria-Hungary, with Germany behind her, was determined to impose upon Serbia conditions that Russia would not tolerate.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum of July 23 accused Serbia of having failed to fulfil the promise made in the declaration of March 31, 1909, and of permitting the pan-Serbian propaganda to be disseminated in the newspapers and public schools of the kingdom. The assassination of the archduke was stated to be the direct result of the Serbian government's violation of its promise, and it was claimed that proof had been found of the complicity of two Serbians, one an army officer and the other a functionary who belonged to the Narodny Obrana. The assassins, it was said, had received their arms and bombs from these two men and had been knowingly allowed by the Serbian authorities to cross the Bosnian frontier. The Austro-Hungarian government therefore found itself compelled to demand of the Serbian government the formal condemnation of the propaganda of the Narodny Obrana, which was dangerous to the existence of the Dual Monarchy, because

its object was to detach from Austria-Hungary large parts of her territory and to attach them to Serbia. The Serbian government was given forty-eight hours in which to agree to disavow the pan-Serbian nationalist movement and to suppress the propagandists in Serbian territory by taking drastic measures, which were outlined in detail in the ultimatum.

Owing to pressure from Russia and France, neither of whom was prepared for war, Serbia accepted in principle the terms of the ultimatum, and promised, if her reservations to certain specific demands were unsatisfactory, to place her case in the hands of the Hague tribunal. This answer was taken by the Serbian premier in person to the Austro-Hungarian minister before the termination of the forty-eight hours. Without referring the response to his government, the minister, acting on previous instructions that no answer other than an unqualified acceptance in every particular of the ultimatum would be admissible, replied that the response was not satisfactory and asked for his passports. On the morning of July 28 Austria-Hungary formally declared war, and the same evening the bombardment of Belgrade was begun.

Between July 23 and August 4 European diplomacy exerted itself to the utmost to prevent a general war. Many volumes have been written giving in detail the story of the *pourparlers* and exchanges of despatches among the chancelleries during the fateful "twelve days." Naturally, as the participants have wanted to exculpate themselves and as the governments have sought to throw the responsibility for the war upon one another, it is impossible, until the archives are opened, for the historian to judge from the evidence.¹ Whatever story may be revealed by a com-

¹ Most of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian official correspondence has been published, because of the complete collapse of those three governments and the communication of their archives to unauthorized persons. But the French and British governments have given out only selected documents from their archives, which are in the nature of briefs rather than of evidence.

plete publication of the diplomatic correspondence and conversations, however, the student who approaches the problem of the responsibility for the World War from the point of view of world politics will regard the "twelve days" as of minor importance. The assassination at Serajevo furnished an occasion for the outbreak of a conflict that had long been threatening between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both of these powers considered that the ascendancy of the other in the Balkans meant its own political disintegration and economic stagnation. And the other powers were committed to the support of the two potential belligerents by a long chain of events and circumstances that had to do primarily with their overseas expansion.

International relations are, of course, affected by numerous considerations, and it is impossible to ignore the many trouble-breeding causes of conflict due to the direct relations of the powers as neighbors in Europe. But it may be fairly argued that none of these sources of friction in themselves would have led to a European conflagration. During the century preceding the war of 1914 the wars among the powers were limited in scope and objective. Both the commitments, due to treaties or understandings, and the incentives were lacking to array all the powers, on opposing sides, in a quarrel between one of them and a small state or between two of them. Even as late as 1878, when Great Britain compelled Russia to bring the treaty of San Stefano before an international conference for revision, there was no danger of a general European war. But the changes that had occurred between 1878 and 1914 made it impossible for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia without a resultant Armageddon.

These changes can be summarized under two heads: those that affected the international position of each power separately and led to the alinement of 1914 and to the later intervention of other states; and those that had trans-

formed war from a conflict between armed forces of limited numbers to a life-and-death struggle between peoples.

When Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia she mobilized against Russia. Russia's counter-mobilization to defend Serbia was answered by the general mobilization of Germany, whose armies threatened both Russia and France. Because France refused to assure Germany that she would stand by and allow Russia to be attacked by Germany, Germany invaded France by way of Belgium, a country whose neutrality she was bound by treaty to respect. Great Britain thereupon declared war upon Germany. Between July 28 and August 4 the Austro-Serbian hostilities involved Russia, France, Great Britain, and Belgium in a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Montenegro entered the lists in defense of Serbia, and within two months Turkey intervened on the side of the central powers. In the meantime, Japan attacked Germany in the Far East. In 1915 Italy joined the entente powers and Bulgaria the central powers. In 1916 Portugal and Rumania declared war on the central powers, and in 1917 the intervention of the United States, Greece, China, Siam, Liberia, and most of the Latin-American republics made the combination against the central empires, Turkey, and Bulgaria virtually a world coalition.

Of the reasons for the entry of the later combatants we shall speak elsewhere.¹ The principal motives that brought in the belligerents of 1914 were: Austria-Hungary and Russia—opposition to and support of the pan-Slavic movement; Germany—the desire to maintain control of the route to the Ottoman Empire and to break France and Russia before they became too strong for her; France—national security, which was believed to be dependent upon the preservation of a strong Russia; Great Britain—the determination to prevent a continental power from securing the hegemony of Europe and challenging

¹ See pp. 290-292, 294, 297, 301-304, 316-317, 361-363, 376-380.

British sea power; Japan—the opportunity of eliminating another European power in the Far East; Montenegro—the knowledge that her independence would disappear with Serbia's; Belgium and Serbia—resistance to aggression, but, coupled with it, the knowledge that if a war among the great powers resulted in the triumph of the central empires, Belgium would fall under German and Serbia under Austro-Hungarian domination; and Turkey—the fear of losing Constantinople and other territory if the group of powers including Russia won the war.

Immediately after the war had begun, however, it was necessary for statesmen to call upon their peoples to fight for ideals. The economic reasons and political combinations that have pitted nations against one another are ignored when the cataclysm they have produced arrives. We must be careful to distinguish between the underlying motives of wars, which are always economic, and the more noble objects men have before their eyes when they are actually fighting. When one's country is invaded, whatever may have been the reason for the invasion, one fights in its defense. The invading armies believe that if they were not in the enemy's country the enemy would be in theirs. Where those who intervene are unable to invoke the instinct of self-preservation, they are spurred to sacrifice by the thought that they are defending the weak against the strong or avenging the victims of the enemy's bloodlust. When we think how unreservedly the peoples of warring nations sacrifice themselves, we realize how large a part idealism plays in the conduct of wars. But this fact makes only the more important the critical analysis of the forces and influences that make inevitable conflicts among nations.

When we examine these motives we see that they have to do with the primal instincts that are the causes of all wars—self-defense and self-aggrandizement; and that, when they are called into play, each in turn is precedent

and consequent. Individually, in the history of Europe, the belligerents had heretofore engaged in wars with each other, and sometimes in combinations. But the influences that had provoked duels or that had led to temporary coalitions were primarily European in character and had to do with real or fancied protection of interests arising from direct relations as neighbors. In the war of 1914 both groups of belligerents had formed their alliances because of changes in their relations as world powers, and both were tempted to engage in the most horrible and costly of all wars through a concatenation of extra-European events. The European nations had reached a stage of industrial evolution, coupled with a standard of living, that led them to believe that they were dependent upon maintaining and increasing their world markets. Almost insensibly their relations with one another had been shaped and had become fixed by considerations of world politics.

Propaganda had become an indispensable agent to governments in the conduct of international relations; for along with universal obligatory military service and increased taxes to pay for armaments had come universal suffrage. The ultimate control of foreign policy, therefore, was in the hands of those who contributed financially and who might at any time be called upon to risk their lives. Yet international obligations were contracted by a few in the name of the people, who were ignorant of the details and principles of the policies of their governments. The object of propaganda was twofold: to make the people believe that their security and prosperity depended upon an aggressive foreign policy, which defended the country's "interests" throughout the world; and to arouse a sentiment of suspicion and hatred against any nation that might happen to become a colonial and commercial competitor. Enemies were changed to friends and friends to enemies according to the exigencies of world politics. The imperialists of Germany led the people to believe that Ger-

many was disinherited and surrounded by enemies, and that backing Austria-Hungary was the only way of salvation. In Great Britain, on the other hand, the people were worked upon to substitute within a decade Germany for Russia and France as the formidable potential disturber of world peace.

Between France and Germany there was undoubtedly a feeling of animosity that could be traced to the war of 1870. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an open wound, and the Franco-Russian alliance made Germany nervous in the possession of her plunder. But too little importance is given the Moroccan question as a factor in reviving and intensifying the hatred between the two countries when the generation that had fought over the Rhine provinces was disappearing. It must not be forgotten that Austria had been humiliated and robbed by Prussia as much as France had been, that the last Austro-Prussian War had taken place only four years before the Franco-Prussian War, and that France had been thwarted in her ambitions and affronted by British imperialism three times since the Franco-Prussian War. The grouping of the powers in 1914 can not be explained by traditional interests or affinities or by rancors, but simply by the evolution of world policies.

With the exception of Germany, who felt that the moment was propitious, none of the powers wanted war in the summer of 1914. Had Germany advised restraint, Austria-Hungary would not have refused to accept the Serbian response to her ultimatum. Had Germany wanted to avoid the risk of British intervention, she would not have invaded Belgium. Germany risked the test of the solidity of the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Japanese alliances and of the genuineness of the Anglo-French Entente. She was willing, also, to discount any weakness in her ally's military power resulting from the disaffection of subject Hapsburg peoples. The uncertainty of Italy's attitude

did not seem to trouble her. She went into the war with her eyes open, confident of victory.

But the initial whirlwind campaign against France miscarried because of the stubborn fighting of the Belgians and the loss of the first battle of the Marne. During the fateful month of August, while invading France, Germany was called upon to make a tremendous military effort to stem the Russian invasion of east Prussia. The hopes of a speedy and easy victory vanished before the armies had been six weeks in the field. On both fronts the Germans found themselves forced to dig themselves in, and to face what promised to be a long and exhausting struggle.

The Entente allies were able to oppose a solid diplomatic front, also, to Germany. On September 5, 1914, Great Britain, France, and Russia signed an agreement, known as the "pact of London," binding themselves not to conclude peace separately with Germany; and to this agreement Japan affixed her signature on October 19, 1915, and Italy on December 1, 1915.

CHAPTER XXV

ITALY'S ENTRANCE INTO THE TRIPLE ENTENTE (1915)

DURING the third quarter of the nineteenth century—the period between the treaty of Paris (1856) and the treaty of Berlin (1878)—Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia were replaced by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy as the powers of central Europe. Both Germans and Italians had achieved their national unity at the expense of the Hapsburg empire, and the war of 1866, in which they were allies against Austria, was an essential step in their unification. But economic considerations gradually led to an alliance with Austria-Hungary, which was concluded in 1882. German and Italian statesmen continued for more than a generation to believe that the Triple Alliance was advantageous to the interests of their countries, and it was still in force when the war of 1914 broke out.

As far as Italy was concerned, the vulnerable points in the alliance were: (1) Austria-Hungary possessed “unredeemed” portions of the Italian “motherland”; (2) Italy could not feel safe without the control of the Adriatic Sea, and yet this was Austria-Hungary’s only outlet; (3) because of Great Britain’s control of the Mediterranean Sea, it was impossible for Italy to be relied upon to participate in any war without the consent of the British; (4) in the competition for overseas markets, Italy’s allies were not in a position to bargain with her and offer her “compensations,” as were the other powers; and (5) Germany had no common frontier with Italy. Had any one of these weak points in the alliance been lacking, the central empires might have been able to prevent the orientation of Italy towards their enemies and the intervention of Italy

against them. But taken together they proved too great a handicap for German diplomacy to overcome when Italy was faced with the alternatives of neutrality or participation in the World War.

Irredentism is a term originally used to denote the doctrine of the agitators for Italian unification, who taught that the people of the Italian peninsula would achieve their goal of becoming a nation only when those who spoke Italian were united under one government. It was the Latin version of the old saying that "where there are Hellenes, there is Hellas," and it was soon developed far beyond just ethnological claims. Where the irredentists were confronted with alien majorities in coveted territories, historical claims and the argument of strategic necessity were advanced.

There were *terre irredente* (unredeemed lands) on the other side of virtually every frontier in Europe; and, while force still remained the supreme argument in establishing a boundary, the aggressive intentions of the powers to despoil one another were usually disguised by the idealism of irredentism. Encouragement of separatist movements in neighboring countries was carried on in time of peace; irredentism was a powerful instrument in the hands of statesmen not only to bring pressure to bear in diplomatic negotiations, but also to foster and intensify the war spirit among the common people; and, after wars, annexation of territories of the vanquished state was always justified by the plea of "redeeming enslaved brothers of blood," taking back provinces that had formerly belonged to the victors, or establishing historic or strategic frontiers.

Although the irredentist ideal was in many cases a reasonable and legitimate ambition, to statesmen it became a cloak for concealing the real objects of diplomacy—economic advantages and military guaranties. Irredentism was a good weapon of attack. But it became

inextricably involved with the aspirations of nationalism and the obligations of patriotism, and therefore was likely to get beyond the control of those who wanted to use it in moderation. This happened in Italy, where a generation of premiers and ministers of foreign affairs had kept in check the irredentist demands of the Italian nationalists.

Italy's *terre irredente* were Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia, held by France; Malta, held by Great Britain; three cantons of Switzerland; the southern half of the Austrian Tyrol; and all the parts of the Adriatic littoral held by Austria, Hungary, Montenegro, and Albania. The more radical irredentists recalled that medieval Italy had enjoyed a privileged position in the commerce of the eastern Mediterranean. The Italian city-states ruled in the islands and the ports of the Ægean Sea, and there were self-governing colonies in Constantinople and other ports of the Byzantine Empire. It was contended that the prosperity and security of the people inhabiting the Italian peninsula depended as much in the twentieth century as in the days of imperial Rome and the medieval republics upon an overlordship in all Mediterranean lands east of Sicily.

The application of irredentist principles to Switzerland was never seriously considered. The Italians, more than the French and Germans, have profited by the neutralization of the Alpine regions that otherwise would have been a troublesome common frontier. Savoy was a mountainous hinterland that prevented Nice, in the hands of France, from becoming a competitor of Genoa and Venice for the trade of central Europe. The western and northern frontiers of Italy with France and Switzerland were strategically excellent, and what lay beyond them was not economically tempting. The frontier of 1866 with Austria, on the other hand, gave all the mountain fortresses to a potential enemy; Trieste and Fiume were powerful rivals of Genoa and Venice; Austria-Hungary had a naval base on the

Istrian peninsula, which dominated Venice; and the Italian coast of the Adriatic was exposed and without ports, while the Dalmatian coast opposite was protected by numerous islands and had several splendid ports.

There were "brothers of blood" beyond all the frontiers: Nice and Savoy had been Italian up to within fifty years; Trieste and most of the unredeemed regions on the Austrian side had belonged to the Hapsburg crown since the fourteenth century. Irredentist propaganda is invariably based on ethnology and history. But behind the racial and historical claims lurk powerful economic and strategic interests. To redeem their Italian-speaking brethren from the yoke of the foreigner and to unite them with the motherland were undoubtedly the motives that actuated the mob spirit in Italy in the spring of 1915. But the propaganda that brought about this result became an irresistible national sentiment because Italian merchants and shippers wanted a monopoly of the Mediterranean trade of central Europe, and because Italian military and naval experts believed that the safety of their country demanded a new mountain frontier on the northeast and the exclusion from the Adriatic of all naval powers other than Italy.

Tunisia was by far the most important booty Italy could hope to take from France by war; and had the French and British fought in 1898 over conflicting ambitions in Africa, instead of adjusting their differences by a series of agreements, Italy would have been tempted to declare war on France to seize the coveted African province. Aggrandizement in Africa entered largely into the calculations of Italian foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century. But the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 definitely destroyed any hopes Italy might have had of using a war between Great Britain and France to take Tunisia from the latter. Italy was not forgotten during the secret negotiations leading up to that agreement, and her acceptance of it as a Mediterranean adjustment had already been pur-

chased by the acknowledgment of her eventual rights to Tripoli.

The naval supremacy of Great Britain makes it impossible for any peninsular state to go into a war on the side of Britain's enemies. Among peninsular states Italy is peculiarly at the mercy of the mistress of the seas. The change in the attitude of Great Britain towards France and Germany between 1899 and 1914 necessitated a strictly defensive interpretation of the Triple Alliance on the part of Italy. Germany realized this and did not count on Italian support. No credit is due to Italy for relieving France of the handicap of having to keep an army on the Italian frontier at the beginning of the war. It would have been madness for Italy to follow a policy of uncertain neutrality. She would have suffered what Greece suffered later. Had there been no other impelling force than that of British sea power, it is probable that Italy would have found it prudent to join the Entente powers.

The sober judgment of conservative and clerical, as well as of advanced radical, leaders was that Italy's wisest course would be to maintain her neutrality. Italy was poor, and had the opportunity to become rich. If the central empires won, she would certainly receive Tunisia and Djibouti and probably more, as a reward for having resisted the Entente propaganda. If the central empires were defeated, it would be to the interest of the victors to weaken Austria by allowing Italy to annex the Trentino (southern Austrian Tyrol) and Trieste. If both sides fought to exhaustion, Italy would be the arbiter of Europe, and could have pretty much all she wanted from both sides. In answer to the argument of the interventionists that, if the central empires won, Italy would have to give up her hope of incorporating the Trentino and Trieste, the non-interventionists called attention to the peril of Slavic penetration to the Adriatic that would follow an Entente victory.

During the first winter of the war the irredentists in-

duced public opinion to clamor for intervention by preaching, what was undoubtedly true, that Austria was the hereditary enemy, and that the full achievement of Italian unity was possible only through the destruction of the Hapsburg empire. When the old cry of the *Risorgimento* was raised, all other considerations were disregarded.¹ Italians must be liberated from the Austrian yoke, and the Adriatic must become an Italian sea.

When Italian statesmen realized the strength of the interventionist propaganda, they appealed to Germany to influence Austria to give up enough of the disputed border districts to satisfy the irredentist clamor. But at the same time, knowing that they might have to yield to the war party, they entered into negotiations with the Entente powers to arrange as good a bargain as possible for their intervention. It is not correct to say that the Italian government was offering Italy's sword to the highest bidder. On the one hand, it was impossible that Italy should consent to fight with her allies; on the other, the men in power differed from the opposition only in degree of willingness to withstand the interventionist pressure and carried on the negotiations with the entente governments to protect Italy's interests in case public opinion forced the issue. The anti-interventionists, under the leadership of men like Signor Giolitti, were not pro-German. It happened that the policy of strict neutrality that they advocated favored Germany, as its success would have meant the loss to the Entente of Italian aid; but this policy was conceived wholly in the interest of Italy. Why should a safe and profitable neutrality be abandoned for a belligerency whose conveniences and possible gains were offset by inconveniences and possible losses?

¹ After the downfall of Napoleon, the treaty of Vienna gave Venetia and Lombardy to the Hapsburgs and restored to their thrones the Hapsburg princes of central Italy. The movement for unification, called the *Risorgimento*, adopted the old Ghibelline motto, "*Fuori i tedeschi!*" ("Out with the Germans!")

Prince von Bülow worked indefatigably at Rome to counteract the entente propaganda which, although frowned upon in court and church circles and actively opposed by the bankers, steadily gained ground during the first winter of the war. The rock upon which the prince's efforts finally split was the unwillingness of Austria to abandon any considerable amount of territory to Italy as the price of continued neutrality. On April 8, 1915, the Italian government formulated its program of concessions that might satisfy the irredentists. An unsatisfactory answer from Austria on April 25 led to the denunciation of the Triple Alliance on May 3. Italy addressed a note to Austria stating that the ultimatum to Serbia and the subsequent Austrian acts which had brought on the World War had been undertaken without the knowledge or consent of Italy, had been contrary to the spirit and letter of the treaty of alliance, had involved Austria in responsibilities that Italy could not share, and that therefore the Triple Alliance had lost its value and was terminated. A fortnight of fruitless negotiations followed. On May 20 Austria offered rectifications of frontier in the Tyrol and in Venetia; the proclamation of Trieste as a free imperial city with an Italian university; recognition of Italian sovereignty over Valona and avowal of Austria's disinterestedness in Albania; and an amnesty to subjects of the empire convicted for irredentist activities.

Had the negotiations been allowed to continue, Austria would probably have ended by accepting Italy's conditions. But the demonstrations in favor of war throughout the country had become too threatening to be ignored. Italy mobilized on May 22, and the next day declared war on Austria. War was declared on Turkey on August 20. A whole year passed, however, before the Italian government realized that it was necessary to have Germany also as an enemy. Only when Germany sent troops to aid Austria on the Italian front did Italy, on August 28, 1916, become

formally an enemy of her old ally. The Italians kept asserting that they had no quarrel with the Germans, and appeared grieved and incensed when they discovered that Germany had determined to aid Austria against them.¹

The Entente military authorities counted upon the Italian intervention to render impossible a counter-offensive of the central empires against Russia, which was a movement that they anticipated and dreaded. The Entente statesmen looked upon the entry of Italy into the alliance as one more link in the chain of enemies with which they were planning to encircle the central empires, and they attached much importance to "the moral effect" of Italian intervention upon enemies and neutrals. In particular, they were confident that it would result in Rumania's adhesion. Entente financial and big business interests, which played a dominant rôle in the diplomacy of the war, regarded the damage to German banks and commercial houses by the defection of Italy as an advantage worth the high price Italian statesmen asked.

On April 26, 1915, more than a week before she denounced the Triple Alliance, Italy had buttered her bread on the other side by concluding at London a secret treaty with Great Britain, France, and Russia. Until the soviet government published the archives of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs three years later, the terms of the treaty of London were not definitely known. Their disclosure, however, did not come as a shock, for the ambitions of Italy had long been a matter of public record. Italy was prom-

¹ A strong and prosperous Germany is an essential part of Italian foreign policy, for Germany is the key to the economic well-being of central Europe, on which Italy is largely dependent. While many Italians during the war declared that Italy needed to cast off the yoke of Germany in business, which was fettering Italy, they were equally positive in announcing their intention not to let Great Britain and France take Germany's place in Italian financial and commercial life. The Italians want to be friends with all Europe. In order not to give offense to the Germany of the future, the Italian government has decided to celebrate November 3 instead of November 11 as armistice day, and the lower part of the *Via Nazionale*, the principal street of Rome, has been changed to *Via Tre Novembre* to emphasize the fact that Italy's victory was over Austria-Hungary.

ised not only the Trentino and the extension of her eastern frontier to include Trieste, where the population was largely Italian, but also the purely German Tyrolese districts south of the Brenner Pass; the peninsula of Istria with a generous hinterland; the northern half of Dalmatia, and almost all the islands off the Dalmatian coast, where the Italian population was negligible; Valona, the principal port of Albania, and its neighborhood; the twelve islands of the Dodecannese, whose population was Greek; and a portion of Asia Minor. If the French and British increased their colonial holdings in Africa at the expense of Germany, Italy was to receive adequate territorial compensation.

The secret treaty of London marked the abandonment, before the end of the first year of the war, of the generous idealism that had seemed to make the conflict one of principles rather than of imperialistic aims. Although the people of the Entente countries sincerely believed that they were fighting for small nations and for a durable world peace, their governments negotiated with one another for political and commercial advantages throughout the world, and concluded a series of secret agreements (of which the treaty of London was only the first) that were wholly inconsistent with their pledges to their own peoples and to the world. In event of victory, the Entente powers were bound to support one another in preying upon small nations in the same manner as the central powers were being pilloried before the world for doing. The treaties signed at Paris in 1919 and 1920, as far as most of their territorial clauses are concerned, simply fulfilled bargains made during the war.

Because the Jugo-Slavs and Greeks suspected the duplicity of the Entente statesmen, the intervention of Italy did not make any appreciable difference in the general military and political situation. In Greece, King Constantine was given a new and powerful argument to use

against the Venizelist campaign for intervention. There was a very widespread feeling among the Greeks that they had been double-crossed, and this feeling never changed, despite the later return to power of Venizelos and the participation of Greece in the war. Rumania did not immediately join the Entente, as had been expected. Even her interventionist statesmen realized that Rumania, too, in order to safeguard against being sold out, must have a definite secret treaty on the Italian model before abandoning neutrality. Instead of hastening the process of disintegration in the Hapsburg empire, the intervention of Italy gave the Dual Monarchy a new lease of life. The Jugo-Slavs had been soldiers of uncertain loyalty on the eastern front, and, with the Czechs, were demoralizing the army. After Italy came into the war they fought like lions on the new front, inspired by the knowledge that victorious Italy would suppress their national aspirations more ruthlessly than Austria had ever done.

We have seen how the Triple Entente was the result of the influence of world policies which modified and then reversed the attitude of the three powers towards one another. The Entente now became a quadruple grouping, mainly because of the irredentist movement, which forced the hand of the Italian government. But, as we have seen, Italy's partnership with Germany and Austria-Hungary had lost its significance from the moment Great Britain, with whom Italy had to remain on friendly terms, formed an entente with France, Germany's enemy. World policies brought about the defection of Italy from the Triple Alliance, for it is doubtful if the irredentists alone could have forced the war. Italian imperialism saw in the victory of the Entente the only hope of further colonial expansion. Germany might win the war, as far as European hegemony was at stake. But Germany's victory, from the trend of her pre-war policy as well as because of her alliance with Turkey, would shut off Italy from expansion in

the eastern Mediterranean. And in Africa France and Great Britain were in a better position to offer Italy colonial compensations than was Germany.

Italy entered the war without foreseeing the sacrifices she would be called upon to make. She greatly underestimated the military genius and vitality of Germany, and never supposed that her troops would be fighting a defensive war on her own soil. Consequently, when Italian statesmen later took into consideration what the war had cost the nation, they boldly argued that even the rewards guaranteed by the treaty of London were insufficient.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE ALINEMENT OF THE BALKAN STATES IN THE EUROPEAN WAR (1914-1917)

SERBIA was the only Balkan state involved in the European war from the beginning. To show her solidarity, however, Montenegro declared war upon Austria-Hungary on August 7, 1914. The other factors in the Balkan situation, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, contained influential partizans of both groups of the great powers, and an internal struggle immediately took place, which did not cease until all four of these states had become belligerents. Because of the wars through which they had just passed the Balkan peoples were not keen to enter upon new military adventures. The consensus of public opinion undoubtedly favored the maintenance of neutrality, and, as the great powers seemed to be evenly balanced, there was little to be gained by extending the war to the Balkans and Asia unless the Balkan States were ready to intervene together on the same side. During the first two months of the war the statesmen of the great powers made no strong bid for Balkan alliances or "benevolent" neutralities. They believed that any aid a Balkan recruit could bring them would be more than offset by the responsibilities they would have to assume of defending the new ally from an attack by its neighbors.

When, however, at the end of September, Turkey joined the central powers, the attitude of the belligerent group towards the Balkan States underwent a change. It was now essential to the Entente powers that Germany and Austria-Hungary should have no opportunity of extending their front through the Balkans to Constantinople. They

decided to concentrate upon Turkey and put her *hors du combat* while she remained isolated from her allies. For this purpose the continued neutrality of the Balkan States was more advantageous than an alliance with one or more which would provoke another to join the Entente's enemies. This policy required delicate and complicated diplomatic manœuvring. Although it eventually failed, it was worth trying, and it would have shortened the war had the British and French fleets and their expeditionary corps succeeded in forcing the Dardanelles in the spring and summer of 1915. But the heritage of evil in the Balkans, due to more than half a century of selfish diplomacy, had to be reckoned with. It frustrated every move and every suggested combination, and was in large part responsible for the prolongation of the war until the Romanoff as well as the Hapsburg empire collapsed, and until economic and political problems of an almost insoluble character arose to rob the ultimate victors of the fruits of victory.

In the minds of Occidentals the war of 1914 was primarily a struggle of France and Great Britain against Germany, and from the beginning its idealism was emphasized. It was a war of democracy against autocracy, of the defenders of small nations against their oppressors. Germany was a military despotism aiming at the conquest of the world, and Austria-Hungary was a government of two minority races oppressing—by dividing them—a non-Teutonic and non-Magyar majority. Serbia was the victim of Austria-Hungary and Belgium the victim of Germany. From our point of view this conception of the war appeared true and reasonable. But the Balkan peoples could not see it in the same light. To them Russia was the principal power affected by the war, and their experience with Russian political ideals prevented them from becoming enthusiastic over French and British championship of democracy and small nations. Fear of Russia drove the Turks into the arms of the Germans, and while

none of the Balkan nations sympathized with Turkey, all of them preferred weak Turkey to powerful Russia as master of Constantinople and the Straits. To Rumania and Bulgaria and Greece the extension of the Muscovite empire to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles was a possibility that they were not fools enough to make, by their aid, a probability. In Paris and London much was said about the Rumanians under the yoke of Hungary. But in Bukharest they thought also of the Rumanians under the yoke of Russia. The dream of a greater Rumania demanded the restoration of Bessarabia by Russia as well as the cession of Transylvania by Hungary.

The secret treaty by which the Entente powers definitely promised Constantinople to Russia was not signed until 1915. But in every Balkan capital it was realized from the outbreak of the war that victorious Russia would not accept any reward less than Constantinople and the Straits. This fact, quite as much as war weariness or lack of confidence in the military superiority of the enemies of Germany, explains the unwillingness of any Balkan state to cast in its lot unreservedly on the side of the Entente powers. And the inability of French and British statesmen to promise the Balkan States that Russia should not have Constantinople was a consideration of equal importance with the opposition of the Entente military authorities to the assumption of new responsibilities in determining, during the first year of the war, the policy of not soliciting (and even rebuffing offers of) Balkan aid.

The French and British also wanted to keep the Balkan States out of the war because they were fishing for bigger game. The aspirations of Italy were in conflict with the legitimate interests and hopes of both Serbia and Greece. Serbia was already involved in the war, and could make no effective protest when bribes were offered Italy. But negotiations with Greece would have proved embarrassing because what Greece would have asked for—the Dode-

cannese, Smyrna, and northern Epirus—the negotiators at Rome were preparing to give to Italy. When Italy entered the war in May, 1915, France and Great Britain were committed to the support of Italian imperialism as they were already committed to the support of Russian imperialism. This meant that the ideals of defending democracy and small nations were not to be applied in the Balkans, and the Balkan peoples knew it.

In the summer of 1915 three events brought about a change in the attitude of the Entente powers towards Balkan neutrality. The naval and military operations at the Dardanelles failed. The Russian offensive against Germany broke down all along the line. The central empires conquered Poland. Armies were free to begin on a large scale the invasion of Serbia. The intervention of Greece, which had twice been offered to the Entente powers and rejected by them, was now sought. Rumania, whose earlier participation had not been deemed necessary, was now solicited with generous promises of the eastern provinces of Hungary. But at the same time the invitation was extended to Bulgaria, coupled with assurances of a revision of the treaty of Bukharest at the expense of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania.

As Italy had done, Bulgaria examined bids from both sides, and chose the side that offered most. The Entente powers were successful in the bidding for Italy, because what Italy asked for was mostly at the expense of Austria-Hungary, an enemy country. But Bulgaria could not have been compensated by the Entente powers without alienating Rumania and Greece. To the central empires, on the other hand, the participation of Bulgaria was essential in order to preserve communications with Turkey, and therefore they paid the price. On July 17, 1915, Bulgaria signed a secret treaty with the central empires and Turkey. After three months more of negotiations with both groups of belligerents, Bulgaria declared war on Serbia on October

14, and within the next few days she received declarations of war from Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy.

Bulgaria coöperated with the central empires in overrunning Serbia. The Serbian army retreated through Albania, accompanied by a part of the civilian population. Hundreds of thousands perished, through hunger and exposure, from the attacks of the pursuing armies and at the hands of Albanian bands, who now took their revenge for the Serbian invasion of three years before. In January, 1916, the remnant of the Serbian army was transferred to Corfu, which the Serbian government made its provisional headquarters on February 2.

The conquest of Serbia put Montenegro, which up to this time had resisted the Austrians as she had for centuries resisted the Turks, in an impossible situation. On November 30, 1915, King Nicholas appealed for help to the representatives of the Allies at Cetinje. But no help was forthcoming. In January the Austrians attacked Mount Lovchen, the great fortress in the mountains over Cattaro, and after four days captured it. On January 12, 1916, Montenegro concluded an armistice with Austria-Hungary, and the Austrian army entered Cetinje the following day. It was reported that the Montenegrins had signed a capitulation, but this was later denied. King Nicholas fled to Rome. Part of his army surrendered and the remnant found its way to Corfu. The conquest of Montenegro was followed by the occupation of Scutari on January 23, 1916. From the Adriatic to the Black Sea the central empires were masters of a large part of the Balkans.

The Serbian disaster was laid at the door of Greece, and it gave rise to one of the most complicated political situations of the World War. The Entente governments claimed that Greece was pledged to defend Serbia by the treaty of 1913. In this contention and in the actions they took on the strength of it they were upheld by M. Venizelos, who had negotiated the treaty as representative of Greece.

King Constantine, on the other hand, advised and supported by most of the statesmen and military leaders of Greece, interpreted the treaty differently. He claimed that Greece was bound to aid Serbia only if she were attacked by Bulgaria and were able to put an army of 150,000 in the field to coöperate with the Greek army. The treaty, according to the anti-Venizelists, was intended to prevent any attempt of Bulgaria to upset the territorial balance of power in the Balkans and did not provide for the contingency of a general European war. After the Bulgarian declaration of war upon Serbia, this interpretation seemed to be a quibble, and many Greeks believed with Venizelos not only that the treaty was operative but also that the vital interests of Greece demanded an alliance with the group of powers that were fighting Greece's two hereditary enemies, Turkey and Bulgaria.

In the first month of the war, before the battle of the Marne, Premier Venizelos had offered to bring Greece into the Entente alliance, but his overture was discouraged. Again, when Great Britain and France were preparing to attack the Dardanelles at the end of the first winter, the offer was renewed. The Greek government was willing to participate by land in the investment of the Dardanelles. But the Entente powers did not want Greece to have a part in the capture of Constantinople, because of their obligations to Russia, and they were anxious to avoid any step that might drive Bulgaria into the opposite camp. Only after they saw that Bulgaria was going to join their enemies and realized the peril of Serbia, did they change their attitude, suddenly summoning Premier Venizelos to fulfil the terms of the alliance with Serbia, which he had been willing to do from the beginning. When Venizelos pointed out that the military situation had changed and that, as she could no longer do it herself, it was necessary to provide for Serbia the 150,000 men stipulated in the treaty as Serbia's quota in the campaign against Bulgaria,

France and Great Britain agreed to furnish this number of troops.

Using these *pourparlers* as justification for claiming they had been invited, the two powers notified Venizelos on October 1 that an expeditionary force was sailing that day from Marseilles for Saloniki. Venizelos immediately protested formally against the proposed violation of Greek neutrality. The Entente powers were sending 13,000 troops instead of 150,000, and Venizelos knew that under these circumstances Greek public opinion would be hostile to war and that he would have to resign. Bulgaria had not yet declared war, and the Entente powers, after refusing Greece's aid at a propitious moment, now tried to force Greece into the war, with inadequate backing on their part, at a time when the risk would be enormous.

Venizelos resigned on October 5, 1915, the day of the entente landing at Saloniki. The expeditionary corps proved unable, as he had foreseen, either to save Serbia or to protect Greece from the invasion that naturally followed the use of her great port as a base for military operations. At first the central empires and Bulgaria, in their anxiety not to offend Greece, respected her neutrality, although it was being violated by their enemies. But when the Saloniki front became threatening by the increase of the Entente's army in Macedonia, they invaded Greece and invested Saloniki. Frontier fortresses and the eastern part of Macedonia, with the port of Kavala, fell into the hands of the Bulgarians. This proved too much for Venizelos, who had been living in retirement. Together with Admiral Coundouriotis, he went to Crete, called upon the Greeks to rally around him to save their country from the Bulgarians, and then set up a provisional government at Saloniki on October 19, 1916, which was recognized by the Entente powers.

Only the islands and the new provinces of Greece, for whose emancipation from Turkey Venizelos had been responsible, adhered to the Saloniki government, and although the quality of the volunteers that flocked to join Venizelos was splendid, their number was not sufficient to change for the better the precarious military situation of the Entente powers in Macedonia. London and Paris began to fear that the Greeks who remained loyal to King Constantine would attack the Balkan expeditionary corps in the rear. The British and French ministers at Athens were instructed to demand the withdrawal of the Greek army from Thessaly, its partial demobilization, and finally its internment in the Peloponnesus. The Greek fleet was seized by the Entente powers; the expulsion of pro-German sympathizers and agents was demanded, and later of the ministers and consuls of the central powers. On December 1, 1916, sailors and marines, mostly French, were landed at the Piræus and marched to Athens to enforce an ultimatum; but they were fired upon, and had to retreat to their ships. A wholesale massacre was avoided only by the threat of a naval bombardment of Athens. Relations between King Constantine and the Entente powers gradually reached the point of open hostility, with the Greek people divided into partizans of the king and of Venizelos. The trump card of the Entente was its mastery of the sea. Greece is one of the most exposed countries in the world. There was no declaration of war, but Greece was blockaded, and finally, on June 11, 1917, the Entente powers compelled King Constantine to abdicate and placed upon the throne his second son, Alexander. Venizelos was brought back from Saloniki and made premier on June 27. Three days later Greece declared war on the central powers, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

Long before the war Rumania had been regarded as an outpost of the Triple Alliance, not because of her sov-

ereign's origin,¹ but because of the policy of her leading statesmen, shown in many ways, to favor in economic as well as political matters the central empires. Rumania was, like Italy, an economic outlet for central Europe. Her ports, Constanza and Galatz, like the Italian ports, Genoa and Venice, were in large measure dependent upon central European economic prosperity. Although Rumania and Italy could not hope to achieve their national unity except to the detriment of Hungary and Austria, disappointment over the award of Bessarabia to Russia by the treaty of Berlin and over the seizure of Tunisia by France inclined the two countries towards the central empires and helped to bring Italy into the Triple Alliance and Rumania into its orbit. The belief that pan-Slavism menaced them more than pan-Germanism served to keep these two Latin peoples for more than a generation in an association that was contrary to their cultural leanings.

When Italy joined the Entente alliance in the spring of 1915, western Europe believed that Rumania would follow her example. The interventionist party in Rumania contained more influential political leaders and bankers than that in Italy. But the increasing military weakness of Russia, the failure of the Entente naval and military expeditions to force the Dardanelles, and, above all, the horrible fate of Serbia, which the Entente powers had proved themselves impotent to prevent, were events that played into the hands of the able and distinguished leaders of the pro-German party. The argument that intervention was a great risk was more reasonable in Rumania than in

¹ Rumania, like most European countries, had a dynasty of German blood and sympathies. King Constantine of Greece was brother-in-law to the German kaiser. King Carol of Rumania was a Hohenzollern. He died shortly after the outbreak of the war, and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand, who was married to a daughter of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, the family to which belonged the royal houses of Great Britain and Bulgaria. Blood relationship, of course, did not necessarily influence the policies of countries, and the easy explanation of the attitude of Greece and Rumania in the early years of the war on the ground of dynastic ties is unconvincing.

Greece, and the fears of the non-interventionists proved later to have been well founded. Rumania allied to the Entente, said the pro-Germans, would be isolated from her proposed allies, as was Russia, and could count on no aid from them in the event of invasion.

Considerations of foreign and internal policy also worked against the Entente in Rumania. Constantinople had been promised to Russia. There was no indication of a willingness to revise the Bessarabian settlement of the treaty of Berlin. By bargaining with Bulgaria the Entente statesmen showed that expediency, and not friendship, was dictating their Balkan policy. Under conditions less dangerous than those faced by Rumania, Greece showed herself unwilling to join the Entente. To the landed aristocracy, which controlled Rumanian politics, irredentism contained a great danger to their privileged position. Under Hungarian rule the Transylvanians enjoyed universal suffrage, while suffrage was limited in Rumania. In Transylvania the Rumanian population owned land in small holdings and had long advocated the breaking up of large estates. If Transylvania were united with Rumania, the existing Rumanian oligarchical system would have to combat an aggressive agrarian policy.

For more than a year after Italy made her choice Rumania hesitated and temporized. The irredentist propaganda finally carried the day. On August 27, 1916, Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary and crossed the Transylvanian frontier. Immediately Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey declared war on Rumania. After initial successes, the Rumanians found themselves on the defensive. They received very little aid from Russia and none from Great Britain and France. The Entente army in Macedonia proved impotent to keep Bulgaria occupied, much

If the throne of Greece was occupied by a brother-in-law of a Hohenzollern and of Rumania by a Hohenzollern, it must be remembered that the arch-Hohenzollern, Wilhelm II, was a grandson of Queen Victoria and cousin of his greatest enemies, the King of England and the Czar of Russia.

less give active aid to the new ally. Within three months most of Rumania was conquered by the armies of the central powers in Bulgaria.

At the beginning of 1917 the fortunes of the entente powers were at low ebb in the Balkans. Their diplomatic efforts had miscarried. Their military campaigns had proved a succession of failures. The expedition against the Dardanelles, after stupendous losses, was withdrawn. The Saloniki army was marking time. Serbia, Montenegro, and most of Rumania were in the hands of their enemies. Greece seemed hopelessly divided. The defection of Russia was imminent. But at this moment Germany took the fatal step of forcing the United States into the war.

CHAPTER XXVII

CHINA AS A REPUBLIC (1906-1917)

BY looking to Peking to represent and bind and be responsible for all China, the great powers first acted in ignorance. Later, when they realized the nature of the imperial organization, they still refused to accept the difference between the Chinese and the European conception of statehood. They insisted upon the authority and responsibility of the imperial throne, and, to clothe their predatory schemes with a semblance of legality, they professed to regard China as a united and cohesive state at the very moment when they were conspiring against Chinese unity.

We can not understand the phenomenon of the birth of the Chinese Republic, involving the fall of the Manchus and the confusing years of *coups d'état* and civil war, without emphasizing the successive attacks of the great powers upon Chinese territorial and political integrity and their attempt at economic enslavement of the country by loans and concessions. If the Manchu dynasty had made the throne the rallying-point of successful resistance against all the powers, there would have been no republican movement. But the weak and corrupt officials at Peking, tolerated in the old days, came to be regarded as the instruments of the "foreign devils." And they were. Inability to prevent the decay of China, in the face of foreign encroachment, doomed the Manchu dynasty. What we are witnessing in China is a transformation of a civilization into a nation. It is not political evolution from imperial to republican institutions, but the slow and confusing pro-

cess of the awakening to national consciousness of the most numerous people in the world.

The revolution of 1911 was preceded by unmistakable symptoms of a new spirit in China. Through the concessions, the opening of more treaty ports, and the increase of taxation, the Chinese of the provinces began to realize that the foreigners were insisting that Peking exercise the prerogative of acting for China so that they might more easily exploit the country. The great powers were demanding that the central government assert its sovereignty, bring the provinces under direct administrative control, and collect taxes, in order that the sovereignty, the administrative control, and the proceeds of tax collections be transferred to them. If the Peking government was to have the authority to pledge the resources of China for the payment of interest on loans and indemnities, to cede ports and the wealth of whole provinces to foreigners, to open wide the door to foreign exploitation, it was high time that the Chinese race became the Chinese nation, in order that it might defend its economic interests by asserting its political sovereignty.

The first symptom of change was interest in military training. Despite increased taxation, public opinion supported the raising of armies. After the Boxer uprising, military drill was introduced into the curriculum of schools. Sons of princes and nobles were encouraged to enter the army, and in the autumn of 1906, after the reorganization along Occidental lines was begun, in a single month young men offered themselves for military service in larger number than had been the total strength of the Chinese army.

The second symptom was interest in administrative, financial, educational, and social reforms. The imperial edict of September 1, 1906, marked the beginning of the effort to follow the example of Japan, that is, to accept Occidental ways of doing things, not because they were believed to be superior, but because self-defense demanded

the transformation.¹ China had never before been faced with the necessity of raising enormous sums of money to be paid out by a central government. The Chinese, except at a few places on the coast, had never before seen foreigners appear in the ports, on river-banks, and in the provinces, with authority from Peking to seize land and to take over its administration. The struggle for existence against the foreigner, including the Japanese neighbor, necessitated learning how to do things as they were done elsewhere. Cutting off pigtails, abandoning baby shoes for women, revising the examination system for civil service, going abroad or to foreign institutions to study, exhibiting sudden jealousy over the maintenance of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet and Mongolia, clamoring for universal suffrage and representative government, recognizing the equality of women—these leaves have been taken from our book by the Chinese in order that they might better be able to keep us from preying upon them.

The third symptom was the growing tendency to show openly hostility to foreigners. As xenophobia was no longer confined to reactionaries and coolies, the old soothing explanations of anti-foreign agitation had become inadequate. For it was traced, not to officials who resented the diminishing of their ability to graft, to villagers who did not like the ways and actions of missionaries, and to peasants the graves of whose ancestors were being disturbed by railway construction, but to the Chinese educated abroad, who were returning in great numbers to point out to their fellow countrymen the shame of being exploited economically and of not being master in their own house. It is impossible for an intelligent Chinese to travel abroad or even to study in a foreign institution in

¹ Four months after the edict of reforms, the edict of December 31, 1906, was promulgated, raising Confucius to the same rank as heaven and earth. Although most of the younger leaders of the revolutionary movement were graduates or former students of Christian schools, the Young Chinese wanted it to be clearly understood that they had no connection with any missionary propaganda.

China without becoming convinced that his people are suffering indignities and injustices at the hands of foreigners in their own country. Therefore the very fact of his education in foreign concepts and foreign ways, since it opens his eyes to the infamy of the treatment of his people, makes him an anti-foreign propagandist. He can see no justification for the conduct of the powers; they are simply bullies, availing themselves of their superior strength. Xenophobia is the most encouraging sign of changing China. For it indicates a development of political self-respect and a proper conception of the obligations and privileges of nationhood. Only freemen are able to create a modern state. Xenophobia will grow in China rapidly as education spreads and intercourse with the outside world increases.

Concentration of power in the hands of the imperial government, which began in 1907, led to a movement for democratic control, and the primary reason given by leaders in the agitation in the provinces for the overthrow of autocracy was that the establishment of representative government at Peking was the only means of resisting the continuance of concession-granting with its consequent encroachment by European powers and Japan upon Chinese sovereignty. At every meeting held in support of the program of reforms a constitutional system of government was advocated, and the resolutions voted contained a paragraph calling upon Peking to refuse the demands of all foreign governments for further favors. At a great demonstration at Canton there was a protest against British vessels of war doing police work in Chinese waters. In 1908 the leaders of the constitutional movement announced that it would result in the control of all railways and mines by Chinese and the abolition of Russian and Japanese administration and jurisdiction in Manchuria.

In November, 1908, the old empress dowager died, leaving the government in the hands of a group of nobles and generals, who promulgated laws in the name of the five-

year-old emperor. The first step toward constitutional government was the convocation of an imperial assembly on October 3, 1910, to consider the problem of meeting the growth of the popular revolutionary movement. Of the two hundred members, one half were Manchus—imperial princes or dukes, clansmen, hereditary nobles, high functionaries, and great landowners. The other half were members of provincial assemblies who had been chosen by the viceroys. The imperial assembly, realizing that the popular demand for parliamentary government could not be ignored, recommended that elections be held for a national parliament. The government, which had wanted to postpone constitutional changes for seven years, compromised on three years. On November 4, 1910, an edict appeared promising the inauguration of the parliament in 1913, and setting forth regulations for the constitution of the cabinet and parliament and for holding a general election. The assembly was not satisfied that it would be safe to wait even three years, but it had no power to amend the edict, and before adjourning warned the government against sanctioning a foreign loan and against granting further concessions to foreigners.

Under pressure of foreign diplomats and foreign financiers, the imperial government did not listen to the warning. This was the direct cause of the revolution that led to China becoming a constitutional state as a republic rather than as an empire. An epidemic of bubonic plague was taken advantage of by Russia and Japan to get Chinese and international acknowledgment of their sovereignty and spheres of influence in Manchuria. When Russia established consulates in towns where importance of trade was no excuse, when Mongol princes visited Petrograd, and when Peking refused to allow the viceroy of Yunnan to take measures to prevent the British from extending the frontier of Burma, the Chinese became thoroughly alarmed. The last straw was the signing of railway agreements with

foreign financiers and the borrowing of money from a foreign group for currency reform and industrial enterprises in Manchuria. Revolution broke out in south China; and the Manchu garrisons were massacred in most cities.

Yuan-Shih-Kai, who was successfully leading an army against the revolutionaries, had to be recalled to Peking to assume the premiership. But neither his military nor political ability could save the Manchu dynasty. Province after province went over to the revolution, and the admiral of the Yangtze fleet joined the rebels. Yuan-Shih-Kai failed in his attempt to form a coalition cabinet. Some of those whom he asked to join him, such as Wu Ting Fang, former minister to the United States, responded by becoming members of the republican government that had been proclaimed at Shanghai. At the beginning of December the regent resigned. Yuan-Shih-Kai agreed to an armistice and proposed federal government for China. The revolutionaries, however, instead insisted that the Manchu dynasty abdicate and a republic be proclaimed. On the last day of the year, Doctor Sun Yat Sen, organizer of the revolution, who had lived for fourteen years in exile and had just returned, was unanimously elected president at Shanghai. On January 5, 1912, a manifesto to the foreign powers proclaimed the establishment of the republic. Two weeks later the success of the movement was assured by the decision of Dr. Sun Yat Sen to resign the presidency in favor of Yuan-Shih-Kai, provided the emperor abdicated and all the provinces agreed.

While the diplomats looked on bewildered, the revolution marched apace. On February 12 the emperor abdicated, after having signed a decree creating a constitutional republic. Yuan-Shih-Kai was ordered to establish a provisional government in conjunction with the revolutionaries. Five days later this appointment was confirmed by representatives of seventeen provinces, who voted at the same time the adoption of the Western calendar. On

March 16 Yuan-Shih-Kai was inaugurated first president of China, and on April 1 the president and members of the cabinet of the revolutionary government gave up their seals of office. Parliament was to be summoned within six months.

Public opinion in America, Europe, and Japan was far from being hostile to the Chinese Republic. As in the case of the establishment of a constitutional régime in Turkey, press comment was universally sympathetic. But foreigners who were in business in China and the European diplomats in the Far East did not want to see the constitutional movement succeed. They knew that if the old system of governing China were done away with, it would mean a serious curtailment of their opportunities to exploit China and to negotiate with one another at her expense. Naturally, they still wanted to grind their axes by bribing or intimidating corrupt officials who were not answerable for their actions to a parliament.

The great powers withheld recognition of the republic, and Yuan-Shih-Kai quickly found that the foreigners were determined not to allow a constitutional government to function. With the exception of the United States (whose sympathy, however, has never gone beyond words), the powers have consistently refused to give China a chance to inaugurate and develop administrative reforms and put her treasury in order. The host of treaty provisions, beginning with the treaty of Nanking, forced on China after Great Britain's Opium War, were based upon the fundamental differences existing between Occidental and Oriental institutions. The foreigners could not trust the Chinese government to protect them or to give them justice in courts; hence the necessity of extra-territoriality, with foreign police (after the Boxer Rebellion detachments of foreign armies, which never went home), foreign courts, foreign districts and treaty ports, leaseholds, and in some cases outright cessions of territory. The postal adminis-

tration was deficient; hence the foreign post-offices, telegraph lines, cables, and wireless stations under foreign control. The Chinese had curious ideas of finance; hence they were not allowed to have anything to do with taxes where the foreigners ruled, or to fix tariffs or collect customs duties. At the point of the sword—or, more literally, at the war-ship's cannon mouth—China kept signing the treaties drawn up by the foreigners, in none of which was there reciprocity. And now, when China tried to follow Occidental methods of government, she was told that she must remain as she was.¹

Yuan-Shih-Kai's first experience with this concerted determination was when the foreign ministers in Peking denied his right to borrow money in the open market and frustrated the Chinese effort to float a foreign loan in any other way than through legation channels. The formation of an army was alarming Russia and Japan, who conceived a scheme for limiting China's ability to command respect for her sovereignty—a banking group of six powers, with the stipulation that China should get no money unless she promised not to spend for military purposes more than one twentieth of what she borrowed. The new government gave European diplomacy a terrible jolt by negotiating a loan of ten million pounds with a private British firm on

¹ During the discussions over the restrictions imposed by the powers upon China at the Limitation of Armaments Conference (session of November 22, 1921), Senator Underwood declared that these restrictions were so sweeping as to make it impossible for China "to go forward upon any scheme for political and territorial freedom." Senator Underwood said that he had been impressed with the fact that China was not being given a chance to establish a stable financial policy, and that this could not be done until she was "unhampered by treaty inhibitions." The powers have refused China the right exercised by other countries to establish their own customs duties and make differential schedules. For the sake of their trade and to the ruin of China, they insist upon a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty, and China is powerless to protect any of her own industries or to tax heavily imported luxuries. The customs duties and railway receipts are deposited in foreign banks, which pay the coupons on loans. But these banks not only get the benefit of the money deposited until the coupons are cashed, but also postpone for a long time payment of balances due the Chinese government. The Washington conference made a small beginning towards rectifying these injustices, but most of them are still maintained.

easier terms than those laid down by the six-power group—and without any clause arbitrarily restricting her military budget. But when the chancelleries recovered they brought united pressure to bear both upon the independent British bankers and upon the Peking government to cancel the loan arrangements.

Elections were held at the beginning of 1913, and on April 8 the first parliament was inaugurated at Peking. Five hundred of the 596 representatives and 177 of the 274 senators were present. Never in history had so large and representative a body of delegates of the Chinese provinces met. It would have been surprising had difficulties not arisen. It was in the nature of things that from the beginning Yuan-Shih-Kai should meet with opposition from his old enemies, the original revolutionaries. Before long a revolt broke out in the Yangtze Valley, which spread in the south, at the head of which were Doctor Sun Yat Sen and others of the first Canton government.

Yuan-Shih-Kai's difficulties were greatly enhanced by the attitude of the powers, whose pressure upon him, while they still refused to recognize him, was enormous. If he acceded to their demands the rebellion in the south was bound to gain in strength. If he refused to continue to sell out the interests of China, as the old imperial government had done, the foreign ministers were ready to combine to prevent him from getting money to carry on his government. The British tried to get him to admit the virtual independence of Tibet and the Russians of Mongolia, while the Russians and Japanese were acting as if Manchuria was altogether lost to China. The powers backed their financiers in imposing a large loan, under onerous conditions, from a consortium of banks, which was secured by mortgaging the salt revenues and the future surplus of maritime customs. One of its stipulations, *i.e.*, that the foreign interests should have inspectors and advisers in the various departments of the ministry of finance, was

one more step to bring the country under foreign control.

The new revolt was put down before the end of the summer. In the presidential election, held in October, Yuan-Shih-Kai was overwhelmingly chosen president for the term of five years. In November, when parliament was considering the limitation of the power of the president, he declared vacant the seats of the members of the southern party, thus excluding nearly half of the senators and more than half of the representatives. On January 11, 1914, he dissolved the parliament and appointed a committee to draft a constitution, which proposed a one-chamber parliament, abolishing the cabinet, and substituting for the prime minister, who was responsible to parliament, a secretary of state who would act under the direct order of the president.

When the European war broke out Yuan-Shih-Kai was the dictator of China, although his authority was by no means recognized everywhere. He had against him the exiled revolutionaries and the Manchu conspirators, who represented the two extremes. He was facing the serious uprising of the mysterious "White Wolf." The powers were still at work in outlying provinces, instigating agents who were undermining or denying the authority of the republic—Russia in Mongolia, Great Britain in Tibet, France in Yunnan, Germany in Shantung, Japan in Fukien, and Russia and Japan in Manchuria. The president had to accept the unpopularity of increasing taxation to meet obligations to foreign powers, and of enforcing respect for the concessions, which intelligent Chinese knew were in large part being developed in a spirit and with an intention that the powers would never tolerate in their own countries. After Japan entered the war, Yuan-Shih-Kai was confronted with a new situation, due to the substitution of Japan for Germany in the Shantung peninsula.

Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the Euro-

pean powers to present her twenty-one demands.¹ Yuan-Shih-Kai issued a remarkable manifesto. He admitted that China had suffered by the concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia, and was exposed to a more serious menace than had existed before in the fact that Japan was now installed on both sides of the capital. He expressed sorrow and shame for the humiliation the country was being forced to bear, but pointed out that the weakness of the Chinese people made these renunciations of sovereignty and impairments of national interests impossible to avoid. Only when China became a strong nation, able to defend herself against all the world, could her wrongs be righted.

At the end of 1915, despite the virtual veto of the Entente powers, the council of state, after a dubious referendum to the provinces, formally asked Yuan-Shih-Kai to become emperor. His consent was a signal for a new revolt. On December 26, 1915, the province of Yunnan declared its independence, and governors of other provinces began to send threatening communications to Peking. The coronation had been fixed for February 9, 1916, but at the end of January Yuan-Shih-Kai announced that the change of régime had been indefinitely postponed. This did not calm the rebels. By the end of April seven provinces of south China had separated from Peking. Despite Yuan-Shih-Kai's declaration that the scheme to reëstablish the monarchy was totally abandoned, the movement kept spreading.

On June 6 Yuan-Shih-Kai conveniently died. The vice-president, Li Yuan Hung, who succeeded according to the provisions of the constitution, declared that he was a constitutionalist and gave proof of his good faith by reassembling the old parliament within two months of his succession. As he was acceptable to the south, unity was temporarily restored. But the north and the south remained divided on questions of policy. The southern leaders were liberals or radicals. Those of the north, recruited from

¹ See pp. 324-325.

military men who had been under the training of Yuan-Shih-Kai, believed that the first duties of the republic were to build up a large army and to organize a centralized system like that of France.

Most Chinese were profoundly indifferent to the war in Europe. Having been treated abominably by all the powers, they were unable to see the force of the claim that the Entente powers were fighting to establish the rights of weak nations throughout the world and to put right above might as the norm of conduct in international relations. Chinese reactionaries and military men had sympathy and admiration for Germany, but not more than the same classes in Japan and Russia, both of which countries were at war with Germany. Chinese liberals believed in the principles proclaimed by the Entente leaders and held imperial Germany in abhorrence. But two members of the Entente Alliance, Russia and Japan, were doing in China what they were fighting to prevent Germany from accomplishing in Europe. From their own country's experience during the last half century, France and Great Britain were known to have a double standard of morality, because they treated Asiatic peoples in the way they condemned and proclaimed a crusade against the central empires for treating European peoples. Chinese neutrality was therefore in sympathy with the attitude of the public mind, and could not have been changed to belligerency by propaganda coming from the outside. Chinese statesmen were ready from the beginning to join the Entente, but this was for the sole reason of thwarting Japan in Shantung and winning the support of the powers in the resistance to the twenty-one demands. Japan saw this, and opposed the intervention of China. But her opposition might not have succeeded had the Chinese been eager to fight Germany.

The break between the United States and Germany completely changed the situation. The Chinese had been following closely President Wilson's speeches. The analogy

between their own wrongs and those bitterly denounced by the American president, and the wonderful vista of independence opened to China by the proposed application of the Wilsonian principles, inspired the Chinese with the determination to enter the war, because it had now become a world war, and to aid in the triumph of the ideal of an association of nations, in which the defense of a nation's rights did not depend wholly upon a nation's own strength or its usefulness as a pawn in the game of world politics.

China was formally invited by the United States to enter the war. A note was sent to Germany breaking off diplomatic relations. But there was delay in the actual declaration of war, because the southern party did not want to strengthen the hands of the northern party by giving the government the opportunity of exercising arbitrary power by proclaiming a state of siege, which would probably follow the declaration of war. The southerners asked that before war was declared a new cabinet be formed, with a larger representation for the south. Civil war broke out again in August, 1917, when the southern provinces seceded, and China is still suffering from a division that increases her weakness.

The civil dissensions in China, however, had not meant differences of opinion in regard to foreign affairs. When President Li declared war upon Germany and Austria-Hungary on August 14, 1917, it was not the fact, but the illegal method of accomplishing it, against which the southerners protested. The southern government, whose headquarters are at Canton, worked with the northern government to present and defend the Chinese point of view both at the Paris conference of 1919 and the Washington conference of 1921.

CHAPTER XXVIII

JAPAN'S THIRD CHALLENGE TO EUROPE: THE WAR WITH GERMANY AND THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ON CHINA (1914-1916)

LESS than ten years after Great Britain agreed to accept Japan as an equal, the Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed. This "agreement for guaranteeing peace in the Far East," made in 1902, was replaced by a treaty of alliance in 1905. The rapprochement proved popular in both countries and worked out to the advantage of both; and it was revised and renewed for ten years in 1911. The influence of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian treaties was felt almost immediately in the Far East. Japan entered into agreements with France in 1907 and with Russia in 1907 and 1910. Germany was diplomatically isolated in Asia as in Africa. When Japan entered the European war, she became an integral member of the Entente Alliance and signed the pact of London. A closely knit convention with Russia in 1916 completed the prestige of Japan as a great power.

The Pacific islands of Germany cost more than they brought in, afforded no opportunity for settlement and very little for trade, and interested chiefly missionaries. Their only value was for naval purposes. They gave Germany places she could call her own on the path from America to Australia and from Asia to Australia. They afforded an opportunity for coaling stations, for cable landings, and for wireless telegraphy. And that was all. But to Germany they looked important because they were all that Germany had.

As Germany was not mistress of the sea, she had no means of defending these possessions when the European war broke out. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, on the mainland of New Guinea, was seized by the Australians at the beginning of September, 1914. New Zealand sent an expeditionary force to Samoa. The Japanese gathered in the other groups of islands. Before the end of 1914 Great Britain and Japan agreed upon the division of the booty. Samoa went to New Zealand, the German islands south of the equator to Australia, and those north of the equator to Japan.

The one possession of Germany in Asia that had intrinsic economic value was the foothold secured in China in 1897.¹ The military efforts of the German government were concentrated on making at Tsing-tau, on the tip of the northern promontory of Kiau-chau Bay, a powerful fortress. But the idea of creating a naval base was linked from the beginning with the plan of developing a port as a commercial outlet for the whole province of Shantung. In the fifteen years from 1899 to 1914, Tsing-tau was transformed from a fishing village into a railway terminus and port, equipped with every modern improvement, and representing an investment of hundreds of millions of marks. In government buildings, warehouses, and dock facilities, Tsing-tau became a model of European enterprise in the Far East.

Early in August, 1914, the British government asked Japan to intervene in the war under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was pointed out to Japan that German cruisers and armed vessels were a menace to commerce, and that therefore the disturbance of "the peace of the Far East and the immediate interests of the Japanese as well as of the British Empire" made operative the alliance. Great Britain wanted German influence destroyed in China.

¹ The lease was not signed until March 6, 1898, and the district was declared a protectorate on April 27.

The reward held out to Japan was permission to take over the German lease of Kiau-chau and the German concessions of Shantung. Baron Kato said to parliament:

“Japan has no desire or inclination to become involved in the present conflict. But she believes she owes it to herself to be faithful to the alliance with Great Britain and to strengthen its foundation by insuring permanent peace in the East and protecting the special interests of the two Allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government has given the following advice to the German Government.”

The advice was an ultimatum to Germany, presented on August 15, 1914, asking for the immediate withdrawal of German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds from Chinese and Japanese waters, and the delivery at a date not later than September 15 of the entire leased territory of Kiau-chau to the Japanese authorities, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. An unconditional acceptance of the “advice” was asked by noon on August 23. Japan couched the ultimatum, even to the use of the word “advice,” on the terms of the Russo-Franco-German ultimatum concerning the restoration of Liao-tung to China, when the three powers had combined to prevent the execution of the treaty of Shimonoseki. It took ten years for Japan to get even with Russia. After twenty years the opportunity came to punish Germany.

Germany ignored the ultimatum. On August 23 Japan declared war and blockaded Kiau-chau. The Germans had only four thousand soldiers and sailors in the fortress of Tsing-tau. There was no hope of relief by land or sea. Although not previously consulted, the Chinese government saw through the Japanese game. China offered to join the Entente powers, and could very easily have undertaken the investment of Tsing-tau by land. Japan did not need to

send a single soldier. But the offer of China was rejected. Furthermore, instead of immediately investing the German fortress, Japan landed twenty thousand troops at Lungchow, on the northern coast of Shantung, a hundred and fifty miles away from the Germans. They were in no hurry to attack the fortress. During the month of September the Japanese took possession of the railway line all the way from Kiau-chau Bay to Tsinan, and the German mining properties. They occupied the principal cities of the peninsula,—places that the Germans had never gone to,—seized the Chinese postal and telegraph offices, and expelled the Chinese employees from the railway. The investment and capture of Tsing-tau was a matter of a few days. But the bombardment and assault of the forts, in which fifteen hundred British soldiers coöperated, did not occur until the end of October. In the meantime the Japanese were installed in one of the richest provinces of China in a way the Germans had never planned.

The garrison of Tsing-tau capitulated on November 7, 1914. The Japanese permitted the governor and officers to retain their swords, and when the vanquished arrived at Tokio they were met by Japanese women who offered them flowers.

When the expulsion of the Germans from Shantung was followed by disasters to the Russians, Japan began to breathe more freely than at any time since she became a modern state. The collapse of Russia changed the political situation of the Far East to the advantage of Japan much more than the expulsion of German influence from China and the islands of the Pacific. Then, too, the European war was dragging on. The Japanese watched with satisfaction and delight the increasing exhaustion of Europe. All the European states were losing the flower of their manhood and piling up huge war debts. Their energies were turned from productive industries. Their shipping was being sunk

by submarines or requisitioned for war purposes. This was the opportunity for Japanese commerce and shipping. It was also the first assurance Japan had ever been able to count upon that European aggression in the Far East need no longer cause fear.

When Japan declared war against Germany, Berlin protested at Peking against the landing of troops outside the leased zone, and also against the seizure by the Japanese army of the German railways in the Shantung Province. President Yuan sent a note to Japan and Great Britain in regard to the violation of Chinese neutrality; but he told Germany that it was impossible to prevent or oppose the action of the Japanese and the British. The Entente powers backed the Japanese contention that Japan was acting once more as the friend of China. If operations had not been undertaken against Kiau-chau, Germany would have used Kiau-chau as a naval base. The impotence of China to compel respect for her neutrality led to disregard of her neutrality.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Shantung peninsula, the Japanese installed themselves in the place of the Germans as they had done ten years before in the place of the Russians in the Liao-tung peninsula and southern Manchuria. They reopened Kiau-chau for trade on December 28. No Germans were left in the interior of the peninsula. But the Japanese continued to occupy militarily the entire German railroad and mining concessions. China reminded Japan of the promise to restore Kiau-chau to its rightful owner. Japan answered that no promise had been given to China in this matter, but that the restoration of Chinese sovereignty was contemplated after the war. In the ultimatum to Germany it was true that Japan had called upon Germany to evacuate the lease in order that China might enter into possession of her sovereign rights. But Germany did not yield to the ultimatum. Japan had to fight to expel the Germans. The indirect

promise in the ultimatum would have bound Japan only if Germany had turned over the lease as a result of the ultimatum.

Japan was not disposed to waste time in diplomatic negotiations with China. The European powers were at war. The United States, from the unbroken experience of the past, could be relied upon to limit interference to an academic protest.

On December 3, 1914, the Japanese minister at Peking was given the text of twenty-one demands for presentation to the Chinese government. They were divided into five groups. Minister Hioki was told that there was to be no compromise in regard to the demands of the first four groups. He was assured, to quote his instructions, that "believing it absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in eastern Asia, as well as for the preservation of the general interests of that region, to secure China's adherence to the foregoing proposals, the Imperial Government are determined to attain this end by all means within their power."

The articles of the fifth group were also to be presented as demands, but could be modified. The Japanese minister held the twenty-one demands up his sleeve for six weeks, during which the Chinese foreign minister kept protesting against the decision of Japan to maintain a special military zone in Shantung and the seizure and holding of the railway traversing the province.

On January 16, 1915, the Chinese government gave the Japanese minister a note pointing out that "two months have elapsed since the capture of Tsing-tau; the base of German military preparations has been destroyed; the troops of Great Britain have already been and those of your country are being gradually withdrawn. This shows clearly that there is no more military action in the special area. That the said area ought to be restored to the control of the local authorities admits of no doubt. . . . As

efforts have always been made to effect an amicable settlement of affairs between your country and ours, it is our earnest hope that your government will act upon the principle of preserving peace in the Far East and maintaining international confidence and friendship."

In response the Japanese minister presented the twenty-one demands. The first group dealt with the province of Shantung. China was asked to agree in advance to whatever arrangements should be made between Germany and Japan concerning "the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the province of Shantung." Japan claimed recognition of her inheritance of German rights to finance, construct, and supply materials for railways running from Shantung into Chih-li and Kiang-su, the two neighboring provinces to north and south. Group two demanded preferential rights, interests, and privileges for Japan and Japanese subjects in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, most important of which was the extension to ninety-nine years of the old Russian port and railway leases. In group three China was asked to agree to the exclusive exploitation by Japanese capitalists of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, an important iron-works in the Yangtze Valley. Group four contained the single demand of a formal declaration by China that "no bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China be ceded or leased to any Power." The fifth group related to the employment of Japanese advisers in political and financial and military affairs; the purchase from Japan of fifty per cent. or more of her munitions of war; railway rights; Japanese missionary propaganda; and a veto power against foreign concessions being granted in the province of Fukien.

China called the world to witness that Japan was trying to accomplish against her the very things the Entente powers, of whose alliance Japan was a member, said they

were fighting to prevent Germany from doing to European neighbors. There was the usual mild protest from America. But the European powers, while demurring for form's sake, promised Japan secretly that they would not interfere with her ambitions in China. She could go ahead and treat China as she pleased, subject only to the caution of not harming French and British interests in the empire. Japan was urged also to come to an agreement with Russia about the spoils.

With the assurance that the Entente powers were behind her—or that they would not oppose her—Japan cut short China's protests by an ultimatum delivered on May 7, 1915. It was modeled on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia of the previous year. If China did not yield to all the demands of the first four groups and the Fukien demand of the fifth group in forty-eight hours, Japan would use force. The other demands of the fifth group were not insisted upon because some of them infringed upon the real or fancied privileges of Japan's allies in other parts of China. Before these screws were tightened, further negotiation was required with Great Britain and France and Russia. Again the United States sent a note. China, with no backing anywhere in the world, had to accept the demands of Japan or enter into war. On May 25 a series of notes dictated by the Japanese minister at Peking and signed by the Chinese minister of foreign affairs gave Japan control of Shantung and put China in the hands of her island neighbor.

To show the danger of secret diplomacy to the maintenance of good faith in international relations, we have no more convincing example than the negotiations between Japan and Russia in the summer of 1916. At the suggestion of the French and the British, who were nervous about the pro-German influence at Petrograd and wanted to do everything they could to propitiate the Russian Foreign Office, Japan came to an understanding with Russia. A

treaty was signed at the beginning of July, 1916, which was given out to the press. It read as follows:

“The Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial Government of Russia, resolved to unite their efforts to the maintenance of lasting peace in the Far East, have agreed upon the following:

“ARTICLE ONE: Japan will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Russia. Russia will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Japan.

“ARTICLE TWO: Should the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other contracting party be threatened, Japan and Russia will take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken to provide for the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests.”

The British press considered the agreement highly satisfactory; and it was pointed out by the government in Parliament that Japan was not only acting fairly toward China and living up to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, but was also doing all she could to knit more closely the bonds uniting the powers at war with Germany.

But after the Russian Revolution the archives of the Russian Foreign Office were published. A secret treaty, signed on July 3, 1916, was discovered. By its terms Russia and Japan bound themselves mutually to safeguard China “against the political domination of any third Power entertaining hostile designs against Russia or Japan.” It was an offensive and defensive alliance, operating from the moment “any third power” should attack either Russia or Japan in their vested positions on Chinese territory. This treaty was a violation of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 and of Article Three of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of July 13, 1911. As the contracting parties agreed that “the present convention shall be kept in complete secrecy from everybody,” this evidence of bad

faith might never have come to light had it not been for the publication of the Russian archives.¹

Without the knowledge of China, the Entente powers gave secret assurances (written except in the case of Italy) that when it came to signing peace with Germany, Japan should have the Shantung peninsula and the German islands north of the equator. These negotiations were carried on and terminated at the moment the United States was getting ready to enter the World War and to bring China with her to the aid of the Allies. The dates of the secret agreements are significant. They were signed between the time America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and the date when she declared war. There was need for haste. The Russian promise to Japan was given on February 20, following the British promise of February 16. France's obligation to support Japan against China was signed on March 1. On March 28 the Italian minister of foreign affairs stated orally that "the Italian government had no objection regarding the matter." The Entente powers wanted to be able, when the peace conference assembled, to show the United States arrangements concluded before she became a belligerent.

¹The archives of the ministry of foreign affairs were published by the soviet government from December, 1917, to March, 1918, in the Petrograd *Izvestia*; but Entente cable and newspaper censorship prevented the republication in Entente countries during the war.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS (1893-1917)

ON May 1, 1893, the World's Columbian Exposition was opened at Chicago. The three caravels of Columbus, reproduced from ancient wood-cuts, bore witness to the small way in which Europe first became interested in the western hemisphere. To the millions of Americans who saw them, the caravels were symbolic of the miracles that had been accomplished in four hundred years. But to European visitors they signified the beginning of a movement of population from Europe which had not been to the profit of Europe. The developers of Caucasian civilization in the two American continents had cut loose from Europe politically and economically, had become self-sustaining, and were using the Old World merely as a source of man power and capital.

Since the end of the Napoleonic era the new nations of the American continents had gradually become isolated. European political systems were no longer able to influence the destinies of America and to create and develop markets through the imposition and maintenance of overlordship. The great colonizing powers turned elsewhere. Spain and Portugal were falling into decay. Holland had all she could do in managing the East Indies. France began to colonize Africa. Great Britain, while her activities were world-wide, devoted her energies to Africa and Asia and allowed her colonists in America and other regions of the temperate zone to develop their own institutions according to their own interests with a degree of freedom that has come to mean virtual independence.

The Chicago exposition was a world's fair in name only.

Although we asked the world to celebrate with us, the invitation was really given for the purpose of demonstrating our self-sufficiency. We were not seeking political alliances or economic understandings; we had no surplus of food products or manufactured articles for which to find markets; and American capital was not looking for investment abroad.

International fairs in European cities had political and economic aims to attain; but we did not think of our country as a partner in an organization known as the world, in which each member was dependent on the others, or at least affected in its security and prosperity by what affected the other members. What the European nations did in their own continent was no concern of ours, and we had not joined them in or made any effort to prevent them from exploiting Asia and Africa.

We did not realize that we were on the threshold of a new era and that the quarter of a century following the Columbian Exposition was to mark the end of our isolation, to thrust upon us colonial responsibilities, to involve us inextricably in the politics of the Far East, and to make us aware of the vital relation between our prosperity and security on the one hand and the problems of the European balance of power and the extension of European eminent domain on the other. We were to become a world power, not by accident, but because of the working out in our case of the economic laws that were already operative in Europe.

During the thirty years following the Civil War the people of the United States still had within the limits of their own country opportunities for industrial and agricultural expansion, for colonization, for opening up new regions, and for the employment of capital, sufficient to absorb the energies of a rapidly growing nation. Despite a healthy increase in the native born, and an immigration that finally reached a million in one year, our capacity for consumption

kept pace with our capacity for production. We did not have to think of overseas markets, of colonizing areas, of mercantile marine, of holders of foreign bonds, of jobs on the pay-roll of weak states for men who could not or would not find work at home; we did not have to worry over the aggressive colonial policies of rival nations; and, having no potential enemies on our own continent and no colonies to defend and no goods to sell or loans to make to inferior peoples, we did not have to keep up a large army and navy. Although our national wealth had become half again as large, and our population twice as large, as that of Great Britain, our national debt was about one fifth of the British debt. We had spent and were spending nothing on account of world politics.

When the United States began to have an excess of production over consumption, and when American capital became interested in foreign enterprises, we were made to realize how slight was the influence of the United States in world affairs. We had no colonial possessions, even in America, except Alaska, and no naval bases in the waters of our own continent. Aside from an interest in Samoa and an undefined connection with Hawaii, we had staked out no claims in the Pacific, and we were altogether without footholds in Asia and in Africa. The European nations were active all over the world. In our own neighborhood, Great Britain, Spain, France, Denmark, and Holland were installed along the route to South America and guarded the Atlantic approach of the canal that was planned to join the Atlantic and Pacific. In the closing years of the nineteenth century we awoke slightly to the realization of the disadvantage of our international position, from the point of view of strategic and economic needs. But, as long as we did not actually feel the menace of any other nation or the effect on our pocket-books of having no foreign policy, public opinion remained satisfied with isolation and was lethargic in the face of world changes and crises.

The evolution of the United States from a self-sufficing and self-absorbed political organism on the North American continent into a world power has not yet been completed. Notwithstanding our participation in the World War and in the international conferences of the victorious powers, there is still a strong sentiment against "foreign entanglements," and three and a half years of negotiations have not yet succeeded in committing us to the support of joint policies, regional or general, for the ordering of world affairs. But that we shall become a world power in the fullest implication of that term has been certain since April 6, 1917, when we declared war upon Germany, as it was inevitable from the day of our treaty with Spain.

The story of the United States in world politics from 1893 to 1917 falls under five heads: (1) acquisitions; (2) assertion of the doctrine of the open door; (3) effort to build up a merchant marine; (4) construction of a navy "second to none"; and (5) intervention in other countries.

At the Chicago exposition there were no pavilions housing the exhibits of American possessions or dependencies. All our acquisitions have come since 1893 by treaty, compromise, conquest, and purchase. In 1898 we acquired by annexation the Hawaiian Islands, and by conquest Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam; in 1899, by a compromise arranged with Germany, the eastern portion of the Samoan Islands, where we had already established a naval base in the harbor of Pagopago;¹ in 1903, by purchase from Panama, the canal zone, together with five islands in Panama Bay, and by a lease from Cuba coaling and naval stations at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda; in 1914, by lease from Nicaragua, the Corn Islands and a naval base on

¹ Pagopago, on the island of Tutuila, was ceded to the United States for a naval and coaling station in 1872. The Samoan Islands were made neutral, with judicial extraterritoriality for foreigners, by the treaty of June 14, 1889, signed by the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. On November 14, 1899, a second treaty of the three powers divided the islands between the United States and Germany, Great Britain receiving compensation from Germany elsewhere.

the mainland; and in 1916, by purchase from Denmark, her islands in the West Indies, which have been renamed by us the Virgin Islands.

With the exception of the Philippine Islands and Guam, these acquisitions had been frequently proposed, but had not previously materialized, in most instances because of the opposition of the Senate. The archives of the State Department, presidential messages, and congressional debates, between 1840 and 1876, contain frequent references to treaties, projects of treaties, and reports of negotiations concerning Samoa, Hawaii, Panama, Nicaragua, and the Spanish and Danish West Indies. Besides these "foreign parts" which eventually came under American sovereignty, the United States did not avail itself of opportunities to annex Salvador, Cuba, Yucatan, the Dominican Republic, and other small countries that at one time or another were not unwilling to surrender their sovereignty to us. Not until our Pacific states had become large and prosperous and Japan began to loom as a great power did we embark upon a policy of acquiring islands and coaling stations. For not until then did we realize the necessity of cutting the canal we had been talking about for half a century and of protecting its approaches and our trade routes to Asia.

The war with Spain, in 1898, not only gave us a place in the West Indies and in the eastern Pacific, but it thrust us into the Far East at a critical moment in the relations between China and the powers; it demonstrated the disadvantages of our lack of a merchant marine and our small navy; and it involved us in intervention in China, Cuba, Panama, and elsewhere.

The opportunity to reaffirm a traditional principle of American foreign policy came to Secretary Hay shortly after the acquisition of the Philippines. In a note to the powers on September 6, 1899, he proposed equality of trade opportunity in China for all nations. "The principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese

Empire" was reiterated on July 3, 1900.¹ In the summer of 1903 the consent of China was secured to the opening of ports in Manchuria. In May and December, 1909, Secretary Knox attempted once more to maintain the open door in Manchuria. In 1906 the American delegates to the conference of Algeciras signed the treaty guaranteeing Morocco, with the reservation that the United States assumed no obligation or responsibility for its enforcement, and had had "no desire or purpose in taking part in the conference other than to secure for all peoples the widest equality of trade and privileges in Morocco." Our participation in the Chinese and Moroccan questions, without any direct interest to defend or advance, demonstrates that the United States was beginning to feel, like Germany, that it was a vital function of foreign policy to insist that the door to trade on equal footing be not closed by further extension of European eminent domain in any part of the world.

During the period of the Napoleonic wars, despite our losses as neutrals and as belligerents in the War of 1812, the American merchant marine increased its sea-going tonnage sevenfold, and in twenty years ships under American registry gradually took over trans-Atlantic trade until from less than twenty-five per cent. the proportion of tonnage carried in American bottoms increased to ninety per cent. From 1815 to 1840 the United States could not only build but operate ships more cheaply than any European nation, and she therefore gradually outclassed British and all other operators of sailing-vessels. The American merchant marine suffered a temporary setback by the introduction of steam-driven vessels between 1840 and 1850, but at the outbreak of the Civil War our steam fleet was nearly as large as that of Great Britain and was admittedly more efficient.

The decade of the Civil War proved disastrous to the

¹ See p. 144.

American merchant marine. During four years of hostilities the demands of war on ships and on both seamen and landsmen destroyed a large part of the shipping and diverted its personnel to other activities. Had our national prosperity remained even in a limited measure dependent upon the carrying trade, the merchant marine would have rivaled Great Britain's again within ten years. But after the war our energies were devoted to railway-building and to the development of the middle west and the Pacific coast. The vast interior of the American continent was opened up, and capital and labor found other channels of productive effort to replace what the carrying trade had brought them. Another factor in the failure to rehabilitate our shipping was the absence of coal and iron at tide-water.

As long as the nation did not feel dependent upon American-controlled shipping for prosperity and security, pride in the American flag and the halo of tradition did not revive the shipping industry. The granting of subsidies, the means used by the European nations for developing their merchant marine, has always been opposed by American public sentiment, and maritime legislation at Washington has hindered rather than encouraged the renaissance of our international carrying trade. By the exclusion of ships of foreign registry from carrying freight or passengers between American ports, our coastwise trade was saved from the paralyzing effect of laws that made operation much more costly for American ship-owners than for those of any other nation. But in international trade, where there was competition, there was no hope for ships of American registry.

After the outbreak of the World War our export trade, which had never before been important enough to make serious aid to the growth of American shipping seem worth while, developed rapidly, and within two years the American people began to see the disadvantage of dependence

upon foreign vessels. The nations that had furnished most of our shipping were using their ships for war purposes, and they had available only sufficient tonnage to carry what products of ours they needed for military purposes. In the meantime their own export trade had diminished, and the opportunities were unlimited for American products to get in on the ground floor in every country outside Europe. But we did not have shipping that could be controlled for the purpose of promoting our own interests. This awakening led to the passage of a shipping act on September 7, 1916, for the promotion and development of the American merchant marine. A shipping board was created to construct ships, with fifty million dollars of capital, to be derived from the sale of Panama Canal bonds not yet put on the market by the United States treasury. The board had hardly been organized when our entry into the war led Congress to consent to unlimited expenditure for the purpose of the rapid construction of merchant-ships.

The American navy acquitted itself with great credit in the Spanish-American War; but public opinion realized that it was the weakness of the Spaniards rather than the strength of the Americans that gave us the victory. Our fleet was divided, and there was no way to pass from one ocean to the other. To reinforce the Atlantic fleet the battleship *Oregon* had steamed all the way around Cape Horn. Dewey's fleet was in the Philippines. Our Pacific coast was without protection. Had Germany or France joined Spain the situation would have been serious. It soon became known that we had actually been dependent upon the good-will of Great Britain, which was fortunately manifested on our side in at least one crisis of the war. The experience of 1898 led the American people to determine that the canal connecting the two oceans must be cut at the earliest possible moment, and that the naval budget must be increased to provide for the building of ships suf-

ficient in number and armament to protect both coasts in the event of war.

Immediately after the Spanish-American War other factors came in to influence the United States to construct a large fleet. Great Britain and Germany adopted ambitious naval programs. Russia was building two fleets with French money. Japan was beginning to loom up as a strong naval power in the Pacific. We had annexed Hawaii and Porto Rico; we had assumed responsibility for Cuba; and the extensive Philippine archipelago, a fortnight's sailing distance from our nearest Pacific naval base, was ours for better or for worse. We had scarcely begun building our new navy when the victories of Japan over Russia proved that the Japanese could not be ignored. If we were to hold the Philippines and Hawaii we must be able to defend them. The Panama Canal and the West Indies entailed responsibilities in event of a European war, no matter how the powers were alined. When the World War finally broke out we were probably more impotent to enforce our neutral rights on the high seas than we had been a hundred years before. Great Britain interfered with our trade; Germany began a submarine warfare and threatened to sink our shipping without warning. After the battle of Jutland the United States decided to build a fleet "second to none." Supremacy of the sea was not aimed at, but we determined to have equality of sea power with the strongest naval power. In July, 1916, Congress adopted a naval program providing for the immediate construction of eight new capital ships and a large number of minor craft, at a cost that the representatives of the people would not have dared to sanction a few years earlier. It was a logical, an inevitable, step. The possession of the Philippines involved us in the Far East. Our foreign trade was becoming precious to us, and we were dreaming of a merchant marine.

Up to 1898, the policy of abstaining from intervention in

internal political affairs of other countries had always had the support of American public opinion and had been scrupulously followed, with the single exception of the quarrel between Mexico and Texas.¹ Opportunities and occasions for intervention had been frequent, especially in Latin America, and there were times when European nations intimated to us that the Monroe Doctrine, which denied it to them, imposed upon us the obligation of intervention. But we interpreted the Monroe Doctrine in a negative sense, and stood steadfastly for non-intervention.² The cry for aid came even from oppressed peoples in Europe, and plausible arguments were advanced to the effect that the boon of liberty we enjoyed ought to make us willing to help others secure it, notably in the case of Hungary, when Kossuth visited the United States. The three considerations that kept us out of the French Revolution, however, invariably prevailed: that every nation had a right to work out its own salvation, irrespective of its size, religious beliefs, or political conceptions; that any intervention would involve us in Old World politics and political methods and systems; and that our national interests would be best served by minding our own business. Consequently intervention in Cuba, which led to the Spanish-American War, denoted an epoch-making abandonment of traditional policy.

We could not claim that the motive for intervention was solely to free the Cubans from the yoke of Spain; Spanish misrule and oppression had been known to us for many years and at several times had reached as bad a state as during the period preceding the war of 1898. But the changing conditions in the relations of the United States with the rest of the world made us believe that a free and

¹ The Mexican War was bitterly opposed by prominent Americans (witness the speeches in Congress and Lowell's "Biglow Papers"), and, despite its benefits, has not been regarded as a creditable exploit by American historians.

² For a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, and our relations during this period with Latin-American peoples, see Chapter XXX.

tranquil Cuba was essential to our national security and prosperity. We promised not to annex Cuba, and we did not do so. But Cuban independence was established only with the stipulation that the United States should have the right to intervene at any time. Washington believed intervention was necessary to defend Cuba against foreign aggression or to straighten out her internal political and economic affairs. It was a veiled protectorate, confirmed by the lease of two naval bases and the annexation of Porto Rico.

As a result of the Spanish-American War the United States became involved in Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands. We did not think it was to our interest—or to theirs—to give the peoples of these islands independence. Nor did we grant them American citizenship.¹ Our relations with them, owing to the lack of a constitutional provision to cover colonies or protectorates, has been anomalous ever since, and the United States has been led into methods of colonial administration and into military undertakings contrary to the ideals of self-determination of peoples that had been advocated up to that time by American public opinion.²

The policy of non-intervention has not since been reëstablished, for the assuming of one obligation led us on to

¹ A limited form of responsible government was granted to the Filipinos by the act of 1916 in which Congress promised also ultimate independence. The Porto Ricans were made American citizens and granted representative government by the act of 1917. Porto Rico is definitely incorporated in the United States. There is difference of opinion in both Republican and Democratic parties as to the political status of the Philippine Islands, and as to what should be the permanent future relations, if any, between the archipelago and the United States, although only Democratic platforms have advocated autonomy or independence for the Filipinos.

² There was not at any time, however, a feeling that we should go to war to assert this right, until the Cuban propaganda swept the country prior to the Spanish-American War. Even then, helping others to win their freedom was a justification rather than a cause for war. Our sympathy with subject peoples was platonic, even though expressed with much effervescence. We had sympathized with Kossuth in Hungary, Emmet in Ireland, Garibaldi in Italy, and the Poles in 1830 and 1863. Jane Porter's "Thaddeus of Warsaw" and William Ware's "Toussaint Louverture" were favorite classics of American childhood, because they breathed the spirit of our Declaration of Independence.

others. In 1900 we participated in the intervention of the powers in China, and American troops have been stationed in China for more than twenty years. In 1903 we intervened in the insurrection of the province of Panama against Colombia and prevented the Colombian troops from attacking the rebels. We have been on the Isthmus of Panama ever since. In 1905 we began to intervene in Santo Domingo, and during the World War took over the government of Santo Domingo and Haiti. In 1912 American marines were landed in Nicaragua, and detachments occupied the capital. In 1913 and 1916 American naval and military forces intervened in Mexico.

As in Cuba, the chain of events or specific incidents that brought about intervention in these various countries were not markedly different from events or incidents that had occurred over and over again during the first century of American history. But European and American investments had increased very greatly in the West Indies, Central America, and China. There were concession-holders and bondholders to be protected, and considerable trade interests at stake. As long as these had been negligible our State Department avoided intervention. But non-intervention is not possible in the diplomacy of a world power. When we became a world power, therefore, we began to intervene where our interests lay, and public opinion, conscious of these interests, approved what it had formerly condemned when other nations had done the same thing.

CHAPTER XXX

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS (1893-1917)

THE first effort of the United States to bring together the nations of the New World that they might talk over their common interests was made by Secretary Blaine in 1881, when the independent countries of North and South America were invited to participate in a general conference in Washington "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." But Chile and Peru, then in the midst of a bitter war, were not disposed to accept this opportunity for pan-American arbitration, and all the invitations were withdrawn. Eight years later, when Mr. Blaine was again secretary of state, he had the honor of presiding over the opening session of the first Pan-American Conference. Except for the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics in Washington, little was accomplished in formulating common American policies. The Latin republics were jealous and suspicious of the United States and combined to defeat even the most harmless proposals. That bad feeling had been aroused by the conference was demonstrated shortly afterward, when our vigorous representations to Chile, because of the killing of American sailors at Valparaiso, were resented throughout South and Central America. We were accused of having tried to intervene in a domestic quarrel.

It was twelve years before the second conference assembled in Mexico City to arrange the conditions under which all American countries were to become signatories of the Hague convention of 1899. The third conference,

in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, had on its agenda the question of American participation in the second Hague convention. At Buenos Aires, in 1910, the scope of the Washington bureau was enlarged and its name was changed to the Pan American Union. The fifth conference was to have been held in Santiago, Chile, in 1914, but was postponed on account of the war.

Until the United States began to be interested in an Atlantic-Pacific canal, due to the rapid development of the far west, and the government became nervous over the possibility of a fresh attempt to extend the working of European economic imperialism to America, virtually nothing was done, officially or privately, to take advantage of our propinquity to the Latin-American states. We had no direct steamship or cable communications with South America, and connections with the West Indies and Central America only by fruit and tourist steamers. American banks did not function in Latin America, whose countries found the capital for railway and port development and equipment and for commercial and mining enterprises in European markets. Our trade with South America was negligible. Engrossed in our own affairs, we paid hardly more attention to the rest of America than to Africa and Asia.

In 1895 a sudden change came when President Cleveland declared that the Monroe Doctrine was a vital American policy and that the people of the United States would enforce it. Great Britain had been carrying on a boundary dispute with Venezuela for half a century. It had never been settled because the British Foreign Office insisted on the outright surrender of most of the territory before a joint boundary commission was formed. The issue in itself was not an important one, and there was no reason to believe that the British had a bad case. But the revival of British imperialism, which other nations were imitating, seemed to necessitate strong action on the part of the

United States, unless we were prepared to allow the European nations to deal with Latin-Americans as they dealt with Asiatic and African peoples. For the sake of making a test, President Cleveland requested Great Britain to arbitrate her difference with Venezuela, basing his intervention upon the Monroe Doctrine. On November 26, 1895, Great Britain replied, rejecting our assumption that the Monroe Doctrine had any international significance and especially repudiating the principle that "American questions are for American discussion"; on these grounds she refused to arbitrate.

On December 17 the president submitted the correspondence to Congress, recommending the sending of a commission to look into the merits of the case, and stating the right and intention of the United States to adjudicate the dispute. Said Mr. Cleveland:

"It will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."

Although the Tory press in England was eager to take up the challenge, the imperial problems arising in the Sudan and South Africa, and the strained relations with France and Russia, made the government decide to yield to the peremptory American demand.¹ The Venezuela boundary question was submitted to arbitration. War with the United States was repugnant to the British people and would have resulted in the loss of Canada. British statesmen and intelligent public opinion realized, also, that Cleveland's action had a deeper significance than the set-

¹ See p. 168.

tlement of the question that prompted it. The assertion of the Monroe Doctrine for the first time with specific legislative indorsement indicated that the United States had reached a stage where isolation was no longer possible. The canal, when built, must be protected. The United States could not afford to have any European nation exercising a political influence equal or superior to hers in South America. For seventy years the Monroe Doctrine had never been seriously challenged, because Europeans had a free field in Africa and Asia. And now that they were beginning to look elsewhere the United States had become strong enough to accept "the responsibility incurred" and "all the consequences that may follow."

Seven years later, when conditions had greatly changed to the advantage of the United States, Great Britain, in conjunction with Germany and Italy, tested the Monroe Doctrine. A joint naval demonstration was made against Venezuela to force her to acknowledge and agree to pay a number of claims. The United States intervened, and, when the powers were assured that Venezuela would recognize the claims and refer them to commissions, Great Britain and Italy withdrew. Germany seemed disposed to continue the demonstration, but recalled her fleet when President Roosevelt told the German ambassador that the maintenance of the blockade might lead to war.

The United States opposed the transfer of Cuba from Spain to France in 1826 and to Great Britain in 1839 and 1843. We tried to purchase Cuba in 1848, and the first filibustering expedition took place the following year. The Cuban question was a national issue in the presidential election of 1856, and in 1859 Congress again debated the purchase of the island. Between the Mexican War and the Civil War the canal question was a consideration in our policy towards Cuba, but the desire of the southern states to extend slave territory, or at least to prevent emancipa-

tion in the island if Cuba passed into British or French hands, was undoubtedly the principal motive of the agitation for annexation. After the Civil War the issue of slavery disappeared from American internal politics, and the canal question was held in abeyance during thirty years of transcontinental railway construction.

American public opinion came to regard an Atlantic-Pacific canal as essential to the prosperity of the United States; the status of Cuba and the Hawaiian Islands and the freedom of Latin-American countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea became the principal issues in foreign policy. Plans were made for the annexation of Hawaii. The nation stood behind President Cleveland when he ordered marines to Bluefields in Nicaragua in 1894, after news had come of a British landing, and when he challenged Great Britain on the Venezuelan question. The newspapers began to feature the Cuban insurrection of 1895, and, although Cleveland stood resolutely against the propaganda for war with Spain, a state of mind was gradually created that needed only an exciting pretext to make war inevitable. It was amply furnished by a tragic disaster that public opinion interpreted, without waiting for proof, as an overt act. On February 15, 1898, at the end of the second year of McKinley's first administration, the battleship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbor. On April 19 Congress decided that the United States had to fight to free Cuba.

The short and one-sided war ended in the peace protocol of August 12, by which Spain agreed to evacuate Cuba and the Philippines and relinquish Spanish sovereignty over them, and to cede Porto Rico and one of the Ladrões to the United States in lieu of indemnity. On the same day the Hawaiian Islands were formally annexed to the United States. The treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, confirmed the cession of Porto Rico and Guam and the independence of Cuba, and relinquished to the United

States the Philippine Islands for a cash payment of twenty million dollars.

The Spanish-American War established the hegemony of the United States in the western hemisphere. It caused a change not only in our own relations, but also in the relations of European powers, with Latin America. The predominant cultural influence of Europe persisted, however, and the United States was not yet ready to assert her commercial and financial ascendancy in Latin-American affairs. Much groundwork, neglected up to this time, had to be done. Direct cable and steamship communications and banking facilities were still lacking. These had to await the time when American finance and industry needed foreign fields for investment and markets for trade. During the first two decades of the twentieth century the increasing wealth and population of the United States automatically strengthened her power and prestige, which received a striking opportunity to prove itself in the World War. But certain deliberate forces were also working to establish political conditions that would render unquestioned the control of the American continents by the United States.

The most important factor in maintaining the advantages won by the Spanish-American War was our navy. When we look back to the "great white fleet" that won the battle of Santiago and to the Pacific squadron that destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, and compare the ships of Sampson and Dewey with those of a quarter of a century later, we wonder how President Cleveland dared to fling the Monroe Doctrine into Great Britain's face. It was fortunate that decadent Spain was the European power with which we had to fight. However, we were sobered rather than dazzled by our easy victory. From 1898 to 1922 the American people spent at times in a single year more money on naval armament than during the previous half-century, and they finally reached a position where

Great Britain had to agree to the principle of equality of sea power.¹ Most of the ships were kept in American waters, and after the opening of the Panama Canal the naval power of the United States in the western hemisphere had passed the point where it could be challenged. And yet, sixteen years earlier the *Oregon* had had to steam ten thousand miles around South America to join the Atlantic Squadron, making the long voyage not only because there was no canal, but also because it was believed that a single ship might make the difference between victory and defeat in a battle with the Spanish.

The South American republics made no attempt to follow the example of the United States in building capital ships. Between the Spanish-American War and 1917 Argentina and Chile acquired no new capital ships. In 1917 the Argentine navy had seven ships, totaling 35,000 tons, all of them old. Chile had two battle-ships, two armored cruisers, and four cruisers, the newest of which was laid down in 1898. No unit of the Chilean navy was over 9000 tons. Brazil laid down two dreadnoughts of 20,000 tons each and two protected cruisers of 3500 tons each in 1907, but made no increases during the next decade. Practically speaking, therefore, the republics of Latin America were completely at the mercy of the United States, and, even had they been disposed to do so, they could have formed a feasible coalition with no other European power than Great Britain.

Next to the navy, the Panama Canal is responsible for the predominant position of the United States in the western world. According to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 the Atlantic-Pacific canal was to be constructed by a private corporation. In 1884 a French company under de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, began to cut through the Isthmus of Panama. After four years, three hundred

¹ In the agreement for limitation of naval armaments, signed during the Washington conference, February, 1922.

million dollars had been spent and only one third of the work was completed. The enterprise collapsed.

When the United States again became interested in the canal project, the necessity of negotiating with Great Britain for a revision of the treaty of 1850 was recognized. We were not then in the same position as at the time of the earlier agreement. President Buchanan had been able to prevent Great Britain from following in Central America "the policy which" (in Buchanan's own words) "she has uniformly pursued throughout her history, of seizing upon every available commercial point in the world whenever circumstances have placed it within her power." But it was at the price of assenting to international control of the proposed canal. The American State Department pointed out that the canal was different from a natural waterway and that Great Britain herself had seized Egypt to control the Suez Canal. It was declared that if the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were not revised, the United States, on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine, would oppose and prevent either international or private European control of an Atlantic-Pacific canal. The American government offered to allow the canal to be built by a private corporation exclusively controlled by the United States or to construct and operate the canal itself. The British government not only refused to revise the treaty, but also endeavored to block the United States by an agreement with the Panama Company and by scheming to establish a protectorate over the Indians of the Mosquito Coast through whose country the alternate Nicaragua route passed.

The firmness shown by President Cleveland in the Venezuela boundary question and the sweeping victory over Spain convinced the British that the canal would never be built if the Clayton-Bulwer treaty continued to tie the United States hand and foot. Secretary Hay succeeded in negotiating a new treaty, which was signed in 1900. This Hay-Pauncefote treaty provided for a neutral-

ized canal under American government ownership, and rules for control were stipulated like those for the Suez Canal. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty until Great Britain admitted that the neutralization would be enforced by the United States alone, and was not to be interpreted as depriving the United States of power to police the canal. The Senate also rejected the clause forbidding fortification. Under the pressure of shipping interests, Great Britain finally compromised and agreed to these modifications. The important clause, in British eyes, was that which promised no discrimination in tolls.

After the British had been satisfied, the United States had still to negotiate with the Panama Canal Company and the Colombian government. Because of our ability to frighten it with the Nicaragua alternative, which was authorized by Congress, the French company finally agreed to sell out its rights at a reasonable figure. The offer was accepted with the proviso that the money would be paid only if and when the Republic of Colombia gave to the United States perpetual authority and jurisdiction over a strip across the Isthmus of Panama not less than six miles in width. A treaty was made with Colombia for a canal zone on the basis of a payment in cash and an annuity. When the Colombian Senate, acting as the American Senate has so often acted in the case of treaties, refused to ratify the agreement, the officials of the French canal company, desperate over the possible loss of a portion of their investment that might be retrieved, organized a revolution in Panama. The United States refused to permit the Colombian troops to put down the revolt, and President Roosevelt immediately recognized the new "Republic of Panama." The only comment that can be made upon this affair is that the American government showed great aptitude for the science of world politics. Roosevelt afterwards declared that the end justified the means, and that if he had allowed Colombia to exercise her sovereign rights

the construction of the canal would have been delayed indefinitely.

On February 23, 1904, the United States Senate ratified a new canal convention, this time with the Republic of Panama, agreeing to give to Panama the same financial compensation as that which had been offered to Colombia. The canal zone, however, was widened to ten miles. After ten years, on August 15, 1914, the Panama Canal, financed, constructed, owned, and managed by the United States, was opened to the commerce of the world. It was built on American territory, subject only to a perpetual annual ground-rent of \$250,000. The ports at either end had become virtually American, and the canal was heavily fortified. The only restrictions imposed upon the United States are those of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which have been differently interpreted by successive American administrations.¹

Nearly twenty-five per cent. of the world's present oil production stands to the credit of Mexico. This fact, coupled with the extensive American and European mining investments of the past quarter century, has radically changed the tenor of the relations between the United States and her southern neighbor. As long as the outside world did not know, or need, the unrivaled oil and mineral resources of Mexico her internal quarrels were of no consequence, and the United States was able to abide by the Jeffersonian principle that "all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." But when European and American investors in enterprises in Mexico found themselves injured in their prosperity by the politi-

¹From the beginning of the renewal of the Atlantic-Pacific project the various questions that arose were complicated by considerations and conflicting motives. Whether the Nicaragua or Panama route should be chosen; whether the canal should be constructed at sea-level or with locks; whether President Roosevelt's policy in regard to the Panama Revolution was justified or should be condemned by an apology, with indemnity, to Colombia; and whether the rebates to American ships engaged in coastal trade constituted a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty or followed the letter and spirit of the agreement—these were all moot questions on which public opinion was divided.

cal evolution of the Mexican people, which led to a struggle against absolutism and to changes of government by violence, the American government was placed in an embarrassing position.

The United States had never followed the policy of European governments in regard to the protection of the lives and property of their nationals in non-European countries by using force when diplomatic representations failed. On the other hand, this policy had been condemned by us on the ground that the strong were unable to resist the temptation of settling differences to suit their own interests and of using them as a pretext for extending their political and economic domination over weak peoples.

The Monroe Doctrine had prevented the extension of European political control over the Latin-American republics. But American trade and investment interests had been small and had meant little or nothing to our national prosperity. When a state of anarchy developed in Mexico, we realized for the first time how strong were the influences that had inspired and directed this European attitude. For we had a large stake in Mexico. Moreover, did not the Monroe Doctrine obligate us, since we denied that right to Europe, to protect the lives and property of Europeans in American countries? At the outbreak of the European war a concrete illustration of the dilemma was forced upon us. The largest source of oil supply for the British navy was in the Tampico region of Mexico. If this were diminished or cut off by internal Mexican revolutions, did we have the right to forbid the British government to intervene and at the same time not assume the obligation of seeing that British companies were protected in producing oil from their own wells?

International obligations, as well as our own internal economic interests, required the occupation of Vera Cruz by the American navy in 1914 and a punitive military expedition against General Villa in 1916. But President Wilson

was determined not to be stampeded into a war against Mexico, especially as he felt that the political unrest was due to a legitimate effort of the Mexican people to establish a democratic form of government. American intervention in Europe, and its aftermath, prevented the Mexican crisis from becoming, in the minds of American people, too acute for peaceful settlement. Burdened with debts and international problems, and weary of military service and war, the American people are no longer moved by the propaganda for intervention in Mexico.¹ But the question will come to the fore again within a few years unless the Mexicans are able to find statesmen who will unite the country and put an end to the revolutions and consequent economic disorganization that make insecure the lives and profitless the investments of foreigners.

After the Spanish-American War, Cuba, although independent, remained under the tutelage of the United States, and Porto Rico became American territory. The Virgin Islands were acquired by purchase from Denmark in 1917. This development has led the United States along the path followed by other powers when they have established their sovereignty in regions away from home. Each new assumption of overlordship leads to others. The status of adjacent countries, and what is happening there, interests the colonial power, and the excuse is easily found for intervention.

Within a decade of the annexation of Porto Rico the United States intervened in Santo Domingo, and within another decade we found ourselves occupying Haiti, sup-

¹The Harding administration has followed the policy of the Wilson administration in withholding recognition of the government of President Obregon on the ground that article XXVII of the new Mexican constitution is an infringement upon private property rights. President Obregon has declared: "Every private right acquired prior to May 1, 1917, when the new constitution was adopted, will be respected and fully protected." The American State Department does not seem to trust this pledge. Secretary Hughes has explained the Mexican situation in the following words: "The fundamental question which confronts the government of the United States in considering its relations with Mexico is the safeguarding of property rights against confiscation."

pressing the legislature, and proclaiming martial law.¹ Thus the three republics of the West Indies, before the close of the second Wilson administration, had become virtual American protectorates. At the same time, northward from the canal zone the preponderant influence of the United States began to be felt in the Central American republics. The State Department now informs the Central American countries how they should act towards each other, and if the peremptory advice is not followed, war-ships appear in the offing and marines are landed.²

After studying the map of the islands that stretch from Florida to Venezuela the new American imperialist is alarmed when he sees that Cuba is flanked on the north by the Bahamas and on the south by Jamaica and the three Caymans. At the eastern end of the Caribbean Sea he finds Great Britain and France in control of the Leeward and Windward Islands, and Holland off the north coast of Venezuela. The events of the past twenty years have caused American public opinion, which formerly did not bother about Cuba, to resent the presence of European powers in our Caribbean Sea. The great Caribbean power is the United States, and, because the Panama Canal must be protected and European intrigues anticipated, the independent countries and islands of the West Indies and the Caribbean coast must allow Washington to supervise both their foreign and internal affairs, and New York to manage their finances and economic life. The proposition has been advanced that we buy out British and French interests in the West Indies by canceling a portion of the war debts. In point of fact, the continued presence of the British and the French in the West Indies is of no importance, now

¹ See p. 339.

² Shortly after the administration of Harding succeeded that of Wilson, Secretary Hughes sent a note of this character to Costa Rica in regard to a border dispute with Panama. The State Department still regards Nicaragua as a virtual protectorate, and we hear the European diplomatic expression "special interests" used to justify certain measures infringing on Nicaraguan sovereignty.

that American naval supremacy in the western hemisphere is assured. Since the Spanish-American War the United States controls the communications of Mexico and Central America with the outside world, and is in a position to invade Mexico by land from the south through Guatemala.

In South America, however, the United States is only potentially the dominant power. Until recently most of the intercourse of South American countries with the outside world was with Europe and by means of Europe. Although they profited by the Monroe Doctrine and appreciated what it meant to them, South Americans were suspicious and afraid of their powerful North American friend. In the Pan-American conferences they combined to defeat suggestions of the United States sometimes simply because of their source. Our dealings with Mexico and Colombia, and of late years with Haiti and Santo Domingo, have awakened justifiable fears of the intention of the United States to dictate in South America as Great Britain, France, and Russia have been dictating in Asia and Great Britain and France in Africa. All the states but one are of Spanish origin. They sympathized with Spain during the war of 1898. Their language, customs, affinities tend to keep them aloof from us. The only rapprochement with North America is that of common interests—a field that has not yet been much developed. As is natural for weaker states, they are not inclined to accept our leadership, moral or material, with the eagerness we think they ought to manifest.

In 1916 President Wilson proposed that the independent states of America unite in guaranteeing to each other "absolute political independence and territorial integrity" and give mutual promises to abstain from settling disputes except by arbitration, and to prevent aid either in arms or in men from being given to foment and encourage political revolutions in neighboring states. The South American press retorted with the principle of Grotius, *i. e.*, that

equality was the basis of sovereignty and of free coöperation of states. American diplomacy in Santo Domingo and Haiti, and the unpleasant story connected with the birth of the Republic of Panama, seemed to belie the worth of the mutual guaranty, where one of the parties was so much stronger than the others, unless it was based upon the domination of that power.

Of the eight Latin-American republics that entered the war, three were under American tutelage (Cuba, Haiti, and Panama) and four were dominated by the United States (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Only Brazil, of all the South American states, entered the war, and had a seat at the peace conference.

The Monroe Doctrine was incorrectly described (and recognized) in the covenant of the League of Nations as a "regional understanding." It is not an understanding, however, but a unilateral declaration of policy on the part of the United States, promulgated as a measure of security and not as a blanket assurance of protection to weak states or as a bid for a spheres-of-influence arrangement with other powers. The regional understandings, such as the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, and the various conventions among the European powers in regard to Africa and Asia (notably the Sudan, Congo, and China conventions), were reciprocal compacts, based on a *quid pro quo*. The Monroe Doctrine, on the other hand, was negative in character, and was not interpreted by the United States to give our government a right to oppose, as the regional understandings of European diplomacy did, the efforts of nationals of European powers to seek concessions, investment opportunities, and trade monopolies in Latin-American countries.

As long as territorial extension and the establishment of protectorates were not the objectives of European diplomacy, the United States did not protest against the abuse of force in the dealings of Europe with the Latin-American

republics. Our financiers and business men were not yet attracted by the opportunities of Latin-American exploitation. As late as 1902 the United States recognized the validity of the position taken by Palmerston in 1848, that a state always has the right, if convinced that justice is denied, to support the pecuniary claims of its citizens by force against a country whose courts they are unwilling to trust. This principle had been contested at the time by the Argentine jurist Calvo, who contended that a state had no right to take up, even as a matter of diplomatic action, the pecuniary claims of its citizens or subjects against another state.

At the time of the joint intervention of Great Britain, Italy, and Germany in Venezuela in 1902, our State Department admitted that these three powers had the right to intervene with force, provided they did not violate the Monroe Doctrine by acquiring territory or by oppressing or instigating the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. The Argentine minister of foreign affairs, Drago, protested, with unanimous South American public opinion behind him, claiming that while international law did not, as Calvo had said, forbid the making of diplomatic representations, it did deny the use of military or naval force for the collection of pecuniary claims. Between 1902 and 1907, when the second Hague conference met, the United States changed her ground, and the American delegates advocated the principle that international debts should be ascertained and collected by some process of law and not by arbitrary force. Mr. Root, in his instructions to the delegates, explained this stand by stating that such use of force was "inconsistent with respect for the independent sovereignty of other nations," and seemed to the United States to be a practice "injurious in its general effect upon the relations of nations and upon the welfare of weak and disordered states, whose development ought to be encouraged in the interests of civilization."

This attitude, maintained from 1907 to 1916, gratified the Latin-American republics and did much to make them believe that the United States intended to resist the current of world politics, which tended to make force the arbiter in differences between great powers and small states. Faith in American sincerity, however, was shaken by our dealings with Santo Domingo and Haiti during the second Wilson administration and by the attitude of Mr. Wilson towards the principle of equality of states at the Paris conference. There was difference of opinion in South America over the Wilson policy towards Mexico, and Washington had not rejected, but had rather welcomed, the mediation of the largest three South American states in the earlier stages of the breach resulting from the refusal to recognize Huerta and from the occupation of Vera Cruz.

During the campaign of 1920 Mr. Harding and several of the Republican senators attacked the outgoing administration for its high-handed and brutal policy in Haiti and Santo Domingo. It was alleged in the Senate by the Republicans that our marine forces had been guilty of atrocities, and that the arbitrary dissolution of the Haitian parliament and censorship of news, involving the imprisonment or expulsion of journalists, had been injurious to friendly relations between the United States and all the Latin-American republics. A reversal of the Wilson policy of dominating these two peoples by armed forces in the interests of American financiers was promised. But Secretary Hughes demanded a ratification of treaties putting Haiti and Santo Domingo under American protection as a prerequisite to the withdrawal of the forces of occupation. And a senatorial investigating committee under Senator McCormick returned from the island with a non-committal report.

As in the Philippines, so in the West Indies: it is easier to take than to give up. But the United States can not pursue a policy of aggression against small states and ex-

pect to be a candidate for the "moral leadership of the world." The European powers and Japan will understand us the better for speaking their language in international relations; but we shall lose our prestige in South America and the respect and confidence of the Latin-American republics.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE UNITED STATES IN THE COALITION AGAINST THE CENTRAL EMPIRES (1917-1918)

THE great majority of Americans regarded the European war as an interesting and dramatic spectacle in which their own country was not concerned. Hence they found no difficulty in following the president's advice that Americans remain neutral in thought as well as in action. Despite the tireless propaganda carried on by both groups of belligerents to win American support, public opinion in general accepted without question the declaration of President Wilson that he did not know the causes of the war and wished that some one would tell him. Those elements that took sides violently when war was first declared, and that worked hard for thirty months to advance the cause of one or the other of the belligerent groups, met with little success.

But in time the Germans, who seemed to glory in violating the ordinary ethics of warfare on land and sea, aroused American indignation by the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other ships; and this bitterness was enhanced by the revelations of German plots against American industries, planned and carried out on American soil. In addition to their monumental tactlessness, the Germans suffered, too, from three handicaps that gradually turned American public opinion against them. (1) Unlike Great Britain, Germany had not a single place on the American continent where she exercised political sovereignty, and therefore her propaganda and her espionage service was driven to violation of the neutrality of the United States and other nations. (2) Not controlling any cables or being able to use in com-

munication with the New World means that were not under the surveillance of her enemies, Germany had to resort to discreditable practices to keep in touch with her agents. (3) Her inability either to contest the supremacy of the sea with the British or to import under neutral flags and through neutral countries made it impossible to purchase war supplies from the United States, and thus American finance and industry became more and more interested in the success of the Entente. Interests engender sympathies, and customers are backed against non-customers.

After two years of war, however, during which there was ample opportunity for the United States to become fully acquainted with the German methods of waging war on land and sea, and after we had suffered much at the hands of Germany, the sentiment for maintaining neutrality was still so strong that neither candidate at the presidential election in the autumn of 1916 dared risk giving the impression that his program for the conduct of our foreign relations implied a departure from neutrality. President Wilson and Mr. Hughes were equally afraid to advocate preparedness, thinking that defeat at the polls was certain for any man whom the American people suspected of wanting to lead them into the war.

In view of these facts, which tragically stand in the way of sentimentalists, it is difficult to accept at their face value the principal reasons set forth by President Wilson on April 2, 1917, and in his subsequent speeches, for the entry of the United States into the World War. The vindication of principles of peace and justice against selfish autocratic power, the fight for democracy, rights of small nations, and universal domination of right by consent of free peoples were splendid ideals to set before a nation entering upon a costly struggle, and none questions the propriety and wisdom of voicing them. But the Entente Powers had begun the war with the proclamation of those very principles almost three years earlier. Either these

principles were not deemed by the American people sufficiently important to fight for, or the nation and its leaders had as a whole been unaware that they were the issues at stake until the beginning of 1917. We can not get away from this dilemma. It is important to admit it, and to state the bald fact of the case, that our intervention in the World War followed the great law of history, which is that peoples fight when they feel themselves menaced in their security and prosperity, and not until then.

It took time for American public opinion to realize that privileges can not be enjoyed without assuming responsibilities. Had Great Britain, France, and Italy not been capacity purchasers of American commodities, whose orders were making the United States experience an unexampled prosperity boom, the German submarine blockade might not have been considered a *casus belli*.¹ On the other hand, the blockade of Germany and the neutral states of northern Europe, which had also been in effect for nearly three years, did not unduly excite American public opinion. For it was understood that the blockaders were always willing to buy at our prices whatever goods we had to sell and were therefore not injuring American trade by the enforcement of the arbitrary British orders in council.

During the first year of the war the United States addressed numerous and sharp protests to Great Britain against interference with American trade and mails. London answered politely, but intimated that nothing Washington might say would result in a change in the methods decided upon to bring Germany to her knees. The British did not attempt to defend their actions at sea by denying the soundness of our interpretation of existing maritime law, but shifted the argument to moral grounds. Germany was a criminal, and Great Britain was defending the whole

¹The greatest loss of American lives and the most outrageous example of ruthlessness occurred two years before the declaration of war, when nearly a thousand non-combatants, including many women and children, went down on the *Lusitania*.

world, including the United States, against her attempt to stifle human liberty and progress. Washington was not convinced that the British *argumenta ad hominem* were satisfactory answers to reasonable complaints, but the notes of the American State Department, although they continued to protest against violations of international law, became academic and temporizing as the Entente powers increased their orders for American goods and floated loans at attractive interest rates through American bankers. Our notes to Germany became more insistent and less compromising in proportion as our trade with the Entente powers grew in importance. There was nothing deliberate or intentional in this. The influences of self-interest, however, are none the less real because they are unconscious. American prosperity gradually seemed to become dependent upon the defeat of Germany, and at the same time German successes began to worry Entente sympathizers in the United States, who had always been more optimistic than the military situation justified.

Without exaggerating or attempting to build up a thesis through the exclusion of other factors,—for the motives inspiring individual, let alone collective, action are always complex and difficult to evaluate,—we are justified in attaching importance to the parallel between the economic and political trends in our relations with European states from August, 1914, to February, 1917. It was inevitable that we should finally engage in war with the country whose activities threatened to impair our prosperity. This happened in 1812. It happened again in 1917.

In the interim Europe fought several wars of far-reaching significance, and the European nations were in constant competition with one another for exclusive political and economic spheres throughout the world. But during this period the United States had no part in European quarrels. As long as the United States was a self-sufficient country she was engrossed in her own internal develop-

ment. She had unlimited opportunities for expansion in her own continent, without coming into conflict with any European power. As she constituted within her own borders the greatest free-trade area in the world and did not have to protect herself by fleets, armies, and alliances, she could be indifferent to events that happened elsewhere.

As we have seen, the United States changed rapidly from 1893 to the outbreak of the European war, but the bulk of the people were as yet unaware of our interdependence with other nations, especially with those of Europe. At the beginning of 1917 both our security and our prosperity seemed menaced by the action of Germany, and our pride and honor were brought into question. On January 22 President Wilson spoke before the Senate of the advisability of "peace without victory" as the means of terminating the European war. Nine days later Germany declared an unrestricted submarine campaign against neutral shipping. Immediately President Wilson became the leader of a militant people, and not many months later, although the issues of the war had remained the same for the European combatants, the American president declared that the questions at stake could be settled only by the application of force to the uttermost until complete victory was obtained.

On April 14, 1916, the United States had demanded the punishment of the submarine commander responsible for the attacks on the *Sussex* and other steamers attacked without warning, on which American travelers had been injured or killed; a full indemnity; and guaranties for the future. Germany was warned that delay in answering would mean the breaking off of diplomatic relations. On May 4 Germany replied that she had exercised great restraint in the use of submarines and could not abandon this weapon of self-defense against Great Britain, but she promised to give warning before sinking vessels and to make every effort to save life, and in return requested the United

States to insist that Great Britain cease to interfere with sea-borne trade. On May 8 the United States acknowledged the receipt of Germany's answer, with the pledge given, and pointed out that the United States was "unable to discuss the suggestion that the safety of American citizens should be made dependent on the conduct of other governments." This is how matters stood when, on January 31, 1917, Germany withdrew the pledge and notified the world that she intended to inaugurate an unrestricted submarine blockade of her enemies' coasts. President Wilson gave Count Bernstorff, German ambassador at Washington, his passports on February 3. After waiting two months for Germany to cancel her submarine blockade orders, the United States declared war on April 6.¹

From the first day the participation of the United States was whole-hearted. President Wilson explained that the war was not against the German people but against their government, and that its purpose was to free the Germans as well as other peoples from the oppression of autocratic and irresponsible government, which disturbed the world's peace and conducted war in defiance of the laws of humanity. The American ideals were elaborated in many speeches, and served the double purpose of giving the Americans a sacred cause to fight for and of breaking down the morale of the Germans, who were not averse to the program of peace outlined in Mr. Wilson's "fourteen points."

The Entente powers realized that the intervention of the United States, aside from its world-wide moral effect, would bring vital economic and financial aid. The United States had already been an indispensable provider of food-stuffs and chemicals, and had helped appreciably in furnishing manufactured products and raw materials for ar-

¹ On December 7, 1917, war was declared on Austria-Hungary. Turkey took the initiative in severing diplomatic relations with the United States two weeks before we joined the enemies of Germany. But President Wilson could never be induced to declare war on Turkey or even to break off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.

mament and transportation. But all the Allied powers were reaching the end of their credit in America, and they had been bidding against one another for American goods. The abandonment of neutrality meant government credits in the United States, the speeding up of production, and the control of prices and distribution. The German shipping that had been tied up in American ports since 1914 became an invaluable addition to the tonnage at the disposition of the Entente powers for the transportation of their American purchases.

It was soon demonstrated that the United States did not intend to limit her participation to economic or naval aid. Within three weeks of the declaration of war Congress voted conscription, and on June 25 the first fighting troops landed at St. Nazaire. A year later a million American soldiers were in France, and this fact, given out with a table of figures for each month, convinced the German people that their government had deceived them concerning the efficacy of submarine warfare and that they would soon be overwhelmed by sheer force of arms.

Aside from the influence of American intervention upon the fortunes of the war, which we can not attempt to estimate here, Germany's folly in forcing into the conflict on the side of her enemies the one great power that had remained aloof radically changed the distribution and comparative strength of the pieces on the chessboard of world politics. From a disinterested observer and occasional adviser, the United States was transformed into a partner in the enterprise of universal political reconstruction, financial rehabilitation, and economic readjustment.

The World War made the United States a great creditor nation, interested in the fiscal policies of European nations. When we transferred to European nations the proceeds of our liberty loans, several million American bondholders automatically became concerned in what happened to Europe; for both principal and interest of their investment

were involved. The war caused us to develop our industrial and agricultural productivity far beyond the needs of home consumption, and to invest billions in a merchant marine. Therefore we were to be left at the end of the war with the habit formed of selling heavily abroad, a thing we had never done before, and with a considerable merchant marine, in support of which we should have to enter into competition with European powers, especially Great Britain and Japan, for the carrying trade of the world.

Because our participation led many of the Latin-American republics and China and Siam to enter the coalition against the central powers, the United States assumed a moral responsibility to pursue to attainment after the war the objects for which we had entered it. The day after President Wilson severed diplomatic relations he sent a note to all neutral states, even the smallest, inviting them to follow the example of the United States, and when we entered the war these countries were encouraged to declare war on Germany. In complying with the request of President Wilson to break with Germany, several states, notably China, officially informed our State Department that the United States was being taken at her word. Our diplomatic representatives at Peking, Bangkok, and Rio de Janeiro, when asked to notify Washington that China, Siam, and Brazil had declared war on Germany, were told that this action was inspired by the hope of seeing prevail in international relations the principles for which ("and for no others") President Wilson affirmed that Americans were ready to sacrifice their treasure and lay down their lives.

We did not approve the objects and methods of world politics as practised by the other powers, and, through our president, we said so. The desire to coöperate in establishing a new world order rather than merely to punish Germany was explicitly stated at the time of our intervention. Denunciation of the evil effect of world politics upon

international relations was the *leit-motiv* of the speeches of Mr. Wilson before, during, and after our participation in the war. Weak nations throughout the world believed in the sincerity of the United States, and our word was considered, especially in China, as good as our bond. Our "moral leadership of the world," therefore, is likely to depend on the measure of success we attain in giving that leadership the character we promised to give it.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMANOFF, HAPSBURG, AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES THROUGH SELF-DETER- MINATION PROPAGANDA (1917-1918)

THE first reaction to the Russian Revolution is shown by the instructions sent to the ambassadors at Petrograd. The new government was to be recognized, but its leaders must be given to understand that the other Entente powers expected an unabated military effort and loyalty to diplomatic understandings. As long as the revolutionary leaders promised to keep up the war and not to change Russian foreign policy, the Paris and London press dwelt upon the advantages of the revolution to the Allied cause. What had been denied before was now admitted—that czarist Russia had been on the verge of making peace with Germany. The revolution was taken, therefore, as a sign of the anti-German sentiment of the Russian people. The embarrassing alliance between Occidental democracies and an Oriental autocracy in a war for freedom no longer made the war aims of the Entente seem inconsistent with the professions of British and French statesmen. The central empires had been greatly helped up to this time by the necessary opposition of the Entente to the aspirations of Poland and Finland and by the pledge that Constantinople should be awarded to Russia.

But no sooner had the new Russian government agreed to acknowledge the rights of Poles and Finns than a remarkable Ukrainian demonstration occurred in the streets of Petrograd, and an autonomous government was set up at Kieff. Other separatist movements started in various parts of the old empire. The Don and Kuban Cossacks

and the peoples of the Caucasus announced that the revolution meant freedom for them as well as for the Poles and the Finns. When espousing the doctrine of self-determination as a means of destroying the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and taking slices off the German Empire, Entente statesmen had discounted its disastrous effect in the Russian Empire, which had been created and was held together only by a strong military despotism.

At the very beginning of the war, Entente propagandists raised the question of subject nationalities, but determined to ignore the aspirations to independence of all other peoples save those under the yoke of enemy countries. There was wisdom in this. Self-determination was a war weapon and not a profession of faith in an ideal. When every nerve was being strained to beat Germany to her knees, it would have been folly to discuss matters tending to undermine the solidarity of the Entente coalition. But as the war dragged on the principles proclaimed by Premiers Asquith and Viviani proved pervasive. Much to the alarm of Entente statesmen, it was discovered that these principles could not be limited. They were advocated by President Wilson. They aroused the hopes of races subject to the Entente powers. The Dublin uprising in Ireland and the unrest in India were warnings of the boomerang effect of using the weapon of self-determination.

The effort to blow hot or blow cold upon nationalist aspirations and irredentist claims, distinguishing among subject peoples on the sole basis of expediency, proved to be an impossible task when the war entered its fourth year. The Romanoff, Hapsburg, and Ottoman empires were neighboring states, and the consideration that Russia was a friendly country, while Austria-Hungary and Turkey were enemy countries, did not alter the essential similarity of their political organization. They were dynastic states, created by combining heterogeneous peoples under one rule, principally through conquest. The symbol of unity

was not a common national consciousness, but the ruling dynasty, supported by a dominant racial element that had not assimilated or fused with the subject elements. Artificial frontiers separated peoples who spoke the same language, professed the same religion, and had at one time enjoyed a common national existence.

The alien elements in east Prussia and Silesia were Lithuanians and Poles, not Russians. The Finns were no more a separate people than the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, who inhabited the Russian Baltic provinces. Russia had oppressed the Poles, materially far more than Germany and morally as much as Germany, and the Poles of Austria had been treated both materially and morally infinitely better than the Poles of Russia. The Ukrainians of Austria could not be worked upon by Entente propaganda without stirring up the other nine tenths of the Ukrainian nation, who inhabited southwestern Russia. Rumanian irredentism could not be limited to crippling Hungary by detaching Transylvania; for the rich Russian province of Bessarabia was also Rumanian. There were more Armenians under Russian than under Turkish rule. If the liberation of non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire was the war aim of the Entente powers, the Russian claim to Constantinople was not so good as that of Greece, and Greece had priority over Italy in regard to the Ægean islands and the Smyrna region of Asia Minor. Syrians and Arabs aspired to freedom and not to a change of masters. When the British decided to recognize the independence of the Hedjaz in order to make possible the conquest of Mesopotamia and Palestine, they discovered that political expediency was not a sufficient excuse for acknowledging the right of Arabic-speaking Moslems on the east side of the Red Sea to be independent and denying that right to a people of the same language and religion, but of a much higher civilization, on the other side of the Red Sea. The doctrine of self-determination, used by the

British in their efforts to arouse alien elements against the Turks, reacted against themselves in Egypt.

From the point of view of world politics, the championship of the rights of small nations was a serious blunder. It was largely responsible for the collapse of Russia, and it would have caused the Entente powers to lose the war had not the United States intervened. Only so far as winning the war was concerned did the United States make up for the defection of Russia. The Americans could not be counted upon to compensate Great Britain in Asia and France in Europe for the disappearance of czarist Russia. Instead of an accomplice in the exploitation of Asiatic peoples, Russia suddenly became anti-imperialist and a propagandist for self-determination, to the confusion of the British in India, Afghanistan, Persia, and Mesopotamia.¹ From a coöperating factor in maintaining the balance of power against Germany in Europe, she was changed to an enemy of "capitalist diplomacy," and henceforth worked against the French policy, born of necessity, of holding Germany in check by an alliance with Germany's powerful neighbor on the east.

The attitude of Great Britain, France, and Italy towards the disintegration of the Hapsburg empire during the war was not harmonious, either as to means or ends, and has given rise to much speculation. No accurate account of the divergent policies that were discussed or followed can be given until the diplomatic correspondence is published. We know, however, from the unsuccessful efforts to induce Austria-Hungary to sign a separate peace, from the terms of the armistice of November 3, and from the discussions preceding the final drafting of the treaty of St. Germain in the summer of 1919, that the three powers whose common victory had destroyed the Dual Monarchy and driven into exile the Hapsburg dynasty had differing views on the future status of the Danubian and Adriatic regions.

¹ See pp. 439-441, 447, 453-454, 468, 471-472, 501-504, 507-509.

British, French, and Italian statesmen were agreed upon the wisdom of encouraging the subject peoples of the Hapsburg empire to revolt against their Austrian and Hungarian masters; for this seemed the surest method of depriving Germany both of a reservoir of troops and of her only means of communication with Bulgaria and Turkey. But all shared the misgiving of Mr. Lloyd George about "Balkanizing Europe." Although the immediate advantage of disrupting the Hapsburg empire was indisputable from a military point of view, the Entente statesmen did not forget that the emancipation of the subject peoples had to be envisaged from the standpoint of post-bellum reconstruction. Up to the time of the defection of Russia, they felt their way cautiously. If Russia was to receive the German Lithuanians of the Memel region, the German and Austrian Poles, and the Austrian and Hungarian Ukrainians, and was to be the big sister of a greatly enlarged Serbia with an Adriatic littoral, in addition to Constantinople and the Straits already promised her, the principal result of the defeat of Germany would be the preponderance of Russia in Europe and her appearance as a naval power in the Mediterranean. After the new Russian government announced its intention to free subject races and to renounce the rewards the old Russia had insisted upon receiving as her share of the spoils, this source of embarrassment and danger was removed.

It became possible for the Entente statesmen to sponsor the resurrection of Poland. The obstacle to recognizing the right to independence of the Czecho-Slovaks was removed.¹ The eastern part of Hungary had already been promised to Rumania and most of the Adriatic littoral of Austria to Italy. British and French statesmen had not up to this time believed that these pledges would have to

¹ The British and French governments could give no encouragement to the Czecho-Slovak emissaries in London and Paris for fear of offending Russia. The Russian government had logically pointed out that any promises made to the Czecho-Slovaks would react to the disadvantage of Russia in Poland.

be met.¹ They had felt that the situation at the end of the war might demand a revision of the promises in the treaties, and that it would be possible to compromise and bargain in such a way as to revamp the Hapsburg dominions into a confederation that would satisfy the Slavs because the Austrians and Hungarians were not to continue to play the rôle of masters.

When the Hapsburg dominions could no longer be held together, problems arose that seemed impossible of settlement except by new wars among the emancipated peoples. As in the Balkans, the liberated states had conflicting claims and could invoke historical, strategic, ethnographic, and economic grounds for possessing the same territories. The Poles dreamed of recreating their medieval empire at the expense of Prussians, Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks. The Teschen district of upper Silesia was claimed by Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, eastern Galicia by Poles and Ukrainians, and the banat of Temesvar by Rumanians and Serbians.

The two most important problems in the application of the principle of self-determination to the Hapsburg dominions were those affecting the future of Austria and the satisfaction of Italian aspirations. Both had been recognized, since the beginning of the World War, as full of danger for the future relations among the great powers, because their solution involved changes in the European balance of power.

Even if Italian and Czecho-Slovak claims were fully allowed in the settlement following the war, there would still be between seven and eight million Austrian-Germans in territory contiguous to Germany. If the principle of self-

¹ They repeatedly said as much to M. Vesnitch, Serbian minister at Paris. Rumanian statesmen have told me that they felt they were being "double-crossed" in the negotiations for the fulfilment of promises made to them in 1916. Proof of the fact that agreements signed under the stress of necessity are not taken too seriously by governments is to be found in a comparison of the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Anglo-Hedjaz treaty. See pp. 437-440.

determination were applied to the German element in the Hapsburg empire, the richest prize of the war would fall to Germany. The vanquished power would be more than compensated for her losses to France, Belgium, Denmark, and Poland by the acquisition of these millions and a fertile territory extending along the Danube, with the third city of Europe as its capital. The French were determined that no such contingency should ever arise, and when it was realized that the Hapsburg dominions could not be held together, French diplomacy asserted that the permanent political separation of Austria and Germany was not a matter to be discussed after the war. Despite the consequences to the Austrians, their exclusion from Germany was to be a basic and unalterable fact in the reconstruction of Europe. Far-seeing Frenchmen, however, believed that it might prove impossible, whatever were the treaty stipulations, to prevent the union of Austria with Germany. Consequently there was a tendency in France during the war to attempt to save Austria-Hungary, and proposals for a separate peace were both made and entertained with that object in view.

Great Britain, on the other hand, was not alarmed over the possibility of the incorporation of the German-speaking portions of Austria with Germany. This contingency did not affect her security as it affected the security of France; it might even prove advantageous to her commerce. Italy felt that she had less to fear from the Germans than from the Russians, and the thought of the union of Austria with Germany was not disturbing. As a neighbor Italy could not help but benefit by the prosperity of Austria shorn of military power, and if that prosperity were dependent upon union with Germany it would benefit Italy to have the union effected.

The difference of policy during the war between France and Italy in regard to the Hapsburg dominions is a striking illustration of how allied peoples, fighting a common

enemy, have in mind and advance antagonistic aims because their situation and their interests are different. France's great enemy was the Hohenzollern empire; Italy's great enemy was the Hapsburg empire. To prevent Germany from inheriting any portion of it, France was ready to preserve the Hapsburg empire. Because her own prosperity was in a measure dependent upon the prosperity of central Europe, Italy was ready to preserve the Hohenzollern empire. Fearing Germany, France wanted to detach from Germany all the territory she could, thus lessening her man power and sources of wealth. In order to dispose of the nightmare of a strong political organism, which had always impeded her growth and had preyed upon her, Italy believed that the annexation of German-speaking Austria (after she had taken her part) to Germany might be the best way of forestalling for all time any scheme to revive the Hapsburg empire. The French, intent upon destroying Germany, regarded Austrians and Hungarians with tolerance and, having nothing to fear from Austria-Hungary, did not see why the territories of the Dual Monarchy should not be reorganized politically and remain a unit. The Italians, intent upon destroying Austria-Hungary, deplored the fact that they had to fight Germany also, and, having nothing to fear from Germany, were willing to see the Germans rehabilitated and even strengthened.¹

When the moment for drawing up armistice terms arrived, Italy held to the letter of her secret treaty of 1915. She insisted upon occupying the Austrian Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, the ports and hinterland of the head of the Adriatic, and ports and islands of Dalmatia. Her object was not to take military precautions to insure the unquestioned acceptance of the defeat by the vanquished enemy, but to stamp out Serbian nationalism in the regions she purposed annexing to Italy. By occupying Fiume the Italians went beyond the terms of the 1915 treaty. These

¹See pp. 450-451.

moves had long been feared by the Serbians, and they proved that the instinct of the Jugo-Slavs of Austria and Hungary to support the Hapsburg empire against Italy had been justified. The Italians still farther limited the application of the principle of self-determination. Entente statesmen had declared that only the peoples subject to enemies of the Entente were to enjoy this right. With the consent of the British and French, the Italians made a reservation even to this narrow limitation of the doctrine: Self-determination was to be exercised by peoples subject to enemy domination only in the case of territories not coveted and claimed by any of the great powers. Where one of the liberators was concerned, there was to be simply a change of masters.

Hard pressed by Germany, and not sure of victory, the Entente powers in the spring of 1918 began to encourage officially the aspirations of the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Rumanians. They entered into relations with national committees that had long been formed and had sent their representatives to London, Paris, Rome, and Washington. Special treatment was accorded Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war of Slavic blood, and when they could be induced to do so, they were formed into regiments to fight against former comrades-in-arms. In August and September the Czecho-Slovaks were recognized as allies and belligerents, and on October 17, 1918, the Czech Republic was proclaimed at Prague. The Polish nationalist army was recognized by the allied and associated powers in October, and when the Germans quit Poland the Warsaw government informed Austria, on November 8, 1918, that Galicia had been incorporated in Poland. Transylvanians proclaimed their union with Rumania and Jugo-Slavs their union with Serbia during the last days of the Dual Monarchy. But the Jugo-Slavs had never received satisfaction from the Entente powers as to the status and territorial limits of their nation. After the armistice they discovered,

what they had long suspected, that Great Britain and France were bound by explicit engagements to sacrifice most of the Slovenes and a part of the Croats and Dalmatians to Italy.

With the exception of the Czecho-Slovaks, there is doubt as to the contribution of the subject peoples of Austria and Hungary to the hastening of the victory of the Entente powers over the central empires. But once the military power of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs was manifestly broken, the effects of the self-determination propaganda were immediately evident. The disintegration of the Dual Monarchy took place automatically and almost without bloodshed.

In 1914, when they realized that Turkey was considering joining the central empires, the Entente ambassadors at Constantinople offered to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in exchange for Ottoman neutrality. They promised not to countenance or recognize any national movement within the dominions of the sultan. A fortnight later, when this bribe seemed to have no effect, they tried intimidation, and warned the Turks that if they joined Germany they would lose the territories where there were non-Turkish elements. These negotiations prove that the self-determination propaganda of the Entente powers, as applied to the Near East, was inspired by the same policy of expediency as their support of small nations elsewhere.

When Turkey joined the central empires, the Entente powers were free to use the weapon of self-determination as a war measure to destroy the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, although two members of the Entente had fought the third to maintain it in the middle of the nineteenth century. There was no desire, however, to carry out the threat and to preach in the Near East the doctrine in defense of which they professed to be fighting in Europe. From the beginning of the war the diplomacy of the Entente powers

in the Ottoman Empire followed its traditional course. If Turkey had to go by the board there would be no emancipation of subject races, but a division of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. The encouragement of aspirations to independence on the part of Mohammedan peoples was contrary to the general interests of Great Britain and France in Asia and Africa. Because of the difficulties of division, and because of the sentiments of solidarity with the Turks of their own Moslem subjects, the British and the French would have preferred to see the Ottoman Empire kept intact, despite the aid and comfort Turkey was giving to their enemies. But Russia and Italy had to be rewarded, and if this were done the other two powers must have their compensations. Present British and French possessions and economic interests had to be protected and the balance of power preserved in the Near East.

Greece, part of the time with the powerful voice of Venizelos, spoke for the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, who were persecuted, exiled, and massacred during the war in a manner scarcely less thorough than that applied to the Armenians. The massacre and deportation of the Armenians was unparalleled. The Syrians, too, were preyed upon. But the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire received no encouragement or protection from the Entente powers. Russian, Italian, and French ambitions could not be realized without the sacrifice of the Greeks and the Armenians. They were, therefore, sacrificed. As these powers were against Greek and Armenian nationalism, and as Great Britain had no interests in the parts of Turkey inhabited by Christian peoples, the armistice with Turkey, after the complete victory, made no provision for their protection or liberation. A fitting epitaph for the tomb of more than a million Christians of the Ottoman Empire, who were fired with hope because of the proclamations of the ideals of the Entente, and whose devotion to the enemies

of Germany was not reciprocated, would be, "They lost their lives because they were loyal to those who could have saved them."

Ideals and sentiments of humanity have no place in world politics. While the Greeks and Armenians were suffering, the Entente powers carried on protracted negotiations over the future of the Ottoman dominions. The Anglo-French agreements of 1915 and 1916 defined eventual rights of Russia and Italy. In return for Constantinople, the *Ægean* islands, the Smyrna and Adalia regions, and southern Asia Minor as far east as Konia, Russia, and Italy agreed to leave eastern Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia to the French and the British. In 1916 two officials, whose names the arrangement bears, settled conflicting French and British claims by a compromise known as the Sykes-Picot agreement. Southeastern Asia Minor, Cilicia, and Syria went to France; and Palestine, the Sinai peninsula, and Mesopotamia, to Great Britain. The dividing lines were settled after long and bitter discussions in which oil and copper, and not the necessities or wishes of the peoples concerned, were the guiding considerations.

The intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the central empires, the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, the disaster that befell the British army in Mesopotamia, and the attempt of the Turks to invade Egypt by crossing the Suez Canal opened the eyes of the Entente powers to the dangers of the Turkish situation. Turkey showed no signs of succumbing and made no move to sue for a separate peace. The disaster to Russian arms in Europe and the stalemate on the French front contributed to diminish the prestige of the Entente in the Near East.

The situation was particularly serious for Great Britain, who was compelled to put forth every effort and use every means to reestablish her military reputation. Unless they showed that they could drive the Turks out of Bagdad and

Jerusalem, the British would have to face troubles in Egypt and India and the loss of all influence in Arabia (where the holding of Aden was important), in Persia, and in Afghanistan. British statesmen and military leaders are not in the habit of fooling themselves. They saw that in Mesopotamia and Arabia they would have to use the natives to fight the Turks, and that no military operation on a large scale, bringing decisive results, would be possible without the coöperation of the Arabs. When this fact was recognized, prodigal promises of independence were made to all the important sheiks of Mesopotamia, and the shereef of Mecca was induced to revolt against the sultan. In return the independence of the Hedjaz was promulgated, with the shereef as King Hussein. Self-determination for the Arabs was preached, and this propaganda, the boldest and most picturesque during the World War, resulted in the conquest of Mesopotamia and Palestine by the British.

The British intended to use the national movement among the Arabs only as a means, and not to allow it to grow to irresistible proportions. To keep the Suez Canal under their protection, and to set up a barrier between the Arabs of Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Syria, and the Arabs of Egypt, the London government conceived the idea of utilizing the Zionist movement. On November 2, 1917, Foreign Secretary Balfour issued a statement declaring that the British government was in sympathy with Zionism and would aid the Zionists to set up a national home for all the Jews in Palestine. A few months earlier, to propitiate the Arabs of the Hedjaz, the British had promised them Damascus, which had been assigned to France in the Anglo-French agreement of the previous year.

The Hedjaz movement was the only one that was recognized by the Entente powers. The belligerency of the Hedjaz was proclaimed, and its representatives attended the peace conference as delegates of a sovereign state. The

other subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire were denied a hearing at Paris, as their fate had already been settled by the series of agreements among the victors. The Ottoman Empire succumbed to the undermining influence of the self-determination propaganda, but the applications of the principle was limited to a far greater extent than in the Hapsburg empire. Only that non-Turkish element whose aid had been needed during the war was liberated. The others went from one subjection to another.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A LEAGUE OF NATIONS AT PARIS AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY (1919)

TO the peace conference, which met at Paris in January, 1919, were invited representatives of all the nations that had been at war with one or more of the members of the central empires coalition. It was not the intention of Entente statesmen, however, to let pass out of their hands either the initiative or the final decision in regard to matters arising at the conference. And, as their object was primarily to harmonize the conflicting interests and ideals of the Entente powers and the United States, and not to reëstablish a state of peace between the victors and the vanquished, the central empires and their allies were excluded from the conference. From the beginning the organizers of the conference arbitrarily divided the members of the victorious coalition into two groups, "the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers with general interests" and "the Secondary States with particular interests." Russia, who had withdrawn from the war after the Bolshevik régime superseded the original revolutionary government, was left outside altogether.

Power and resources, not numbers and contribution to the victory, decided the category in which each member of the coalition was placed. The actual sacrifices of Japan and the United States, who were classified as "Principal Allied and Associated Powers," had not been as great as those of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania. It was also patent that from the point of view of future prosperity and secur-

ity only France and Italy among the big five had as much at stake in the various settlements as the minor European members of the coalition. The treaties were made by the great powers, who decided among themselves, in accordance with their own interests, every question that arose. Only six plenary sessions were held during the framing of the two principal treaties, and the texts of the treaties were not communicated to the smaller states or to the enemy states until the statesmen of the five principal powers had definitely agreed upon terms that amounted to the harmonizing of their own ideas and the compromising of their own interests. At the second plenary session, when the statesmen of the smaller powers protested against this high-handed method of procedure, M. Clemenceau, speaking for his colleagues of the Entente and for President Wilson, refused to entertain the protest on the ground that the great powers, whose authority was supported by twelve million soldiers, must control the conference.¹

At the end of May, when the treaty of St. Germain, to be presented to Austria, was laid before a plenary session, the premiers of the small states most affected by its terms renewed the protest against the injustice of drafting documents that were to have a vital bearing upon their national destinies without giving them a voice in the deliberations or decisions. Again the doctrine of the great powers was set forth, this time by President Wilson, to the effect that those who possessed superior strength and resources had the right to judge what was best for weaker nations. It was understood, of course, that in forming their judgments

¹ "As events turned out, the great powers kept matters in their own hands to a much greater extent than was anticipated at the opening of the conference, and the bulk of the treaty was made by them alone, and only presented to their smaller allies when the time for signature came. . . . An attempt of the small powers to assert their rights was nipped in the bud at the second meeting. The natural result was that the plenary conference played only a formal part in the organization." "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris" (Institute of International Affairs, London), i, p. 249.

the strong would exercise wisdom and justice and disinterestedness.

The organization and methods of the Paris peace conference must be taken into consideration in appraising the attempt to create a league of nations. It was inevitable that the character of the League of Nations, whatever had been its original conception, should undergo a modification when drafted under such conditions, and that its final organization should conform to the general spirit and purposes of the treaties. The idealistic principle of equality of nations was denied by the conference. In its place was put a realistic conception of the privileges and obligations of five great powers that had waged a war and won a victory in common and who were determined to make an effort to arrive at a peace settlement that would confirm and maintain indefinitely their privileged position. It was natural, therefore, that the covenant of the League of Nations should provide for a council of nine members, five (the majority) being designated as permanent members and four (the minority) being elected members. Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States were given the permanent seats, and all the other nations were to fill from their number the minority seats. Every nation was to have a place in the Assembly of the league. But the real power was vested in the Council.

Along with the thought of safeguarding the authority of the five great powers, the framers of the covenant had to keep in mind the unwillingness of the great powers to be automatically party to any common action that any one of them might deem prejudicial to its individual interests, or that would deprive a great power of the advantage of its superior strength in a dispute with a small power. These two inconveniences, which formed—on the technical ground of sovereignty—powerful objections to an international organization, were remedied by inserting a clause

giving each member of the Council the right of veto and by making voluntary the submission of disputes to the international court provided for in article XIV.¹

In the question of the League of Nations, as in many other questions, an honest effort was made to advance the cause of world peace by providing a machinery that would lessen the chances of another war breaking out in the same manner as the war of 1914. There was also the desire to set up an international organization that would take care of a host of minor matters of an international character and that would facilitate coöperation after the war among the various powers in dealing with problems affecting their relations with one another and with smaller states. And statesmen were sensitive to public opinion, which demanded that they devise at Paris some means of improving international relations. Most of the advocates of the League of Nations idea argued at the time and have reiterated since that the important thing was to make a real start along the road of international association; and they therefore emphasize the fact that a league of nations was created at Paris and has been functioning since. Its impotence in the things that count, however, they do not seem to see, and they refuse to admit that the defects in the original covenant make its amendment impossible. The clause, "no such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom" (article XXVI), prevents the League from developing into what President Wilson declared that it must be—"an association of all nations for the common good of all"—and from fulfilling the sole function that will diminish the chances of war arising from international disputes—compulsory submission of quarrels to an international court.

¹ The right of veto was rather a right of withdrawal, but, in numerous speeches in defense of the treaty of Versailles, Mr. Wilson interpreted it as a veto right and emphasized the stipulations of the covenant that enabled any member of the League to avoid surrendering its sovereign rights. He thereby admitted that membership in the League did not mean that a state would ever have to act against its own interests.

The study of world politics shows us how nations, when they have become strong, have invariably been a law unto themselves, have developed and maintained armies and navies on the plea of necessity for national security, and have then used this power to advance their commercial interests by the exploitation of weaker peoples and to impose upon all who could not resist them their own interpretation of moot questions.

At Paris the weaker powers were unanimously in favor of a league of nations based upon equality of opportunity to secure justice in international disputes, equality of opportunity to participate in world markets, and reciprocity in all international dealings. A covenant that would have secured these advantages was what President Wilson had in mind, but it was impossible to get any great power to surrender the advantages of its privileged position in dealing with other nations. The original covenant draft was modified accordingly, with the result that the League of Nations, as embodied in the treaty of Versailles, does not bind the great powers to deal justly with the other states or even with each other.¹

It was generally supposed in the United States that the Entente statesmen, with few exceptions, were opposed to the League of Nations, or at least to having it incorporated in the treaty of Versailles. The picture of President Wilson forcing the covenant upon an unwilling conference, and saving it after it had been sidetracked, is pure fancy. It

¹ Compulsory arbitration or reference of moot questions to an international tribunal, which was the original idea, received drastic emasculation in articles XIII and XIV, and was further weakened by the provision of article XV that any recommendation of the Council in the matter of a dispute would have to be unanimous to be binding. In article XIII disputes had to be of a kind that the parties "recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration," and in a paragraph defining what kind of disputes are suitable the word "generally" was inserted before "suitable." Article XIV does not establish but merely provides for "plans for the establishment" of a permanent court of international justice; the said court is simply "competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it"; and its opinion upon disputes or questions deferred to it by the Council or the Assembly is only "advisory."

is true that Mr. Wilson, like Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, had pronounced ideas in regard to the covenant, and that after a draft was agreed upon he regarded the league as the most important feature of the treaties. But the covenant, as it appears in the treaty of Versailles, was prepared in fifteen sessions of the commission intrusted with its drafting, ten of which in the first half of February produced the draft submitted to the plenary session of February 14, while the other five, between March 22 and April 11, completed its revision. The commission began its work with certain definite limitations, and did not attempt to include in the covenant the conceptions of international association as advocated by idealists. When it came to controversial points, like article X and article XXII, it accepted the compromises decided upon by the heads of states in secret conference and communicated to it. The spirit shown by the members of the commission was an eminently practical one. They avoided a discussion of proposals that they knew their governments would not accept, and they did their work in the same way as the other commissions, *i. e.*, by embodying in a text the decisions arrived at by the Council of Ten or the "Big Four" in every clause where there was a conflict of interest or policy among the great powers.

Far from being opposed to the League of Nations and its inclusion in the treaty, the Entente statesmen looked upon it as an excellent means of solving problems, and of securing guaranties and help from the rest of the world in enforcing treaty clauses that were to their own particular advantage. Article X guaranteed the territorial *status quo* of the treaties. Article XXII provided for the annexation of the German colonies and a division of the Ottoman Empire, under the guise of mandates held by the new possessors as trustees of the League of Nations. Equality of treatment commercially in mandated territories was guaranteed only to members of the league, thus excluding Ger-

many from the markets of her former possessions and of the Ottoman Empire.¹

In addition to these provisions, which have to do with the covenant alone, the treaties intrusted to the league the administration of the Saar Basin and the duty of revising, at a later date, certain articles relating to inland transportation that encroached upon elementary rights of sovereignty. In this way the execution of the treaties was bound up with the League of Nations, and upon neutrals, by the fact of their entrance in the league, was imposed the obligation of aiding in forcing the defeated powers to carry out treaty provisions that had been dictated to them and were conceived in the interest of a limited number of states.

Criticism of the League of Nations, especially in the United States, where it became an issue of internal party politics, was bitter and unreasoning, and brought forth equally bitter and unreasoning defense. It is difficult to find any story or critical estimate of the League of Nations (or of the work of the Paris peace conference on the whole) that is not a polemic. The experience of three years has demonstrated, however, the apparent futility of the league as an instrument for accomplishing the objects that Mr. Wilson and other idealists had in mind as the purpose of its existence. Speaking on September 27, 1918, Mr. Wilson said:

“It will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and able to pay the price, the only price that will procure a secure and lasting peace, and ready and willing to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace shall be honored and fulfilled. That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed, and not only

¹Of course, Germany can be admitted to the League of Nations, but France has the power to prevent her admittance, and the French government has declared in speeches of successive premiers before the Chamber of Deputies that it will oppose the candidacy of Germany until the terms of the treaty of Versailles are fulfilled, which will take at least thirty years.

impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a league of nations, formed under covenants. . . . The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all."

Although Mr. Wilson changed his mind as to the practicability of an association of nations and a peace settlement along the lines indicated in his war speeches, the wisdom of his earlier opinions seems to have been demonstrated by events.

After the signing of the treaties, of which the covenant of the League of Nations formed the first articles, preparations were made for organizing the secretariat, which was installed first at London and then at Geneva. Between January 16 and October 28, 1920, the Council of the League held ten sessions at London, Paris, Rome, San Sebastian, and Brussels. But, both in personnel of the delegates and in the importance of the matters passed upon, it was evident that the Entente powers did not intend to use the League as the organization through which the principal questions concerning the application of the treaties and the problems arising from the war were to be settled. Vital matters were taken up in conferences of the premiers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, who decided upon the terms of the treaty with Turkey, which had not been settled by the Paris conference, and all other matters important enough to affect the interests and relations of the three powers. Other questions were referred to a council of ambassadors in London or in Paris. The Council of the League, attended by minor personalities, sometimes dis-

cussed major questions, but in no case asserted the right of making settlements and carrying them out.

On Monday, November 15, 1920, the Assembly of the League of Nations, with 241 delegates from 41 nations, was opened at Geneva, and its sessions continued until December 18. A second meeting was held in September, 1921. Much useful work was accomplished at these two meetings, but neither the Council nor the League, during the first two years of the League's existence,¹ took the initiative in the settlement of any dispute, or made a decision of any kind contrary to the wishes or orders of the British, French, and Italian governments. The Assembly entirely failed to assert its authority over the Council. The latter did what it was told to do, or decided questions it was asked to decide, by the British, French, and Italian premiers. The numerous questions upon which the statesmen of the three Entente powers are still of different minds have not come before the League of Nations.

¹ The formal ratification of the treaty of Versailles was finally completed on January 10, 1920, and the League of Nations thus began to function on that day.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE REFUSAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO RATIFY THE TREATIES AND ENTER THE LEAGUE (1919-1921)

THE yearning of the world for a new international order, which would tend to make wars less frequent and diminish the burden of armaments, did not decrease in intensity and did not express itself less emphatically after the signing of the treaty of Versailles than before. But in every country disappointment over the work of the conference at Paris was bitter, and because the covenant of the League of Nations had been made an integral part of the treaty of Versailles the League was discredited along with the impracticable treaty provisions. So strong was the opposition to the ratification of the treaty of Versailles in the United States that the four other treaties were never even submitted to the Senate.

The treaty of Versailles was subjected to long and penetrating criticism in the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The protests showed: (1) fear that national interests had been sacrificed to questionable international advantages; (2) uncertainty as to the adequacy of the means of enforcing the provisions of the treaty; (3) dissatisfaction with the League of Nations covenant; (4) doubt as to the wisdom of attempting to incorporate in one document the solution of two different questions—making peace with Germany and setting up the machinery of a new world order. In Italy and Japan parliamentarians declared that the treaty was conceived in the interests of France in so far as Europe was concerned, and in the interests of Great Britain outside Europe. France, Italy, and Japan ratified the treaty, however, because in definite

particulars it did advance French and Japanese interests, while Italy was to be the principal beneficiary of the treaty with Austria. In every essential matter the treaty was advantageous to Great Britain. Since the various arrangements made at the end of the Napoleonic wars, no international settlement had advanced so strikingly the strategic, territorial, political, and economic interests of the British Empire.¹ Of the principal powers the United States alone had gained nothing tangible by the war.

The treaty fight in the United States Senate is a dramatic episode in American history. Its merits and importance can hardly be estimated until we have more perspective. But, in justice both to Mr. Wilson and to his opponents, as well as for the purpose of gaining a clear idea of the issues at stake, the popular and prevalent impression of Mr. Wilson as a fanatical idealist or a man unwilling to confess his failure, and of the Republican senators as partizans inspired with the sole motive of discrediting a Democratic president, must be corrected.

During the latter part of the peace conference Mr. Wilson became ill, and his physical condition affected his judgment. This condition led to a nervous breakdown, so that during the critical period of the treaty fight it was doubted by many whether he was capable of making reasonable decisions. The senators, on the other hand, from the very fact of the president's condition, felt that the treaty and the covenant needed the most careful scrutiny, and when it was discovered that ratification would mean involving the

¹ Great Britain's principal naval and commercial competitor was ruined and bound hand and foot, and the major parts of her colonies were added to the British Empire; the elaborate competitive system—merchant marine, cables, banks, and business interests—erected by German enterprise in every part of the world fell chiefly into British hands; the British protectorate over Egypt was recognized; the British self-governing dominions were given membership in the League of Nations; Great Britain's right to speak for India was acknowledged; and no question (present or future) of self-determination that might embarrass the British Empire was introduced even by inference into the clauses of the treaty. This new status was guaranteed by article X, which had been cut down by omitting the qualifying clauses suggested by President Wilson in his original draft of the article.

United States in obligations and responsibilities that we were asked to assume without compensatory advantages, reservations were proposed. There is no reason to believe that the senators who voted consistently against ratification without reservations were not inspired by enlightened devotion to duty. A proposal was before them to abandon what had been the policy of the United States in foreign affairs since the foundation of the republic, and yet no advantages either to the world or to America were convincingly set before them as a reason for so drastic a step.

Mr. Wilson had ample warning of the opposition that would be made to the unqualified acceptance of the League of Nations as drafted at Paris, but he failed to take the steps that might have induced the Senate to ratify the treaty. He did not perceive that American public opinion would not follow him in the successive compromises that he had felt compelled to make during the Paris negotiations. Faced with the alternatives of inviting the participation of the Senate in the peace conference or of taking the American people into his confidence each time he made a compromise, he chose neither course. He could have overridden the Senate's opposition only if he had had the people behind him. Of all the points he took to Paris, the last to give up, in view of the attitude of the Senate, was that of "open covenants, openly arrived at." Yet for weeks secrecy shrouded the conditions of peace dictated to the Germans, and, even after the terms were made known in European countries, Mr. Wilson forbade their publication in the United States. During these weeks the President lost the confidence of the American people, and in every successive step of the treaty fight public opinion rallied more and more to the side of the senators who refused to accept the treaty without reservations. After his nervous breakdown the president, either because of mental incapacity or because of the mistaken advice of those around him, persisted in believing that the people were in favor of

ratifying the treaty as he had brought it back from Paris.

Immediately after the treaty of Versailles was signed President Wilson left Paris. He arrived in New York on July 8 and, in person, on July 10 presented the treaty for ratification. In his speech recommending that the Senate give its assent to the treaty, Mr. Wilson made it clear that he expected his decisions during the course of the negotiations to be approved without modification in any particular. It was his thesis that reservations to the articles creating the League of Nations would vitiate the whole treaty. This attitude he never modified. When the Foreign Relations Committee reported the treaty to the Senate with reservations, three groups formed: most of the Democrats favored ratification without reservations; most of the Republicans favored ratification with reservations; and a small group, called "bitter-enders," were determined to reject the whole treaty. The debates closed on November 15, 1919. If the minority Democrats had given in to the majority Republicans, it would have been possible to secure more than the two thirds necessary for ratification. An effort was made to compromise on the reservations in order to secure the acceptance of the treaty. This last chance of ratification was blocked by the president, who advised his followers in the Senate to vote against the treaty if any reservations were appended to it. On November 19 the treaty definitely failed to pass the Senate, the Democratic minority and the bitter-enders combining to defeat ratification.

President Wilson could have changed his tactics and have resubmitted the treaty with the intimation that he was willing to accept the more important of the fifteen reservations, with modifications in their wording. But he did not choose to do so. On the contrary, he declared that the question of the League of Nations and his attitude towards ratification would have to be submitted to the people at the presidential election a year later. This would be, in his own language, "a solemn referendum."

During 1920 the tendency of the Entente premiers to usurp the functions of the League Council, or to ignore it, and the continued state of war and conflicting ambitions in Europe, seemed to confirm the wisdom of Senator Lodge and his colleagues of the majority. When the treaty question was finally submitted to the people on November 2, 1920, after a campaign in which the League of Nations played a leading part, Mr. Wilson's candidate, ex-Governor Cox of Ohio, was defeated by an overwhelming vote. Senator Harding, also of Ohio, who had advocated the reservations in the Senate, received the largest majority ever given a presidential candidate.

Many considerations of internal politics entered into the presidential election, and it is doubtful whether the vote indicated the unwillingness of the American people to commit the United States to the principle of an international association. In fact, leading Republicans, including notably ex-President Taft, although they supported Mr. Harding, had taken throughout the treaty fight the position that the fears of the senators who made the reservations to the covenant were not wholly justified. In November, 1919, only the uncompromising tactics of President Wilson prevented treaty ratification and our entry into the League. There is no doubt that public opinion would have approved at that time ratification with very mild reservations.

But the psychological moment for coöperating with our associates in the World War by a belated acceptance of the Paris treaties had passed. The aftermath of the war had revealed a reversion on the part of European governments to the diplomatic methods and ambitions for which we had pilloried Germany. With the German imperial government no longer a disturbing factor in international politics, the relations between great powers and small states and among the great powers themselves seemed to show no marked improvement over 1914. It began to be realized that if the treaty of Versailles had been accepted we should

logically have had to ratify the other treaties. Taken as a whole, the Paris settlements were beginning to cause sharp differences of opinion among the Entente Powers in Europe and the Near East, and our own State Department had become involved in difficulties with Great Britain over the interpretation of the mandate programs.¹ Because of Ireland, Egypt, Persia, and India, American public opinion was turning against Great Britain. The unreasoning pressure that France put upon Germany, French encouragement to Polish imperialism, the betrayal by France of the Armenians in Cilicia, the failure of Japan to adjust the Shantung difficulty with China, and Japan's insistence upon refusing the United States freedom of cable communications through the island of Yap destroyed American faith in the desire of our late associates to coöperate with us in establishing a new world order. We began to realize that at Paris the other powers had feathered their nests well, and had expected that the United States would be willing to share in responsibilities without demanding to share in privileges.

War with Germany and Austria was terminated by a joint congressional resolution passed by the House of Representatives on June 30, by the Senate on July 1, and signed by President Harding on July 2, 1921. On August 25 the American high commissioner in Berlin and the German foreign minister signed a treaty declaring at an end the technical state of war that had continued ever since the armistice. The treaty of Berlin was very brief. Germany assented to the terms of the American resolution of July 2, and agreed to give to the United States all the rights and advantages stipulated in the treaty of Versailles, with the exception of certain portions specifically mentioned as excluded at the volition of the United States. The repudiated portions were: the covenant of the League of Nations; the

¹ For these differences of opinion among the Entente powers see Chapter XL, and for the American interpretation of the mandate programs see Chapter XLVI.

boundaries of Germany; the political clauses for Europe; the sections concerning German rights outside Germany, with the exception of the cession of the German colonies "in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers"; and the provisions concerning the organization of labor. By these omissions the United States dissociated herself from the other signatories of the treaty of Versailles in regard to the responsibility for the war, the trial of war criminals, and the guaranties for the fulfilment of the treaty. The right was reserved to participate in a reparations commission or any other commission established under the treaty. But "the United States is not bound to participate in any such commission unless it shall elect to do so."

From the point of view of our associates, the making of a separate treaty of this character was preposterous and denoted the return of the United States to the old rigid policy of refusal to participate in Old World affairs. Without giving us advantages such as they had gained by the treaty of Versailles, the Entente Powers had hoped to secure our aid in its enforcement. But American idealism could not answer a call to the renunciation of particular interests and to world service that was not answered by the other nations. Our treaty with Germany was an inglorious termination of what had started out to be a crusade. But it was to be expected that we should tire of a monopoly of the crusading spirit. Public opinion, therefore, received the news of the separate treaty with Germany, followed by similar treaties with Austria and Hungary, without protest; and these agreements were promptly ratified.

In reality the United States did only what the other victorious powers had done. We negotiated and concluded treaties strictly on the basis of our own interests, and, as we had no interests at stake in the political clauses of the treaty of Versailles, with the single exception of the Ger-

man colonies,¹ our government refused to assume any obligation under the clauses pertaining to political settlements in or outside Europe, except in the case of the colonies. But we reserved all the privileges in economic matters that a victorious nation is accustomed to exact of a defeated enemy. At the same time, being dubious about the value of the concessions wrung from Germany at Versailles, we were careful not to bind ourselves to participate even in the reparations commission.

After three and one fourth years of maintaining an army of occupation on the Rhine, the American government notified the Allied governments that the cost of the armies of occupation was considered by us a first lien on German reparations. In his note of March 11, 1922, Secretary Hughes presented a bill of \$240,000,000, the cost of the army of occupation up to the end of 1921, and contended that provision should be made for the payment of this sum in the apportionment of the sums that were being paid by Germany. The Allied governments replied that the United States had no claim on any sums collected by the reparations commission, because (a) we were not signatories of the treaty of Versailles; (b) Germany had bound herself in such a way by that treaty that she had no authority to make a separate treaty with the United States, which involved financial settlements; and (c) that the United States had taken no part in collecting from Germany the sums against which she was attempting to place a lien.

Our flare-up of idealism might have accomplished much in establishing a sane and magnanimous world peace. The Paris conference had proved, however, that our associates were unwilling to follow us along the path of Mr. Wilson's fourteen points. As each great power advanced and de-

¹ Article 119 reads: "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions." That the United States did not accept the treaty of Versailles does not alter the fact that the United States has become one of the title-holders of the former German colonies.

fended its particular interests, American enthusiasm cooled. The revelations of intrigues and conflicts of interests in the Near East; the expenditures of enormous sums for military purposes by our former associates, great and small, who could not pay even the interest on their indebtedness to us; the refusal to consider our interests in the distribution of the German cables; and the effort to exclude American capital and trade from mandated territories, gradually turned American public opinion from eagerness to coöperate with Europe to indifference. When Secretary Hughes declined the invitation to the economic conference at Genoa, scheduled for April, 1922, the policy of refusing to sit in a conference that seemed to us more political than economic was generally approved.

That the United States has not abandoned the hope of constructive international coöperation in the settling of world problems, however, was indicated by the Limitation of Armaments Conference, which assembled by invitation of the American government at Washington on November 12, 1921, with nine powers participating. Public opinion supported President Harding when he issued the call to the conference, showed great interest in its proceedings, and indorsed the program for limitation of armaments and for emancipating China which the United States was partially successful in having adopted. The later opposition in the Senate indicated the constitutional weakness of our government for carrying on international negotiations rather than any marked hostility to the treaties on the part of the American people.

CHAPTER XXXV

WORLD POLITICS AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES (1919-1922)

THE peace conference that assembled at Paris in January, 1919, undertook four tasks: to reëstablish peace by imposing treaties upon Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; to bring together all the nations of the world into an organization for the preservation of peace and for the amelioration of political, economic, and social conditions through international coöperation; to dispose of the territories wrested and the indemnities exacted from the defeated enemies; and to harmonize the conflicting ambitions and policies of the principal victors so that the general world supremacy, which their union had given them, might remain permanently theirs.

The effort to attain these objects made necessary the exclusion of the minor allies from a voice in the decisions, the abandonment from the principle of "open covenants, openly arrived at," and the partial, if not complete, repudiation of the pre-armistice agreement with Germany. The minor allies were excluded because they had not won the war and would not be called upon to guarantee the peace; open diplomacy was discarded because it was regarded as impracticable and would certainly have defeated the objects which the Entente statesmen had in mind; and the pre-armistice agreement was ignored because the framers of the treaty of Versailles were sure that Germany would have done the same thing had she been in their place.¹ Mr. Wil-

¹ These are not the opinions of the writer, but are a summing up of the arguments advanced in the speeches of the leaders of the conference when they were explaining and defending their attitude on these questions.

son and other members of the American delegation contended for a just and practicable peace, but they were worsted by the Entente statesmen, whose concern was not a durable world peace but the advancement of their world policies.¹

The treaty of Versailles has been subjected to a minute analysis and criticism and has been attacked and defended by the leading men of our day. Several of those who signed it have denounced it bitterly, along the lines of the protest of General Smuts, who declared at the time he signed:

“The promise of the new life, the victory of the great human ideals, for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfilment of their aspirations towards a new international order and a fairer, better world, are not written in this treaty. . . . There are territorial settlements which in my humble judgment will need revision. There are guaranties laid down which we all hope will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which can not be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate. There are numerous pin-pricks which will cease to pain under the healing influences of the new international atmosphere.

“The real peace of the peoples ought to follow, complete, and amend the peace of the statesmen. . . . I am confident that the League of Nations will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin brought about by this war. . . . The enemy peoples should at the earliest possible date join

¹ This was definitely stated by M. Clemenceau to the Chamber of Deputies on January 2, 1919, and by Mr. Wilson in several interviews and speeches after the conference, notably with members of the Senate committee on foreign affairs, when he explained that he had been forced at Paris to acknowledge the priority of the secret agreements among the Entente powers over his “fourteen points.” Although most of these agreements had been concluded during the war and after Entente statesmen had proclaimed the idealistic objects for which they were fighting, they were brought forward as sacred obligations. Had not the principal object of the war been to uphold “the sanctity of treaties”?

the League, and in collaboration with the Allied peoples learn to practise the great lesson of this war, that not in separate ambitions or in selfish domination, but in common service for the great human causes, lies the true path of national progress."

Like President Wilson, General Smuts had placed too much hope in the League of Nations, and had been willing to compromise with the aims and methods of the old diplomacy in order to get the covenant of the League written into the treaty. The threefold demand of those who opposed the "real peace of the peoples" was: punishments, reparations, and guaranties. The first two could be assured only by the third. Much has been written about the atmosphere of hatred and resentment at the Paris conference, and about the fear of statesmen to defy public opinion. But were the men who determined the policies of the conference really swayed by bitterness and passion or by the clamor of the people for a punitive peace? The feeling against Germany that undoubtedly existed in Entente countries and in the United States was used to justify treaty terms unique in history, and also to explain the failure of the Wilsonian principles. But the student of world politics finds in the treaty not only the realization of hopes cherished since the early days of the war and written into secret treaties, but also the triumph of theories advocated long before the World War by writers and statesmen who believed that the European nations were engaged in a struggle for existence. The carefully elaborated policies advanced during the Paris conference demonstrate the prevalence of the belief that the attitude of nations towards one another can be summed up in the primitive formula, "Your life or mine."

The trial of the kaiser and war criminals, the acknowledgment of Germany's responsibility for the war, and the admission on the part of Germany that she owed an indemnity larger than her capacity to pay were the three

points written into the treaty that put the German people at the mercy of their victors.

It was fully realized that no German government could bring to book the kaiser and high officers of the army and navy upon charges preferred by their enemies, that it was against human nature for an entire nation to avow itself wholly and solely in the wrong, and that payment of the sums named in the treaty would mean that Germany, upon the basis of the world trade figures of 1913, should be allowed to enjoy immediately the privilege of monopolizing more than half of the whole world's trade. Punishments and reparations, in the form provided for by the treaty of Versailles, were impossibilities, if not absurdities. Hence, failing to punish her sovereign and national heroes, and defaulting in indemnity payments, Germany would have to submit to the permanent stranglehold of the guaranties. The treaty thus gave the Entente powers the right to destroy Germany as a world power and to make it impossible for her ever to regain political and commercial prestige outside Europe. Unless we realize the deliberate intention of the treaty, couched in unmistakable terms, we can not understand the aftermath of the Paris conference in Europe and the consistent attitude of France. The framers of the treaty of Versailles had no illusions about the trial of war criminals or the ability of Germany to pay the sums they intended to demand. But by making it impossible for Germany not to default they would hold in their hands indefinitely the means of preventing her from aspiring to regain her political and commercial influence throughout the world.

If it endures, the treaty of Versailles will mark the disappearance of Germany as a world power, just as the treaty of St. Germain marks the disappearance of Austria-Hungary as a world power. For the treaty took away Germany's army, navy, and merchant marine; restricted her air service; expelled her subjects from, and confiscated

their enterprises and individual property in, the Near East and Far East and in all the countries of the victorious coalition; put an end to German missionary effort, Catholic and Protestant, in Africa and Asia; forbade the export of German capital; and placed Germany's foreign trade under the control of a commission made up of appointees of competitor nations from whose decision there is no appeal. Germany lost her cables, her foreign banks and commercial houses; she agreed to an export tax on her products, to be fixed by her competitors; she consented to internationalize her rivers under foreign commissions, and to allow her neighbors to use her canals and railways and certain of her ports independently of German control. Since reciprocity was not promised in the disarmament, transportation, and economic clauses of the treaty, Germany virtually signed away her sovereignty and put herself into the hands of receivers.


From the point of view of world politics the treaty of Versailles marked a new stage in the struggle of European nations for world power. Precedents were set that, if successfully maintained, will make the investments of foreigners in every country of the world dependent solely upon the strength of their own government or its ability to form and maintain alliances with dominant powers. Up to the time of the treaty of Versailles international law distinguished between the property of a government and that of its nationals. Private property was not considered liable to seizure. According to the treaty of Versailles, a belligerent country, within its own dominions or those of its allies, has the right to confiscate property of any nature belonging to subjects of an enemy country, and, if victorious at the end of the war, to compel the government of the defeated country to agree to indemnify its own nationals for property thus confiscated.

The treaty of Versailles divided Germany's overseas possessions among the British, French, and Japanese, and

canceled the concessions and leases and took away the property of Germans in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Siam, China, and the parts of the world under the domination of the victorious colonial powers. Germany renounced her participation in international commissions, and her privileges of extraterritoriality in countries where the European powers and the United States enjoyed a special régime for residents and traders. But the victorious powers did not give up their own enjoyment of these privileges.

One third of the industrial population of Europe is therefore deprived of any part, on equal terms, in world markets and in the exploitation of the rest of the world. The treaty of Versailles has taught the dispossessed a lesson very different from that General Smuts hoped they would learn "in collaboration with the Allied peoples." For the treaty is the triumph of "separate ambitions" and "selfish domination" and denies the principle of "common service for the great human causes." The Germans have learned that defeat in war brings personal disaster as well as national humiliation, and that if a man wants to be sure of his ability to trade on equal terms with other nations and keep what he has created in other parts of the world, he must be the subject of a power that is able to develop opportunities for its nationals and protect them in the enjoyment of those opportunities by possessing superior force and knowing how to use it.

When we consider the origins of the World War and the manner in which the Germans carried on their side of the conflict, we may think the punishment none too severe. Unfortunately, the lesson is driven home elsewhere than in Germany. The aftermath of the war has shown that British, French, Italians, Japanese, and Americans are unwilling to trust one another. They believe that their "place in the sun" will be made secure only by their own armaments and by a vigilant and aggressive foreign policy. The



greater their political and economic interests in various parts of the world, the more they will strive to defend them by their own efforts.

A reading of the German observations on the terms of the treaty of Versailles (May 29, 1919) and the answer of the Allies (June 16) is necessary if one would understand the implications of the various principles that inspired the peace terms. The Germans protested against the one-sided application of what the Allies had considered the fulfilment of ideals. Disarmament, self-determination of peoples, liberation of natives in colonies from exploitation, abolition of capitulations in Asiatic countries, cancelation of leases and concessions, non-fortification and free passage of the Kiel Canal, internationalization of waterways, leases at ports, a free port at Danzig for a landlocked state, unrestricted through transit on canals and railways, punishment of officers and soldiers guilty of inhuman conduct in war, trial of rulers and ministers accused of having been responsible for the war, a league of nations, an international labor commission, restoration of the loot from museums to invaded states, cancelation of loans foisted on weak states at large discounts and usurious rates of interest, waiving of the Chinese Boxer indemnity, nullification of treaties and restoration of indemnities obtained by force—none of these provisions is open to objection. They all mark a distinct step forward in the progress of civilization, and in their ensemble they represent the evil results and at the same time the motivating causes of world politics.

But the embarrassing difficulty that their inclusion in the treaty of Versailles has raised for the victorious powers is the finding of a ground that will at the same time justify their imposition upon the enemy and the refusal of the victorious powers to apply them, or analogous principles, to themselves. In their reply to the Germans the Entente Powers took the position that everything demanded of

Germany was just and reasonable in itself, but that the reason for the demands was the fact that Germany was responsible for the war and had to be punished. Eighteen months later Premier Lloyd George was correct in stating that the basis of the treaty of Versailles was Germany's war guilt. In the final analysis, however, the acknowledgment of her guilt, and the ability to impose penalties because of it, lay in the verdict of an ordeal by battle. Hence, the basis of the treaty was in reality the victory of the Entente powers.

As the aftermath of the treaty of Versailles falls heavily upon the world and brings complications of all sorts for the victorious powers in their relations with European and non-European peoples, we see that the stipulations inserted in the treaty to right wrongs, make restitutions, and remedy geographical and economic inequalities can no more be limited in their application to the vanquished powers than was the principle of self-determination during the war. From disarmament down to the Boxer indemnity, most of the demands made upon Germany would have been justified and possible of fulfilment had the victors bound themselves to follow the same principles in their dealings with other peoples. With reciprocity in all matters where reciprocity would have been for the common good, the treaty of Versailles would have been a peace of justice. Without reciprocity it was a peace of force, and its terms were possible of execution only so long as the force that caused the Germans to sign the treaty continued to be applied to make them execute it.

CHAPTER XXXVI

WORLD POLITICS AND THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN (1919-1922)

THE answer of President Wilson to Austria-Hungary's peace overture of October 7, 1918, was one of the most important documents issued by a belligerent government during the war. It was the death-warrant, not only of the Dual Monarchy, but also of a dynastic union of peoples and states that had existed throughout the modern period of European history. The American president announced that the great powers were not going to use their traditional privilege of deciding what were to be the territorial and political readjustments and how they were to be effected, but that in dealing with the Hapsburg empire they intended to apply practically the principle of self-determination, in defense of which and for the enforcement of which the Entente Allies and the United States claimed to be fighting. Four years after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, it is interesting to go back to the assurance Mr. Wilson's despatch contained and subject it to the control of a startling succession of disturbing events.

For the first time in history, a great nation, asked to make peace with Germany, based the argument of *non possumus* on the ground that the wishes of the peoples to be liberated, and not its own interests, the interests of its associates, or those of the enemy, were primarily at stake, and that the peoples concerned in the readjustment were to decide the matter. Was the contention of President Wilson practicable, or was the settlement of the Hapsburg succession possible only by dictating the treaty terms to the successor states in the same way as to the enemy? The

disruption of the Hapsburg empire was a momentous decision, and those who decreed it assumed a grave responsibility.

In his speech of September 27, 1918, the president had already proclaimed the universality of the ideals for the triumph of which the United States threw her weight into the balance against Germany and Austria-Hungary. In order to make clear the exact sentiment of his country he took for illustration the infamous treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bukharest. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk showed Germany's disregard of the rights of nations she purported to be liberating from the Russian yoke. The Poles and the Baltic states were not allowed to participate in framing the treaty. The treaty of Bukharest showed a conquering nation imposing her will by force upon a conquered nation and exacting economic privileges that meant an abdication of sovereignty for the vanquished. We held up to abhorrence foreign policy based on expediency and force. We declared that right and justice must triumph everywhere. We encouraged the aspirations to independence of all small nations.

Austria-Hungary, like Russia, but unlike France and Italy and Germany, was a political organism, not a nation. It had grown through centuries by conquering and annexing alien peoples. Austrians and Hungarians had suppressed the freedom and national life of these peoples, but were not able to assimilate them. Before the spread of education among the masses, the granting of general suffrage, and the formation of the habit of newspaper-reading, the Hapsburgs ruled comfortably. The great body of the people consisted of ignorant peasants, and the land-owning aristocratic element among the subject races supported the Hapsburgs because it was politic to do so. But during the past half-century, as the world has been evolving towards democracy, suppressed nationalities awakened to their inferior position in the empire. When they tried to assert them-

selves politically the Austro-Hungarian oppression became severe. After the disastrous war with Germany the Austrians (east Germans) lost to Prussia the dominant position among the German states of central Europe. They were not sufficiently numerous to keep the Hungarians in subjection. Consequently in 1867 Germans of Austria and Magyars of Hungary formed a compact to transform the empire into a dual monarchy. The Magyars won their independence.¹ After that, they, in turn, practised towards smaller races what they had suffered before at the hands of the Germans.

For fifty years the Dual Monarchy continued to exist without any spirit of solidarity among the various elements in Austria and Hungary. Long before the recent war it was predicted that the hybrid régime would not outlive Emperor Francis Joseph, who had presided over it during all that period.

Hungarians and Germans were at loggerheads, and each of the two dominant elements was in constant conflict with the lesser races. But the organism held together, not only because it was to the mutual advantage of Austrians and Hungarians, but also because the land-owning and industrial classes among the lesser nationalities realized the social and economic advantages of belonging to a large state. These classes furnished their full quota of officers for the army and navy, and were prominent among the functionaries of the Dual Monarchy. Two Czechs, for example, were successive premiers during the war.

In legislative assemblies Austrians and Hungarians were able to hold the balance of power by playing one subject people against another. The Hungarian policy was consistently

¹ By the terms of the Ausgleich of 1867, the empire of Austria and the kingdom of Hungary were constitutionally independent of each other, but agreed to form a permanent political union on the basis of equality under a common sovereign and with foreign affairs and the army and navy and the finances of the Dual Monarchy under unified supervision. The commercial union, however, could be terminated by either party at the end of any ten-year period.

one of suppression. This was possible, for even in parts of the monarchy inhabited by allogeneous races a majority of the land-owners was Magyar. Austria was able to keep a semblance of parliamentary life by granting autonomy to the Poles in Galicia in return for their support in the Vienna Reichsrath. The combination was advantageous to the Poles. They formed only a bare majority in Galicia over the Ruthenians (Ukrainians), and needed the German support as much as the Germans needed their support. Although the Czechs were the next largest racial element in Austria to the Germans, the Austrians were not compelled to follow the same policy towards them, because Bohemia was wedged in between Austria, Germany, and Russian Poland. Russia supported the national aspirations of Jugo-Slavs in Hungary and Ruthenians in Austria, but she did not dare to encourage either Poles or Czechs. To strengthen their national aspirations would have had a dangerous influence upon the situation in Russian Poland.

There were two forms of separatist movements in Austria-Hungary—national and irredentist. A national movement is the aspiration to independence, within its former political limits, of a subject people. An irredentist movement is the aspiration to political union with a neighboring state of the same blood and language. The Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak movements were national; the Ukrainian, Rumanian, and Italian movements were irredentist. The Poles, confined to the province of Galicia, were not nationalists to the point of desiring independence, because autonomy under the Austrians was preferable to union with a much greater number of Russian Poles. For the same reason irredentist propaganda did not move them, and they feared that its application, in case of the disruption of the empire, would militate against them in eastern Galicia, where the great majority was Ukrainian. It is important to bear in mind this classification, because it distinguishes between problems relating to the Hapsburg dominions alone

and problems indissolubly connected with those of neighboring states.

Because they stood out clearly from other movements, and because we had definite, tangible reasons for encouraging them, the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav movements were mentioned specifically in our answer to Austria-Hungary. The Czecho-Slovaks had been giving us aid against our enemies, and the Jugo-Slavs belonged to the same race as the Serbians. But when the division of the Hapsburg dominions became a task intrusted to a conference in which the United States had a leading part, it was found that the application of the principle of self-determination, even if limited to friends, presented puzzling complications. It was as hard to deal with the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs as with the other emancipated peoples.

It is probably for this reason that when they drafted the treaty dictated to Austria, the principal allied and associated powers were unwilling to call into consultation the representatives of the peoples whose destinies were affected. They feared the effect upon their own harmony and upon the purposes they had in mind of claims advanced and arguments adduced by the premiers and national leaders of the east-central and southeastern European nations. On May 31, 1919, the day before the presentation of the treaty to the Austrians, its text was communicated to the peace conference delegates at a plenary session. Rumanians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, and Jugo-Slavs alike protested bitterly, but without avail. The Austrian protests were equally fruitless. The Austrian delegates signed the treaty on September 10, and the Austrian government ratified it, yielding to hunger pressure, on October 18, 1919. The delay of three months between the presentation of the terms of peace and the signature of the treaty was due to the insistence of Italy upon dictating the military clauses, and also the political clauses where her interests were affected, and the diplomatic effort to reconcile the successor

states to the provisions that infringed upon their sovereignty and tended to render them economically dependent upon the Entente powers.

From the beginning of the treaty-making the Allies had considered the Hapsburg empire defunct, and had recognized the separation from the empire of more than thirty million of its fifty million inhabitants. Since there was no longer a political organism known as the Dual Monarchy, Austrians and Hungarians were considered separate peoples with no bond uniting them. Their only common destiny was that of being defeated enemies who would have to pay the penalty of defeat. In deciding upon the boundaries the three factors ethnography, strategy, and economics were successively applied for the purpose of taking away as much territory as possible from the Austrians and Hungarians. History has never given us a sterner example of the age-old principle of *vae victis* than the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.

The treaty of St. Germain compelled the Vienna government to renounce outright its two largest and most populous provinces, Galicia and Bohemia. The province third in size, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, was reduced to a narrow strip north of the Brenner Pass. Parts of Styria and Carniola were arbitrarily lopped off, and all of the provinces bordering on the Adriatic, the only outlet to the sea, had to be abandoned. Moravia and Silesia, essential to Austria not only for coal but also for food, were joined with Bohemia to form the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. The outlying province of Bukowina was given to Rumania. Two thirds of the Austrians were left in a circumscribed area under the Vienna government, condemned to bankruptcy and slow starvation, and although they comprised only one fourth of Austria's pre-war population, they were saddled with the same reparations terms as Germany. Vienna, the third city of Europe, contained thirty-five per cent. of the population of independent Austria. It had grown naturally

as the capital of an empire of fifty millions, and it was manifest that under the new conditions it could survive and the Austrians could exist only by a free exchange of commodities with the successor states or by union with Germany. The treaty of St. Germain did not provide for the former and it forbade the latter.

Like the Germans, the Austrian delegates were not allowed to appear before their judges to plead their case. In a written memorandum they pointed out what would follow the enforcement of the treaty of St. Germain. From whatever standpoint they were viewed the treaty terms seemed bound to create more causes for wars than they removed. For, like those of Versailles, they were based upon two dangerous illusions: the permanent subserviency and isolation of the Germanic element among the peoples of Europe, and the ability of the non-Germanic states bordering upon post-bellum Germany and Austria to develop a prosperous industrial and commercial life independent of and indifferent to the economic and social rehabilitation of the regions from Hamburg to Vienna.

The first illusion is shown in the disposition of the territories taken from Austria by the treaty of St. Germain. When strategic, historical, or economic arguments were advanced for separating German population from Austria, there was never any hesitation. The principle of nationality did not apply to the Austrians. On the other hand, economic, strategic, and historical considerations had no weight when invoked by the Austrians.¹ At the Paris conference it was: "Heads I win, tails you lose." One can not wade through the mass of documents, reports, and speeches relating to the treaty of St. Germain and its aftermath without realizing that the framers of the treaty ignored the

¹ Only two concessions were made to Austria. A plebiscite was provided for in the district of Klagenfurt, which Italy preferred to see remain with Austria because its possession by the Jugo-Slavs would embarrass her; and a frontier region of west Hungary was awarded to Austria for the obvious purpose of making bad blood between the two enemy peoples.

possibility of a strong Germany in the future moved irresistibly to war by irredentist propaganda or in a position to join forces advantageously either with Slavs against Latins or with Latins against Slavs. In emancipating subject peoples the Paris conference in many cases, as in the Tyrol and Czecho-Slovakia, simply turned the tables. Three millions of Germans, living in regions of the successor states neighboring upon German and Austrian territory, were put under the rule of their former subjects. It was taken for granted that the German element in Europe was so completely crushed by the war that this condition would not give rise to a new era of irredentist propaganda, or that the successor states would remain united among themselves and in the political orbit of a united entente.

The second illusion contradicted the great lesson of modern economic history, which is the interdependence of nations. Even if the motives had been of the highest and had been carried out in a spirit of altruism, it is doubtful whether the economic provisions of the treaty of St. Germain would have proved less harmful to the tranquillity and well-being of the peoples the treaty emancipated than were its political provisions. The Hapsburg empire may have been the result of snuffing out the liberties of small nations. But there can be no doubt of the material advantages, since Europe became dependent upon world markets, of belonging to a large political organism. Under Franz Josef the Hapsburg dominions enjoyed common rail and water communications and the privilege of free interchange of commodities, and at the same time were able to build up a merchant marine and a consular system that enabled them to compete with the other great powers in world markets.

The treaty of St. Germain separated elements from Austria and united them to their "brothers of blood." Poles and Czecho-Slovaks formed free states. But the financial and industrial edifice of half a century was destroyed, and

nothing was provided to take its place. The successor states, deprived of free access to the Mediterranean and of a merchant marine, and compelled to establish their own diplomatic and consular staffs throughout the world, suddenly found themselves unable to count upon the backing of a great power in their international relations. And their normal and most precious markets were beyond a new frontier, on which arose a menacing tariff wall. Moreover, the financial and economic prostration of Vienna and the chaos in Germany affected them so vitally that there was little difference between victors and freedmen on the one side and vanquished on the other.

Austria had no colonies and had not taken part in the extra-European struggle for protectorates and spheres of influence either before or after becoming a dual monarchy with Hungary as an equal partner. Italy was the only great power that profited territorially by the destruction of the Hapsburg empire, but in the long run Germany seems likely to receive a large accession of territory. Unless the successor states join with Austria and Hungary in reforming the territories of the old empire into a unitary economic and probably political system, by federating, the treaty of St. Germain will mark the completion of the unification of Italy and Germany. And if Italians and Slavs strive for the mastery of the Balkans the balance of power may once more be held by a Germany greater than ever before, because she will have lost her alien provinces, which were as much a source of weakness as of strength, but will have gained sovereignty over all the Germans of Europe.

CHAPTER XXXVII

WORLD POLITICS AND THE TREATY OF TRIANON (1919-1922)

ALTHOUGH the treaty of St. Germain, signed on September 10, 1919, marked the official end of the Hapsburg empire, almost another year elapsed before the terms to be imposed upon Hungary were definitely settled. The treaty of Trianon, with Hungary, was conceived in the same spirit as the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, and Neuilly, and it conformed very closely in its text to the treaty of St. Germain. It was not signed, however, until June 4, 1920, because of the internal political difficulties of the Hungarians, which retarded the establishment of a new government; their conflicts with former subject peoples; and the unwillingness of the successor states to ratify the treaty of St. Germain and to come to an agreement among themselves as to a division of the spoils.

The treaties of Versailles and St. Germain gave birth to two new states, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Together with Italy, these states were the principal beneficiaries of the treaty of St. Germain. Italy's territorial interests were safeguarded in the terms of the armistice of November 3, 1918, and in settling the complicated economic and financial problems of the Hapsburg inheritance she had the advantage of a voice in the decisions. For giving in to her point of view in matters concerning Austria, France and Great Britain were rewarded, in turn, by her willingness to take their point of view in regard to the European and world liquidation of Germany's assets. Hence Italy received as large a share of the inheritance as she wanted, fiscal and tariff freedom, and an insignificant financial liability as a

successor state of the Dual Monarchy. Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, were not in a position to defy the principal allied and associated powers, and, having nothing to give and no voice in the treaty decisions, they had to take what was given them. They came out of the conference with more than they deserved from a territorial point of view, but with economic and financial fetters that bound them to the Entente powers. In so far as the successor states were concerned, both the territorial and economic clauses of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, and the special treaty creating Poland, were inspired by the political and commercial interests of these powers.

The Hungarian inheritance raised questions of a different order, and the successor states were not in the same relation to the Entente powers or to one another. Italy's claims were in conflict with those of the Jugo-Slavs. The Jugo-Slavs had joined Serbia, an allied state from the beginning of the war. The inheritor of eastern Hungary was Rumania, another allied state, whose intervention in the war had been solicited by the Entente and to whom the Entente powers were bound by a secret treaty that promised explicit rewards for intervention. To complicate the drawing of new boundaries, Serbian and Rumanian claims to the banat of Temesvar overlapped.

During the peace conference a revolution at Budapest brought into power a Bolshevist government that for some months defied the authority of the victorious powers. After it was overthrown the Hungarians came to blows with the Rumanians. The Rumanian army, disregarding orders from Paris, captured Budapest and proceeded to loot Hungary. Declaring that it was simply taking the reparations question into its own hands and getting back what had been stolen from Rumania, the Bukharest government, paying no attention to Entente protests, took from Hungary locomotives and rolling stock, military supplies, and cattle. This may have been the quickest method of securing restitution,

but it upset the plans and calculations of the experts at Paris, who were arranging the economic clauses of the treaty with Hungary.

The impossibility of dealing with the successor states of Hungary in the same way as with the successor states of Austria was impressed upon the Entente statesmen by another salient fact in the situation. Czecho-Slovakia was recognized as a belligerent in the last months of the war, while Poland was the creation of the enemy coalition, and was recognized by the victors only by the invitation to take part in the peace conference.¹ The provisional governments set up by the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks after the collapse of Germany, and the *de facto* extension of their authority, needed Entente support. The Polish and Czecho-Slovak frontiers with Germany depended not on their own strength but on the good-will of the peace conference. In regard to Hungary, however, the principal allied and associated powers found themselves confronted with a series of *faits accomplis*. By force of arms the Czecho-Slovaks took Pressburg (Pozony) from the Hungarians, winning for themselves a port on the Danube and control of railway communications between Vienna and Budapest. By force of arms the Rumanians occupied Transylvania and a part of the banat of Temesvar. Similarly the Serbians were in control of the rest of the banat and Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and were contesting Dalmatia with the Italians. The disposal of the greater part of Hungary and of the Adriatic provinces of Austria was, therefore, not in the hands of the principal allied and associated powers. They could not say to Rumania and Serbia what they said to Poland and Czecho-Slovakia: "You are our creation and your existence depends upon our good-will."

The treaty of St. Germain contained an article against which the successor states (with the exception of Italy, who was not to be bound by it) protested with vehemence at

¹ On January 18, 1919, six days after the conference opened.

the eighth plenary session of the conference on May 31, 1919. It appears in identical terms in articles LI, LVII, and LX. As far as the small states were concerned, it was the "joker" of the treaty of St. Germain. It read:

"The Serb-Croat-Slovene (Czecho-Slovak-Rumanian) state accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that state who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

"The Serb-Croat-Slovene (Czecho-Slovak-Rumanian) state further accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as these powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations."

In the treaty of Trianon this clause was dropped for Czecho-Slovakia and was modified for Jugo-Slavia and Rumania in articles XLIV and XLVII to read:

"The Serb-Croat-Slovene (Rumanian) state recognizes and confirms in relation to Hungary its obligation to accept the embodiment in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers of such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that state who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion, as well as to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations."

Article CCCI of the treaty of St. Germain, repeated in article CCLXXXV of the treaty of Trianon and CCIX of the treaty of Neuilly, reëstablished the pre-war Danube commission of the treaty of Berlin. But of the riparian states only Rumania was to be represented, with one vote. The other three commissioners were to be British, French, and Italian. The transportation clauses of the treaties im-

posed upon the successor states disabilities similar to those imposed upon enemy states.

The heart of the treaties lies in the clauses quoted above, and their modification in the treaty of Trianon denotes a partial victory of the small states against the effort of the Entente powers to control the internal political and economic life of the successor states of Austria-Hungary.

The famous minorities article of the treaty of St. Germain, with the economic clause added to it, shows how far the Entente powers were ready to go to infringe upon the sovereign rights of the states created or greatly increased in area by the victory over the central powers. President Wilson, who was ignorant of the real meaning of the minorities articles, tried to explain and justify the limitations of sovereignty imposed on the successor states by the fact that if guaranties were not given new wars might arise, the burden of and responsibilities for which would fall upon the principal allied and associated powers.

The representatives of the successor states, however, argued from similar clauses in the treaty of Berlin that the intention was not to protect minorities but to give the great powers an excuse for intervening in the internal affairs of small states and to wrest from them economic concessions under threat of calling attention to non-fulfilment of such promises. Specific instances of this form of political pressure that amounted to blackmail could be cited. If it were necessary to make international treaties in regard to the protection of minorities in independent constitutional states, why was Italy, also a successor state and heir to large minorities, not asked to subscribe to these clauses? And were the principal allied and associated powers willing to give international pledges for the protection of minorities in their own dominions? The small states wanted to know why they were to be responsible to "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers" and not to the League of Nations, and what relation the second paragraph of the

minorities article, which concerned commerce, had to the first paragraph.

It will be noted that in the treaty of St. Germain the successor states (except Italy) were not asked to come to an understanding with the principal allied and associated powers about "provisions to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations" on the basis of reciprocity, but were ordered to agree without reservation—just as enemy states had been ordered to do—to "such provisions as these powers may deem necessary." In the treaty of Trianon the principal allied and associated powers remain the arbiters for the protection of minorities, but their control of internal transportation and commerce is eliminated. They remain, however, masters of the great waterway of south-central and south-eastern Europe, able to use it in their own interests for the furtherance of their own shipping and commerce, without any reference to the peoples (except the Rumanians) to whom it is a vital means of communication with the outside world. Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria are not represented on the Danube commission.

It is impossible to go into a detailed examination of the treaty of Trianon. But it, like the treaty of St. Germain, exhibits the principles inspiring the world policies of dominant powers. These powers believe that their strength gives them the right to assert the transcendancy of their political and economic interests in every part of the world. There are two weights and two measures, one for themselves and those who are strong enough to defy them, and the other for weaker peoples. And they are willing to grant privileges to weaker states and to protect them only if in exchange their own paramount authority and their special interests are recognized.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

WORLD POLITICS AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY (1919-1922)

BULGARIAN plenipotentiaries were summoned to Paris at the end of July, 1919, and shut up in the Château de Madrid for seven weeks before they received the draft of the treaty. As in the case of the other enemy delegations, no opportunity was afforded them to present their point of view or to discuss the terms of the treaty before it was framed. When the draft of the treaty was received, written remonstrances and suggestions were allowed and were answered in detail. But the Bulgarians were told what the Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians had been told, *i. e.*, that they had been responsible for the war and had conducted it in a barbarous manner, and that the various penalties imposed upon them were justified not only because of their past conduct but because they could not be trusted in the future. An ultimatum, requiring signature within ten days as an alternative to the denunciation of the armistice, made the Bulgarians realize that there was to be no difference between the treatment accorded them and that accorded the central empires. The treaty between the Allied powers and Bulgaria was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27, 1919.

In conjunction with the other treaties, the treaty of Neuilly makes a radical shift in the balance of power in southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Even after the treaty of Bukharest, Bulgaria remained larger and more populous than Serbia and Greece. From the Paris peace conference she emerged diminished in territory and population, while her neighbors became countries so much

larger than herself that it is difficult to justify the strategic frontiers of the treaty of Neuilly, which were drawn in disregard of the principle of nationalities and of the economic necessities of the Balkan peoples. The figures speak for themselves:

	1914		1921	
	SQUARE MILES	POPULATION	SQUARE MILES	POPULATION
Bulgaria	47,750	5,500,000	45,000	5,200,000
Rumania	53,454	7,700,000	113,221	16,101,000
Serbia (or Jugo-Slavia)	33,900	4,600,000	101,250	13,635,000
Greece ¹	42,000	4,800,000	60,000	7,500,000

If the Entente statesmen had observed the eleventh of the fourteen points of President Wilson, they could have taken a great step towards permanent peace in the Balkans. It was possible to have drawn the Macedonian frontier of Bulgaria in accordance with ethnic considerations, to have insisted upon Rumanian agreement to the return of the southern Dobrudja,² and to have left Bulgaria an unhampered outlet in western Thrace to the Ægean Sea. Rumania had more than doubled in population and in area, and Serbia had tripled. Greece, enlarged for the second time within a decade, still had glorious opportunities for further expansion. In view of these changes in the relative size of the Balkan states, there was no justification for taking territory and inhabitants from Bulgaria and for thus still further increasing the number of Bulgarians beyond the frontiers of their country. We have already seen how Bulgarian irredentism precipitated the second Balkan

¹The figures for Greece are approximate, and will be larger if all Thrace is awarded to Greece and if she is successful in retaining the Smyrna region of Asia Minor. I am indebted to "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris," iv, p. 454, for the table given above.

²This strip between the Danube and the Black Sea was ceded to Rumania by Bulgaria in the treaty of Bukharest and is inhabited almost exclusively by Bulgarians.

War and influenced Bulgaria to enter a coalition with the central empires and Turkey in the effort to attain her national unity.¹

The avowed intention of the territorial and military provisions of the treaty of Neuilly was to render Bulgaria powerless to make another attempt to upset treaties drawn to her disadvantage. This, in justification of despoiling Bulgaria, runs through the claims of the other Balkan states and it is the answer of the Allied powers to the Bulgarian observations on the treaty. But the geographical position of Bulgaria, with three hundred miles of Danube river-front lying across the path of the natural rail route to Constantinople, is too strong a factor in the struggle for mastery in the Near East to keep Bulgaria down. The treaty of Neuilly presupposes a state of mind in the Balkans and in Europe that does not exist and that can not exist so long as European diplomacy believes that the race is to the swift and the battle to the strong. As Premier Venizelos of Greece clearly saw in 1913 and again in 1915, and as King Carol of Rumania and his premier, M. Marghiloman, also believed in 1913, too great a shift in the balance of power in the Balkans would bring about new combinations leading again inevitably to war. A durable peace for the Balkans and for Europe is possible only if irredentism can be diminished as a source of friction, and if none of the great powers is longer able to use a vengeful and dissatisfied Balkan state to advance its own political interests.

Serbia got into difficulties with Austria in 1914 because of public sentiment demanding the liberation of large bodies of Serbian-speaking peoples under foreign domination in adjacent territory, and because she had no outlet to the Mediterranean either through the Adriatic Sea or through the Ægean Sea. The absence of an outlet gave Austria-Hungary the opportunity to keep the lesser king-

¹ See pp. 261-264, 297-298.

dom in economic dependence, and deepened the bitterness aroused by the irredentist propaganda of the Narodny Obrana.¹ Russia took advantage of the state of mind of Serbia to work against Austria-Hungary and to aspire to the hegemony of the Balkans. In "the war to end war" the goal should have been to do away with the conditions that brought on the war. But the treaty of Neuilly put Bulgaria in the position in which Serbia was placed before the war. Deprived of her outlet to the Mediterranean and thwarted in her ambition to complete her unification, Bulgaria remains a valuable pawn to be used by Rumania against Serbia, by Italy against Serbia, by Serbia or Rumania against Greece, and by Russia against Great Britain or France, in coalition with Turkey or independently.

The treaty of Neuilly, like the other treaties, illustrates the triumph of considerations of world politics over constructive statesmanship. In Entente circles there was a strong current of expert opinion favorable to Bulgaria's double plea that she be allowed to retain her port on the *Ægean* Sea and her border districts. Neither friendship for Bulgaria nor a willingness to condone her participation in the war on the side of the central empires and Turkey inspired this advocacy of equitable treatment. The so-called Bulgarophiles had in mind the liquidation, in so far as was possible, of the intolerable and dangerous condition that had made the Balkans the cockpit of Europe and the quarter in which causes of war had arisen almost perennially ever since the beginning of the decay of the Ottoman Empire.

But the British did not care to offend the Greeks, through whose expansion they saw the opportunity of controlling Constantinople. The French, on the other hand, supported the claims of Serbia and Rumania as an offset to Clemenceau's attitude on the minorities question, because they desired to unite Poland and the other successor states of

¹ See pp. 273-276.

the Hapsburg empire in a military alliance against Bolshevik Russia and against Germany.¹ The Italians wished to keep alive the bitterness between Serbians and Greeks and Bulgarians in order that they might have a fertile field in which to work against pan-Serbianism and pan-Hellenism.

Owing to her geographical position again, Bulgaria has not felt so acutely as Germany and Austria the continued military pressure of the Entente powers; and as she is a self-sufficing agricultural country with few industries, an economic boycott would not weigh heavily upon her. On the other hand, France and Italy have begun to realize that the friendship of Bulgaria is a diplomatic asset in their dealings with the Little Entente (Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia) and in their relations with Greece.

In the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon the cessions of territory, with the exception of those to Italy, were in each instance made subject to agreements between the principal allied and associated powers and the successor state as to the fulfilment of certain promises: protection of minorities; economic and transit facilities; handing back of property belonging to Austrian and Hungarian nationals; and liability for portions of the old Austro-Hungarian national debt. Jugo-Slavia and Greece are not bound, in the treaty of Neuilly, to respect the property of Bulgarian nationals in ceded territories. The treaty, more-

¹ Major-General F. J. Kernan, U. S. A., wrote to President Wilson on April 11 a secret report of his mission in Poland in which he said: "In central Europe the French uniform is everywhere in evidence, officers and men. There is a concerted, distinct effort being made by these agents to foster the military spirit in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and, I believe, in Rumania. The imperialistic idea has seized upon the French mind like a kind of madness, and the obvious effort is to create a chain of states, highly militarized, organized as far as possible under French guidance, and intended to be future allies of France. . . . The claim is that this chain of strong military states is essential to hold back the tide of Russian Bolshevism. I regard this as largely camouflage. Each of the three states named has aggressive designs on the surrounding territory, and each is determined to get, by force if need be, as large an area as possible."

over, contains a special article (XLVIII) in which Bulgaria renounced in favor of the principal allied and associated powers her portion of Thrace, which was won in the first Balkan War and not taken from her by the treaty of Bucharest. In return, the powers undertook "to insure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the *Ægean* Sea." This region was already occupied by the Greek armies, who extended their occupation to Adrianople and the rest of the province, which had remained Turkish. The status of Thrace has not been determined and no definite arrangement has been made with Greece concerning Bulgaria's "economic outlet." The settlement of these questions hinges upon the disposition of Constantinople.

CHAPTER XXXIX

WORLD POLITICS AND THE TREATY OF SÈVRES (1920-1922)

THE Paris conference adjourned at the end of November, 1919, without having come to an agreement upon three vital questions: the terms of the treaty with Turkey; the adoption of a common policy towards Russia; and an understanding as to the means to be employed to compel Germany to fulfil the terms of the treaty of Versailles. The treaty of Versailles, however, had created international machinery for its enforcement. Furthermore, the covenant of the League of Nations, incorporated in the treaty, provided specifically for the settlement of the Turkish question, and generally for the liquidation of such a situation as that which existed between soviet Russia and the Entente powers. In January, 1920, when the final ratifications of the treaty of Versailles were exchanged, the Supreme Council of the Entente powers could have been merged into the Council of the League; and had this been done, the new organ for international coöperation would have been vested immediately with dignity and authority.

If the creators of the League had believed in it and had been willing to trust their interests to it, the skeptics would have been convinced and the cynics confounded. Such a decision would have had an incalculable influence upon American public opinion nine months before the American electorate was asked to choose between entering the League and staying out of it. The League was the potential *deus ex machina*. The neutrals, associated with the victors in a judicial and wise application of the treaties, would have aided in deciding upon a world policy towards Russia, and

in settling the future of the Ottoman dominions in conformity with article XXII of the Versailles treaty. The moment was propitious for an honest effort to substitute international coöperation for national rivalry.

But the premiers of Great Britain and France and Italy elected to hold secret continuation conferences, in which they endeavored to settle international problems, not in the interests of world peace, but in their own interests. Each had national aspirations to satisfy and a definite foreign policy to follow.¹ They saw in the League only an instrument to advance the selfish interests of the countries they represented. It would never do to let representatives of smaller states, as provided for by the treaty of Versailles, sit in on their discussions and have the power to check or veto their bargains and compromises.

The inheritance of the Ottoman Empire was a bone of contention and a cause for war throughout the nineteenth century. It played an important part in bringing on the World War, and was one of the chief considerations in secret diplomatic negotiations during the war. Owing to the defection of Russia, the calculations of the Entente powers had been upset. Because Russia had denounced the secret treaties, French, British, and Italian statesmen were slow to solve the Ottoman problem. Had czarist Russia survived the war, she would have installed herself in Constantinople, and there would have been no question of an independent Armenia. On the other hand, the continued military coöperation of Russia would have made possible the unchallenged occupation of Asia Minor and Syria by Italy and France, and of Mesopotamia by Great Britain.

¹ In writing of international relations one most often uses the names of nations where the government rather than the people is meant. Similarly, when we speak of premiers and cabinets, in matters of foreign policy, we do not distinguish between the personal active agent and the impersonal machinery in which he is simply a cog. If they want to keep their positions, European premiers must conform to the policies dictated to them by their ministries of foreign affairs. Their control over the conduct of foreign affairs is in the methods of attaining ends, and not in the ends.

Palestine would have been internationalized. But, with Russia eliminated, Great Britain and France, Italy and Greece became rivals in the Ottoman Empire the moment the armistice was signed. A bitter conflict of interests arose. This, and this alone, prevented the conference of Paris and the continuation conference at London from settling the terms of the Turkish treaty. This, and this alone, was responsible for the renewal of Armenian massacres, and for the rise of a powerful nationalist faction in Turkey, able to defy at once the simulacrum of government at Constantinople and the victorious powers.¹

The Turkish question called for three main decisions: what territories to take away, how to force the Turks to give them up, and what to do with them. The premiers were no more ready to make these decisions in April, 1920, than they were the year before. Nevertheless, there always must be an end to a transitory period. The delay was affecting the prestige of the Entente powers and their harmonious relations. The time had come to cut all Gordian knots simultaneously. On May 11 the decisions of the Entente premiers, incorporated in a draft treaty, were communicated to the Turkish delegation in Paris. After a delay of three months the treaty was signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Between May and August a compromise

¹ The American partizans of the League, who declared that our refusal to enter the League and to take a mandate for Armenia was responsible for the delay and confusion in deciding upon terms of peace with Turkey, showed a lack of knowledge of the fundamental factors in the Near Eastern difficulties. The unwillingness of the United States to accept an Armenian mandate was the result rather than the cause of the tangle, and the bitter clash of interests dismayed Americans who were closely watching political developments in the Near East and who desired to see the United States assume responsibilities there. The Armenian mandate was never offered us on practicable terms. When the San Remo conference asked President Wilson to decide the frontiers of Armenia and offered the mandate to the United States, Cilicia, the outlet to the Mediterranean, was not included, and there is reason to believe that the offer was inspired by the hope of seeing the United States become involved in the profitless and costly task of occupying the mountainous northeastern corner of Asia Minor and interposing a barrier between Russian Bolshevism and the proposed British, French, and Italian spheres of influence. See my article on the San Remo conference in the *Century Magazine*, July, 1920.

had been arranged with Greece in regard to the Dodecanese, and the Greeks had occupied Thrace and had been successful in a campaign against the Turkish nationalists in northwestern Asia Minor. The authority of the old Ottoman government, therefore, extended hardly farther than the city of Constantinople, which was occupied by Entente forces. Asia Minor, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, was in open rebellion against the sultan. The delegates who signed the treaty of Sèvres, which has never been recognized by the Anatolian Turks, represented only Constantinople and its vicinity.

The treaty of Sèvres stipulated that Turkey should cede to Greece the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, Thrace almost up to the fortifications of Constantinople, and should agree to the autonomy of Smyrna with a generous hinterland. This latter area was to have an independent parliament, but was to be under Greek administration, and was to have the right to attach itself definitely to Greece by a plebiscite after the lapse of five years. Greece received also the islands of the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, where a plebiscite would be held by Italy to decide the destiny of the island if Great Britain agreed to cede Cyprus to Greece.¹ Turkey recognized the independence of Syria, Armenia, the Hedjaz, and Mesopotamia; accepted the French protectorate over Tunisia and Morocco, and the British protectorate over Egypt and the Sudan; conceded British sovereignty over Cyprus; and ceded to Great Britain the rights secured to the Ottoman government by the Suez Canal treaty of 1888. Palestine was to be a Jewish national home under the League of Nations, with Great

¹ Italy, however, was free to hold this plebiscite at any time within fifteen years after the cession of Cyprus to Greece. Premier Venizelos sacrificed Rhodes, in his compromise with Italy, in order to secure the abandonment of Italian opposition to the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The population of Rhodes is overwhelmingly and fanatically Greek, and the treaty of Sèvres therefore created a new Cretan question in the Ægean Sea. The original draft of the treaty provided that Turkey cede the Dodecanese to Italy, but this was modified in favor of Greece before the treaty was signed.

Britain as the mandatory power. The coasts of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus were to be regarded as the "zone of the Straits," under the control of a commission appointed by the League of Nations, but consisting of British, French, Italian, Japanese, Rumanian, and Greek members. In the final draft of the treaty a Turkish member was added to the Straits Commission.

Before the treaty of Sèvres was signed it had already been discredited by its principal authors. The premiers in the three-cornered struggle at San Remo, each antagonist pitted against the other two for the triumph of national interests, had been influenced in their decisions by the questions of recognizing the new Russian government and exacting reparations from Germany, and by their manifest inability to resort to arms to suppress Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had set up an opposition Turkish government at Angora. This accounts for their generosity to Greece and their ability to arrive at what they believed to be an equitable compromise of their own conflicting interests in the Near East. Great Britain wanted to trade with soviet Russia and call off the propaganda of Lenin in Islamic countries. Italy wanted food-stuffs from Russia. France, on the other hand, was primarily interested in securing British and Italian support in demanding the fulfilment by Germany of the disarmament and reparations clauses of the treaty of Versailles. In their anxiety to finish with the Turkish question and preserve harmony in dealing with the Germans and Russians, the three premiers agreed not to expel the Turks from Constantinople, and to intrust Greece with the task of pacifying Thrace and the Smyrna region. Armenia was left in the lap of the gods. France and Great Britain were already in military possession of the Arabic-speaking portions of the empire.

Forgetting, or ignoring, the considerations of European policy that led to the compromise of San Remo, and deeming insufficient the share of the booty assured by the secret

agreement entered into on the day the draft treaty was handed to the Turks, French and Italian public opinion made short shrift of the treaty of Sèvres. Premier Millebrand was accused of sacrificing realities to Great Britain in the Near East in exchange for a dubious promise of support against Germany. Signor Nitti anticipated his critics by declaring that the treaty of Sèvres was all wrong and had no value, because it was signed by representatives of a government that was not in control of the territories ceded, and because the Entente powers were unable, or unwilling, to apply force against the nationalist Turks, who refused to be bound by the treaty. Signor Nitti added that Italy could not be counted upon to help the Greeks to occupy and maintain themselves in the territories awarded them by the treaty. Both French and Italian public opinion believed that the British stood behind the Greeks, and that any territories governed by Greece in Asia Minor would be virtually under British protection. The French and the Italians also accused Great Britain of wanting to control Constantinople by the indirect method of having it fall to the Greeks.

With the exception of the islands, the regions given to Greece by the treaty of Sèvres were not in the possession of the powers that dictated the treaty. A fortnight before the treaty was signed, the Greeks, acting as mandatories for their allies, had invaded eastern Thrace and had occupied militarily what Turkey was asked to cede to them. More than a year earlier, on May 6, 1919, when Venizelos was representing Greece at the Paris conference, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau had requested him to seize Smyrna, appointing Greece the agent of the victorious powers. The Turks would not have had to sign the treaty of Sèvres had not the Greek armies, advancing from Smyrna at the end of July, 1920, defeated the nationalist Turks, occupied Brusa, and interrupted the communications between Constantinople and Angora. In respect to

Thrace and the Smyrna region the treaty of Sèvres did no more than recognize a *fait accompli*, which had been brought about by the sole effort of the Greek armies.

In November, 1920, following the death of King Alexander, who had been put on the throne of Greece by the Entente powers in 1917, Venizelos was defeated in a general election on an issue he himself had placed before the people—their choice between him and former King Constantine. Venizelos had to leave Greece, and Constantine returned to his throne. This event was hailed with great satisfaction in Rome, for the Italians had been greatly embarrassed by the diplomatic influence of Greece in Entente councils through the personality of Venizelos and the obligation of the Entente to reward Greece because of the services of Venizelos. In France the return of King Constantine was considered an insult to the dignity and authority of the Entente and a sign of reviving German influence. The French government seized upon it as a pretext for revising the treaty of Sèvres.¹ What Greece had received, said the French, was given to her because Venizelos was the friend of the Entente and could be relied upon to advance Entente interests. This thesis, elaborated in the Chamber of Deputies and in the press, revealed the motives behind the treaties, and was in variance with the reply of the Entente powers to President Wilson during the war as to the objects they had in mind.² Was the purpose of the treaty of Sèvres to free the Greeks only if the country to which they were joined managed its affairs in such a way as to safeguard and foster the political interests

¹ Reasons for divergent policies in relation to Greece and Turkey are given on p. 455.

² On December 18, 1916, President Wilson had asked the two groups of belligerents to define their war aims. On January 10, 1917, the Allied governments sent a joint reply, dated from Paris, which gave as one of the specific objects of the war freeing the alien populations under Turkish rule and ending forever the rule of the Turks in Europe. Nothing was ever said during the war about emancipation from the Turks being contingent upon political services rendered after the war by Greece to advance the particular interests of the Entente powers in the Near East.

of the Entente powers? Moreover, the French argument assumed that Greece held Thrace and Smyrna as a gift from the Entente powers, and also set the dangerous precedent that a treaty was subject to revision if subsequent interests of any of its signatories would be advanced by its revision.

It was the military impotence of the Entente powers in the Near East that gave the Greeks the opportunity to occupy eastern Thrace and to install themselves as agents of the Entente at Smyrna. The return of Constantine was an indication that the Greeks discounted the displeasure of the Entente powers and knew that they could not look to western Europe for aid in their war against the Angora government. Entente prestige suffered greatly in the Balkans and in Turkey as a result of the successfully defiant attitude of Greece. It was soon realized that Great Britain, Italy, and France had disagreed about the advisability of continuing to support the Greeks and were going to take no steps to enforce the provisions of the treaty of Sèvres.¹ Mustafa Kemal Pasha managed to keep the Greeks at bay during 1921, and gradually won the support of all the Turks. Even Constantinople, under the guns of the Allied war-ships, became Kemalist. The Turkish nationalists renewed the massacres and deportation of Greeks and Armenians with the same impunity as during the World War; they entered into diplomatic relations with the soviet government of Russia; they refused to ratify an agreement with the Italians until its terms suited them; and they attacked the French in Cilicia.

Realizing that they could not hold Cilicia against the Turks and that they were threatened with the loss of Syria, the French government sent a delegation to Angora in March, offering to withdraw the French armies from Cilicia in exchange for immunity in Syria. For several months negotiations were carried on, and finally, on October 30,

¹ See pp. 455-456, 484.

1921, the French government announced that it had ratified an agreement made at Angora with the Turkish nationalist government, declaring peace between the two governments and providing for economic coöperation. The new treaty gave back to Turkey not only Cilicia, but also a considerable slice of northern Syria. The new frontier, running from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Tigris River, recognized as Turkish territory important regions, including the districts of Aintab and Urfa. A special régime was provided for the port of Alexandretta. Concessions for ninety-nine years were given to a French group for iron-, chrome-, and silver-mines in the valley of Harchite, and the Turkish government expressed its readiness "to examine with the greatest good-will other requests which may be made by French groups relative to concessions in mines, railways, ports, and rivers, on condition that such requests conform to the interests of both France and Turkey." A portion of the Bagdad Railway, with a branch line from Adana to Mersina, was leased "to the French group designated by the French government."

The treaty of Angora illustrates how considerations of world politics prevail over signed treaties, loyalty to allies, and obligations to weaker peoples. In order to keep Syria and to get a fresh hold upon the economic development of Asia Minor, the French government did not hesitate to repudiate its signature to the treaty of Sèvres, the clear implications of article XXII of the treaty of Versailles, and Entente obligations towards the Armenians and the Arabs. France went into Cilicia ostensibly to protect the Armenians. When she found that she could not stay there, she withdrew without assuring the lives and property of those on whose friendship she had relied to make possible her initial occupation of the province. Handing the districts of northern Syria back to the Turks, without consulting the other signatories of the treaty of Sèvres and the members of the League of Nations, constituted a violation of the

treaty of Sèvres and of the League covenant. In addition, the French government knew that these regions of northern Syria had been recognized as Arab in the Anglo-Hedjaz agreement of 1915, and that their permanent alienation from Turkey was one of the bases upon which rested the Sykes-Picot agreement made between Great Britain and France in 1916.¹

In the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire a special régime, with Great Britain as mandatory, was provided for Palestine alone by the treaty of Sèvres. The Hedjaz, Mesopotamia, and Syria were to be independent. The manner in which this independence was to be safeguarded was provided for in article XXII of the covenant of the League of Nations, which formed, as in the other treaties, the first section of the treaty of Sèvres. The language of article XXII does not seem capable of misinterpretation. It reads:

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”

The article further provides that the mandatory's authority “shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council”; that the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report; and that a permanent commission “shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.”

Had the mandate idea been put into practice, it would have been a departure in world politics. Bearing the white

¹ See p. 378.

man's burden had long been the hypocritical cloak for imperialism, but it was reasonable to suppose that a beginning could be made in substituting the big brother for the big stick. But the Entente statesmen had agreed to the mandate proposal at Paris as a subterfuge for evading their war promises to the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire and as a means of annexing the German colonies without accounting for this booty in the indemnity reckoning with Germany.¹ In the Near East, as well as in China, the Pacific, and Africa, the Entente powers were bound to one another to divide the spoils of war in accordance with the terms of secret treaties. Their premiers confronted President Wilson at Paris with the argument that the war had been fought to assure the inviolability of international engagements, and that the necessity of fulfilling these transcended the "fourteen points." It was asserted, also, that the secret treaties were none the less sacred because of later international engagements, such as the pre-armistice agreement with Germany, the promises to subject races, and even the texts of the treaties concluded at Paris.

Russia and Italy were not interested in the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire, and the division of these regions was a matter that concerned only Great Britain and France. Knowing the danger of allowing misunderstandings to arise, the British Foreign Office and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916 arranged their future spheres of influence in Asiatic Turkey by the Sykes-Picot agreement. The complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the spheres of influence of Russia and Italy in other parts of the empire, were presupposed. Therefore the line between the French and British spheres was drawn on the calculation that France would have the southeastern part of Asia Minor. The French were persuaded to agree

¹ Former Secretary Lansing is of this opinion, and the writer's own sources of information confirm it. See Lansing's "The Peace Negotiations," p. 61.

to the division of Syria, Palestine going to Great Britain. France was to have the rest of Syria and Great Britain Mesopotamia. British agents, however, had already promised the shereef of Mecca that if he would rebel against the sultan, Great Britain would sponsor the formation of an Arabic empire, including all the Arabic-speaking parts of Turkey. The border districts to be regarded as Arab were specified. In 1917, when the aid of the Arabs was sorely needed in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, these promises were reiterated, despite their conflict with the Sykes-Picot agreement.

When the armistice was declared, Great Britain found herself in the embarrassing position of having promised the same territories to different people. By the Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria, including Damascus, was to go to France, and by the Balfour declaration of November 2, 1917, the British cabinet had promised to make Palestine "a national home" for the Jews. British generals in Mesopotamia had also been prodigal in their promises of "complete independence" to several Arab tribal rulers. On the other hand, they had just as definitely promised the Damascus region and Mesopotamia to the shereef of Mecca, whom they had made king of the Hedjaz; and before the conquest of Palestine, which would have been impossible without his aid, they had told King Hussein that they would respect the holy places of Islam and would allow complete political and religious liberty to the inhabitants of Palestine. This pledge could not be observed without repudiating the interpretation that the Zionist leaders had been allowed to make of the Balfour declaration.

Emir Feisal, son of King Hussein, represented the Hedjaz, recognized as an independent state, at the Paris conference; and the Hedjaz was a signatory of the treaty of Versailles. Its name appeared among the contracting powers in the treaty of Sèvres, and the Hedjaz was a charter member of the League of Nations. But, before the

signature of the treaty of Sèvres, Feisal, who had installed himself in Damascus in accordance with the British understanding, was driven out by the French, whose action was prompt and decisive. The quarrel was not referred to the League of Nations as provided for by treaties to which France and the Hedjaz were co-signatories. The British, failing to extend their administrative control over Mesopotamia by armed force, compensated Feisal, the enemy of France, by making him ruler of Bagdad under the title of king of the Irak, a region whose boundaries touched those of Syria, from which the French had driven Feisal. French public opinion believes that the "disloyalty" of the British in Syria freed them from the obligation of conferring with the British before signing the treaty of Angora.

In the parts of the former Ottoman Empire that they occupy Great Britain and France have ignored the mandate principle. They have not consulted the wishes of the inhabitants, and from the beginning they have never considered that they derived their authority from the League of Nations. Their occupation of the supposed mandated territories, which are "provisionally recognized as independent nations," is a military occupation, maintained by constant fighting and political repression. They can not report to a commission of the League progress in the "rendering of administrative advice and assistance," because they have no intention of merely helping, "until such a time as they are able to stand alone," the people over whom they are ruling.

The recognition of the independence of the Hedjaz and the creation of the kingdom of Irak have made the position of the British on the other side of the Red Sea precarious, if not untenable. The Egyptians refused to accept the British protectorate provided by the treaty of Sèvres, claiming that the protectorate violated the treaty of London (1840) and was in contradiction to the assurances given by British statesmen to the Egyptians and the world

from the time of the occupation down to and including the World War. The Palestinians are equally recalcitrant, and refuse to be sacrificed either to the exigencies of British world policy or to the fulfilment of the Balfour declaration. Farther north, the Syrians are making the French occupation exceedingly costly. In Egypt, Palestine, and Syria the authority of the British and French extends in the spring of 1922 only as far as their guns carry. Not only are they having difficulty with the inhabitants of the countries they seized, but their relations with each other have changed from the cordiality of comrades-in-arms to the suspiciousness and dislike of political rivals and commercial competitors.

CHAPTER XL

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE PREVENTED BY UNSATIS- FIED NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS AND DIVERGENT POLICIES OF THE VICTORS (1918-1922)

AS far as enemy states were concerned, the armistices —with Bulgaria, September 28; with Turkey, October 30; with Austria-Hungary, November 3; and with Germany, November 11—ended the World War. The drastic terms of the Allies were accepted without equivocation, and there was no opposition to any measures taken to put them into effect. Except in Turkey, the victors made the stipulations and took the precautionary measures necessary to prevent a renewal of hostilities on the part of the vanquished. During the years immediately following the World War, therefore, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were powerless to disturb the peace. From a diplomatic as well as a military point of view, these four states counted for nothing in international relations. Their armies were disbanded, their navies were destroyed, their fortresses were dismantled or were occupied by allied garrisons, their military equipment, from huge cannon and airplanes down to uniforms and shoes, passed into the hands of their enemies, their citizens were refused passports for travel, and their embassies and legations and consulates remained closed in almost every country of the world.

As we have seen, the vanquished were excluded from a voice in the deliberations of the peace conference, and when their plenipotentiaries were summoned to Paris to sign treaties that represented the desires and ideas of their conquerors, they were shut up under guard and not allowed to communicate, much less exchange opinions, with the dele-

gates or the press correspondents of the victorious powers. This diplomatic exclusion continued for more than two years after the treaty of Versailles went into force. In the various political and economic conferences, and in the meetings of the League of Nations, former enemy states and Russia played no part.¹

The failure to reëstablish peace can not be imputed to an inconclusive victory that left the victors in no position to impose their will upon the vanquished. Nor were reconstruction and rehabilitation throughout the world retarded through opportunities offered to the defeated powers (except Turkey) to fish in troubled waters. They were unable to escape the consequences of their defeat by dividing the victors during the peace negotiations or by alienating small states from the *bloc* of their enemies through direct concessions and bribes of economic advantages. The reëstablishment of peace was prevented by unsatisfied nationalist aspirations of the small states and by divergent policies of the five principal allied and associated powers.

An examination of the main features of the five treaties and of the problems to which they gave rise has shown that the recent World War did not accomplish the change that was hoped for in the character of international relations. In the policies they advocated, statesmen continued to have a national, not an international, vision. Their object was the aggrandizement of the nation they represented, their justification the security and prosperity of their own country, and their criterion the force at their disposal. Before the conference opened, Premier Clemenceau summed up this conception of a statesman's duties when he explained to the Chamber of Deputies that he would go into the conference with a maximum and a minimum program, with the sole idea of getting for France as much as he could. From

¹ The economic conference at Genoa, in April, 1922, was the first official international gathering since the war in which Germans and Russians sat with the delegates of the other powers. See p. 559.

January, 1919, to January, 1922, beginning at Paris and continuing until Washington, the victors held conference after conference for the ostensible purpose of establishing a new world order. But, unfortunately, what they really had in mind were the interests of their own nations; and, since the elimination of Germany and Russia gave them opportunities for the development of their world policies such as they had not enjoyed before, the principal allied and associated powers gradually drifted from the solidarity of comradeship-in-arms into conflict among themselves over the spoils of the war.

In considering the "spoils of the war," we must guard against the mistake of placing too great emphasis upon territorial gains and indemnities. Under twentieth-century political and economic conditions, the extension of sovereignty over new territories and the payment of indemnities are not indisputably advantageous to powers victorious in war. In fact, these traditional rewards to the victors are likely to prove positively harmful. The new territories may bring internal and international complications and military and financial burdens, and the indemnities may hurt commerce and retard industry. The greatest assets of victory are gains that tend directly to increase the security and prosperity of the victors.

In almost every case, the cessions of territory and the indemnities provided for in the terms dictated to the enemy were prompted by strategic and economic considerations. The framers of the treaties had two objects in mind: to render the vanquished powers militarily impotent, and to destroy them as trade competitors. Into the treaty with Turkey a third object entered: to divide as much of the Ottoman dominions as possible into exclusive spheres of influence among Great Britain, France, and Italy. The emancipated peoples, therefore, although erected into independent states, joined to neighboring states, or put under the tutelage of the different powers as mandated territo-

ries, had a string attached to their liberty; in return for the gift of emancipation, they were to fight for, trade with, and open up their countries to the mining and industrial enterprises of the victorious powers.

In making the treaties and in taking measures to enforce them, however, divergent opinions and policies arose among the framers of the treaties because they were to one another what the central empires had been—a potential menace and actual trade competitors. In the conferences that succeeded the common victory of the autumn of 1918 the surviving powers have been thinking of one another and have acted towards one another as they thought and acted towards Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in pre-war days. The destruction of the balance of power has made necessary a revision of the strategic and economic policies of each of the remaining great powers. Instead of harmony and coöperation, there have been jealousy, suspicion, and keen competition for the political and economic spoils of the war. The principal and allied associated powers have been unable to come to an equitable understanding concerning each participant's share in the advantages accruing from the victory. Divergent needs and ambitions have resulted in divergent policies.

The European balance of power, as it existed in 1914, was the result of centuries of political evolution. Each great political organism had its essential place and served as a check upon the others. Because of Russia and France, Germany could not absorb the Hapsburg empire. Because of Russia, Germany feared to attack France. Austria-Hungary and Russia kept each other from penetrating the Balkan peninsula. France and Germany made possible the creation and independent existence of Belgium, and both of these powers vitally contributed to the unification of Italy. Italy profited for half a century by being able to hold the balance of power in Europe between Germany and France, and in the Mediterranean between France and

Great Britain. The increasing strength of Germany prevented Russia from attacking Austria-Hungary, just as the increasing strength of Russia prevented Germany from keeping France intimidated. The remarkable growth and prosperity of Germany aided British commerce on the continent, and acted as a deterrent when France was eager to fight Great Britain. It was a commonplace of European diplomacy that if Austria-Hungary had not existed, this political organism would have had to be created in order to preserve the peace of Europe. It will readily be seen that the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and the military and economic prostration of Germany gave rise to new problems that inevitably led to disagreement among British, French, and Italians. Since the interests of these three peoples were conflicting in the matter of the reconstruction of Europe, the danger of divergent policies leading to misunderstandings soon became apparent.

The disturbing effect of the permanent elimination of Austria-Hungary and the temporary exclusion of Germany and Russia from a share in shaping the destinies of Europe was not limited to European reconstruction. In various crises between 1878 and 1914 the European and world situation of the great powers proved to be interdependent. Wars between European states and the subjugation of weak nations outside Europe were frequently prevented by the distribution of the balance of power. No great power attempted to repeat Russia's effort to encroach upon the Ottoman Empire, for, after San Stefano,¹ it was realized that the powers were ready to combine against a despoiler of Turkey. The World War reopened the Near Eastern question, and, with Germany and Russia out of the calculations, Great Britain, France, and Italy inevitably became bitter rivals, not only for the Ottoman succession, but also for paramount influence in countries bordering on Turkey.

¹ See p. 48.

In the Far East, Russia ceased to be a checkmate to Japan. Germany, too, no longer stood in Japan's way, and the Entente powers soon came to realize that their ally, Japan, was proving a far greater menace to their security and prosperity in the Far East than Germany ever could have been. The withdrawal of czarist Russia, with which British diplomats knew how to deal, left Persia and Afghanistan open to a propaganda against British influence that could not be checked.

The unsatisfied nationalist aspirations of small nations and subject peoples made impossible a durable world peace on the basis of the settlements arranged at Paris. These aspirations were not always legitimate or practicable, and frequently there was a conflict between the claims of the various peoples aspiring to independence. Therefore all could not be satisfied, and recognition by the principal allied and associated powers of some of the nationalist aspirations to which they refused to listen would undoubtedly have resulted in as much injustice and political instability as already existed because of the conditions against which weak states and subject nations protested. Compromises and disappointments were inevitable.

But these compromises were not made upon the basis of adjusting as equitably as possible the rival claims of small states or of finding a *modus vivendi* for subject peoples that conformed to their own best interests and that would lead to the realization of reasonable and legitimate aspirations. In Europe, and outside Europe, nationalist aspirations were used by the statesmen of victorious powers to advance their own interests, frequently by wringing concessions from, or attempting to block the aims of, former comrades-in-arms. A paradox or a vicious circle has been established: because of the divergent policies of the principal allied powers the aspirations of small states and subject peoples were not realized at the Paris conference, and because these aspirations were not satisfied within reason-

able and practicable limits, the policies of the principal allied powers, since the peace conference, have become more divergent.

Concrete illustrations can be given to demonstrate that the statesmen of Great Britain, France, and Italy have quarreled because of world politics since the war in the same way as during crises before the war, and that the recent coöperation during a long and costly struggle has not created bonds of friendship among the peoples of the allied nations strong enough to prevail against the bitterness and selfishness and fear accruing from the conceptions and pursuit of world politics.

Always keeping in mind the two preoccupations of foreign policy, security and prosperity, we find that the war gave Great Britain and Italy satisfaction, in so far as the enemy states were concerned, on the score of security. Great Britain achieved the destruction of the German navy and the virtual banishment from the high seas of the German merchant marine; Italy achieved the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. France, on the other hand, still faced a Germany numerically stronger than herself and better equipped industrially to manufacture the widely varied implements of war, which now included airplanes and poison gases, both indistinguishable in time of peace as military weapons.

Under these circumstances, France felt that her national security depended upon the permanent political and economic disability, in the family of nations, of her great foe. The policy of France was to alienate as much territory as possible from Germany, either by taking it herself or giving it to others; to prevent the voice of Germany from being heard in the League of Nations or any other international conference; and either to break up the unity of the German Empire or to put the German people into economic servitude. The means of accomplishing these purposes were: (1) permanent retention of the territories

occupied under the terms of the treaty of Versailles; (2) keeping Austria from joining Germany; (3) including within the frontiers of Poland as much German territory as possible, notably the great industrial region of upper Silesia; (4) creating as extensive a Poland as possible, which, in return for French support, would agree to maintain a large standing army to replace Russia as France's ally; and (5) making and interpreting and enforcing the reparations terms of the treaty with the view of frustrating whatever attempts Germany might make for political and economic rehabilitation.

In getting much of what they wanted into the treaty of Versailles, the French had been aided by the foolish electoral promise "to make Germany pay" of Mr. Lloyd George, in December, 1918, and by the need of Great Britain and Italy to call upon France frequently against the United States or, more correctly, against President Wilson. The French did not win the left bank of the Rhine and a clear title for themselves to the Saar Basin, nor did they get for Poland Danzig, certain large districts of east and west Prussia and upper Silesia. But they did secure the right to continue the occupation of the Rhine provinces, to control the internal policies of the German government, and to exclude Germany from international conferences until the terms of the treaty of Versailles were fulfilled.¹ This, of course, meant the Greek kalends unless there were a revision, or at least a series of modifications, when it was discovered that Germany could not literally fulfil all the clauses of the treaty, such as trial of war criminals, disbanding of gendarmerie, and the payment of reparation sums demanded.

Since the signing of the treaty of Versailles, France, on the ground of security, has stood for its strict fulfilment, even when it was acknowledged that the terms could not be fulfilled. In the latter case, France has announced her

¹ See Chapter XLVI.

intention to proceed to exercise the sanctions provided for in case of non-fulfilment: retention of the left bank Rhine provinces; occupation of additional German territory, notably the Ruhr Basin, which contains most of Germany's remaining coal and her greatest industries; and seizure of the customs of German ports and frontier cities, in this way reducing Germany to the position of China and Turkey.

But what the French deem necessary for their security the British and Italians realize is disastrous to their prosperity. The treaty of Versailles is not drastic enough for the French: it is too drastic for the British and Italians.¹ For this reason the French have encouraged and the British and Italians have discouraged a separatist movement in the Rhine provinces and the imperialism of the Poles. Mr. Lloyd George, during the conference, opposed the incorporation in Poland of German districts and the mad desire of the Poles to extend their frontiers to the northeast, the east, and the southeast, at the expense of Lithuanians, Russians, and Ukrainians. He was consistent in this opposition during the crises that followed the creation of Poland and throughout the development of the upper Silesian question.

The British premier had the support of the Italians. British and Italian statesmen and public opinion realized that normal business conditions and commercial prosperity could be reestablished only through the economic rehabili-

¹ The widely circulated book by J. M. Keynes, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," which appeared in 1920, was roundly condemned by able American scholars who had been experts attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Events have proved, however, that Mr. Keynes, who had been the representative of the British treasury at the Paris conference, really set forth the prevailing governmental view of the treaty of Versailles. Similarly, in the autumn of 1921, former Premier Nitti of Italy published a book, "L'Europa senza Pace," denouncing, as Mr. Keynes had done, the terms of the treaty of Versailles as unjust and impracticable, and pointing out their blighting effect on the restoration of peace and prosperity in Europe. Mr. Keynes has just published a second volume in which he confesses that his earlier pessimism has not been fully justified, but he reiterates the need for revision.

tation of central Europe. In the long run the payment of reparations, either in goods supplied directly to them or in money derived from the sale of goods in extra-European markets, would hurt them far more than the amounts they received from the reparations. Therefore they gradually withdrew their support from France, condemning her attitude towards Germany and her encouragement of Poland. When the upper Silesian question was finally settled on the basis of division of the disputed territory, in which Poland was favored, the British and Italian press did not attempt to conceal the dissatisfaction and misgivings aroused by persistence in the policy that could be explained by no other motive than that of rendering Germany impotent to meet the reparation payments.

In the political and economic conferences, often confined to the premiers of the three powers, which followed in rapid succession the initial attempts to enforce the treaty of Versailles and to interpret and complete the other treaties, the French and British bargained with each other, France gaining the assent of Great Britain to the policy of threatening Germany in exchange for granting the British a freer hand in the Near East. After Italy had adjusted her Adriatic difficulties with the Jugo-Slavs, this method of compromise did not appeal to her; she had nothing to bargain about! But between the conference of San Remo in the spring of 1920 and that of Cannes in the early days of 1922 the internal situation in Great Britain had made her statesmen less keen about scoring diplomatic advantages outside Europe and much more insistent upon relieving the intolerable situation of central Europe and avoiding the competition of German goods by loosening the screws applied to the German government. Unemployment was a great problem in England. Trade relations had to be resumed with central and eastern Europe, and British merchants could no longer, for the sake of France, envisage with equanimity any policy that would result in the flood-

ing of the markets of the world with cheap German goods. The same feeling prevailed in Italy. After all, Great Britain and Italy had much less interest in the indemnities from Germany than had France.

When France found that she could no longer count upon British and Italian coöperation in, or even diplomatic approval of, her plans to seize the Ruhr Basin and the custom-houses of Germany following the refusal or inability of Berlin to meet the stipulated indemnity payments, President Millerand invited former President Poincaré to form an avowedly nationalist cabinet to replace the ministry of M. Briand, who had been temporizing with Great Britain at Washington and Cannes.¹ But the French ministry of foreign affairs had broken loose from the entente cordiale months before, and had opened a definite breach in the seemingly harmonious diplomatic front of the Entente powers by negotiating a separate peace with the Kemalist Turkish government at Angora. This agreement abrogated, as far as France was concerned, fundamental terms of the treaty of Sèvres and the mandate clauses of the covenant of the League of Nations. Up to this time France had not accepted the mandate principle, either in letter or spirit; but the Angora treaty was the first instance of a denial of the common partnership of the principal allied and associated powers in extra-European territories ceded to them collectively by Germany and Turkey.

The Paris treaties left unsatisfied throughout the world the nationalist aspirations of friends as well as of foes. Of the successor states of Austria-Hungary, Italy fared

¹In the second week of January, 1922, M. Briand, called back to Paris from the Cannes conference by a political crisis, defended energetically and with seeming success his policies before the Chamber of Deputies. Although he might have obtained a vote of confidence, he resigned because President Millerand told him that the country did not approve of his concessions to the British. Commenting on the resignation of M. Briand, M. Viviani said that it was impossible for a statesman to attempt to manage French foreign affairs on the basis of what was practicable, in view of the radical difference of opinion with Great Britain on the question of how Germany should be treated.

best. But even she had to compromise with the Jugo-Slavs. The treaty of Rapallo, ratified by Italy on November 27, 1920, although it gave Italy most of what she had claimed, satisfied the Italian nationalists scarcely more than it did the Jugo-Slavs. Czecho-Slovakia contained large alien elements, separated arbitrarily from their German, Austrian, and Hungarian kin in neighboring countries. Rumania and Serbia differed on the division of the banat of Temesvar. Poland secured, partly by French backing and partly by force of arms in defiance of the Entente powers and the League of Nations, large portions of Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian territory. From Bulgaria were taken regions inhabited entirely by people of their own tongue, who claimed to be Bulgarians. In violation of the explicit terms of article XXII of the treaty of Versailles, the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the Hedjaz, were divided between Great Britain and France. The treaty of Versailles compelled Germany to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt and the transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan, although Egyptians and Chinese were not consulted and obdurately refused to submit to this disregard of their sovereign rights. Persia was denied a hearing at the peace conference, but in August, 1919, was compelled by the British to sign a treaty virtually establishing a protectorate, which was afterwards repudiated when the British government found that it could no longer keep troops in Persia.

At the peace conference and afterwards the aspirations of the Arabs, Syrians, Palestinians, Egyptians, Persians, and Chinese, although they had been encouraged during the war by definite promises, were used as threats and bribes in the deliberations of the principal allied and associated powers. In a manner more disguised, but not less effective and for the same purposes, the peoples of the Hapsburg and Romanoff empires, and also the Albanians

and Greeks, were favored or militated against according to the exigencies of the world policies of the world powers.

That their own interests and not the merits of the case shaped the decisions of the principal allied and associated powers is most clearly shown in the shifting attitude of Great Britain and France towards the Armenians, Greeks, and Turks since the conclusion of the war.

Because of their unexampled sufferings, the Entente powers promised to avenge the Armenians and protect them, even if they were unable to assure them independence, in case of victory. This was one of the objects of the war, as set forth by the Allies in their joint response to President Wilson's disconcerting inquiry at the end of 1916. The Armenians were encouraged to enlist in the Entente armies, and were formed into separate battalions by Russians, French, and British. Like the Arabs, they fought against their oppressors, and after the armistice with Turkey they were used by the French in Cilicia and by the British in the Caucasus to help pacify and police occupied territories. But when changed conditions elsewhere suggested a modification of the original plans of the victors, the Armenians were deserted by both the British and the French, and in the treaty of Angora the French handed Cilicia back to Turkey, with no adequate stipulations for the protection of the Armenians. The remnant of the race out of whose sufferings so much political capital had been made during the war to arouse hatred of the Germans and the Turks was without compunction left once more in the power of the Turks.

The Greeks were forced into the war, after their first offer of aid had been rejected, because of the military necessities of the Entente powers.¹ After the armistices the presence of the Greek armies in Macedonia and Thrace, and their occupation of Smyrna at the invitation of the Entente powers during the peace conference, made possible the

¹ See pp. 300-301.

acceptance of the authority of the victors by the Bulgarians and the Turks. Without the Greek forces to call upon, the Entente powers would hardly have dared to settle in Constantinople and undertake to disarm Bulgaria,¹ and they could not have expelled the Turks from Thrace. They relied upon the Greeks to furnish the bulk of the forces used to attempt to intimidate the Turkish nationalists, who disregarded the terms of the armistice. The Greeks kept the nationalists occupied while the French were getting their hold on Syria and while the British were trying to bring Mesopotamia and the Caucasus under their administrative control. The French became suspicious of the Greeks, however, and, although they themselves had signed the treaty of Sèvres, they encouraged the Turks to resist the Greeks. The Italians went farther and furnished the Turks with arms and ammunition.

Italy was determined to prevent the rise of a powerful rival in the eastern Mediterranean. The ground for French suspicions was the British support of the Greeks. They feared that Greek penetration in Asia Minor would lead to the occupation of Constantinople, which the Greeks would hold for the British. The French attitude towards Greece in 1920 was similar to the British attitude towards Bulgaria in 1878. When Venizelos was defeated at the polls and King Constantine returned to the throne, in November, 1920, the French seized this event as a pretext for open diplomatic hostility to the efforts of Greece to protect Hellenism in Asia Minor. When the British realized that the Greeks could not defeat the Kemalist Turks, they cut off their subsidies and declared that Constantinople and the Straits should be neutral in the war between the Turkish nationalists and the Greeks. Six months later the British learned that the French were dickering with Kemal Pasha

¹It must be remembered that the Rumanian army, scarcely recovered from its demoralization, had to face the Bolshevist menace in Bessarabia, and that the Serbians, still more depleted in men and material, were straining every nerve to oppose a solid front against the Italians.

at Angora. When the Franco-Kemalist treaty was signed, the British denounced French bad faith and began to support the Greeks again.

Following close upon a war of heroic sacrifice and idealism, these facts are disagreeable to record. But it is not enough to realize that peace did not come as a result of the treaties, and to connect the unsettled condition of the world with the agitation of dissatisfied small nations and subject peoples. The Turks have a proverb that "a fish begins to corrupt at the head." If the principal allied and associated powers had trusted one another, and had been willing to coöperate for the common good, they could have imposed upon the world the reality of peace as easily as they imposed upon Germany a signature on the dotted line. United, none could have withstood them; divided, they have undermined one another's authority and have kept the world in a disturbed economic and a dangerous political state because they have tried to push one another aside in the mad rush for the fruits of victory.

CHAPTER XLI

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1917-1922)

ON March 12, 1917, Czar Nicholas suspended the Duma. The Lower House disregarded the ukase. When ordered to arrest its members, the Petrograd garrison mutinied and went over to the revolutionists. Thereupon the Duma delegated to an executive committee the authority to set up a provisional government. The next day the principal reactionaries and most of the czarist ministers and high functionaries were imprisoned. On the 14th Moscow, Odessa, and other cities declared for the provisional government. Czar Nicholas abdicated on the 15th.

In Entente countries the Russian Revolution was interpreted as a popular movement, sponsored by the moderate political leaders, to prevent German influence at the Russian court from gaining the ascendancy to the extent of causing the disruption of the Entente Alliance. For months rumors of a separate peace had circulated in neutral countries, and had caused great uneasiness at London, Paris, and Rome. Now it was predicted not only that Russia would go on with the war, but that the disappearance of czarism would mean a universal awakening of enthusiasm for the war against German absolutism. Color and hope were given to this belief by the declarations of the provisional government. New Russia, they said, was naturally interested in, while old Russia was indifferent to, the worldwide triumph of democracy. The speeches of President Wilson, published in full by the Russian newspapers, were regarded as the gospel of a new era in international relations.

The revolution had deeper roots and was more far-reaching in its influence than had at first been supposed. The Duma leaders who came forward to assume the responsibilities of government, however, seemed to be as blind as were the Entente diplomatic representatives to the fact that war weariness was the reason for the instantaneous acceptance of the revolution by the armies and the civilian population. The mass of the Russian people had no antipathy to the Germans. They were ignorant of the imperialistic aspirations that the Russian government hoped to realize by the victory of the Entente. They would not have understood them if they had known. For nearly three years the Russians fought against their enemies without a conscious national feeling either of self-defense or of self-aggrandizement. None of the complex of motives that inspired the British, French, and Italians had stirred and spurred and sustained them. Controlled and directed by the machinery of the old régime, they answered the call to arms, and fought well if well led, or badly if badly led. When the czarist government collapsed, its machinery broke down.

Revolutionary Russia was expected by the Entente statesmen to continue to function as czarist Russia had functioned. The first provisional government, composed of different elements of widely varying political theories, was unanimous in its decision to continue the war; but a split soon occurred over the question of the objects of the conflict. Prince Lvoff and Foreign Minister Miliukoff were aggressive and impenitent nationalists who, like the Young Turks, believed that absolutism could be destroyed by a popular movement, without renouncing the spirit and policies of absolutism. This belief led them to assure the Entente ambassadors that the understandings and the undertakings of the alliance would be preserved. They were willing to go on with the war on the old basis, *i. e.*, that each should contribute to the common cause and that each should receive an explicitly defined share of the

booty.¹ But other members of the cabinet, whose spokesman was Kerensky, declared that the overthrow of the czar meant a radical departure from the former policies of Russia. They were willing to urge the people to go on with the war, and approved the recognition of the independence of Poland—a measure greatly to the advantage of the Entente. But the ideals of the revolution were the right of peoples to decide their own destinies and the renunciation of intrigues and bargains by which peoples were enslaved. If Russia freed Poland, they argued, why should not Great Britain free Ireland?

The clash between the two groups came over the question of Constantinople. Kerensky told representatives of the French and British press that the revolutionary government had no interest in the old czarist policy of conquests, which was contrary to the spirit of the revolution, and therefore waived all the pledges and understandings of the secret treaties. He specified the acquisition of Constantinople as an aspiration that revolutionary Russia no longer sponsored. Miliukoff replied that Constantinople was as much the dream of new Russia as of old Russia. This brought to the front the question of the attitude of revolutionary Russia towards the international engagements of the fallen régime. The socialists were strong enough to compel Prince Lvoff to issue a manifesto stating as the policy of the government the principle of “no annexation, no indemnities,” which the newly formed soviets of work-

¹ The liberal and radical elements in Russia had always resented the alliance with France. They believed that France had loaned money to Russia neither for friendship's sake nor for investment, but solely to create a military and naval machine with which to menace Germany at no expense to themselves. Moreover, the exigencies of her foreign policy had rendered the government of democratic France unsympathetic—even hostile—to the liberal movement in Russia. The financial and political support of the French alliance had, in fact, enabled the absolutist régime to remain in control of the destinies of Russia. When the war broke out, Russia had been promised in secret treaties her share of the spoils, and had received the definite assurance from the other Entente powers that they would not interfere in the Polish question. In 1916, and again in the early part of 1917, France solicited Russia's support for France's claim to a Rhine boundary, and promised in return to aid Russia in suppressing Polish aspirations.

men and soldiers were advocating. The government's declaration of April 9 read:

"The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at dominating other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories; but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or to humiliate any one."

This reversal of policy gave more concern to Entente statesmen than did the loss of battles. It was a smashing blow to world-politics diplomacy. President Wilson's speeches were regarded as harmless babble, for the simple reason that the United States had no stake in the secret agreements made before and during the war. But dealing with Russia on the basis of *quid pro quo* had been the directing principle of French and British foreign policy, and had made possible the formation of the Entente Alliance. Closing their eyes to the fact that the old political structure was too shattered to be repaired, and that the Russian people needed a new and radically different stimulus if their fighting spirit was to be resuscitated, the Entente governments insisted that Prince Lvoff and Miliukoff continue to play the game in the old way. At the end of April Miliukoff sent a note to the Allied powers, declaring that new Russia was in complete agreement "with the well known war aims of the other Entente powers" and that "the nation's determination to bring the World War to a decisive victory" had been accentuated by the revolution. The executive committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates ordered the government on May 4 to send a new note to the Allied powers, contradicting that of Miliukoff, who was virtually dismissed as a result of this intervention of the soviets.

Prince Lvoff formed a coalition government, in which Kerensky was shifted from the ministry of justice to that of war and marine combined. The new ministry notified the powers that "in its foreign policy the provisional government, rejecting, in concert with the entire people, all thought of a separate peace, adopts openly as its aim the reëstablishment of a general peace, which shall not tend towards either domination over other nations, or the seizure of their national possessions, or the violent usurpation of their territories—a peace without annexation or indemnities, and based upon the rights of nations to decide their own affairs." There was urgent need for a reply that would conciliate the radical elements, which by this time were acknowledged to have the real power in Russia. For a tacit armistice had already been entered into by the common soldiers on the front, and the morale of the army was breaking down. At the end of May an earnest appeal was made by the soviets to the Allied governments to give a definite answer to the formula of "no annexations, no indemnities."

On June 12 the British and French governments made public their answer to the Russian manifesto of April 9. Great Britain had replied directly, stating that the purpose of the United Kingdom "at the outset" was to defend its existence "and to enforce respect for international arrangements. To these objects has now been added that of liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny." The British government was in agreement with the Russian declaration of not dominating "other peoples or taking from them their national patrimony or forcibly occupying foreign territory." Heartily accepting and approving the "principles laid down by President Wilson in his message to Congress," the British government believed "that, broadly speaking, the agreements which they have from time to time made with their allies are conformable to these standards. But if the Russian government so de-

sires, they are quite ready with their allies to examine and, if need be, to revise these agreements." The French, in more general terms, sympathized with the Russian principles, which were their own, but deftly evaded any promise to accept "no annexations, no indemnities," even if the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and the compensation for physical damages resulting to France from the German invasion were excepted.

When a final offensive at the beginning of July ended in defeat, the Russian army disappeared as a factor in the war. Kerensky became premier on July 16, and tried in vain to induce the Allied powers to realize the consequences of a refusal to agree to a definite revision of the secret treaties along the lines of President Wilson's principles. Had not the United States intervened shortly after the Russian Revolution and shown amazing zeal and efficiency in contributing money and men to the Allied cause, it is probable that Kerensky would have met with some measure of success in his negotiations. But the Entente statesmen deliberately weighed the advantages and disadvantages of a compromise with revolutionary Russia. On the one side, a partial renunciation of imperialism might keep Russia in the war; on the other, there was no telling how far the Russians would force them to go in waiving the possible gains of victory, or whether Kerensky or any other leader could be counted upon to whip into shape once more the Russian armies. Now that the United States was in the war, ultimate victory seemed assured, no matter what happened in Russia.

At the beginning of the revolution the socialists were in favor of continuing the war. The entry of the United States, under the ægis of the Wilsonian principles, had made them feel that an Allied victory over Germany would establish a new world order. Delegations from Great Britain and France and Italy of cabinet ministers and par-

liamentarians of their own political creed assured them that there was an increasingly powerful sentiment growing up in Allied countries for a durable peace based upon a renunciation of imperialism. But as the months dragged on and they saw that the Allied governments had no intention of defining their war aims and pledging themselves to the principle of "no annexations, no indemnities," even with modifications, they lost interest in sustaining or recreating a war spirit among the people, and either made no further effort to retain their leadership or joined the extremists.

Much has been written about various causes of the collapse of the Kerensky government. Kerensky is blamed for his impracticable theories and his lack of firmness in dealing with the growing power of the Bolsheviks. But the fundamental factor in undermining his influence and paving the way for the Bolshevik régime was the refusal of the other Entente powers to give the Russians, who were loyal to the Entente and who wanted to continue the war, the assurance that the Entente coalition was ready to make peace—if Germany was—on the basis of coöperation in establishing a new world order. The majority socialists were in sympathy with the program of freeing alien peoples from Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Ottoman domination, and they had proved the genuineness of this sympathy by consenting to the independence of the peoples similarly held under Romanoff domination. Believing that changes of sovereignty should be made with the interests of the peoples concerned in view, and not under the influence of promoting the interests of the victorious powers, they called upon Great Britain, France, and Italy to abandon the definite rewards and arrangements of the secret treaties, as Russia was willing to do, and to adopt in place of them a policy of disinterestedness. They argued that the central empires would then have to accept peace on that

basis or be put unmistakably in the position of defenders and upholders of the principles that the Russian Revolution was combating.¹

During the autumn of 1917 the war became so unpopular that the loyalty to the Entente of the Kerensky cabinet made inevitable its downfall. Food was scarce in the cities, and the peasant masses, agitated by the stories of cruelty and hardship brought back by deserting soldiers, encouraged disobedience of the orders to return, and began to threaten to starve out those in the cities who were opposed to ending the war. Moreover, their chief interest—and this the soldiers shared—had become the expropriation and further division of the land. The Bolsheviks had secured control of the Petrograd and Moscow soviets and those of other large towns. By a *coup d'état* on November 7 they overthrew the Kerensky government. The next day Lenin formed a new revolutionary committee to govern Russia under the name of “the commissaries of the people.”

Trotsky, president of the Petrograd soviet, became “commissary of the people for foreign affairs,” and celebrated his advent to power by publishing secret treaties entered into by Russia and several of the other Allied powers. These were followed by the serial publication in a Petrograd newspaper of the correspondence of the Russian ambassadors with the ministry of foreign affairs and

¹ More than a year later, on September 27, 1918, President Wilson summed up and indorsed the attitude of the Russian socialists when he said: “Assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, . . . and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of their final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and discussions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of these deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world.”

of confidential communications among the Entente powers. The authenticity of these documents was not denied. They revealed what had long been suspected but could not be proved, *i. e.*, the existence of concrete war aims at variance with the idealistic professions of the Entente statesmen.

The Bolsheviks declared an armistice, entered into negotiations with the central empires at Brest-Litovsk, and, yielding to the pressure of German invasion, signed on March 3, 1918, a treaty with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, upon the following terms: (1) renunciation of sovereignty over Finland, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, and evacuation of these territories; (2) promise to secure for Turkey the due return of her eastern Anatolian frontiers and the recognition of the annulment of the Turkish capitulations; (3) evacuation of the trans-Caucasian provinces; (4) internment of Russian and Entente war-ships in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and Arctic Ocean until the conclusion of a general peace; (5) complete demobilization of the Russian army. It was agreed that Germany and Austria-Hungary were to arrange the status of the liberated territories on the western frontiers, in consultation with the inhabitants, and that Turkey should enjoy a similar responsibility in the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum. The Ukraine, having signed a separate treaty with the central powers coalition, was recognized by Russia as an independent state. Lenin and Trotsky declared that the government was compelled to conclude peace on the terms dictated by German imperialism, but that the Russian people could look forward confidently to a later general peace, concluded on equal terms with all people after the other nations, like Russia, had rid themselves of their capitalist governments. Trotsky changed his portfolio to that of military and naval affairs, and was succeeded in the con-

duct of foreign affairs by Tchitcherin. Up to the present writing¹ these three men had remained in control of Russian destinies.

The collapse of the central empires and Turkey destroyed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, whose terms were denounced by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey in the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Sèvres. By later treaties, concluded directly with the peoples concerned, the soviet government recognized the independence, and agreed upon the new frontiers, of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Poland. Through the post-armistice military intervention of Great Britain and France, governments independent of Moscow, Berlin, and Constantinople were set up in the Ukraine, Baku (called the Azerbaïdjan Republic), Georgia, and Armenia, and were given *de facto* recognition. But while the four Baltic Sea republics and Poland had been able, through their own efforts and some aid from the Entente, to preserve their independence, repel Bolshevik invasions, and secure frontiers more favorable than those accorded them by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Ukraine and the republics of the Caucasus succumbed to Bolshevik propaganda. Before the end of 1921 these states had adopted the soviet form of government and were closely allied with Moscow.

After the defection of Russia the Entente powers refused to recognize the soviet government on the ground that it did not express the will of the people. Therefore they declared that they were justified in intervening with military forces to carry on their war against Germany on Russian soil. The armistices were signed, yet the Entente powers, including the United States, did not withdraw their troops from Russia. On the contrary, they adopted the attitude that the soviet government was the enemy of mankind, and they did all in their power to aid counter-revolutionary movements. In addition, the blockade meas-

¹ May, 1922.

ures, which had proved so effective against Germany and which had been extended to Russia without a declaration of war, were maintained. Successively, however, during 1919 and 1920, the Bolshevist armies defeated General Denikin, Admiral Kolchak, General Yudenitch, and Baron Wrangel, who had behind them Entente diplomatic and military support,¹ and the Ukrainian General Petlura, who was backed by Poland.

The history of the French Revolution repeated itself. Every effort of counter-revolutionary armies, working for the restoration of the monarchy and receiving aid from foreign powers, not only met with disaster, but also strengthened the hold on the people, which was slight at first, of the régime that the world had determined to destroy. When foreign troops invaded Russia at Archangel, at Vladivostok, and at Odessa, national feeling ran high. When the British simply replaced the Turks and the Germans in the Caucasus and revealed the fact that they were aiming at the oil-wells of Baku, the bulk of the more intelligent Russians still alive in their own country rallied to Lenin, though they loathed him. When France armed and trained the Poles and incited them to attack Russia, and when the Russians realized that the French diplomatic and military agents in Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania were trying to induce these states to join Poland, from general to private the Russians who truly loved their country offered their swords to Lenin.

The Russian Revolution, culminating in a separate peace with Germany and in the establishment of a communist

¹ British, French, and Greek military missions and troops were with Denikin; Kolchak had Czecho-Slovak and Japanese aid, and Americans guarding his lines of communication; a British military mission in Esthonia and the combined Allied forces at Archangel inspired Yudenitch's march on Petrograd; and Baron Wrangel was actually recognized by the French government. All these attempts to overthrow Lenin were made possible by Entente supplies, and even the Red Cross abandoned its neutrality to further the anti-Bolshevist propaganda by giving medicines, food, and clothing to the Russians who welcomed these adventurers and withholding its ministrations from the regions that did not join the anti-Bolshevist armies.

government of remarkable energy and stability,¹ has influenced world politics in a way that the defeat of Germany did not do and that the victory of Germany would not have done. For, despite her success in penetrating the Ottoman Empire and her Shantung venture, Germany was not a factor of prime importance either in the Near East or in the Far East. Had she won the war she would still not have had control of the sea, and she was not in territory contiguous to the Ottoman Empire and China. Losing the war, Germany withdrew from world politics without radically affecting the struggle of the more fortunate European powers, Japan and the United States, for world power and world markets. Russia, on the other hand, had been an integral factor in the development of the Near Eastern and Far Eastern questions. She had affected the evolution of British colonial policy, directly in the protection of India and indirectly in the arrangement of spheres of influence in Africa. As we have seen, the alliance that the Germans believed was encircling them in Europe and excluding them from markets outside Europe had been possible because Russia was a colonial power, imbued with the same imperialistic ambitions as France and Great Britain, and was able to bargain with the other two colonial powers, while Germany had to shake her saber to make her voice heard.² The geographical position of Russia gave her the key position in world politics. She was neighbor to the central empires and the Balkan States in Europe, and to the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan in Asia.

The withdrawal of Russia from the World War by the

¹ The writer wishes to remind his readers that the limitation of the scope of his subject to the phases affecting international relations makes impossible and irrelevant mention of many other aspects of the situations with which his chapters deal. In order that there may be no misunderstanding, he wishes it to be understood that the statement of facts does not necessarily mean that he is glad that they are facts! The writer has no sympathy with the methods of Bolshevism, and no faith in its economic theories.

² See Chapters XIV and XV.

treaty of Brest-Litovsk came too late to give the victory to Germany. But this defection from the Entente alliance, coupled with the defection of Rumania two days later,¹ would have enabled Germany and her allies to conclude an advantageous peace, had not the United States demonstrated her ability to place in France an army of unlimited strength and excellent fighting quality despite the submarine blockade. The United States, however, did not and could not take the place of Russia in the combinations of European diplomacy, in reference either to the balance of power in Europe or to the maintenance of the doctrine of European eminent domain in Asia. By denouncing the pre-war arrangements, on which Great Britain relied for her security in Asia and France for her security in Europe, and by renouncing the privileges accorded Russia for further expansion in the secret treaties concluded during the war, Lenin and his associates not only robbed the Entente powers of the fruits of victory so exactly provided for by their statesmen, but also challenged the *status quo ante bellum* in Asia.

The fear of the spread of Bolshevism to the rest of Europe and to the United States had little to do with the bitter opposition of the French and British governments to the soviet régime. Political, economic, and social conditions in central and western Europe and America do not furnish fruitful ground for communist propaganda. Entente statesmen knew this, but they played up the Bolshevik nightmare during the peace conference and afterwards in the effort to destroy the soviet government before its influence might extend throughout Asia and into Africa, imperiling the hold of the colonial powers upon their subject races. This is a strong statement, but many significant facts can be adduced to support it. The defeated countries did not adopt Bolshevism as the alternative to

¹The preliminary treaty between Rumania and the central empires was signed on March 5, 1918.

signing drastic treaties. Italy, who had no colonial interests of importance to consider, was the least alarmed of the Entente powers, although she was more seriously threatened by communist propaganda than any other country in Europe. When Great Britain realized that Lenin could not be overthrown, her government and her courts recognized the new régime as the *de facto* government, exacting not the repudiation of the political theories and practices against which the crusade had been declared, but the cessation of propaganda in India and the countries that formed the shields to India. The military intervention of Japan was aimed at preventing Bolshevik propaganda from reaching China and Korea as much as at inheriting Muscovite influence in Mongolia and Manchuria and controlling the future of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. The Entente powers did not intend that the destruction of German and Russian autocracy should be followed by a worldwide political and colonial readjustment in which the same principles would be applied to the territories and dependencies of all nations.

The opportunism and lack of guiding principles in world politics are demonstrated by the capital the Entente powers endeavored to make out of the misfortunes of Russia after the victory over Germany was assured. If Allied statesmen believed that the great mass of the Russian people was opposed to Bolshevism, and was being terrorized by a gang of ruffians subsidized by Germany, the rigorous blockade of more than a hundred million human beings, our allies, was inexplicable. If, on the other hand, they believed that Russia was so contaminated with Bolshevism that a *cordon sanitaire* was necessary, continued military intervention after Germany had sued for peace was an act of war against a great nation, based upon our condemnation of that nation's management of its internal affairs. President Wilson tried to put an end to this anomalous situation by proposing the Prinkipo conference in Febru-

ary, 1919. The suggestion was howled down, but nothing constructive was adopted in its place. At that time Entente statesmen might have been justified in holding that the Bolsheviks were usurpers; they were not justified in refusing to look upon the civil war in Russia from the point of view of helping the Russian people to their feet. There was no sympathy for a great people in the throes of political and social evolution. Occidental Europe and America did not want to admit the right of the Russians to work out their own salvation without interference; nor did we give the anti-Bolsheviks the right to speak for Russia at the Paris conference, nor assure them that we should make no decision affecting Russian territories and interests without their participation and consent.

The occasion was considered propitious for carrying out policies that would have been modified or blocked by whatever delegates the Entente governments might have been willing to regard as representing genuine Russian sentiments and the interests of the Russian people. At the peace conference Russians would have insisted upon a drastic modification of Italy's gains in return for giving up Constantinople; they would have contested the right of Great Britain to speak for Persia, to erect the Azerbaïdjan Republic, and to give Palestine as a home-land to the Jews; and they would have protested vehemently against the policies of France in Poland and the other successor states, and of Japan in Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. The strongest argument Lenin was able to make in bidding for united Russian support, aside from the obvious one of foreign invasion, was when he pointed out in speeches and manifestos that the "capitalist countries" were not holding Russian imperial interests in sacred trust for the "capitalist Russia" they professed their eagerness to reëstablish. If the Entente powers and the United States were sincere in their friendship for the Russian people, as American Secretary of State Colby asserted in his note of

August 20, 1919, why did they agree to the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, encourage Polish imperialism, attempt to alienate the Caucasus, allow Japan to stay in Siberia, and make a division of the spoils of the war in the Near East and elsewhere without reserving any part for Russia when she should "return to her senses"?

Soviet Russia during 1921 radically modified its communist theories of government and abandoned its revolutionary propaganda in Europe and America. The blockade and the impracticability of the soviet theories combined to bring the country to economic ruin and to famine. The renewal of trade with the outside world was essential, and food-stuffs had to be solicited from America to save millions from starvation. Gradually Russia is returning of her own accord into the family of "capitalistic nations." But Moscow has not abandoned the intention of allowing all the former subject races of the Russian Empire to work out their own destinies in their own way. This in itself is a danger to European overlordship in Asia and in the Mohammedan countries of Africa, however much Lenin may find it to the interest of his country to abide loyally by the trade agreement entered into with Great Britain, and prevent Russia from being used as the base of self-determination propaganda.

Unless Russia again becomes reactionary and imbued with the spirit of imperialism, however, the mischief in the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East can not be repaired. Soviet Russia has renounced the capitulations in Turkey, the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1907, and her concessions and leaseholds in Persia and China. She has canceled the Persian debt and the Boxer indemnity, and has concluded treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, and her former Moslem subjects of central Asia on the basis of equality. This gives no further excuse for Great Britain to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia and Afghanistan, and sets an embarrassing example of international

morality for the other European powers to follow. In China especially, the Russian Revolution, despite what was accomplished at Washington, has confronted Europe and the United States with the choice of allowing Japan to become the dominant power in the Far East or renouncing particular interests for the common good of all nations.

CHAPTER XLII

OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS OF "SECONDARY STATES" (1815-1922)

ASIDE from the five principal allied and associated powers, two other belligerents, Portugal and Belgium, and three neutrals, Spain, Denmark, and Holland, had title to overseas possessions after the peace conference completed its work.

The Portuguese footholds in Asia are insignificant: on the west coast of India the enclaves of Goa and Damão; in the Arabian Sea the little island of Dio; in the Malay Archipelago the eastern portion of Timor with a strip called Ambeno on the neighboring island of Pulo Cambing; and the island of Macao at the mouth of the Canton River in China. The Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa, however, are important not only because of their size and potential wealth, but also because of their geographical distribution. The Madeira and Azores Islands are considered an integral part of Portugal. The colonies are: the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea, São Thomé and Príncipe, Angola, and Portuguese East Africa. They cover nearly eight hundred thousand square miles, and have a population of more than eight millions.

The fourteen islands of the Cape Verde group are on the route from Europe to South America and command the coastal passage around Africa. The cables to Brazil and to South Africa, and also the line to British Gambia, touch at St. Vincent. Guinea is an enclave in French West Africa. São Thomé and Príncipe are advantageously located in the Gulf of Guinea. Angola extends from the mouth of the Congo south to former German Southwest

Africa. Portuguese East Africa occupies the east coast from Cape Delgado, the boundary with former German East Africa, south to Delagoa Bay, which cuts off the Transvaal from the sea, and lies just north of Natal. Portugal has not been able to keep pace with the other colonial powers in the development of either Asiatic or African colonies, and, as she is not a maritime power, they have no strategic value to her. She has retained her colonies only because for the past two hundred years she has never been in antagonism with British policy nor allied to one of Britain's enemies.

Before the World War the Portuguese colonies loomed large in world politics, because Great Britain and France, especially the former, feared that Germany planned to annex them, either by seizure or by purchase. Angola and East Africa became neighbors of Germany between 1884 and 1889, and it was feared that some pretext would be invented to seize them when Great Britain was fighting the Boers. What worried the British most was the thought of having Germany in possession of islands on the trade routes. Consequently, at the beginning of the Boer War the British government sounded Germany as to her intentions and indicated its willingness to agree upon an eventual division of the Portuguese colonies, should Portugal at any time feel the necessity of disposing of them. These *pourparlers* were resumed in 1913, and the British were willing to consent to the continental expansion of Germany in Africa, provided they could acquire the islands. The war put an end to the plan of joint purchase. Portugal retains all her colonies, but, as Great Britain and France have more of Africa than they can develop and there are no other bidders, the Portuguese colonies have no present international market value or importance.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the convention of 1890 between Belgium and the Congo Free State was about to expire. The question of annexation was raised in

Belgium, and in the rest of the world the question of the fitness of the Belgians to be the stewards of so large and important a part of the African continent. Livingstone's dream of central Africa for Christ had been superseded by the actuality of central Africa for rubber, and European penetration of the Dark Continent, far from bringing civilization and happiness to the natives, had left them in barbarism and brought them misery. In 1902 the British Foreign Office intimated to the powers that had signed the Berlin act that it might be advisable to put an end to the maladministration of the Congo Free State.¹ Failing to secure agreement among the powers, the British government in 1903 independently made strong diplomatic representations at Brussels. Belgium was told that this action was prompted, not by tales of travelers and missionaries, but by reports of British consuls, one corroborating the other in such a fashion that the evidence could not be controverted.² The Belgian public took this move in bad part. It was felt that Great Britain's motive in protesting against the conditions in the Congo was the desire to appropriate the fruit of the work that had converted the Congo into a rich domain and to link up the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with the British possessions in south-central Africa for the purpose of realizing the Cape-to-Cairo all-British railway.

On December 4, 1907, the Belgian government presented to the Chamber a treaty between King Leopold and Belgium. The Congo Free State was purchased by Belgium from the king, but the government refused to be respon-

¹ The writer regrets that he is unable to give the necessary space in this volume to a statement of the various international conferences and agreements concerning Africa. See Herslett, "The Map of Africa by Treaty."

² The British government published a memorandum of Lord Cromer, who declared from personal investigation that the population of the Belgian bank of the Nile was practically extinct; that the Belgians were so hated and feared that no Belgian officer could move outside of the settlements without a strong guard; that the natives fled from the Belgian officials; and that the Belgian soldiers were allowed by their superiors full liberty to plunder, and rarely made payment for supplies.

sible for the debt of nearly \$23,000,000. The status of the colony was established by a special law, and provision was made for its government. The powers were faced with a *fait accompli*. In 1885 they had erected the Congo into a free and independent state and had guaranteed its perpetual neutrality. Germany recognized the transfer of the country to Belgium, but Great Britain withheld her assent until 1913, when the Belgian administration proved that the old conditions had been remedied.

During the first year of the European war there was much discussion about the future of the Congo. Germany intended to use her hold on Belgium, if she had been able to maintain it until peace negotiations began, as a trump card in the readjustment of European spheres in Africa. Had she been successful it would have meant the realization of the German dream of a path from east to west across the continent. The Germans insinuated that the great sums loaned to Belgium by the Allies were secured by an Anglo-French economic, if not political, mortgage of the Congo. In order to offset this propaganda, the French minister handed to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs at Havre, on April 29, 1916, a note that read:

“The government of the French Republic declares that it will lend its aid to the Belgian government at the time of the peace negotiations with the view of maintaining the Belgian Congo in its present territorial status and of having attributed to this colony a special indemnity for the losses incurred in the course of the war.”

On the same day the British and Russian ministers stated that their governments adhered to this declaration, and the Italian and Japanese ministers that Italy and Japan approved of the French note. When the war ended, in regard to the territorial *status quo* of the Congo the Entente powers were as good as their word. But the Belgians were indignant when they learned that Great Britain and France

had secured the consent of President Wilson to a division of the German colonies in Africa. The Union of South Africa was to be the mandatory for German Southwest Africa, and the British government was to administer directly German East Africa. The Belgians raised a howl, for they had helped materially in the long war against Germany along the east African frontier and had contributed men and material in the final campaign. Were they to have no territorial reward? When the news of the Big Four's mandate arrangements reached Brussels, King Albert went to Paris by airplane, and succeeded in wresting from the British certain districts of the new British colony. This incident is worth mentioning, for it shows how, before the treaty of Versailles was signed, the British government had discounted the mandate idea. The treaty ceded the German colonies to the five principal allied and associated powers, and the League covenant (article XXII) provided for a mandatory régime under the control of the League of Nations. But the British regarded German East Africa as theirs by right of conquest, and gave a bit of it to the Belgians, who had helped them win it.

Spain's colonial empire received its death-blow in the war with the United States. Her overseas possessions, after the treaty of Paris, were reduced to three small colonies of slight value and no importance on the west African coast; a strip of Guinea coast and five islands in the Gulf of Guinea; and the Riff coast of Morocco opposite Gibraltar.¹ Only the Spanish colony in Morocco is of international importance. Because of geographical proximity, Spain has been interested in Morocco since the Middle Ages, and at one time or another she established claims to the Moroccan coast both on the Atlantic and on the Mediterranean. These claims were not acknowledged by

¹ The Canary Islands are considered by the Spaniards an integral part of their country, just as the Portuguese consider the Azores and Madeira. There has never been any question of Spain or Portugal parting with any of these islands.

the natives except when force was applied, and they became a source of international dispute when France began to extend her protectorate over Morocco. After Great Britain and Germany had withdrawn their opposition to the French penetration of Morocco, Spain was compelled to come to terms with France. By the treaty of Madrid, signed on November 27, 1912, France accepted the right of Spain to exercise her influence in a clearly defined Spanish zone along the Mediterranean for about two hundred miles, with a hinterland averaging sixty miles. The district of Tangier was neutralized; but the Spanish zone extended along the hinterland of Tangier to the Atlantic, thus cutting off Tangier from communication with Fez and the rest of Morocco.

A large portion of the Spanish zone, called the Riff, has never been pacified, and occasionally the Spaniards have been besieged in their ports. Successful defiance of Spanish authority and the resultant anarchy have greatly annoyed and retarded the French in their effort to make Morocco a French protectorate. As long as the Spanish remain in possession of the northern tip of Morocco, the development of Tangier is blocked, and French administrative control suffers. Relations between Spain and France on the Moroccan question have been strained for the past decade. Since the World War France has attempted to get the Spanish out of Morocco. In 1921 the Spanish were badly beaten by the natives in the Riff. In fact, the disaster was the worst blow to European prestige in Africa since the Italians were routed by the Abyssinians at Adowa twenty-five years before. But the Spaniards hold on grimly to their last overseas possession. It is at once their Naboth's vineyard and the souvenir of their great colonial empire.

Since the sale of her West Indian islands to the United States in 1917, Greenland has been the only colonial possession of Denmark. Its inhospitable climate and ice-

bound location make it of no international importance. Iceland was under Danish rule for centuries, but received autonomy in 1874. On November 30, 1918, an act of union made Iceland a free sovereign state, united to Denmark only by a personal bond of union under the king of Denmark. The Danish government informed the powers, shortly after the World War was concluded, that she recognized Iceland as a sovereign state.

We have seen how the Napoleonic wars ended disastrously for Holland. Her forced alliance with France gave the British an excuse to seize the Cape of Good Hope, to penalize Holland by detaching Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo from Surinam, and to legalize the capture of the foreign settlements in Ceylon by the presidency of Madras. The convention of London, signed on August 13, 1814, and recognized in the treaty of Vienna, took from Holland all her colonies except the East Indies, the island of Curaçoa in the West Indies, and part of Surinam in South America. This agreement has often been criticized by British writers, who believe that the restoration of the Dutch East Indies was a sad and inexplicable blunder.

In extent and population the Dutch East Indies are by far the most important island group of colonies in Asia—in fact, in the entire world. They are nearly seven times as large and seven times as populous as our Philippine-Sulu group, which lies north of them. With the exception of the northern side of Borneo, which is British, and the eastern end of Timor, which is Portuguese, the Dutch are in undisputed possession of all the islands between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to New Guinea. Sumatra forms one side of the Strait of Malacca, and the Riau-Lingga archipelago controls the approach to Singapore. Except Java, none of the islands has been completely pacified or administratively organized. While Java has only one fifth of the area of the East Indies, her population is probably three quarters

of the total. There are four cities in Java of more than 100,000, and railways extend throughout the island.

A sense of justice may have prompted the conquerors of Napoleon to recognize that the Dutch alliance with France had been a case of *force majeure*, atoned for by the aid given at Waterloo, and that the taking of Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and a part of Holland's possessions in America was sufficient punishment. But sound policy dictated leaving Holland with rich colonies. The advantage to Great Britain of giving back the East Indies may not have been apparent at the time. Probably it was not thought of at all. But in more than one international crisis the fear of losing her colonies has acted as a deterrent to anti-British tendencies of Dutch foreign policy. Hollanders had to be guarded in the expression of their sentiments at the time of the Boer War. In the World War joining forces with Germany would have proved as great a risk to Holland as taking sides against Germany; and in the East Indies the Dutch, far less pro-German than in Holland, prudently maintained a "benevolent" neutrality towards the Entente. The influence of Great Britain's sea power was felt by Holland, as by Italy and Greece.

In 1913 a commission on the defense of the West Indies declared that it was necessary for Holland to build a fleet to protect the colonies, and the creation of a new navy was already under way when Germany precipitated the European war. In view of the precarious position of the possessions in the East Indies, which Holland can not hope to defend by her own means, no country was more interested in the formation of a league of nations to guarantee the present colonial *status quo*, and, when that failed, in the deliberations of the Washington conference. The brilliant prospects for Holland in the Asiatic colonies are dependent upon world peace and a strict prohibition by international agreement of the sale of arms to natives. In 1920 and 1921 the United States engaged in an acrimonious cor-

respondence with Holland over the question of discrimination against Americans in affording opportunities for the development of the mineral oil resources of the East Indies. But until weak nations like Holland feel that their possessions are secure by international agreements, and not by the grace of one or more great powers, favors will be granted—in self-defense—to the nationals of the power by whose good-will they are allowed to hold colonies.

CHAPTER XLIII

FRENCH COLONIAL PROBLEMS (1901-1922)

AFTER the World War, as before, France held second place to Great Britain in the extent, population, distribution, and importance of her colonial possessions. These two powers had been the principal beneficiaries of the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres. Japan had a small share in the division of the German colonies, and Italy inherited a little of the Ottoman Empire. France received Morocco, Kamerun, Togoland, and Syria.

The colonial problems of France fall under six heads: (1) the place of France in the Near East; (2) the place of France in the Far East and in the Pacific; (3) the relations between France and her scattered colonies; (4) the political consolidation of the north African empire; (5) the military value of the colonies; and (6) the economic exploitation of the colonies.

Ever since the crusades France has been interested in the Near East, and after the eclipse of the Italian city-states French culture and commerce formed the principal link between Europe and the Christian races of the Ottoman Empire. During the nineteenth century French foreign policy attempted to use ancient treaties and privileges to prevent Russia and Great Britain from gaining a paramount influence in the Near East. Great Britain, however, succeeded in getting control of Cyprus and Egypt, though both countries were attached to France by ancient bonds and were in proximity to Syria, which France had coveted for centuries. By the agreement of 1904, France withdrew her opposition to the consolidation of British power in the

Near East through the possession of Egypt and the Sudan, in return for the withdrawal of British opposition to French penetration in Morocco. But the World War re-kindled old aspirations, and France bargained with Great Britain to divide the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire. When Turkey signed the armistice, Syria was occupied by France, and has been under French military domination ever since.

The French have not made a success of their ambitious undertaking in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Only one, and that a minority, element in Syria wanted France as mandatory; all the Syrians, irrespective of creed, have resented the mutilation of their country by the exclusion of Palestine; the Moslems, who formed the majority, are not content to be French subjects, when in the adjacent Hedjaz the Arabs are independent and in the adjacent Irak they enjoy autonomy. Bad blood has been created by the contradictory promises made to the French and the Arabs by the British, and by the fact that Emir Feisal, whom the French drove out of Damascus, has been made king of the Irak by the British.¹

At first the French occupied Cilicia. But the military pressure and propaganda of the Turkish nationalists made them realize that they could not hold this fertile province, which they had always maintained was a part of Syria, and to make secure their position in the latter country they were compelled in the summer of 1921 to conclude a treaty with the Angora government, by which they abandoned not only Cilicia but also several districts of northern Syria. Coming at the same time as the coronation of Feisal at Bagdad, the treaty of Angora was a serious blow to French prestige.²

The French are finding the occupation of Syria expensive, dangerous, and fruitless. It makes them offend the susceptibilities of the Mohammedans, which they can ill

¹ See p. 440.

² See pp. 436-437, 454.

afford to do; it gives rise to friction with the British; and it demands soldiers and money that France does not have to give. This situation was foreseen by many prominent Frenchmen, who believed that France should not attempt to extend her authority in the Mediterranean east of Tunisia, unless it were to occupy Constantinople. These critics of the Syrian policy pointed out that France had no bases in neighboring territories, as the British had in handling Mesopotamia and Palestine. Syria, they said, would always be a drain on France, and the French hold precarious; while Constantinople could be managed by a few war-vessels, without expense or risk to prestige.

The place of France in the Far East and in the Pacific does not involve, as in the Near East, embarking upon a new and complicated venture, with disadvantages outweighing advantages. In Indo-China a rich colonial empire had been created before the war, and its development had not brought France into conflict with other European powers.¹ The only danger that could menace Indo-China was Japanese aggression. France could not hope to defend Indo-China against Japan, and in the logic of events it has seemed that the next challenge to Europe issued by Japan would be against France.² But, fortunately for France, Great Britain holds Hong-Kong and Kowloon and the United States the Philippines, which are strategically at the mercy of Japan. Until these powers become enemies, Japan will have to wait. The only other way that France's present position in the Far East can be questioned is if, because of the maintenance of high export and import duties in Indo-China, Japan and the United States raise in diplomatic conference the question of bringing once more

¹ In their respective encroachments upon the sovereignty of China and Siam, Great Britain and France had reached a common frontier, which threatened friction. The British charged that the French advance of frontier violated an Anglo-Chinese treaty (see pp. 61-62). Differences of opinion were settled by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 (see pp. 192-193).

² See the opening paragraphs of Chapters X, XII, and XXVIII.

under Chinese suzerainty her former outlying provinces and tributary kingdoms.¹

The British delegates at the Washington conference argued that overseas possessions necessitated a large navy. This argument provoked discussion in Paris concerning the relations between France and her scattered colonies. The Pacific islands are taken care of by the four-power treaty, signed during the Washington conference. But France has also Guadeloupe and Martinique in the West Indies; a colony in Guiana on the South American continent; the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off Labrador; and Réunion, Mayotte, the Comoro Islands, and Madagascar, off the east coast of Africa. On the African continent Djibouti is an isolated colony of the Somali coast at the entrance of the Red Sea. These possessions, for the most part remnants of France's ancient colonial empire, and closely attached on sentimental grounds to the mother country, are, as well as the French possessions in India, not near one another. Great Britain has all her colonies and dependencies, on mainland and island, closely linked together. In addition, she controls the seas. In sea power, France has bound herself at Washington to the ratio of 1.75 to 5 in relation to Great Britain. If she later agrees to admit limitation of submarines and light surface craft to the same ratio as that decided upon for capital ships, France is likely to demand the extension of the principle of guaranty, confined to Pacific islands in the four-power treaty, to possessions throughout the world. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the coupling of a guaranty with the fixing of a ratio in naval and military strength means the adoption by the great powers of a more specific mutual guaranty of the world-wide *status quo* than that implied in article X of the League of Nations covenant.

¹ During the Washington conference the question was frequently asked, "What is China?" If China includes Manchuria and the two Mongolias, does not her sovereignty (once we start tampering with the existing situation) extend over Indo-China and the maritime province of Russia?

The evolution of French foreign and colonial policy since 1900, culminating in the treaty of Versailles at the end of a successful war, has tended principally to the creation of a consolidated north African empire. A glance at the map will show why the Moroccan question was considered of sufficient importance for French statesmen to abandon Egypt and the Sudan to Great Britain, thus renouncing the dream of a French belt across Africa; to antagonize Germany to the point of war; and to pursue a policy towards Spain which, after the World War, remains uncompromisingly hostile.¹ First of all, Morocco was needed to make Algeria secure; and then, when France expanded across the Sahara Desert, it was realized that the African empire of French dreams would be practicable strategically, politically, and economically only if France controlled Morocco. The protectorate of 1912 received international sanction in the treaty of Versailles. Moreover, Germany's two colonies in west Africa were given to France, and the British consented to changes in the boundaries of Nigeria. The acquisition of Togoland removed the fly in France's ointment in west Africa, and the elimination of Germany in equatorial Africa gave France a clear sweep of territory from the Congo to the Mediterranean.

Through Algeria, Tunisia, and now Morocco, all parts of the French north African empire can be reached by land. Airplanes have radically changed the great problem of the Sahara Desert, and it is probable that within the next few years railways will reach from Tunis to Lake Chad and the Congo, and from Algiers to Timbuktu, Senegal, and Dahomey. By the Atlantic the distance is not great from Bordeaux to the Moroccan, west African, and equatorial African ports. From the double standpoint of defense and

¹ See p. 479. Although economic reasons are advanced, the refusal of France to renew her tariff convention with Spain (February, 1922) is due to the Moroccan question. French public opinion demands the withdrawal of the Spanish from their Moroccan zones if they are unwilling and unable to maintain order there.

economic opportunity, no colonial possession of a European power rivals France's north African empire. France does not have the problem of distance.

But as her African colonies are developed and become more essential to the well-being of France, French statesmen see the vital importance of naval control in the western part of the Mediterranean. The future of the north African colonies depends upon the ability of France to assure against interruption from any quarter communications between Marseilles and Cette and the Mediterranean African ports. Unless, by agreement or independently, France enjoys naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, it will be unwise for her to grow to look upon the north African empire as an extension of France and a reservoir of soldiers, food-stuffs, and raw materials. This situation threatens to precipitate a new crisis in international relations. Italy is wholly a Mediterranean power, and, if she can not control the Mediterranean herself, she prefers to see Great Britain and France offset each other. Great Britain regards the Mediterranean as an essential link between the mother country, India, and Australasia, and ever since the Suez Canal was cut her foreign policy has aimed at control of this sea.¹

The part played by colonial troops, chiefly blacks, in resisting the German invasion of 1914, and, in fact, throughout the World War, has not been minimized or forgotten by the French. The Latin races do not share our Anglo-Saxon prejudice against colored peoples. The French frankly admitted their debt to Africans and Asiatics in

¹ The naval agreement between Great Britain and France before the World War, which seemingly gave France the preponderance of naval power in the Mediterranean, was concluded for a specific purpose, *i. e.*, holding Germany in check, and was not intended by the British to be even a tacit acknowledgment of France's right to a larger navy than Great Britain's in the Mediterranean. If France had acted in opposition to any British interests, there was nothing in the agreement to prevent the British from sending to the Mediterranean all the ships they wanted to. The new principle, adopted at Washington, of limitation of fleets by scrapping and a naval holiday, brings up a new strategic problem. It takes away the potential ability of sending ships when needed to assert the authority of the great naval power.

winning the war, and did not hesitate to station colonial troops in the occupied regions of Germany. We regard as negroes any race with an admixture of negro blood, and we class among colored races virtually all Africans and Asiatics. To the French, the Tunisians, Algerians, Berbers, Moroccans, Malagasy, and Indo-Chinese are not in any essential different from white people. Only the natives of west and equatorial Africa are blacks, and the French, while agreeing that these people are different from us, none the less receive them socially and allow them the right to marry whites.

It is necessary for us to understand this when we discuss what is one of the most important values of the colonies from the French point of view. In their eyes Africans and Asiatics are a military asset, and can be used in Europe in time of peace as well as in time of war to offset the discrepancy in population between the French and the Germans. When an Englishman or an American expresses his misgiving for the future of France in relation to Germany on the score of population, the Frenchman answers calmly, "But we have our colonials." The government, in January, 1922, increased the colonial quota from 200,000 to 300,000, about fifty per cent. of the total mobilized strength of the French army. Conscription is in force in the colonies, as in France, but with this difference: the native levies, especially in west and central Africa, are being organized and developed with the idea of making them infantry divisions to be used by France in Europe and the Near East, while French conscripts are not ordered on foreign service except in time of war.

Article XXII of the League covenant provides for peoples, "especially those of central Africa," who are governed under the mandate régime, freedom from "military training for other than police purposes and the defense of territory." Without waiting for League approval, the French government published, on March 25, 1921, a

decree establishing a form of government for Kamerun and Togoland. This decree authorized the raising and training of conscript armies, as in other French African colonies. France interprets the expression "the defense of territory" to mean the defense of French territory anywhere in the world. It is an old thesis, and not an unreasonable one, that the obligation of protection is mutual. A mother country defends her colonies, and it is their duty to help defend her, if for no other reason than that in her security and prosperity lie their security and prosperity.

But the training of Africans for military service has other aspects than the one uppermost in French minds, which is, of course, drawing upon the vast reservoir of subject peoples to make up for disparity in population between the mother country and her great enemy. These aspects will readily be grasped by the reader. We have space to mention only two of them. If France counts on Africans to maintain her position in Europe, she will have to adopt a naval policy that aims at the control of the Mediterranean Sea. If by conscription the natives of Africa are trained to fight and are in possession of weapons, France and the other powers with colonies in Africa may find in the course of time that their subjects can not be longer exploited with impunity. They will demand self-government and the use of their labor and their natural wealth for the benefit of their own country. This is already happening in the older French colonies, in Algeria, and in Tunisia.

Much has been written since the World War of the great wealth of the French colonies, and of the economic advantages France will enjoy from their development. The value of the north African empire, for food-stuffs as well as for soldiers, was amply demonstrated during the war. And in the decade before the war the increase in prosperity of the colonies had been marvelous. From the figures of 1920 and 1921 one sees that the colonies have not suffered by

the war, except in the cessation of works of public utility and of the development of concessions through lack of capital and through the inability of French industry to furnish railway and other materials and machinery. Capital, however, is now being found again, despite the serious situation of French finances, and steel plants and machine works are again able to export to the colonies.

The difficulties that confront France in the economic development of her colonial possessions are the lack of administrators and colonists and the maintenance of high protective tariffs for the benefit of the mother country.

As compared with the British, the French have always suffered from poor material in civilian colonial administrators. The French army has furnished splendid men to the colonies, but the general run of officials has been and still is decidedly second-rate. Social and economic conditions in France militate against recruiting high-grade men for service abroad. The upper classes do not have younger sons to find posts for, and life and opportunities at home are sufficiently attractive to prevent the type of man that enters the British colonial service from seeking a career in the French colonies. The same handicap hurts the French in finding good business men to cast in their fortunes with the colonies. There is a livelihood for all capable men in France better than they could earn abroad. So why exile?

Spaniards, Italians, and Jews, and not Frenchmen, form the bulk of the European element in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Since the original decree bestowing citizenship on the Jews of Algeria, the French government has struggled with the problem of making the census figures show an increase in the French population. But France has no excess population, and there is little more emigration to north Africa than to any other part of the world. The French stay at home. Climatic considerations would keep emigrants from northern and central France, if there

were any, from choosing the northern coast of Africa for colonization. Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, however, are near Italy, and Italy has an excess population, a large part of which finds the countries on the opposite coast of the Mediterranean adapted to its climatic needs. If Spain begins to follow Italy in developing an excess population, and France remains stationary, it will be hard for France to justify—and also to profit by—her occupation of the major portion of Mediterranean lands suitable for European colonization. The question is bound to arise, and, like that of permanently maintaining military superiority over Germany, how it will be answered depends, in the final analysis, upon the comparative fecundity of the French with neighboring European peoples.

Great Britain has developed self-governing dominions in different parts of the world, and she herself has become a great industrial and maritime nation. British colonies help one another to greater prosperity by their number, their natural trade, and their positions on trade routes; and all benefit by the remarkable development of commerce and communication between Great Britain, India, and the self-governing dominions. The British have been so far ahead of other nations in the organization of their commerce and in their control of the carrying trade that they could afford to let other nations do business with their colonies on equal terms. Only in recent years have there been preferential tariffs within the British Empire, and these have not been onerous, nor have they prevented a colony from excepting particular products where it was to its advantage to do so.

The French conception of the relations between the colonies and the mother country is different. The colonies exist primarily for the benefit of France; hence heavy import and export duties imposed on the rest of the world are omitted in favor of French merchants, and French shipping is everywhere given the preference. If France was in the position, as an industrial state, to sell to and buy

from all her colonies, and, as a maritime power, to give them excellent service, they might not suffer in comparison with the colonies of Great Britain. But, as matters stand, it is difficult to see how the French colonies are going to keep pace in prosperity with the British, unless they are allowed to trade on equal terms with the whole world and avail themselves of the world's shipping.

The way that France has fenced off her colonies against the rest of the world (and she is trying to do this now in Morocco also) brings up a burning issue in world politics. A Frenchman has stated it in these words: "La question s'ouvre, de savoir si les autres peuples toléreront indéfiniment que nous privions la communauté humaine des ressources préparées pour son bien-être par la nature."¹ The French themselves realize that exploitation and monopoly can not continue indefinitely. Subject peoples will demand the right to trade on equal terms with other nations than France. The other nations, if they find that France is not using and developing the resources of her colonies, will demand the open door. Whether they get it—and here is the heart of the world politics of to-morrow—will depend upon which is stronger, the power barring the door or the power trying to open it.

¹ See U. Gohier in *La Vieille-France*, March 17, 1921.

CHAPTER XLIV

BRITISH IMPERIAL PROBLEMS (1903-1922)

THE World War put the British Empire to severe test. Would the structure stand the triple strain of years of exhausting fighting in Europe, economic disorganization resulting from interruption of sea-borne trade and communications, and disaffection among subject peoples? More decisively than most observers expected, the answer was affirmative; an outstanding phenomenon of the war was the solidarity of the British Empire. From the very first days, the self-governing dominions and India contributed men and money without stint; the troubles feared in Egypt did not materialize; and rebellions in south Africa and Ireland were short-lived. Facts seemed to prove that Cecil Rhodes was a poorer prophet than Otto von Bismarck. Rhodes had said that Great Britain as an empire could not afford to fight Germany, while Bismarck had prophesied that Germany would not win a general European war if Russia were on the other side. But was Rhodes wrong? The answer depends upon whether we find that Great Britain has come out of the war stronger and more prosperous as a world power than when she entered it.

The greatest difficulty, in discussing British imperial problems in the light of the World War, lies in the correct appreciation of war events and war conditions in relation to the political situation confronting the empire at home and overseas. Speaking in the House of Commons on February 14, 1922, on conditions in India, Mr. Lloyd George reminded the members of Parliament that it was impossible to consider events and conditions since 1914 as solely responsible for the grave crisis confronting British rule in

India. He said that as far back as 1906 Lord Morley kept calling the attention of the government to the serious unrest in India. The general cause was the contact of Asia with Western education, and the particular cause was the success of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. The World War simply gave the agitators new arguments and made the people more ready to listen to and to be influenced by agitation than before. This caution we must bear in mind in discussing the various problems of the British Empire. In the Near East and in the Far East, as in India, what has happened since 1914 is the development of resistance against European overlordship and exploitation, which received its first great impulsion from the success of Japan in blocking the further extension of European eminent domain in Asia. The troubles in Ireland, Egypt, and South Africa go back to the nineteenth century. The burning question of adjusting, on a basis satisfactory to the last, the political and economic relations between Great Britain and her self-governing dominions has been an issue ever since the Boer War.

Speaking broadly, the tie that binds the British Empire is that of interest. And it is the same tie, whether, in the case of the self-governing dominions, one calls it maternal or filial affection, or, in the case of some of the colonies, conscious dependence, or, in the case of subject peoples held against their will, bearing the white man's burden. The British Empire grew to its present dimensions because it paid the English to have overseas possessions. For the benefit of the industries and commerce of the United Kingdom, the British invaded and conquered large parts of Africa and Asia and annexed islands all over the world. In regions of the temperate zone, where white settlement was possible, the mother country was compelled to grant the colonists self-government, and relations were gradually adjusted until they rested upon mutual interests. In all other parts of the empire the British ruled by force and

for the benefit of the United Kingdom, which furnished the force and paid the bills. In the final analysis, however, the relations between Great Britain and her self-governing dominions will be governed by the element of mutual advantage in the association, and between Great Britain and her subject peoples the relations will remain as they are if the British continue to believe that it pays to hold these people in subjection and if they continue to have the money and man power to do so.

At the time the revolt of the American colonies was brewing, the British government, in order to prevent the spread of the movement to Canada, by the Quebec Act of 1774, granted the recently acquired French of Quebec a large measure of autonomy. Later Canada, which was becoming preponderantly an English-speaking country neighboring on the United States and developing in the same way as the United States, could never have been kept within the British Empire on any other basis than that of autonomous, representative institutions. This furnished the example for Australia and New Zealand when they increased in wealth and population sufficiently to stand upon their own feet. As the alternative to constant rebellion, very costly to put down, South Africa was made a self-governing dominion within the decade after the Boer War. Following upon five years of armed resistance to British authority, Ireland (except Ulster) was given dominion status in January, 1922, under the name of the Irish Free State. With the exception of Canada, the self-governing dominions have come into existence in the twentieth century: Australia, 1901; New Zealand, 1907; South Africa, 1910; and Ireland, 1922.

Following the example of Canada, all of the self-governing dominions have shown, from the beginning of their quasi-independent existence, the determination to place their own interests ahead of those of the mother country, and to demand a share in shaping imperial policies and

enjoying imperial privileges if they were to be expected to assume imperial responsibilities. This has caused them to question and deny the original credo of world politics, *i. e.*, that the extra-European world existed for the benefit of Europe. At the time of the Boer War, Sir Wilfrid Laurier answered the British government's appeal for a contribution in money and troops in the following terse sentence: "Canada does not intend to be drawn into the vortex of European militarism." Later the Canadian government decided that, if Canada were to be called upon to contribute to the support of the imperial navy, the ships should be used in Canadian waters, be manned by Canadian officers, and fly the Canadian flag. These demands were afterwards modified, but have since been renewed. Another significant illustration of Canada's feeling of separateness is the desire intimated to the British government by the Ottawa government that British titles and honors be not conferred upon Canadians.¹ A strong sentiment showed itself in Canada and Australia in favor of Irish aspirations. Canada and the other dominions have established their claim to complete tariff autonomy, but, because of trade advantages, are willing to grant imperial preference in their tariff schedules.

At the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and Germany, the self-governing dominions did not hesitate to throw in their lot immediately with the mother country. The trade and naval menace of the German Empire, and moral indignation against Germany, were factors that worked as strongly in the dominions as in England. In addition, South Africa had been feeling keenly the development of the neighboring German colonies in Africa, and

¹A special committee of the Canadian House of Commons was appointed in April, 1919, to consider the question of titles in Canada, and it was unanimously recommended that hereditary titles should cease upon the death of the present holders, and, by a large majority, that no further titles, knight-hoods, and minor orders should be bestowed by the British crown upon Canadian citizens. These recommendations were subsequently ratified by Parliament.

Australia and New Zealand of German colonial expansion in the Pacific. But the participation of the dominions in the war, involving the raising and sending of armies to Europe and heavy expenditures, naturally led them to demand representation in the imperial war cabinet, and from this to separate delegates at the peace conference and to membership in the League of Nations the steps were logical. The heads of the governments of the dominions impressed upon London the patent fact that they must have some say in the conduct of the war and the shaping of the policies to be adopted when peace was made. So far as the conduct of the war, in its diplomatic as well as its military phases, was concerned, these demands proved to be impracticable. For the British cabinet derives its authority from a parliament representing the people of the United Kingdom.

At a conference of premiers in London, in 1907, the virtual independence of the dominions and their equality with the United Kingdom had already been recognized by the adoption of the principle that "the Crown is the supreme executive in the United Kingdom and in all the dominions, but it acts on the advice of different ministries within different constitutional limits."¹ But this did not solve the problem of the participation of the dominions in all-important matters of common imperial concern. How could the dominions be given an adequate voice in foreign policy and in the conduct of foreign relations? The participation of the dominions in the peace conference and their separate membership in the League of Nations emphasized their sovereign status. But it is difficult to see how the dominions can expect to have a voice in British foreign policy under the present system. They can advise and warn, as they did in 1921 in the matter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This right of advising the British pre-

¹ See C. P. Hallinan's letter from London in the *New Republic*, February 8, 1922.

mier, however, does not give the dominions a share in conducting the activities of the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Colonial Office, whose heads are responsible only to a parliament elected by the people of England and Scotland. At the present time England and Scotland have a population much larger than that of the self-governing dominions combined, even when we exclude Ireland from Great Britain and put her population with that of the dominions. But the time is coming when the dominions will outnumber the mother country.

As far as the self-governing dominions are concerned, the danger to the solidarity of the British Empire is in the inevitable divergency of interests that will arise from divergent political and economic conditions, and from the desire of the dominions, if they are to assume the burden of empire, to share in the privileges of empire. These dangers have already appeared. Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders looked upon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was advantageous to British political and trade interests in the Far East, as exceedingly disadvantageous to their interests. If the situation in India and China should make wise, from the point of view of the United Kingdom's interests, a new understanding in the future between Great Britain and Japan, what would be the attitude of the British dominions that feel the expansion of Japan to be a menace to their security? Are Hong-Kong and India more important to Great Britain than the maintenance of the only slightly profitable political tie with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada?

At the peace conference South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand demanded their share of the German colonies. If India, Egypt, and other countries continue to be held in subjection to Great Britain, with the aid of self-governing dominions, it is reasonable that the dominion premiers will be demanding a share of the good jobs and that dominion trade interests be considered in the exploitation of

these countries. On the other hand, the sponsorship by the British government of the policy of Australia and New Zealand, to exclude Asiatics from settlement in vast regions that they themselves can not colonize or develop, embarrasses the British in India and imperils future relations with Japan.¹

The self-governing dominions are virtually lost to Great Britain except in a sentimental way. In time of war they are not likely again to prove themselves a precious asset, if their own interests are not involved. They are not of as much benefit to the industries and commerce of Great Britain as the British tax-payer might in justice hope for. The dominions exact a *quid pro quo*, and there is a question in the Englishman's mind as to whether they do not get more than they give. Canada largely made her own way. But Australia and New Zealand were liabilities to the British tax-payer for several decades, while the people of the United Kingdom are saddled with a heavy debt owing to their activities in making possible the Union of South Africa. The United Kingdom will never get a return upon the South African investment. It may be true that Ireland was held in subjection because of her unfortunate geographical position and for economic reasons. But for a hundred years the English paid dearly for the doubtful privilege of ruling Ireland. No European nation has benefited from the exploitation, or rather attempt at exploitation, of peoples of European stock. The relation of master and servant between Europeans and Asiatics and Africans, on the contrary, has generally proved so profitable, up to the war of 1914, that the European nations were willing to risk wars with one another in order to enjoy that privilege.

At the Paris conference, and again at the Washington conference, India was represented by separate delegates in the same way as the self-governing dominions, and India

¹ See p. 516, especially the foot-note, and p. 517.

has been given a seat in the League of Nations. The Indian members, however, are not elected by the people, but are simply representatives of the British military government which rules the country. The British crown is represented in India by a viceroy, who, with the secretary of state for India, a member of the British cabinet, has virtually unlimited power. The various parliamentary statutes were consolidated in the Government of India Act, passed in 1915, and amended in 1916 and 1919. The last amendment makes possible the appointment of a high commissioner for India in London, as in the case of the self-governing dominions. The nationalist movement in India had already reached formidable proportions before the outbreak of the war. But since 1919 it has become a movement of the masses. The Indians demand, at the least, self-government with full dominion status.

The composite character of the vast country under the control of the government of India, which contains nearly one fifth of the human race, of different religions and customs, is advanced as an argument against the possibility of applying the principle of self-determination to India. We are reminded that India is not a nation, that hundreds of millions are in the deepest ignorance, and that a large number of native rulers still control the interior of the peninsula, holding virtually absolute sway over seventy millions. The Mohammedan element, numbering more than sixty millions, descended from medieval conquerors, is kept from oppressing the Hindu majority, and the native rulers from fighting one another, only by the presence of the British government. The almost superhuman obstacles to the establishment of full responsible government in India are self-evident. If the nationalist movement signified only the unwise and impracticable political aspirations of groups of enthusiasts in a hopelessly divided country, it would be no more than an interesting internal problem of a colonial power in its dealings with subject peoples. But

India is in a very real sense the corner-stone of the British Empire, and how Great Britain faces the unrest in India and what will be the outcome are questions of vital importance in world politics.

When we consider that all the powers have concentrated their foreign policies upon and have been willing to fight wars for the markets and concessions and mineral wealth of the Chinese and Ottoman empires, and have made great sacrifices for small gains, we realize what it means to Great Britain to have undisputed control, from the international point of view, of the destinies of India and the surrounding countries and islands. It is the richest colonial plum that the world has ever known. One fourth of the revenues of India go to England for "home charges," and more than two thirds are spent in the maintenance of a military establishment that has been used to extend the British Empire elsewhere in Asia and in Africa and to defend Great Britain's interests on the battle-fields of France and at Gallipoli.

As a market and place for capital investment, India has been worth to Great Britain all her other colonies put together. Can England afford to allow any of the real power in Indian affairs to pass out of the hands of British military and civilian officials? Would not this mean the end of European exploitation in Asia and of the economic imperialism upon which the prosperity of Great Britain is believed by the imperialists to rest?

British public opinion has always been divided upon the questions of whether suppression of the liberties of other peoples is justifiable and whether it actually pays to conquer peoples and hold them against their will. But India has seemed so unmistakably a worth-while prize and has furnished so comfortable a living for a host of Britishers that successive generations, Conservative and Liberal, have supported the government's Indian policy even when there were misgivings over the too logical house-that-Jack-built

policy of acquiring the approaches to India by land and sea. For India's sake Siam, China, Persia, and Egypt were despoiled, Tibet was invaded, three wars were fought with Afghanistan, Russia and France were first antagonized and then conciliated, and the doctrine of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was first upheld and then violated. Enough of the colonial ventures were made to pay and proved a credit to the Anglo-Saxon empire-building instinct to offset those that did not pay and that dimmed English prestige and honor.

From 1906 to 1916 the nationalist movement in India, though troublesome, was not serious, and it did not tax the ability and the wits of the Indian government. Beginning with 1916, the agitation for self-government became serious because of the fact that German diplomacy had forced Great Britain into the position of fighting Islam. When the Mohammedans of India, disaffected because of British participation in a coalition that threatened to complete the political downfall of Mohammedan countries, joined the Hindus in the movement for autonomy, British officials in India began to realize the gravity of the situation. Economic and political concessions were made, and when these did not satisfy, repressive measures were taken. Along with the effort to maintain unimpaired British authority, however, the Englishmen at the head of Indian affairs did their best to remedy some of the injustices that were being seized upon by agitators to move the Mohammedan and Hindu masses. These men warned the British government that peace terms as favorable as possible had to be accorded to Turkey; that the demands of Lancashire for a tariff on cotton goods prejudicial to the interests of India had to be rejected;¹ that budget estimates should be revised to

¹ When the government of India raised the duty on cotton goods from 7½ per cent. to 11 per cent., the Lancashire cotton industry, manufacturers and workers together, sent a deputation to Secretary Montagu to protest. The deputation explained that Lancashire interests were superior to Indian interests, and they demanded the annulment of the increase. Supporting this position, the *Morning Post* said editorially: "The British Empire

spend less on the army and more on education;¹ that a high commissioner resident in London, instead of a member of the British cabinet, should safeguard the interests of India in contracts, as in the case of the dominions and colonies; and that Indians should be allowed to enter freely and colonize in parts of Australia and Africa.

In part the good advice was followed, but every effort to take into account Indian public opinion involved offending other imperial interests. Mr. Lloyd George frankly avowed on several occasions that the varied interests of the British Empire had to be compromised, as it was impossible to satisfy some without dissatisfying others, and that this was particularly true in the case of certain demands of his Majesty's Indian subjects, which seemed legitimate to the British government, but which were rejected by British manufacturers and industrial workers and by public opinion in the self-governing dominions and colonies.

When, before the end of 1921, it was realized that the Ghandi movement for passive civil disobedience, which involved boycotting English cotton goods and refusing to pay taxes, was spreading alarmingly, in the face of the visit of the Prince of Wales, the British government announced its intention of taking every measure necessary to uphold the authority of the British crown. It is realized, however, that repression will fail, and that the only way to counteract and discredit the Ghandi movement is for the government of India to convince the people that they are in India was founded for the good of the British trade. . . . We do not believe in indulging in beautiful ideals at the expense of some millions of our fellow Englishmen."

¹ On May 8, 1921, a writer in the *Rangoon Mail* said: "To-day, after one hundred and fifty years of British rule, India, instead of gaining educationally, has been forced to a far lower level than she occupied in the past. There are no educational facilities whatever in four out of every five villages; only ten men in a hundred and one woman in a hundred and fifty can read and write. The excuse given by the British government is lack of funds. . . . The government schools have as their object the creation of a small class upon which the government can draw for its supply of efficient, submissive minor employees. The Indian student is taught everything Western and in particular everything English, and exclusively in the English language. No chance is lost to impress upon him the superiority of the European."

well off and that they are being justly treated under British rule. The agitation for full self-government will subside only when the Mohammedans are placated by a drastic revision of the treaty of Sèvres¹; when Indian tariffs are adjusted in the interest of India and not of Great Britain; and when the Indian people, if forced to bear their share of the burden of defending and maintaining the British Empire, will receive in return privileges within the empire enjoyed by British subjects of European origin.

As in India, the nationalist agitation in Egypt was confined to a small class until the end of the World War. From 1883 to 1914 the occupation of Egypt was proclaimed by British statesmen to be temporary, and the outward forms of Ottoman suzerainty and khedival authority were preserved. To the other powers, as well as to the sultan of Turkey and to the Egyptian people, the prime ministers and foreign secretaries of Queen Victoria gave solemn pledges to preserve the independence of Egypt and to terminate the occupation. When Turkey declared war against Great Britain, the British government announced that Egypt was no longer a part of the Ottoman Empire, and proclaimed the country a British protectorate for the duration of the war. The khedive was deposed and his uncle made sultan. To the new sultan King George sent a letter explaining that the protectorate was simply a war measure, and that the British government intended to preserve the independence and integrity of Egypt.

The Egyptians, despite their religious faith, contributed materially to the campaign against Turkey, and made possible, together with the Arabs of the Hedjaz, the British conquest of Palestine. But after the armistice the pro-

¹ The sensational recommendation of the government of India in behalf of the Turks, published without the consent of the British cabinet by Secretary Montagu, gives weight to this opinion. Lloyd George asked for Montagu's resignation, which was promptly given. But Mr. Montagu on February 15, 1922, made a vigorous defense in the House of Commons, claiming that the publication of the despatch from the government of India urging favorable action on the claims of the Angora Turks was of vital importance to the strengthening of the tottering British rule in India.

tectorate was not abolished, and when the Egyptians elected a delegation to go to the peace conference at Paris, its principal members were arrested by the British military authorities and deported to Malta. An uprising followed in Egypt, which was ruthlessly suppressed. The British, however, were unable to send enough troops to pacify the country, and were therefore compelled to release the Egyptian delegation and allow it to proceed to Paris. But no attention was paid to it there, and the British succeeded in inserting recognition of their protectorate over Egypt in the treaty of Versailles.

Confronted with troubles in Ireland, India, and Mesopotamia that taxed its military resources, the British government was not in a position to enforce acceptance of the protectorate beyond the carrying distance of the rifles of its garrisons. Lord Milner was sent out at the head of a commission to appraise the strength of the nationalist sentiment. The result was a recommendation that the protectorate be withdrawn and a treaty negotiated with the Egyptians, acknowledging their independence, and reserving only the right to garrison the Suez Canal, to control foreign relations, and to safeguard the interests of foreigners in Egypt. Although this program was opposed by the extreme nationalists, there was a reasonable chance of its adoption. The British Foreign Office, however, insisted upon retaining a certain number of officials in Egyptian government service and upon maintaining garrisons in Cairo and other interior cities and using Alexandria as a naval base. A fresh uprising occurred, and a great nationalist leader, Zaglul Pasha, whose deportation to Malta in 1919 had been the origin of the troubles, was arrested and sent to Ceylon, where he was imprisoned.

The anomalous situation in Egypt is one of the most serious of British imperial problems. It has revealed the British military weakness and also the growing impatience of sober-thinking Englishmen at the thought of bearing the

cost and running the risks of a military campaign merely to satisfy the extreme policies of the imperialists. Protecting imperial communications through the canal was the justification for going to Egypt in the first place. If that privilege be granted in the treaty, why should the government, refusing the advice and warning of Lord Milner, insist upon retaining control of the internal affairs of the country? The commercial advantages of controlling Egypt and the opportunity of putting several thousand men on the Egyptian pay-roll at good salaries make the British occupation worth something. But the common people are beginning to ask whether the game is worth the candle, *i. e.*, whether in actual pounds and pence the people of the United Kingdom get out of holding in subjection a country like Egypt a fair return on the money and human lives invested in the enterprise.¹

In 1921 a great clamor was raised in the British Parliament and press over the expense and the doubtful value of the conquest of Mesopotamia. It leaked out that, despite the advantages of airplane scouting and punitive expeditions, the British army had signally failed to pacify and extend its administrative control over the Mesopotamian Arabs, as the French had done over the Syrians. Between the armistice and August, 1920, the British government spent \$500,000,000, and for 1921 the budget asked \$300,000,000 for Mesopotamia and \$35,000,000 for Palestine. Questioned in Parliament, Mr. Winston Churchill, the new colonial secretary, confessed that there was doubt as to the existence of valuable oil-fields in Mesopotamia, and that the hundred thousand British troops in the mandated territory were insufficient to keep the Arabs in order. And yet the United States had been protesting against the

¹ Following the example of granting freedom to Ireland, since these lines were written the British government has issued a proclamation announcing to the world that the king has made Egypt a free state, Great Britain retaining only control of the Suez Canal and the right to protect Egypt against any foreign aggression. Sultan Fuad has changed his title to *melek* (king), and Zaglul Pasha is coming back from Ceylon.

possibility of not having a share in the region's exploitation. The British tax-payer was called upon to pay for asserting a title that both the natives and a friendly power contested. Mr. Churchill announced that the number of troops in Mesopotamia was being reduced and that the cabinet was in favor of withdrawal from Mesopotamia. "If we hold the Persian Gulf and Basra," said Mr. Churchill, "we have the key of the Middle East."

In 1921 the British set up Emir Feisal as king of Irak (Mesopotamia) at Bagdad, and Emir Abdullah, his brother, as king of Trans-Jordan. These two, sons of King Hussein of the Hedjaz, make no secret of the fact that they intend to drive the French from Syria, smash Zionism in Palestine, and create a great Arab kingdom. Many of the English military and civilian officials in Egypt and the mandated territories sympathize with the Arabs, and this threatens to estrange the British and French in the Near East. As far as a survey of the press and personal letters from friends in the Near East are an indication of the attitude of British officialdom towards the mandates entrusted to Great Britain out of territories taken from Turkey, the opinion seems to be, "Let us get out!" As the *London Times* correspondent says: "As for oil, I learn on good authority that the opinion of the experts is that it will be three years before it is known whether there is sufficient to justify the projected pipe-line to Haifa. And in the meantime the British cabinet actually proposes to spend £6,000,000 [\$30,000,000] on repairing its depreciated assets in Mesopotamia's railways. So long as we stay, there will ever be a fresh reason for staying, and a fresh reason for spending. Let us arise and go."

In August, 1919, it was announced that Persia had signed a treaty with Great Britain, consenting to a virtual protectorate. The former Russian sphere of influence was to be taken over by the British. This treaty was secured by bribery and intimidation, and was repudiated by the Per-

sians as soon as they were able to assemble a parliament. In the meantime, Great Britain had been forced to withdraw from the Caucasus, which she had occupied after the Turkish armistice, and to sign a treaty with Afghanistan, renouncing her former privilege of controlling foreign relations of the Kabul government, and recognizing the complete independence and equality of Afghanistan. On the other side of Persia, the British were suffering reverses in an attempt to quell a revolt in Mesopotamia. It was time to throw ballast overboard. Lord Curzon, in November, 1920, admitted in the House of Lords that the British Empire could not go on indefinitely increasing its responsibility, and that Persia happened to be the place where the halt must be called. Persia was evacuated. The bulk of the British forces in Mesopotamia were withdrawn to Basra, near the Persian Gulf. The collapse of the counter-revolutionary movements in southern Russia led to withdrawal from the Caucasus. The states of the Caucasus and Armenia became Bolshevik, while Persia and Afghanistan signed treaties with soviet Russia. The Anglo-Afghan treaty, signed at Kabul on November 22, 1921, guaranteed passage of munitions to Afghanistan through India, a stipulation that, indirectly at least, violated the arms and ammunition protocol signed at St. Germain on September 10, 1919.¹

In the Near East the abandonment of internal administrative control over Egypt and the mandated territories of the former Ottoman Empire would entail a similar abandonment on the part of France. It would be impossible for the French to maintain themselves by military means in Syria if the British decided to abide by the terms of article XXII of the covenant of the League of Nations, and gave

¹ Article VI, section 3, stipulates "the eastern frontier of Persia in the Gulf of Oman." But gun-running into Afghanistan was aimed at. It is manifestly unfair to let the Afghans receive arms *via* India, which they will sell to the Persians with two extra commissions, the British agent's and the Afghan's.

Palestine a government in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. In fact, if the British adopt the policy of friendly coöperation with Turks, Arabs, and Afghans in order to propitiate the Mohammedans of India, the French will have to withdraw from Syria and the Italians and Greeks from Asia Minor. Constantinople will remain Turkish and the Ottoman Empire will have a new lease of life.

In the Far East British power and commercial influence has been fostered since the Boxer rebellion by an alliance with Japan, twice renewed,¹ and by agreements with Russia and France. The unforeseen situation arising in China from the radical change of government in Russia in 1917 seemed to dictate a fuller understanding with Japan, who was falling heir to the inheritance of both Germany and Russia. The Foreign Office, backed by a large section of public opinion, felt that the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be renewed and strengthened in 1921. Had it not been for the intervention of the self-governing dominions and the disinclination to alienate American sympathy, Japan and Great Britain, in conjunction with France, would have effected a virtual partition of China. The self-governing dominions, however, had put a bar on Japanese immigration as well as Indian immigration, even to the new mandated territories, thus raising a delicate problem for British diplomacy in connection with Japan, as with India. Because London was a party, willy-nilly, to Asiatic exclusion in vast portions of the British Empire, the reasonable gentlemen in Downing Street were ready to counteract what was an affront to Japan and an injury to her commercial and shipping interests by agreeing to give Japan a free hand in Siberia, Mongolia, and the former Russian and German spheres in China. The British commercial

¹ This alliance terminated automatically with the exchange of ratifications of the four-power treaty negotiated at the Washington conference.

interests had everything to gain by a compromise with Japan.

The dominions, however, made it clear that the growing power of Japan was a menace, and that their policy was that the British Empire should seek an understanding with the United States. Canada was more specific, and declared that the American policy in regard to Japanese expansion on the mainland of Asia and the open door was what she must adopt for her own security and prosperity. The treaties agreed upon in the Washington conference, especially the four-power treaty, which superseded the Anglo-Japanese treaty, were the result of the influence of the dominions in British foreign policy.

The World War has made the United States and Japan trade and shipping rivals of Great Britain. Competition in naval building was stopped for ten years by the Washington conference, but the economic war is only beginning. The British have always imported more than they have exported, because the United Kingdom can not raise either its food-stuffs or its raw materials. The difference was made up in shipping and banking profits, interest on investments abroad, and the pensions and portions of salaries paid by subject races for the services of British administrators and soldiers. Self-government naturally lessened the money coming in for salaries and pensions; a part of the banking business has been lost to New York; and the surplus profits invested in the countries with which the United Kingdom trades have not kept pace with the increased volume of trade. In the Far East the Japanese have been cutting into the carrying trade, and the American Shipping Board has become, with official government backing, a keen competitor in trans-Atlantic and South American freight and passenger business. There is less transshipping and brokerage in British ports, and now Queenstown looms up as a rival of Liverpool and South-

ampton. Marine insurance, like international banking, has partly gone to New York. How to win back the lion's share in the world's carrying trade and prevent competitors from bidding against them is a problem the British must face and solve. For the profits of ocean carriers are needed more than ever before to make up the adverse balance in foreign trade.

Important as the markets of the dominions, India, other colonies, the Near East, and the Far East were to British trade, they could not many years longer make up for loss of central and eastern European markets. Trading with Russia and the reëstablishment of normal conditions in Germany are imperative duties of British foreign policy. In 1921 more than two million workers were unemployed in the United Kingdom. Germany was the United Kingdom's best single customer in the years immediately preceding the World War, buying slightly more than the United States and as much as Australia and Canada combined. Of the products of certain important industries, Germany bought, either for herself or for redistribution, 40 per cent. of the British output, and Germany was, next to the United Kingdom, the best customer of the British Empire as a whole in some raw materials and food-stuffs.

Great Britain has come out of the war victor, with increased prestige and territories; but the cost to her taxpayers mounts up to 25 per cent. of their earnings in income tax alone. The question will arise as to whether the successful pursuit of a world policy is worth while. It is a question that can not be answered now. But, for the first time since steam power and transportation caused the rise of world powers, we have the opportunity of finding out whether a populous and highly industrialized European state can feed its population and make both ends meet without colonies, without any share in world politics, without special privileges or concessions anywhere in the world, and without merchant shipping protected by a huge

navy. The treaty of Versailles has given the world the opportunity to test the value of a *Weltpolitik*. If Germany can subsist, and pay any part of her indemnities, without all the paraphernalia of economic imperialism, is it necessary for other industrial powers to have great navies and to maintain by armies the overlordship of non-European races, paying heavily in human life and treasure, and constantly incurring the risk of coming to blows with other powers seeking the same ends by the same means?

CHAPTER XLV

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF POST-BELLUM JAPAN (1919-1922)

IN answer to an inquiry from the secretariat of the League of Nations, a statistics committee reported that the wealth of Japan at the end of 1921 was 86,077,000,000 yen. The estimate for 1913 was 32,043,000,000 yen. These figures indicate that in less than a decade the national wealth of Japan has almost tripled. When we look into the categories of estimated valuations, we find that lands are considered to be worth more to-day than the total national wealth of 1913, but that this increase in value is not proportionately as great as that of buildings and of marine, harbor, and river property. The most notable increase is in industrial machinery. The population of Japan proper increased 4,000,000 during the war, and it is estimated that in 1922 there are more than 60,000,000 Japanese living in an area not much larger than that of Great Britain, whose population is one fourth less.

During the half-century before the World War British publicists and economists of the imperialistic school succeeded in convincing the British people that existence, let alone prosperity, was dependent upon an aggressive colonial policy. This was the justification of heavy taxation, military burdens, wars of aggression against Africans and Asiatics, and the denial to many weaker peoples of the right to enjoy the Englishman's own most precious boon—political liberty. Because the Japanese, owing to increase in population and multiplication of industries, began to feel in their national consciousness the same necessity for expansion that the British have long felt, one is justi-

fied in considering the post-bellum foreign policy of the Japanese in the light of how we should feel were we in their place. Like the Germans, the Japanese have taken as their teacher Rudyard Kipling, and their motive for wanting overseas possessions, a large merchant marine, and a navy to protect that marine is admirably expressed in Kipling's lines:

"Oh, where are you going to, all you Big Steamers,
With England's own coal, up and down the salt seas?"
"We are going to fetch you your bread and your butter,
Your beef, pork, and mutton, eggs, apples, and cheese."

"And where will you fetch it from, all you Big Steamers,
And where shall I write you when you are away?"

"We fetch it from Melbourne, Quebec, and Vancouver—
Address us at Hobart, Hong-Kong, and Bombay."

"But if anything happened to all you Big Steamers,
And suppose you were wrecked up and down the salt
sea?"

"Then you 'd have no coffee or bacon for breakfast,
And you 'd have no muffins or toast for your tea."

"Then what can I do for you, all you Big Steamers,
Oh, what can I do for your comfort and good?"

"Send out your big war-ships to watch your big waters,
That no one may stop us from bringing you food."

"For the bread that you eat and the biscuits you nibble,
The sweets that you suck and the joints that you carve,
They are brought to you daily by all us Big Steamers—
And if any one hinders our coming you 'll starve!"

Next to Belgium and Holland, Japan is the most densely populated country in the world. In comparison with the European world powers, Japan has 396 persons per square mile against England's 370, Germany's 310, Italy's 306, and France's 193. The population of the United States and China is far below 100 per square mile. When we study

these figures, we must take into consideration the fact that the European peoples are able to overflow to their own colonies or the colonies of others, and—until very recently, at least—have been freely admitted to the United States. The habitable parts of the globe, capable of an almost indefinite development of resources, are the heritage of the white races. From the United States, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa the Japanese, like other Asiatics, are barred.¹

It is impossible to deal with the problem of Japan's international relations without these facts in mind. Whatever may be our professions of friendship for the Japanese government and the Japanese people and their professions of friendship for us, whatever may be the agreements signed at Washington to make war impossible, we must realize the truth of what President Wilson said in his war message, on April 2, 1917: "Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit." When Europe and America accepted Japan as a world power, on a footing of equality in international conferences, they did so, not of their own initiative and because of good-will, but as a result of Japan's astonishing ability to use the means of compulsion that they themselves had employed in becoming world powers. But the white race did not accept, and does not yet propose to accept, the Japanese people on a footing of equality.

¹ Australia, with a greater area than the United States, has scarcely more than 5,000,000 inhabitants, five sixths of whom live in the southeastern tip of the continent. And yet the Australian premier said recently that the continent could support 100,000,000 white people in their accustomed standard of living, and in this opinion Lord Northcliffe, then visiting Australia, concurred. New Zealand and South Africa have each scarcely more than a million white population, and the possibilities of development are vast. And yet, these three dominions, clamoring for immigrants and sorely needing labor, exclude Asiatics. This is the greatest problem in world politics today. By the most generous calculation of increase, Europe, if she directed all her immigration towards these dominions, could scarcely fill their needs for a hundred years. It is a case, as the Australian premier said, of safeguarding the patrimony of our great-grandchildren. Will Japan and India wait a hundred years?



Before 1914 there was no other way for Japan than tacitly to acknowledge the exclusion of her people from as yet uncolonized and undeveloped parts of the earth's surface and from a share in the full colonization and development of other parts. Japan was too weak to defy the European powers and the United States; and she had the misfortune of arousing against herself the resentment of her neighbors of her own race, because her first advances in imperialism had to be directed against them. But a profound change occurred in international politics between 1914 and 1919, culminating in the folly of the treaty of Versailles and the Entente policy towards Russia. Instead of standing together, the white peoples came to blows over their monopoly, and ended by fighting one another. The vanquished were excluded, like the Asiatics, from a share in the world beyond their frontiers.

Then, as if unaware of the fatal breach they had made in their own solid front against the other races, the victors in the internecine war of the white race continued to maintain the attitude towards Japan that they had been justified in maintaining when there was racial solidarity. The writer is certain that he has not made too bald or sweeping a statement. Without raising this point an effort to explain the post-bellum foreign policy of Japan would be fruitless.

As to objects of foreign policy the Japanese people are united. These objects are the result of the same desires that have created the objects of the foreign policy of the other great powers, and are subject to criticism and condemnation only if we believe that the Japanese are an inferior race who have no right to aspire to a gradually rising standard of living. It would be possible for the Japanese to accept their position *vis-à-vis* the white man's world, were they willing to abandon any effort to increase their national well-being and to provide for their future security and prosperity. But if we regard the Japanese

as human beings, with the same reactions and ambitions as ourselves, we shall give them the credit of a foreign policy that aims to establish: (1) the supremacy of Japan in eastern Asia; (2) the ejection of the European powers and the United States from footholds on the mainland and islands of Asia in close enough proximity to her to threaten her security or the interruption of her maritime communications; (3) the allotment to Japan of an equitable share of spheres of influence and colonizing areas by agreement, or, failing this, by conquest; and (4) the insistence upon the granting of equality, in the fullest sense of that term, to Asiatics in their own continent and in Africa with Europeans, or the expulsion of Europeans from Asia and Africa if this equality be not granted.

The Japanese are not given to boasting about, or even discussing, what they intend to do. They succeed in keeping their thoughts to themselves, and are not aggressive with mouth or pen, as are Occidentals. The author is unable to refer to any printed page or speech of statesmen as authority for the four essential points of Japanese foreign policy. But every act of the Japanese government in its international relations has tended to help along this program. The supremacy of Japan in eastern Asia, begun by the war of 1894 with China,¹ has suffered no setback during the last thirty years; the ejection of the European powers, begun in the war of 1904 with Russia² and continued in the war of 1914 with Germany,³ has progressed marvelously in eastern Siberia and outer Mongolia since 1918. Japan's demand for spheres of influence dates back to the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, continues through the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1916, and was quietly and firmly pressed at Paris and Washington; while fear for India and for Indo-China is, in part at least, the explanation of the remarkable hold of the Japanese Foreign Office upon London and Paris every time the question of evacuat-

¹ See Chapter X.² See Chapter XII.³ See Chapter XXVIII.

ing Siberia and Manchuria has come up in international conferences.

As to the methods of attaining these objects the Japanese are divided. Throwing aside the camouflage of government and opposition parties, of the Elder Statesmen and the modernists, of jingos and anti-militarists, we find the leaders of public opinion endeavoring to influence the government and the people to adopt one or another of the following means to the one end.

A great many Japanese are of the opinion that force of arms, which has been Japan's means of international progress so far, will carry her steadily along to the supremacy of Asia by adroit diplomacy, punctuated with an occasional war. Japan must not unnecessarily antagonize Europe or the United States, and she will find her best opportunities by remaining closely allied to the Entente powers for the present, meanwhile keeping her powder dry. This party is enthusiastic about the Washington conference, contending that the five-five-three ratio of naval strength is a great step towards Japanese supremacy and relieves the government of a heavy financial burden. By not tempting fortune for a number of years, Japan will be ready to take advantage again of whatever situation arises in the next European war.

A great many other Japanese are also of the opinion that force of arms is Japan's sole means of winning her proper place in the world, but they think that her opportunity lies in coming to an understanding with Russia and Germany, so that when the next war arises she will be able to strike the British and French in the Far East. This party sees in the present condition of Europe a unique opportunity to use the powers Japan has already ousted from the Far East to help her get rid of the others.

A great many other Japanese are also of the opinion that force of arms is the one argument of world politics, but they have no faith in the advancement of Japan's

objects by alliance and coöperation with any European power. They declare that despite surface indications the white race will stand together in a pinch, asserting for instance that Germany or Russia, like Great Britain or France, would go to the aid of the United States in a Japanese-American war. This party bitterly opposes the imperialistic policy of Japan towards China, and advocates autonomy, if not independence, for Korea. It sees in the rapprochement of China and Japan the irresistible means of expelling all European powers and preaches the gospel of Asia for the Asiatics by the Asiatics. Its emissaries are working hard in Korea and China, and are beginning propaganda in Indo-China and India. They have condemned their own government for its actions in Korea, denounced the twenty-one demands, advocated the restitution of Shantung, and represented themselves as anti-imperialists and liberals, ready to encourage the aspirations of all subject and downtrodden peoples.

The anti-militarist movement in Japan, of which much has been written since Germany's downfall, is not fairly presented to European and American readers. It stands to reason that the Japanese are not more peace-loving than ourselves. We are anti-militarists and even pacifists, but with reservations. We want a fair share of prosperity for ourselves and assurances that our children will be secure and prosperous. But if we are given no bone when bones are being handed around, or when some other dog tries to take ours, we are ready for a fight. The Japanese movement against militarism and for harmonious relations with other nations is predicated upon the assumption that Europe and America intend to treat Japan fairly and recognize that she has the same needs, and the same right to provide for them, that we have. The success of the anti-militarist movement in Japan depends upon developments outside Japan. Similarly, the English-speaking branches of the white race, by their policy in regard to Japanese

political and economic expansion, will determine whether we shall soon have another world war. They can not maintain a monopoly of the world's colonizing areas and raw materials without having to fight one of three combinations, *i. e.*, (1) Japan and the Latin-European countries; (2) Japan, Germany, and Russia; or (3) Japan and China.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE PLACE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD (1920-1922)

THE rise of the United States as a world power has been sudden and accidental, in contrast with the slow and deliberate extension of the economic influence and the political sovereignty of the European powers. The Spanish-American War was caused by domestic considerations,¹ and none realized that it was going to involve us in world affairs. Without intending it we became a colonial power in the Pacific and were compelled to play a rôle in international diplomacy in the Far East. We did our best to keep out of the European war, and, during the four years since the armistice, we have avoided assuming responsibilities in the Near East and have refused to enter into alliances with European powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the new European order established by the Paris treaties. But, willy-nilly, the American people are forced to recognize that the political as well as the economic equilibrium of the world depends upon the policies adopted by the United States.

The place of the United States in the world and her preponderant position in international affairs are the result of a natural growth in population and wealth, which has rapidly changed the relative position of the American people among the peoples of European origin. A hundred years ago, during the period of reconstruction following the Napoleonic wars, we were a small nation, with undeveloped resources, and, although we grew rapidly each decade in population, the internal development of our own

¹ See pp. 343-344.

country more than consumed our surplus, and we had to seek liquid capital in Europe. We had no part in the extension of the white race's political sovereignty over Asia and Africa, in its colonization of Australasia and parts of Africa, and in the marvelous development of international trade. Even on our own hemisphere we had few investments in foreign countries and traded very little with Latin America. But the decades preceding the World War saw us pass in population all the European nations except Russia, and between 1914 and 1920 we were transformed from a debtor to a creditor nation, with the other great powers owing us huge sums of money. Our intervention in the World War decided the issue in favor of the Entente powers, and brought into the conflict with the German coalition China, Siam, and the majority of the Latin-American states.

A review of the increase in population tells the story of the change of our position *vis-à-vis* the other powers:

YEAR	POPULATION	IMMIGRANTS ENTERING U. S. IN PRECEDING DECADE
1820	9,638,453	250,000 (est.)
1830	12,860,692	143,439
1840	17,063,353	599,125
1850	23,191,876	1,713,251
1860	31,443,321	2,598,214
1870	38,558,371	2,314,824
1880	50,155,783	2,812,191
1890	62,947,714	5,246,613
1900	75,994,575	3,844,420
1910	91,972,266	7,753,816
1920	105,710,620	6,100,000

Of the 34,000,000 immigrants added to the United States by immigration, considerably less than a million have come from Asia, and only half a million from France. Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Scandinavian countries have furnished the largest elements, ranging from five and a half to two millions. It is interesting to note, however, that the northern European immigration has declined appre-

ciably since 1890, and that the bulk of the immigration during the last thirty years has come from eastern, south-eastern, and southern Europe. In the years immediately preceding the World War Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia furnished more than three fourths of the total immigration.

Chinese exclusion laws became operative forty years ago, and the more delicate problem of excluding Japanese has been adjusted temporarily from time to time by a "gentleman's agreement." But until after the World War no laws were enacted curtailing the volume of immigration from Europe. In 1921 Congress passed a temporary restriction bill, fixing at three per cent. of the number of immigrants already in the country the annual quota to be admitted from each European state. A strong current of opinion is making itself felt at Washington to suspend entirely for from three to five years the privilege of entry into the United States of those who come avowedly to make the New World their treasure-trove or permanent home. We need a breathing-spell to assimilate the foreigners already in our midst; a great wave of undesirable immigration is feared; and widespread unemployment makes it inadvisable to add to the number of unskilled laborers seeking jobs.

But even if we have little or no immigration during the years immediately ahead, or if we decide upon a definite policy of limitation by constitutional amendment,¹ the immigration from Europe of the past century—and especially of the past thirty years—has established for the United States a unique and unalterable place among the nations of the world. Our place is unique and unalterable owing to the fact that by natural increase alone and by reason of the actual and potential wealth within our own

¹From the temper of Congress, reflecting the opinion of the country, it is reasonable to suppose that restriction of immigration will soon become a great national issue, and that the settlement of the problem will be reached by a constitutional amendment.

borders we are bound to become and remain for a long time the most numerous and most wealthy of white peoples. Immigration accomplished this. But immigration accomplished also a radical transformation in the racial and cultural character of the American people to such an extent that when we finally entered the field of world politics we were without a national consciousness of our own and at the same time without an irresistible affinity of blood or culture for any one European people. No one group or element of our population is now, or is likely to be in the future, strong enough to commit the United States to a foreign policy supporting one power or a coalition of powers against any other or others. Changing circumstances might have led us into a political alliance with one or more European powers, had we not received a continual and abundant infusion of new blood from every part of Europe. But the American people are too pan-European now to make possible the abandonment of Washington's farewell advice.

There are no opponents to the policy of keeping the United States a white man's country. While it is impossible for our government to discriminate in favor of any European country, it is equally impossible to modify the existing regulations and agreements for the exclusion of Asiatics. But there are some Americans who believe that our foreign policy, in dealing with the question of Asiatic immigration, must bring us into line with the self-governing dominions of Great Britain in a common exclusion agreement. Said Senator Lodge, a few weeks after the election of President Harding:

“There is one arrangement I should like to make very much, and that is an arrangement with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in regard to Asiatic immigration. Their danger is the same as ours, and the shadow hangs darkest over Australia. We must face it, and it might as well be understood that it is in no sense of hostility to any nation,

but there are certain great principles that must be accepted. One is that no nation has the right or can find a cause of war in the demand that her people shall migrate to another free country, as the first sovereign right is the right to say who shall come into the country."¹

As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lodge speaks with authority, and it is necessary to draw attention to the import of his words. We have already discussed the problem of Japan's attitude towards the exclusion of Asiatics from Australia and New Zealand, and have pointed out how this is bound to become a great issue in world politics, affecting the future of European relations with India as well as with the Far East.² It will be generally admitted that there is a solidarity of interest between the United States and Canada in the matter of mutually supporting the policy of excluding Asiatics. But the United States—and Canada as well—some day will have to face the alternatives of supporting the thesis that Australasia is a white man's land or of refusing to oppose the logical expansion of Japan. Sentimental reasons would dictate the choice of the first; but whether the second is not the wiser choice and the choice indicated by the interests of the peoples of the western hemisphere is an open question. We are confronted with the same problem in regard to Japanese expansion in eastern Asia and the islands off the coast of the Asiatic continent. European and American sovereignty has been extended to that part of the world because of the need of the European and American peoples for colonizing areas and markets. Now that Japan, following Occidental economic evolution, has become an industrial nation, are we going to hem her in, prevent her growth, attempt to destroy her, or are we

¹ Speaking at the Union League, Philadelphia, November 28, 1920. Upon this principle the inhabitants of Palestine base their right to oppose Zionism, and the British government is beginning to see the unwisdom, as well as the injustice and inconsistency, of forcing the Palestinians to accept immigrants from Europe whose avowed object is to get political control of the country.

² See pp. 516-517.

going to acknowledge her right to a share in the world beyond her frontiers?

Instinctively the American people are ready to underwrite the *status quo* in Canada, and to consider that our national interests are affected by any changes or upsets in any part of North or South America. But they will not intervene in the political affairs of Europe, and if we are asked to defend the title of European nations to their possessions in other parts of the world, questions immediately arise with which only those who are versed in practical world politics are competent to deal. For we must satisfy ourselves that the *status quo* we are called upon to defend, at the risk of another bloody and costly war, is advantageous to the present and future interests of the United States.

In tracing the motives and the results of the expansion of European nations overseas we have realized how each of these nations has endeavored to establish exclusive rights of exploitation, how they have come into conflict with one another by trying to check one another's expansion, how they have avoided wars by bargaining and arranging spheres of influence, and how Japan's recent history is simply an imitation in self-defense of the foreign policies of European countries. *Do ut des* (I give that you may give) has been the principle of diplomacy where it was impossible or was deemed inexpedient or too costly to resort to force. Conquest, or failing that bargaining, has made the political *status quo* in Asia and Africa. To weak peoples and to peoples conquered in war this *status quo* is disadvantageous, because it places the commerce and capital and shipping of these peoples in a position of inferiority in world trade.

In so far as world trade is concerned, the United States is in the same position of inferiority as weak nations and is almost as badly off as the nations that were compelled to sign the Paris treaties. It is simply because we have not

set store upon overseas trade and investments and have not had a large merchant marine that we have not felt the pinch of the hold of Great Britain, France, and Japan upon the Far East, and of the two former powers upon the Near East and Africa—a hold that the treaty of Versailles, the San Remo conference, and the treaties of the Washington conference immeasurably strengthened.¹ American goods are discriminated against in Manchuria and other parts of China, in Indo-China, and, in fact, in every part of the world where the flags of the European nations fly; and the same handicap is felt by American steamship lines and American capital seeking investment.

Numerous instances have arisen since the World War to prove that the Entente powers and Japan have felt no sense of obligation towards the United States in their arrangements to enjoy the fruits of the victory over Germany, and our State Department has protested on several occasions against the tendency to exclude American citizens from a share in the spoils. We have space only to enumerate some concrete illustrations of discrimination: ignoring American interests and claims in the allotment of cables surrendered by Germany, and in the distribution of mandates (island of Yap); refusal of British and French governments to grant American companies equal opportunities for oil prospecting and development in Mesopotamia with those granted to British and French companies (Colby and Hughes notes of protest); throwing out by Alexandria Chamber of Commerce, controlled by Englishmen, of the lowest bids for transport of Egyptian cotton to the United States, and the insistence that this cotton be transported in British bottoms or at least be transshipped by way of Liverpool (protest of United States Shipping Board); in-

¹ See pp. 550-551. If the American student desires to get a graphic picture of what these advantages are, let him go through the treaties, keeping in mind that the *status quo* of 1914 was already exceedingly advantageous to the powers who were the exclusive beneficiaries of the 1919 and 1920 treaties and agreements.

terference of British and French High Commissions in Constantinople with American efforts to get trade and unfair discrimination in favor of their own nationals, under guise of military necessity (protest of American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant); the effort of Great Britain to get exclusive control of the resources of Persia (Anglo-Persian agreement of Teheran, August, 1919, against which the American government formally protested); the campaign in the French press to erect against other powers than France the same tariffs that hold in French colonies; and the propaganda in Great Britain for imperial preferential tariffs in other than self-governing dominions (already begun in the 1918 Indian export duties).

The reader who has followed the story of world politics through this book will realize how these discriminations fall upon the United States in the way that they fall upon weak and dispossessed nations. Great Britain and France and Russia in the past made mutual concessions to one another; Great Britain and Japan did the same; after the opening of the World War Italy was received into the Entente Alliance with definite advantages and rewards promised her; and now, when Russia recovers her power, she will be able to get back many of her old exclusive rights beyond her European frontiers, and force the Entente powers to revise their post-bellum agreements and let her in on the Near Eastern spoils of war. Each of these powers is compensated for what the other four enjoy; and they have a common interest in preventing Germany from recovering her colonies and her former commercial position outside Europe. Their present policy towards Germany is influenced by their ability to bargain with one another in African and Asiatic territories and spheres of influence.¹

The United States is assured by her European comrades-in-arms that the enemies of Germany fought for a common cause, won a common victory, and are equally interested

¹ See pp. 549-550.

in enforcement of the treaties. But the principle of community in ideals and sacrifices and burdens in time of peace does not extend to community in the fruits of victory. Not only did the Entente powers divide among themselves the mandates for the German colonies and the territories liberated from the Ottoman Empire, but they also left the United States out of the reckoning in the apportionment of the indemnity to be exacted. They went so far as to contest the right of the United States to hold the ships and to retain the other property she had seized from enemy nationals.

Despite our refusal to enter the League of Nations and to make ourselves responsible for the execution of the Paris treaties, we are still importuned to undertake responsibilities and to enter into commitments that tend to make us accept as permanent and even to pledge us to defend a world-wide political and economic *status quo* that is decidedly to our disadvantage if we intend to or feel that we need to play the rôle of a world power.

We have been disappointed in the realization of our ideals; we are too divided in blood and cultural background to coöperate with certain European nations to further their interests against the interests of others because of kinship, affection, or admiration; and, as a nation, we are not yet interested enough in foreign trade to believe that our prosperity is dependent upon an aggressive foreign policy aimed at throwing open the doors closed against us and removing the discriminations and inequalities handicapping American goods, capital, and shipping in Africa and Asia.

The events of the past four years in international politics have strongly influenced the American people against the policy of political coöperation with other nations in settling the affairs of the world. When he refused the invitation to participate in the Genoa conference, President Harding proved himself a correct interpreter of American public opinion. And there is not much chance of a change

in the attitude of the United States towards the rest of the world until the American people begin to compete with other nations for world trade, with the feeling that their well-being depends upon getting a good share, or until, by the initiative of other nations, we are persuaded to abandon our policy of aloofness and indifference. Let us examine these two contingencies.

The war in Europe created an unprecedented demand for American manufactured and agricultural products and seemingly brought unprecedented prosperity to the American people. In addition to supplying the European markets with war materials and with food-stuffs and manufactured articles, we found a demand for American goods in South American and colonial markets. But the conditions that created this export trade were artificial, and the prosperity was artificial. Europe bought from us because of her desperate need and because her energies were devoted to fighting; the other continents bought from us because we did not have the competition of European goods. After the war was over we discovered that a good part of our exports was paid for with money our government had loaned the borrowers, or was sold on credit. Most of what we supposedly earned during the war was our own money, subscribed to the successive American Liberty Loans or to loans of foreign governments offered in the United States through American banks. Since the latter part of 1919 the high price of the dollar has militated against American foreign trade. But, even if exchange were normal, could we sell extensively in world markets in competition with the European powers and Japan, and would it be worth our while to do so? If we limit immigration, is it probable that for many years to come American producers as a whole will regard overseas markets as profitable? Many competent students of American economic life are of the opinion that through supplying domestic markets we shall see during the next thirty years a return to the prosperity

that this country experienced in the generation after the Civil War. It is hard to dissent from this opinion and to controvert it, especially when one realizes that the instinctive orientation of the American people is towards a new period of intensive internal development.

Some American capitalists and manufacturers and bankers care very much about foreign trade, and have carried on a powerful propaganda to create an appetite for it and to inform business men of the patent reasons for our lack of success in capturing and holding a share of it. Much has been written on the necessity of controlling cables, extending long credits, having our own merchant marine, investing money in the countries in which we plan to develop markets, opening branches of American banks, sending out bona fide Americans to represent American interests, learning foreign languages, adapting our goods and our weights and measures to the markets in which we intend to sell, improving our consular service, and getting the State Department and our diplomatic representatives behind American trade in the way that the machinery of other governments stands behind the trade of their nationals. But the great mass of Americans do not care enough about foreign trade to go after it in the European way, and do not believe that the returns will compensate for the abandonment by our government of its traditional policies for the policies that have brought the European nations and Japan at one another's throats.

Because we do not feel ourselves dependent upon and therefore are not worrying about world markets, the insistence of the United States upon the open door in China and upon equal opportunities for American trade and investment elsewhere has been purely academic. We have made no threats; and we have esteemed the privileges of too slight value to assume responsibilities in order to make good our claim to them. This fact is seen in our attitude towards the question of mandates. We have not wanted

to add to our responsibilities. On the contrary, most Americans are willing even to give up a great possession already acquired, like the Philippine Islands. Suggestions that the United States liquidate in part or in whole the Allied indebtedness by taking over the British and French possessions in the West Indies and in South America, or by acquiring title to Near Eastern countries and the German colonies, in regard to which the mandate scheme does not seem to be working, receives little attention in the American press.¹ World power, in terms of economic imperialism or bearing the white man's burden, does not tempt the American people enough to induce them to set a price upon their coöperation with other nations in managing the world.

But if we were persistently and ardently wooed our interest could be aroused. One might not value a thing enough to fight for it or even to ask for it, but he would probably not refuse it if it were offered him. The power and the self-sufficiency of the United States are factors in the international situation that the Entente powers would do well to consider as Siamese twins. It may be sound doctrine for them to preach that we need their friendship and coöperation as much as they need ours, and that our well-being is dependent upon their economic rehabilitation and political ascendancy. But American public opinion will not accept it. Those who seek our aid must make sacrifices to obtain it. The time never was when we were influenced by the argument that they were fighting our battle for us, although it might have been, had the right kind of a peace crowned the victory over Germany. The American people are deaf to the two pleas most commonly advanced for a close understanding and coöperation with the Entente powers, that we should be defending civiliza-

¹Or in Congress. In fact, the advocates of an exchange of this sort have been laughed at more than once. Senator France's scheme for taking over the German African colonies was ridiculed in the Senate, and was the subject for many quips in the press.

tion and that we should be advancing our own interests. The way the victory over Germany has been used makes us doubt, rightly or wrongly, the former; and our common sense, after studying the play of world politics during the years that followed the armistices, has caused us to question whether the maintenance of the world-wide *status quo* conforms with our interests, or at least whether we should be justified in committing ourselves to any financial or military burdens in upholding the arrangements of the Paris treaties.

The place of the United States in the world is that of the strongest of the powers, whose potential supremacy is not recognized by the other powers and is not yet a danger because it is not yet an ambition. Because of the composition of her people the United States can not be reckoned upon to take sides in any European quarrel or to support the domination of one European people over another. Because of the resources still undeveloped within her own frontiers, the United States has not entered into world politics as a struggle for existence or as a means of attaining and maintaining prosperity. Because of her geographical position and population, national security is not one of her problems in international relations. By the initiative and skilful diplomacy of other powers she may be led into extending her colonial responsibilities and into backing her own race against the yellow race. But of her own initiative it is not probable that she will acquire new colonies, or that she will assume the championship of European supremacy in the Far East and the Pacific.

CHAPTER XLVII

BASES OF SOLIDARITY AMONG ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS (1922)

NONE denies that the world is askew. Ships of state are pilotless and rudderless, riding God knows whither. In every country internal economic and social conditions are so upset that forecasts of the morrow seem futile. And yet, international political relationships depend upon these internal conditions more intimately and more entirely than ever before in history. Statesmen are still sitting at the diplomatic chessboard, making moves in accordance with the old rules of the game. But each realizes that shaping the foreign policy of his nation is no longer independent of or divorced from home policies and problems. The old order upon which one could count in directing foreign affairs has given place to new and uncertain values. Just what the changes are, whether for good or bad, whether permanent or temporary, and how we are to adjust ourselves to them and take advantage of them or combat them, as the case may be—on all this we need constructive thinking, uncrowded by the hysteria and emotions born of the war.

The creation of a sentiment of solidarity among the peoples of the English-speaking world will do more to improve international relations generally and to hasten the era of a durable world peace than any other concrete proposal that has been advanced. But, unfortunately, the advocates of an English-speaking union base their hopes of its fruition upon the assumption that the United States and the British self-governing dominions are predominantly English (or English and Scotch) in their blood, culture, and sympathies.

The American of Scotch or English descent, for instance, is likely to say that this is an Anglo-Saxon country, and that the Germans, Irish, and other Europeans did not have to come here; when they did come, it was incumbent upon them to forget old ties and to become assimilated with us. This element asserts the right to justify close ties with Great Britain on the ground that "blood is thicker than water," but denies the right of harking back to the home country to the other national groups that go to make up the composite population of the United States.

In 1914 this contention was put squarely before Americans of continental European origin. But it was never admitted by them. The remarkable unity of the American nation, after we went into the war, did not mean, among Americans of other than Anglo-Saxon origin, the abandonment of affection for, or pride in, their own ancestors. Now that peace has been restored, German-Americans refuse to accept the brand of hyphenate, arguing that, until their country of origin became the enemy of the United States, they had as much right to feel sympathetic towards it and even to help its cause as did the Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin to sympathize with and help Great Britain. Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin must remember that the United States from the beginning contained elements without a drop of Anglo-Saxon blood in their veins; that Germans, Irish, and Hollanders fought in the Revolutionary War; that a large part of the Irish and Germans came to this country before the Civil War; and that the remarkable growth and prosperity of the United States is due to emigration from continental Europe and Ireland in the last sixty years fully as much as, if not more than, to what has come from England and Scotland.

The greatness of the United States in the third decade of the twentieth century is due to the combined aid of several different elements of her population. The elements that are not Anglo-Saxon are so numerous and so powerful

in wealth and political influence that it is impossible to build the structure of an English-speaking union upon the foundation of blood and cultural ties with England. The federal census for 1920 demonstrates the folly of considering the United States an Anglo-Saxon country. The Anglo-Saxon element in our population is not only becoming proportionately smaller as a result of our variegated immigration, but it is also refusing to reproduce itself.¹ It will do us no good to discount the importance of our compatriots who are not of Anglo-Saxon blood. If we want to make English-speaking solidarity a national policy instead of a group cult, we shall have to find an appeal to the American public different from that of orators and writers who speak to present-day Americans of our English ancestors and our precious English heritage.

Nor is the superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture an argument that impresses many outside the proportionately dwindling Anglo-Saxon element. It smacks too much of a discredited political system that sought to replace or dominate other cultures by the *Kultur* of the *Übermensch*. Culture is a vague word. If it means traditions, customs, and mental habits, as embodied in literature and preserved in family life and religion, we shall find many other American elements than German unwilling to abandon for the Anglo-Saxon culture what they brought here from the Old World. Thousands of flourishing communities exist in the United States, nurseries of splendid Americans, where the new generation is being brought up with traditions, customs, and mental habits different from those of Anglo-Saxons.

¹In 1921 Germans led in the number of naturalized citizens, followed by Austrians, Italians, and Jews. In New York City the birth-rate for foreign born last year was 38 per thousand; for native born, 16; and for the districts of the city from which membership in the English-speaking Union is exclusively recruited, 7. At a dinner given in the interests of Anglo-American friendship, the diners, representing the quintessence of Anglo-Saxon culture in New York, did not boast of enough children, all told, to amount to their own number. More than half of the waiters were of former enemy nationality, and the married waiters averaged between four and five children. At one table a German waiter had more children than the eight diners put together.

From Scandinavians to Italians, the rapidly increasing groups of continental European origin are not giving up their culture for Anglo-Saxon culture. So strong are atavism, the home circle, and the church that our public school system does not Anglicize the children in teaching them English. We are unsuccessful in telling Hans Schmidt, Giuseppe Tommasi, Abram Einstein, Olaf Andersen, Robert Emmet O'Brien, and a dozen others that they are not good Americans because they do not cheerfully accept the supremacy of the English and Scotch among us and the superiority of English and Scotch ways. Nothing could be better fitted to arouse within them a fierce determination to resist assimilation and oppose the policy of Anglo-Saxon solidarity.

Most thinking Americans, after a review of world politics during the past century and after the experiences of the World War, agree that the British Empire and the United States ought to face the future together. An encouraging beginning in this direction was made at the Washington conference. But how are we going to create an irresistible public opinion in the United States in favor of a foreign policy that will embody as one of its cardinal principles the fostering of English-speaking solidarity? What are the bases of solidarity among English-speaking nations?

The Anglo-American community of blood and community of history are bases of solidarity to not more than half, if indeed half, of the American people. The blood of the rest is not ours, the earlier English history they did not share with us, and American history gives them ground for antagonism to the British rather than for sympathy with the British. Only the Teutonic element understands our religion. Community of culture is limited to language. This is a bond with Canada, for there is constant intercourse between Canadians and Americans, and the same books and periodicals are read. It is becoming a factor in our relations with Australia, also, because Australians read

popular American periodical literature. But beyond the limited circle that is already Anglo-Saxon few British and Americans come into personal contact, and the reciprocal purchase of books and magazines and newspapers is surprisingly small. Common language is an asset working in favor of those who seek to bring together the English-speaking peoples. But it is hardly a basis for solidarity.

We can appeal to the whole English-speaking world, however, and emphasize as bases of solidarity: (1) common laws and the same spirit of administration of justice; (2) similar development of democratic institutions; (3) common ideals; and (4) common interests. The first two are in a certain sense included in the third and fourth, and the fourth covers the first three. One appeals to the moral sense and to self-interest, and then, to clinch the argument, shows how idealism is in harmony with interest, as in the adage, "Honesty is the best policy."

In discussing these bases of solidarity it must be remembered that the problem involves the direct relations between each two of the members of the English-speaking group of nations and between each English-speaking country and the colonies and possessions of the British Empire and of the United States. The following list shows how wide a field is covered and how the question of the political unity of English-speaking peoples touches many of the most important phases of world politics:

Great Britain and United States
 Great Britain and Ireland
 Ireland and United States
 Great Britain and Canada
 United States and Canada
 Ireland and Canada
 Great Britain and Australia
 United States and Australia
 Ireland and Australia
 Canada and Australia

Great Britain and New Zealand
United States and New Zealand
Ireland and New Zealand
Canada and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand
Great Britain and South Africa
United States and South Africa
Ireland and South Africa
Canada and South Africa
Australia and South Africa
New Zealand and South Africa
Great Britain and India and other possessions
United States and British possessions
Ireland and British possessions
Canada and British possessions
Australia and British possessions
New Zealand and British possessions
South Africa and British possessions
United States and her possessions
Great Britain and American possessions
Ireland and American possessions
Canada and American possessions
Australia and American possessions
New Zealand and American possessions
South Africa and American possessions
British possessions and American possessions

Thirty-six separate headings may seem at first glance useless repetition. But some problem of solidarity arises affecting primarily the two parties coupled in *each* of these relations. In fact, it is not difficult to find several sources of friction calling for adjustment, several problems demanding solution, under every single one of the thirty-six. Indeed, we might be justified in adding to the list because of the new responsibilities that have come to the British Empire through the acquisition of the former German colonies, some of which have been given to South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. The character and limitations of the mandates are as yet unsettled, and the United States has questioned the rights of the mandatories. A diplo-

matic conflict has already arisen between the United States and Great Britain over the Mesopotamian mandate.¹ If the United States feels that her interests in German Southwest Africa and in the Pacific islands formerly belonging to Germany are ignored, will she address herself to Great Britain or directly to the self-governing dominions?

The years immediately ahead are years of peril for the solidarity of English-speaking countries. One feels a crying need of light, and more light, in considering the quadrangular character of relations between different parts of the world now under Anglo-Saxon domination—Great Britain; the British dominions; the United States; and the possessions and protectorates of Great Britain, the dominions, and the United States. The Washington conference has brought to the front and emphasized the undefined nature of these relations. Japan? The Pacific? Tariffs? Shipping? Sea power? Status of the liberated Near Eastern countries and of the former German colonies? Panama Canal? Monroe Doctrine? League of Nations? The new Irish Free State? We can not treat these matters simply as questions between London and Washington. Nor can Great Britain treat them that way. Both London and Washington are forced to take into consideration the wishes and interests of the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, whose virtual independence gives them distinct points of view and programs of their own.² With the exception of South Africa, the self-governing dominions are, like the United States, the outgrowth of European civilization transplanted and developed under the ægis of England. It is natural that in mentality, and frequently in interests, they should be nearer to us than to the mother country. Canada and South Africa have important European elements that have not been under the influence of, and are antipathetic to, Anglo-Saxon culture. During the years of tension between the United Kingdom

¹ See p. 551.

² See pp. 496-499.

and Ireland, from 1916 to 1922, Australia's Irish rivaled ours in singing the hymn of hate against England.

Consciousness and appreciation of our common system of jurisprudence is the first basis of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. There is unity in the conception and administration of law in English-speaking countries. Just laws justly administered are the foundation of civilized society. Those who live under them prize them more highly than any other possession. No alien, whatever his origin, fails to acknowledge the blessings of Anglo-Saxon law. Our laws and our courts are the outgrowth of centuries of English history and experience. They offer the greatest protection to the individual and the widest possibility of personal freedom that the world has ever known. Within recent years, if America meant to the immigrant "the home of the free," it was because of the scrupulous administration of justice according to the laws handed down to us from colonial days. Similarly the emigrant from continental Europe who went to a British colony was sure of a "square deal." Before the law he was the equal of any other man. Entering our society, he shared immediately the benefits of our most sacred heritage—free speech, free assembly, the *habeas corpus* act, and the principles of Anglo-Saxon law assured to the inhabitants of the United States not only by custom and our system of jurisprudence, but by the first amendments of the Constitution. As far as laws and the administration of justice are concerned, the English-speaking countries have had a similar development, and this powerful link that binds them to England more closely than a common language has not been severed.

Political institutions and jurisprudence go together. Although the American commonwealth has developed its political institutions with less strict adherence to English standards than in the case of jurisprudence, the modifications do not affect the spirit of the representative government we received from England. When the American

colonies fought the mother country, it was to preserve their rights as Englishmen, which they believed had not been forfeited by transplantation. The War of Independence established a principle that has been vital in the development of English-speaking countries. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa owe to the American rebels the possession of Anglo-Saxon liberties in new worlds without having had to fight for them.

The continental European who emigrates to white men's countries under the Anglo-Saxon form of government becomes, after naturalization, an equal partner with every other citizen. He votes. He is eligible for office. No argument is necessary to convince him of the advantages of living under Anglo-Saxon political institutions. If these institutions are properly administered, he appreciates them as highly as he appreciates Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. The second basis of solidarity among English-speaking peoples, therefore, is Anglo-Saxon polity, and it can be urged upon Americans who are unresponsive to the call of blood and culture.

Every inhabitant of English-speaking countries is interested in the maintenance and defense of the jurisprudence and polity under which he lives. We must prove to him, first of all, that we ourselves cherish this jurisprudence and this polity; that (whatever the lapses of the war years) we intend to conduct our national life in the strict spirit of them; and that he is our partner in their benefits. Then we can point out to him that English-speaking countries can not afford to risk the deterioration or loss of these precious possessions by pursuing antagonistic policies in the electrically charged post-bellum world, and he will begin to see the common sense of a rapprochement between Great Britain, her dominions, and ourselves.

Community of ideals, the third basis of solidarity, furnishes a powerful argument to the inhabitants of English-speaking countries to stick together. The World War

touched the soul of the English-speaking peoples, and the sacrifices necessary to victory were consented to, in Great Britain and the dominions as in the United States, because of the moral indignation of the people and their responsiveness to the crusader appeal. In a certain sense the United States was kicked into the war, because public opinion demanded that Germany's challenge be accepted. But, after we entered it, the remarkable effort in man power and money made by the United States was due, not to spontaneous combustion, but to the clever propaganda of official and unofficial organizations, assisted by the press. Germany's crime and America's ideals were what brought us to the fighting-point and kept us there. Despite our mixture of blood and of cultural backgrounds, successive generations of development under English jurisdiction and polity have imbued us with an idealism that is distinctly Anglo-Saxon. It was slow to awake, but when it did awake, the people of the United States were ready to make every sacrifice for the triumph of the ideals embodied by President Wilson in his war speeches.

Speaking at Manchester in December, 1918, on the eve of the peace conference, the President declared that the United States could never enter into any league that was not an association of all nations for the common good. He undoubtedly had in mind the formidable number of millions of Americans who were reluctant to aid Anglo-Saxon and Latin against Teuton, but who supported the war against Germany without hesitation because Germany stood for militarism, autocracy, imperialism, and the oppression of small nations. Mr. Wilson knew that these millions of loyal Americans would not feel called upon to sanction and collaborate in enforcing a sordid and materialistic peace that would make some races or peoples masters of others. For the sake of idealism and for the United States, their adopted country, they fought against kith and kin, shoulder to shoulder with those whom they believed, rightly or

wrongly, to be the oppressors or enemies of their country of origin. Can we expect our compatriots of German or Irish or Slavic stock to support a European and a world order based upon the permanent inferiority and subjection of those whose blood runs in their veins and whose culture their home training has taught them to respect and foster?

Some unthinking Americans hotly answer in the affirmative, and revive the epithet of hyphenate. But in doing so they reveal themselves to be backsliding Anglo-Saxons. A sense of justice and the ability to put one's self in the other man's place are the Anglo-Saxon qualities *par excellence*. One who is of pure British blood and who has been steeped in Anglo-Saxon traditions can not help looking with contempt upon parvenus who are *plus royalistes que le roi*. The American of German or Irish origin who speaks or works for Anglo-Saxon racial and cultural supremacy is a strange creature. "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem," is a sacred sentiment to the decent-minded man. The pride I have in my ancestry and my sense of partnership in English history and traditions enable me to respect others for thinking of other countries as I think of England. Insisting that they foul their own nests is a sad test for recruits to Anglo-Saxon solidarity. Americans who maintain that it is our duty as good citizens of the United States to work for the material advancement of Great Britain because of kinship are appealing to group feeling, not national feeling, and are therefore as guilty of hyphenism as are the propagandists of other group partizanships.

The justification for advocating political coöperation among English-speaking peoples, if we are appealing to the sentiment of the American people, is, therefore, that this group of peoples is using its influence, in international relations, for the triumph of a new world order. The *sine qua non* of the rapprochement is harmony of ideals. Great Britain will be drawn to us, the self-governing dominions will be drawn to us, and we shall be drawn to Great Britain

and the self-governing dominions if and because we have common ideals. On both sides we need to discuss the claims of weaker nations courageously and endeavor to remedy shortcomings in following ideals; for this is the way to remove sources of friction and barriers to English-speaking solidarity.

In regard to Germany, Great Britain has acted admirably and is living up to her ideals of fair play and is not kicking the other fellow when he is down. The generous settlement of the Irish question is a great step forward to the establishment of good feeling among English-speaking countries. We must strive to make the association of English-speaking nations a committee for giving Anglo-Saxon liberties to the whole world. This thought came to me with peculiar force when I stood on the spot in the Moses Taylor Pyne estate where are buried those who fell in the battle of Princeton. On a bronze tablet are inscribed the words of Alfred Noyes:

“Here freedom stood by slaughtered friend and foe,
And, ere the wrath paled, or that sunset died,
Looked through the ages, then, with eyes aglow,
Laid them to wait that future, side by side.”

The “future, side by side” of English-speaking countries can mean only working for the spread of freedom. We shall not help each other to deny freedom to others, and if we did join in an Anglo-Saxon freebooting expedition across the world, we should quickly follow the law of pirates and be at each other’s throats.

But common idealism is not sufficient as cement and as motive power. In every human association interest is the corner-stone. Men coöperate in no undertaking in which the element of mutual advantage does not play the predominating rôle. Other factors are present, of course, and mutual interest may not be the exciting cause of entering into a common undertaking. But is not interest the tie

that binds, as well as the foundation upon which is built, human society? The three bases of solidarity among English-speaking peoples already suggested have in them the element of interest. The fourth basis of solidarity is the mutual discovery of tangible benefits accruing to all alike from coöperation in international affairs.

What are the interests we might have in common? Are they numerous and important enough to justify a close union among English-speaking countries? What particular interests would have to be sacrificed in order to further the common interests? Are the sacrifices possible? Is it worth while to make them? A study of world politics is necessary before we can answer these questions. But those who believe that the political and economic rapprochement of English-speaking peoples is a possibility that ought to be carefully considered will fail of appreciable results unless they realize the composite racial and cultural character of the American nation and unless they are willing to discuss new questions frankly and with detachment in the good old English fashion.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THE CONTINUATION CONFERENCES: FROM LONDON TO GENOA (1919-1922)

THE victors in the World War attempted to arrange terms of peace in a conference from which the vanquished were excluded. Because the victors were unable to compromise their divergent aspirations and foreign policies and were unwilling to arrange to enforce the peace by automatic military measures, this method of peace-making failed. Of the justice and wisdom of the Paris treaties there was room for an honest difference of opinion. Of their practicability no difference of opinion was possible. It was immediately recognized that the Paris conference had not accomplished its purpose, and there began a series of continuation conferences that followed one another in rapid succession for three years.

Before the Paris conference formally ended, the premiers, secretaries of foreign affairs, and ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Italy began to hold special meetings to discuss unfinished business and new problems as they arose. At the end of November, 1919, when the treaty of Versailles was not yet in operation and the League of Nations was not yet functioning, representatives of the three powers conferred in London on the Greek crisis, the Fiume situation, and the devolution of the Ottoman Empire. In January, 1920, the Italians conferred with the British in London and then with the British and French in Paris on the Adriatic problem. An agreement was reached, to which it was hoped the United States would assent. Although its details were kept secret, the agreement was announced as the final word of the three powers

on the Fiume and Albanian questions, and was communicated to Serbia in the form of an ultimatum. The Serbians were summoned to consent to the status of a free city for Fiume, its frontiers touching on Italian Istria, with port and railway facilities placed under the League of Nations, with the alternative of seeing the three allies put into operation the secret treaty of London, which would have meant the extension of Italian sovereignty over the better part of Dalmatia. Parts of Albania were to be given to Serbia and Greece, and the rest of that country placed under an Italian mandate.

The United States protested vigorously against the policy of coercing Serbia and partitioning Albania. Italy and Serbia finally agreed upon a compromise frontier, and in the treaty of Rapallo, November 12, 1920, Serbia sacrificed Fiume to save Dalmatia. The Albanian arrangement was modified, chiefly because of the ability of the Albanians to protect their frontiers against Serbians and Greeks and to expel the Italians; and Albania was admitted to the League of Nations.¹

The San Remo conference, which opened on April 19, 1920, had as its agenda (1) the execution of the treaty of Versailles, (2) Russian affairs, and (3) the settlement of the terms of the Turkish treaty. These three questions, debated in secrecy, were neither envisaged nor decided on their merits; but they were debated at the same time, and each premier gave in on some point in order to have his way on others. Millerand won on Germany; Lloyd George on Turkey; and Nitti on Russia. All three premiers professed to be satisfied, and declared that they were in harmony. But San Remo was the beginning of a marked

¹ The Italian government had great difficulties throughout the year 1920 with an important and aggressive nationalist movement, which supported d'Annunzio and his legionaries, who continued to hold Fiume in defiance of the Entente governments and the League of Nations. The treaty of Rapallo was decided upon at a conference at Santa Margherita Ligure, which ended on November 10. Although the Italian parliament ratified the treaty by a substantial majority, d'Annunzio refused to accept it, and declared war on his own country. He was ousted by the Italian army on Christmas eve.

divergence in the policies of Great Britain and France in the Near East and towards Germany, and of the withdrawal of Italy from an active part in the Near East and from supporting France against Germany. Nitti resigned, failed in an attempt to form a new cabinet, and was succeeded on June 9 by the veteran Giolitti, who announced that the object of his foreign policy would be "to insure definite and complete peace for Italy and the whole of Europe, in order to achieve which we must, without delay, establish friendly relations with all other peoples, and, without restrictions, resume normal relations even with the Russian government."

The three powers agreed upon the terms of the treaty which the Constantinople Turks later signed at Sèvres,¹ and divided the mandates, Syria and Cilicia going to France, Adalia and Rhodes to Italy, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, and Palestine to Great Britain. France and Italy agreed to let Great Britain guard the Straits, and thus virtually control the Constantinople region.

Lloyd George and Nitti had wanted the Germans to be invited to San Remo, and bitterly opposed the intention of France to use the indemnity to prevent the economic rehabilitation of central Europe. But, as Millerand had given in on Lloyd George's Near Eastern claims and on Nitti's demand for a free hand to reopen trade relations with Russia, he was able to secure the pledge of his colleagues that no revision of the treaty was contemplated and that France would be supported in insisting upon a strict and literal fulfilment of the treaty of Versailles. A note was sent to Germany summoning her to disarm by destroying war materials and reducing her army, and to begin paying reparations by huge deliveries of coal. The German government was ordered to send delegates to Spa on May 25, ready to submit a plan for meeting the demands of the Allies.

¹ See pp. 431-433.

France, on the other hand, had not gained the support of Great Britain and Italy against Germany without concessions in another quarter than Turkey and Russia. The invitation to Spa was the first admission on the part of France of the advisability of discussing the fulfilment of treaty terms with Germany; the threatening note to Germany contained a clause assuring her that it was not the intention of the Allied powers to annex any portion of German territory and that "in cases where the German government was faced with unavoidable difficulties the Allied governments would not necessarily insist upon literal interpretation of the treaty terms"; and France agreed to refrain from again taking coercive measures without the consent and coöperation of the other two powers.

On April 24 a secret oil agreement was signed at San Remo by British and French delegates, providing for an equal division of interests and exploitation in Rumania and for a quarter interest to France in Mesopotamia and a quarter interest in Anglo-Persian oil piped to the Mediterranean through territory under French mandate in return for the provision by France of pipe lines and branch railways for the movement of British oil through her spheres of influence to the Mediterranean. On November 20 Secretary Colby protested against the San Remo agreement and declared that the United States refused to recognize the establishment of a British oil monopoly in Mesopotamia and other mandated territories. This protest was made after the British government had denied the existence of the monopoly and the United States government had found evidence to the contrary. Instead of acknowledging American rights, the British entered into a new secret convention with the French on December 23, 1920, confirming the previous agreement and excluding the United States and other powers from the possibility of working profitably ante-bellum concessions in Mesopo-

tamia, let alone of acquiring and developing further ones.¹

On April 29 Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the German ministers were to come to Spa prepared to make definite proposals concerning the method by which they intended to pay, how large an annuity they were able to give, and to explain how they were planning to complete the work of disarmament and bring the war criminals to trial. But it was patent that the Entente powers were not agreed themselves upon the amount of the indemnity they intended to ask and the proportionate division of the sums to be received from Germany. Every critic of the treaty of Versailles had pointed out the absurdity of attempting to get any considerable payment out of Germany until she knew just how much she was expected to pay. During the San Remo discussion Millerand had refused to agree upon the principle of fixing a lump sum. Consequently, a new conference was arranged at Hythe on May 15 to discuss the program for the Spa meeting. The French claim as preferential creditor in the distribution of the indemnity was admitted, and it was agreed that there should be no discussion of treaty revision at Spa. France succeeded in raising the amount of the indemnity from the British figure of 100,000,000,000 to 120,000,000,000 francs. The Hythe conference gave the Entente powers for the first time a financial program; but it provoked Poincaré, the president of the Reparations Commission, to resign his position on the ground that the premiers had usurped one of the most important functions assigned to the commission. The treaty of Versailles had provided that the Reparations Commission decide the total indemnity after two years of examination of German resources.

The attitude of the French in regard to the size of the indemnity and of the Italians and the Rumanians in regard to their share of it necessitated further preliminary con-

¹ The text of the two secret agreements is given by H. Woodhouse in *Current History* (New York, January, 1922), pages 653-656.

ferences at Boulogne and Brussels, where statesmen haggled like pawnbrokers and concessions were made that common sense knew threatened to defeat the hope of keeping alive the goose to lay golden eggs. Italy and Rumania refused to be satisfied with claims to indemnity against the bankrupt Hapsburg empire. Italy held out for 20 per cent. of the German indemnity, and agreed at Brussels to admit the French lump sum of 150,000,000,000 francs only when her delegates were solemnly promised a higher proportion of the indemnity than had been allotted them in earlier conferences.¹

The Spa conference opened on July 5, and marked the abandonment of the consistent policy of the victors since the armistice of treating with Germany only by written notes ending in peremptory threats of force. For the first time German statesmen were able to discuss questions orally. The conference lasted eleven days, and ended in an agreement that added to the obligations Germany had assumed at Versailles. Germany bound herself under penalties to deliver two million tons of coal per month, to hand over live stock to the victors, to proceed to the punishment of war criminals, and to insist upon the surrender of arms in the hands of civilians and withdraw arms from the security police. By January 1, 1921, the army was to be reduced to the figure stipulated in the treaty of Versailles. On the other hand, the Allies agreed to lend Germany large sums to build up her disorganized industries. France was skeptical of the results of the agreement, but Lloyd George declared that the road from Spa was the road to reality.

While the Spa conference was in session news came of

¹At Spa, before going into the conference with Germany, the powers finally agreed upon the following distribution of the indemnity annuities: France, 52 per cent.; Great Britain, 22; Italy, 10; Belgium, 8; Serbia, 5; all the rest, 3. Belgium was also permitted to transfer her entire war debt to Germany, and her priority was recognized on the first 2,000,000,000 gold marks. But the conferees were still at loggerheads over the amount of the indemnity, and it was decided to let this run over until a later date. The treaty gave until May 1, 1921—there was still a year of grace!

the collapse of the Polish campaign against soviet Russia, and during the summer conferences were held at Lympe and Hythe to decide upon the policy of the Entente towards Poland and Russia. It was an embarrassing situation; for France was strongly backing Poland, and yet the British sense of fairness could not but react against flagrantly adopting two weights and two measures in dealing with Poland and Russia. There had been no intervention in favor of Russia when the Polish armies went far beyond the line set by the Supreme Council. Could the Allies stultify themselves by calling upon Russia to halt when the Poles were losing? Was it to be "heads I win, tails you lose"? At Hythe, despite the urging of Marshal Foch, it was decided to help Poland with munitions but not to send Allied troops to Warsaw. At Lympe Lloyd George persuaded the Allies to agree that if Poland accepted the terms of soviet Russia they would not intervene to prevent or upset the arrangement. Only if Russia insisted upon terms "not consistent with the existence of Poland as a free nation" were the Allies to assist Poland. But not even then would troops be sent. Aid would be given in equipment and military advice, by naval pressure, by international economic boycott, and by sending supplies to General Wrangel, who was leading a counter-revolutionary movement in south Russia. Great Britain and France could not see alike on this question. The British government was at the time negotiating a trade agreement with Russia. When the fortune of arms turned, and Poles drove back the Bolsheviks, the French, without consulting their allies, recognized General Wrangel as a belligerent, and thus gave the Russians one more reason to hate their former ally.

On November 11 the French and British governments announced a new plan for settling the amount and method of collection of the German indemnity—a plan that would allow the Reparations Commission to play, figuratively at least, the rôle assigned to it by the treaty of Versailles.

The commission was to choose experts who were to meet at Brussels to hear representatives of the German government and then report to the commission; members of the German cabinet were to confer with the Allied premiers at Geneva when the Reparations Commission should have acted upon the Brussels report; and then in a final session at Paris the Reparations Commission would consider the Brussels and Geneva recommendations, and fix a lump sum for the Germans to pay and a sliding scale of the annuities.

The Brussels conference (December 16-21), being confined to experts, was successful. The Allied delegates were impressed with Germany's intention to do the best she could, and recommended that she be allowed 3,000,000,000 gold marks of credits for food and about the same for raw materials. Upon the basis of credits to make possible the resumption of German production and of 100,000,000,000 gold marks as the total indemnity, the Allied experts reported that the problem of paying the indemnity was capable of solution.

But political considerations again entered into the situation. The French press recalled that when the British and French premiers were discussing how aid was to be given to Poland at Lympe the previous summer, Lloyd George, in consideration of Marshal Foch withdrawing his demand for troops to aid the Poles, had consented to make a joint declaration to the effect that "the suffering and economic ruin resulting from the war should not be borne by the nations who did not cause it." The French now insisted that the British make good their frequently reiterated promises to make Germany pay. A new conference opened in Paris on January 24, 1921, which revealed to the world the hopeless divergence between the French and British points of view.

In the discussion of disarmament Foch and others declared that Germany had failed to fulfil the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty, and that the danger was

so great that France would be justified, as a military precaution alone, in occupying the Ruhr Valley. Lloyd George answered that the French fears were not justified. France demanded that the indemnity be fixed at 400,000,000,000 gold marks. Lloyd George answered that Germany could not pay this amount. M. Doumer contradicted the British premier, explaining that it was reasonable to expect 17,000,000,000 francs per annum from German exports, of which 12,000,000,000 could be taken by the Reparations Commission. Lloyd George said that this calculation was absurd, because it ignored the factor of raw materials essential for manufactures. How could Germany pay for her raw materials, coal, labor, etc., on the basis of retaining five billions out of seventeen billions? The Italians stood with the British.

On January 27 ex-Premier Millerand, who had now become president of France, intervened to end the deadlock, and the plan of the Boulogne conference was substituted as the basis of discussion which provided for an indemnity of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, which, with interest, would make a lump sum of 250,000,000,000 gold marks in annuities. It was decided that Germany should pay in forty-two annual instalments 226,000,000,000 gold marks, and for the same period an annual tax of 12 per cent. on her exports. If these conditions were not fulfilled, the Allies should have the right to seize German customs, impose taxes on the Rhineland and military penalties, and exercise financial control over Germany at the first default. But as the treaty had set thirty years as the limit of Germany's servitude, and this plan provided for twelve additional years, it was necessary to secure Germany's consent. The Berlin government was ordered to send experts to renew the Brussels discussions on the basis of the Paris agreement, and to be ready to meet the Allies in London on February 28.

The London conference failed to arrive at any agree-

ment, whereupon the Entente powers and Belgium threatened to levy an import tax of 50 per cent. on German goods entering their countries, and to force Germany to pay the tax, which would be pooled and divided as indemnity. Dr. Simons then told the Entente statesmen that such a tax would mean either that the German exporters would add this amount to their price and the consumers eventually pay it, or that German trade would go to the wall. Despite the announcement of the Allies that they would collect the customs tariffs in the Rhineland and of the French government that the Ruhr coal region would be seized if the German government did not consent to the Paris decision and pay down 12,000,000,000 gold marks on or before May 1st, the final German answer was refusal. The delegates left the London conference with the whole question still up in the air.

At the last moment, yielding to an ultimatum as she had done in signing the treaty, Germany prevented the occupation of the Ruhr Valley by agreeing on May 11 to pay the indemnity, and the initial sums stipulated were transferred to the credit of the Reparations Commission.

But in the summer the League Council, which met at San Sebastian from July 30 to August 5, felt that economic conditions in Europe, and in fact throughout the world, were growing worse, and that some form of international coöperation was imperative. A financial conference was called to meet at Brussels on September 24, to which invitations were sent to every nation except Turkey and Russia. Delegates from thirty-six countries met under the presidency of ex-President Ador of Switzerland. An unofficial American delegate explained that the United States could not participate in the conference, and would not be able, in fact, to take active steps to aid European rehabilitation until old scores were marked off and a spirit of solidarity was developed. The most important results of the Brussels conference were the revelation of the fact

that the Paris treaties were largely responsible for the economic and financial chaos, and the announcement by M. ter Meulen, of Holland, of a practicable plan for aiding countries on the verge of collapse. He proposed to establish in these countries a reservoir of collateral to be drawn upon if necessary to cover credits for imports, under the supervision of a commission of financial experts appointed by the League of Nations. The commission would assess the value of the collateral offered, and the government of the borrower's country would issue bonds, secured by the collateral, and running for from five to ten years, with interest. The commission and the governments would thus arrange credits for private individuals.

Believing that, while the United States should not become involved in European political questions, it was still incumbent upon us to lead in restoring the world to normal conditions, President Harding, shortly after his inauguration, invited nine powers to discuss the limitation of armaments and the problems of the Pacific at a conference to assemble in Washington on November 12, 1921. The agenda of the Washington conference excluded the questions uppermost in the minds of Europeans. But the American government believed that if a start were made in improving international relations by the limitation of naval armaments and by ending for a time the possibility of war arising from causes in the Far East, further conferences would deal with land armaments and other sources of international friction. The Washington conference ended on February 6, 1922, with treaties and agreements to its credit that were a distinct step forward.¹

In the meantime, however, the Entente powers had to continue discussing European questions. Premiers Lloyd George and Briand met in London on December 21, 1921, to go over the whole field of German disarmament, reparations, and the economic restoration of Europe. A week

¹See Chapter XLIX.

later, at a meeting of the French and British financiers in Paris, a corporation was organized to finance the restoration of Europe, to whose capital the United States and Germany were to be invited to subscribe equally with Great Britain and France.

On January 6, 1922, the Entente premiers, the Reparations Commission, and a big delegation of experts met at Cannes. The Germans were asked to come to Paris, and hold themselves in readiness to be called at Cannes if needed. Lloyd George and Briand negotiated a defensive alliance between Great Britain and France, the text of which had hardly been agreed upon when Briand was called back to Paris to meet opposition in the Chamber of Deputies that led to his resignation. The Reparations Commission agreed to a provisional delay in indemnity payments, without considering Germany in default, contingent upon the payment of 31,000,000 gold marks every ten days. Although they refused to recognize the fact officially, the members of the commission realized that the German government had come to the end of its credits, and could not be expected to pay the annuities imposed by the ultimatum of May, 1921.¹ Upon the suggestion of Italy, it was agreed that a general conference should be called to meet at Genoa in the first week of March, "of an economic and financial nature, of all the European powers, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Russia included." The opening date, at the request of France, was postponed until April 10. The United States was also invited, but declined to participate on the ground that the conference would inevitably deal with the internal political problems of Europe, in the solution of which the United States did not propose to become involved.

The text of the Anglo-French treaty provided that in

¹Walter Rathenau, who had shown more willingness than most German statesmen to meet the demands of the Entente, declared that Germany could pay 500,000,000 gold marks in cash and 1,000,000,000 in kind annually, but not more. This amount fell far short of the Entente figures.

case of "direct and unprovoked aggression against the territory of France by Germany" the alliance would become operative; that Great Britain would act in concert with France to maintain the permanent neutralization of the Rhineland, and also to prevent Germany from taking military, naval, or aërial measures incompatible with the treaty of Versailles. The treaty was to run for ten years, but did not bind any of the dominions of the British Empire. The alliance was bitterly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies, after the formation of a new ministry under former President Poincaré, and it was amended to make the guaranty reciprocal. It was argued in the Chamber that the alliance should have bound Great Britain definitely to the French policy in Poland and to the strict execution of all the terms of the treaty of Versailles.

France went to Genoa with the stipulation, as to previous conferences, that the revision of the treaty of Versailles should not be discussed, and that there should be no recognition of soviet Russia that did not provide for the acknowledgment of the foreign debt of czarist Russia by her new rulers.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS (1921-1922)

I WAS finding that putting down one's impressions of the permanent results of the Washington conference was no easy task when my twelve-year-old burst into the room. "I want you to read my history paper," she said. "The teacher gave it back for me to correct." A distracted eye wandered down the sheets where events in medieval history were summed up with disconcerting conciseness, and suddenly fell upon this statement: "The idea was a good one, but they tried to do it in a crazy way." This seemed to be a whole answer. "What was the question, Christine?" I asked. "Oh, they wanted to know all about the crusades."

Centuries from now school-children may dismiss the American crusade for limitation of armaments in one illuminating sentence. They will have the advantage of perspective and of being unaffected by the momentous event. But what can we say of the publicists and the statesmen of 1922 who make use of Christine's terseness and scorn to consign to oblivion the Washington conference? Was it an episode between San Remo and Cannes, between Spa and Genoa? Was it no more than the same old gang in a new place, filled with the same old notions and going through the same old motions? None has denied that the idea was a good one; but did anything come of it? Will history say that the Washington conference accomplished the objects for which it was called? The well-being of the present generation throughout the world depends so completely upon a long period of peace that we can not afford

to wait for the proper perspective in discussing and attempting to estimate the results of the Washington conference.

In the first place, we note an immediate and unqualified step forward in bettering international relations; for public opinion in the most heavily armed countries admits, in regard to the proposal to limit armaments, that "the idea is a good one." The march of human progress is never really interrupted. We keep moving, most of the time at snail's pace; but occasionally there is a jump. It is curious that, while war seems to breed hatred and bitterness, even among allies, the inherent good-will of mankind, inhibited during the conflict, shows itself in overflowing measure afterwards. Politicians, striving to retain their leadership by keeping alive war passions, are out of tune with the sentiment of the people, and if they do not change their attitude they are discarded. Since the World War fishing in troubled waters has become a dangerous sport, and only superficial observers believe that statesmen who deliberately build upon the foundation of hatred and suspicion of their nation towards other nations are not riding for a fall.

The Paris conference assumed the permanence of certain factors in the world situation that were transient: hatred of Germany; military impotence of Germany; lack of dependence of German industries upon private initiative; solidarity of interests among "the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers"; willingness of the victorious peoples to give their lives and money to pursue throughout the world policies similar to those that Germany had pursued. Upon these false assumptions were based the treaty of Versailles and the four other treaties; and the original conception of the League of Nations was modified under their influence. But it was soon discovered that the peoples who had fought through years, sustained by the idea that they could make the world a decent place to live in, sincerely wanted what they had fought for. They refused

to believe that there is no substitute for force, and they were apathetic over the spoils of the war. The statesmen thought, or at all events said, that this was due to war weariness and burdens of taxation. But they were wrong. They did not understand, nor could they break, the spell that their own war speeches had cast. Had they not told the Germans that right would triumph over might? Now that Germany was vanquished, were not the victors in a position to cut down on might and let right have an innings?

During the World War the peoples of western Europe and America had come to look upon Germany and her war lord as responsible for the great evils in international relations: violating treaties; bullying weak nations; denying freedom to subject peoples; initiating the attempt to partition China; seeking colonial aggrandizement at the expense of other powers; using unfair methods in international commerce and the carrying trade; and leading the way in competitive naval and land armaments. The fact or degree of Germany's responsibility for these evils does not enter into the question. What matters is that hundreds of millions were brought by a skilful propaganda to condemn Germany because of them. The propagandists had in mind, in giving an excellent education in international affairs, the condemnation of Germany; and they probably did not see that the permanent result of calling attention to the evils would be the condemnation of the evils themselves.

The men who imposed upon Germany and her associates terms of peace that perpetuated the old causes for wars and created new ones undoubtedly believed that they were expressing the just resentment, and defending and advancing the interests, of their respective peoples. Territories and indemnities and economic advantages they exacted from the defeated nations on the triple plea of punishments, reparations, and guaranties. But they bound over

their enemies to keep the peace without promising to keep the peace themselves. On September 27, 1918, President Wilson summed up the case of the people *versus* their leaders in words to the prophetic character of which his own fate bears tragic witness:

“It is the peculiarity of this great war that, while statesmen seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background; and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a people’s war, not a statesmen’s. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken. . . . The world does not want terms of peace; it wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.”

At Paris the Entente statesmen spoke for their own nations, and had in mind a European settlement; and when problems outside Europe were before them, the solutions they proposed were suggested by the sole consideration of how certain European nations were to benefit by them. This is why Japanese public opinion was indifferent to the Paris negotiations and settlements, and why American public opinion received without enthusiasm the results of the Paris deliberations, repudiated the treaties, and refused to join the League of Nations. Had we not entered what we thought was a world war in order to secure a world peace? Mr. Harding and his advisers did not misinterpret the sentiment of the American people. The willingness to coöper-

ate with the rest of the world was not less after November 2, 1920, than before. The call to the Washington conference and the specific proposals of Secretary Hughes for the limitation of naval armaments expressed the eagerness of the United States to make a fresh effort to establish a durable world peace.

President Harding knew how to "follow the clarified common thought" better than President Wilson did. Ideology does not long hold "the thought of the mass of men." It is too prolific, too complicated, and deals too much with the unknown and the untried. A definite plan for attaining a concrete object will receive the indorsement of public opinion and can be put to trial with a prospect of success; but the sponsorship of a mass of ideas does not appeal to a mass of men. When I came to the United States in the summer of 1919 to follow the treaty fight at Washington, I put before my young son for his first meal in New York dishes dear to the American heart. He refused to eat most of them, and my astonishment was greatest when he left untouched his watermelon. "It's good, Lloyd," I urged; "do try to eat it." He shook his head with finality. "There is too much of it," he said. So thought the American people about the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, and so, on sober second thought, thought they about Mr. Wilson's fourteen points and subsequent discourses.

The invitation to the Washington conference was accompanied by the proposed agenda: (1) limitation of armaments and (2) problems arising from the changes in the balance of power in the Pacific and the Asiatic countries bordering on the Pacific. It was intimated in diplomatic correspondence, and also in public statements, that the practicable basis of discussion would be the limitation of the naval armaments of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, and that it was for this reason that the conference had to deal with problems of the Pacific and of

China. The fact that there was a Washington conference showed that President Harding and his associates believed that the Paris conference had failed to create the conditions and the machinery that would lead to the abandonment of competitive armaments. It proved, too, that the statesmen of the nations associated with us in the war were convinced that the United States was an indispensable factor in world politics, and that public opinion in Entente countries demanded the acceptance of the American offer to make an effort for disarmament outside the League of Nations.

Both in his introductory speech on November 12 and in his closing speech on February 6, however, President Harding declared that the transcendent objects of the conference were to pronounce war "utterly futile" and to "challenge the sanity of competitive preparation for each other's destruction." The method of achieving this was to be "a world opinion made ready to grant justice precisely as it exacts it." And he added: "Justice is better served in conferences of peace than in conflicts at arms." Here we have the key-note of what the Washington conference attempted to establish as a new guiding principle in international relations. Because experience demonstrated the "folly" of the solution of international differences of opinion by arms and the "utter futility" of war, diplomacy should adopt the preventive measure of settling disputes in conferences among the interested powers. But a conference must be "ready to grant justice precisely as it exacts it."¹

While admitting that "the idea was a good one," correspondents and editorial writers have by no means agreed that the conference was a success. The hypercritical and the cynical and the satirical have advanced

¹The Harding program at the Washington conference demanded justice for China, for example, as a means of compounding the rivalry among the powers over China.

different grounds on which to affirm that the conference did not get beyond the point of agreeing that the limitation of armaments is a good idea. We are told that the experts of the leading naval powers recognized that the day of capital ships has passed, and that limitation of capital ships, even though it meant scrapping new ships, would have no serious effect upon the naval strength of the powers concerned. At the same time, the governments were saved the embarrassment of finding large sums of money to build implements of war of whose efficacy they were in doubt. When it came to smaller craft, which may again come into favor because they can more easily evade the torpedoes of submarines and the bombs of airplanes, there was no agreement. And how can we talk about a fixed ratio of naval strength when we have no means of checking up on one another in the construction of airplanes and submarines whose value in naval warfare is still x ? As for poison gases and rules of maritime warfare, the shades of the two Hague conferences and the declaration of London haunt us. And see how pleased the Chinese are over the four-power treaty! The agreements among the powers concerning Morocco, Persia, Siam, Korea, Egypt, and China have always started out with a preamble about the maintenance of "independence and integrity."

But there is a radical difference between the Washington conference and the international assemblies with which the comparisons are made. Are we not justified in entertaining the reasonable hope that the Washington conference, after many disappointments, was the beginning of a new era in international relations?

The Hague conferences were held at a time when governments had academic notions, and public opinion no notions at all, about the horrors, the loss of life, the financial burden, the destruction of values, and the economic disasters of twentieth-century warfare. We had not yet bowed down ourselves to and served our Frankensteins in heaven

above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. At Paris in 1919 the war was still too close upon us for any other thought to prevail than that of punishing our enemies, reimbursing ourselves for our losses, and rewarding ourselves for having won the war. When reminded that we had claimed to be fighting a war to end war, we were ready to bring this great object into harmony with the gratification of our resentment and of our desire for spoils by asserting that peace would be secure when the vanquished (and those who contemplated their fate) learned that war did not pay.

During the three years between the collapse of Germany and the opening of the Washington conference the victors also learned that war did not pay, that world peace could not be built upon punitive treaties, and that the elimination of Germany from world politics and her disarmament did not do away with international crises arising from imperialistic ambitions and with competitive armaments. This was no surprise to statesmen of the old school; they had not expected the game to stop when Germany dropped out. But it was a surprise to the "masses of men." Public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, in the British dominions, and in Japan demanded that an honest trial be made of the conference idea to settle disputes and to put an end to competitive armaments. The conviction behind this demand made itself felt at Washington throughout the conference. Day after day there rang in the ears of the delegates the fiat of public opinion in the form of a judgment, a plea, and a warning. The "clarified common thought" was this:

"We now know that war is too horrible to be considered soberly and deliberately prepared for.

"Another war may mean the end of civilization.

"Do not count on us to give our lives and our money to settle international disputes by fighting.

"The defeat of Germany and the terms of peace imposed upon her and her allies have not removed the old causes of war.

"Now, you statesmen do something about it; you will have to succeed by conference, or we shall turn to other leaders."

When we realize that the conferees at Washington acted under the impulsion of public opinion, unique in its enlightenment and its determination, we see how absurd is the attempt of critics to throw cold water upon this conference by invoking the failures of previous conferences. I went to Washington in a skeptical frame of mind, and, after the initial impression of the simple ceremony at Arlington and of the dramatic opening session of the conference wore off, my skepticism returned. I had attended so many conferences where noble declarations of purpose had proved irrelevant to the business in hand or had become denatured in the bitter conflict of divergent ambitions that I lost two good months in trying to satisfy myself that I had been right in predicting failure. But the statesmen did not run true to form! Confronted by Secretary Hughes with the principle of compromise in renunciation, the time-honored principle of compromise in aggrandizement was abandoned. Then it dawned upon me that a new era in international relations had begun. The World War had been a cataclysm, and mankind had learned a lesson. Once more in a great crisis the masses of men proved to be the masters of men.

Will the new era materialize? Many good things get a start and somehow are nipped in the bud. Few converted in revivals stick; and when the devil is sick, becoming a monk is not an unattractive suggestion. The memory of the horrors of the war will grow dim; a new generation of potential fighting-men will be ready to try its hand at the fascinating and glorious game of its fathers; and the money

squandered between 1914 and 1922 will be paid off or written off. "Men will fight," you are sententiously reminded, "and you can't change human nature. Look at the children in your own nursery, and the next time they all set up a yell at once, just use common sense, and admit that nations are like children. If they have nothing to fight about, they will invent reasons; and if they have no weapons, they will make them."

This is the argument of the man who is half baked in his knowledge of both history and human nature, and it is precisely because he is allowed to get away with fallacious half-truths that public opinion in civilized countries did not long ago put an end to the caveman and outlaw conception of international relations. In the forests of Germany our ancestors used to lie in wait for one another with stone axes, and every man carried his with him. The population did not increase fast. But the more we perfected our weapons the less ready we were to use them. We combined, forming communities and nations, so that we would not have to be thinking about our security all the time, but could delegate the fighting business to those who liked that sort of thing. Instead of being a succession of wars and a constant appeal to force, the progress of civilization is the steady development of the substitution of reason for force in human relationships. The history of our own country strikingly illustrates the determination of men to make security of life and property depend upon the reign of law and not upon the agility of the individual with his six-shooter. The wild west disappeared as soon as men by common consent were organized "to grant justice precisely as they exacted it."

The scramble of European nations for world markets was prompted by a miraculous development of industries and means of transportation. When the European peoples began to think that security and prosperity were contin-

gent upon beating the other fellow to it all over the world, and that the only means of doing this was the use of superior force against Asiatic and African peoples and also against one another, primitive human nature reasserted itself. Colonial rivalry was the prelude to the *danse macabre* of the bayonet-pierced, the bullet-ridden, the shell-torn, the gassed, and the influenza- and famine-stricken from Flanders to the steppes of Russia. Conscription, airplanes, submarines, and long-range guns brought the world back to the Stone Age: each man was lying in wait for his neighbor.

A French journalist shook his head when he saw President Harding leading his people in the Lord's Prayer at Arlington Cemetery. "*C'est toujours la même chose! Votre Harding est un pasteur protestant comme l'autre.*" Within twenty-four hours he shook his head again at Memorial Hall, and added Hughes to his list of Protestant pastors who seemed to be in charge of American foreign policy. Mr. Harding, appealing to God, put himself in Mr. Wilson's class; while Mr. Hughes, calmly offering to scrap battle-ships and asking the other powers to follow suit, outwilsoned Wilson and outhardened Harding. My French colleague had written glowing editorials before the conference predicting a deadlock between the United States and Great Britain on the naval question and between the United States and Japan on the Chinese question. France, he pointed out, would play the profitable Bismarckian rôle of honest broker. Go-between and arbiter, France would help the three powers in turn to advance their particular interests, and as a reward they would all agree to let France have what she wanted. Wilson had proved an impossible man to deal with, for he had honestly striven for peace and not for the aggrandizement of the United States. It was a shock to find Harding and Hughes taking it for granted that the other powers had come to Washington to

act together for the common weal. A new spirit must prevail and a new language must be learned. A new spirit *did* prevail and a new language *was* learned.¹

It was hard for statesmen trained to measure success by aggrandizement to think of success in the terms of renunciation. The first steps were falteringly and reluctantly taken. But the fact remains that they were taken. The 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 ratio for capital ships agreed upon among the naval powers, which puts an end for ten years to competitive naval construction and entails the scrapping of ships already launched or building, is a precedent of inestimable value, as is the surrender of leases in China. Avaunt the critics who tell us that these decisions mean nothing or who belittle their importance by pointing out that they do not go far enough! Each figure is the result of a genuine sacrifice on the part of the power that accepted it, a sacrifice of a kind that has never before been willingly made in an international conference. The United States swallowed her pride when she renounced the largest navy in the world, which was within her grasp; Great Britain when she renounced the supremacy of the sea, which she had held for centuries; Japan when she renounced the

¹None of the treaties went as far as had been hoped; but, despite the necessity for constant compromise, each one established a new principle in international relations and opened the way for further negotiations. The treaties recommended by the Washington conference were:

(1) A five-power treaty involving the scrapping of sixty-eight capital ships, the restriction of the tonnage of navies and of fortification in the Far East, and a ten-year naval holiday.

(2) A five-power treaty outlawing the use of submarines as an agency of attack on merchant-ships and prohibiting the use of poison gas.

(3) A nine-power treaty stabilizing the conditions in the Far East and reiterating the open-door principle in regard to China.

(4) A nine-power treaty making a beginning of the division of Chinese customs, abolishing foreign post-offices, and releasing the Chinese government from the obligation to keep funds lying idle in foreign banks.

(5) A four-power treaty binding the principal Pacific powers to respect one another's territory in the Pacific and to confer when the peace of the Pacific is threatened (abrogating the existing Anglo-Japanese treaty).

(6) Agreement between Japan and China for the restoration of the German lease in Shantung, coupled with declaration of the willingness of Great Britain to renounce the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei and of France to renounce the lease of Kwang-Chau-Wan.

completion of a ship-building program that the nation had been taught to believe was indispensable to its dignity and security; France when she renounced the privilege of ever attempting to regain the glory that was hers before Trafalgar; and Italy when she renounced making a bid for the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean, which was a reasonable and feasible hope. It is beside the mark to explain these renunciations by stating that they represent the acknowledgment of an inevitable situation on the part of all the powers except the United States. The statesmen were guided by realities and not by *force majeure*. Foremost among these realities were the impossibility of increasing taxation and the improbability of a new war benefiting any one. Pride yielded to common sense because all the powers were willing to sacrifice.

If we were able to give reasons for believing that the Washington decisions will not serve as precedents and to assert that the Washington conference was an isolated international gathering, we should be justified in regarding it as a triumph of the English-speaking peoples in a conspiracy to get an international acknowledgment of their world-wide hegemony and therefore be quit of the burden of having to hold by force what they had gained by force. And we should be justified in suspecting that Japan will interpret the agreements as giving her a free hand in Siberia and in northern and central China. But did not President Harding declare that the decisions were precedents and that the Washington conference was the beginning of a new method of settling international disputes? Mr. Harding still has three years, and probably seven, in an office that gives him the greatest power in the world as an initiator of plans for international undertakings. When other questions—perhaps some of the unsolved questions of Washington—become acute and disturb the relations between powers, will not the matters at issue be threshed out in a conference among all the powers affected

by them? If we give reason a chance, reason will prevail over force.

Whether the naval experts are in favor of capital ships or suggest the multiplication of other means of defense and offense, the scrapping of ships already built and the naval holiday of ten years will make exceedingly difficult the resumption of naval construction. Unless the next ten years fail to create "a world opinion made ready to grant justice precisely as it exacts it," public opinion will demand the renewal of an agreement that saves so much money, and, having gotten out of the habit of voting huge naval budgets, parliaments will fight shy of the responsibilities involved in abandoning the five-power treaty. On the other hand, if this world opinion is created, the limitation of naval armaments will be followed rapidly by the limitation of land armaments.

But the conditional clause is all-important. The use of force to maintain law and order meets with universal approval, and society has developed the unconscious instinct of siding with the agents of law and order. Moving-picture audiences may laugh at policemen, but if you have ever been arrested you know how instinctively hostile to the prisoner is the crowd. But the application of force is occasional and incidental in well ordered society, and the majesty of the law does not depend upon the numbers of those who enforce it and the quality of their weapons. Mass resistance of the law rarely, if ever, occurs, except when there has been an abuse of force. If those who hold in their hands power and wealth act fairly and decently, they do not need to arm to the teeth to make secure from attack their persons and their possessions. And even if they are unfair and indecent, they can go pretty far before some one up and whacks them.

Why do international relations have to be different from internal relations? Beyond a police force to deal with malefactors, we provide no means for making secure our

lives and possessions. We presume that the people we meet are not thugs. Although thugs exist, we do not arm ourselves when we go for a walk, and few of us have fire-arms in our homes. Why do nations have to think of one another as thugs and provide means of defense accordingly? We have come to this sorry pass in international relations because we have been like dogs fighting over bones or pigs with both feet in the trough, unable to drink all the swill ourselves but with teeth sharp enough to keep other pigs out. The study of world politics proves that the amazing development of land armies by conscription and of competitive naval construction has followed the overseas expansion of Europe.

To have and to hold was the motto of European diplomacy that led the way to Armageddon. Titles were gained by force and maintained by force. One war-ship, landing a few sailors or marines, staked out a title. The deed was written and recorded by a punitive expedition. The property was developed by an army, which became a permanent garrison, and whose means of communication with the home-land had to be guarded by an ever-increasing fleet. Is it possible for the European powers, the United States, and Japan to continue to hold by any other means than force what was won by force? And does not history teach us that every colonial power, after it has made a colony or a protectorate by "pacifying" and extending its administrative control over a weaker and therefore supposedly inferior people, has been apprehensive of hostile intentions on the part of other colonial powers?

The abandonment of predatory foreign policies, well begun by the renunciation of leases in China, is a prerequisite to permanent limitation of armaments. This will certainly be accomplished if the people can be made to see that economic imperialism has not paid expenses, and that large armies and navies never have had *raison d'être* except as instruments of aggression. When the governments

of the great powers make up their minds to use the same standards of conduct in dealing with other peoples that they have long used in dealing with their own people, all the world can let everything go in land and naval armaments beyond the police forces. The way initiated at Washington was a "crazy way" of working towards world peace only if the reign of law and order throughout the world is not what twentieth-century civilization is striving for.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A COMPLETE list of source and secondary materials for the study of world politics would make a volume in itself. What I believed to be a brief list, with brief comments, was compiled; but I find myself compelled to prune it down. Consequently, I have limited my bibliography to books that are actually on the shelves of my own library, and to which I have referred in writing this Introduction to World Politics. Not all of the books that were consulted are listed, but only those which it is believed will be of assistance to the general mass of students in this field. Original sources—official parliamentary papers and collections of documents and correspondence issued, or whose publication has been authorized, by the various governments—are omitted.

WORKING MATERIALS

For maps I use *The Times Survey Atlas and Gazetteer of the World* (London, 1921), which is the most complete atlas, both as to maps and as to index of names, that has yet been published. It contains a transparent indexing frame, which enables one to put his finger immediately upon any of the hundred squares into which each page is divided for reference. Occasionally I find it necessary to refer to E. Ambrosius, *Andrees Allgemeiner Handatlas* (Leipzig, 1914), whose excellent *Namenverzeichnis* is in a very handy separate volume. The best small atlas published since the war is *Putnam's Handy Volume Atlas of the World* (New York, 1921), which contains the latest census figures of population, and indicates on the maps the changes made by the treaties of 1919 and 1920.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BEFORE 1878

(Chapters 1, 2, 3)

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THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION

(Chapters 3, 6, 7, 13, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 39, 40, 48)

The two outstanding reference volumes are: E. Driault, *La Question d'Orient* (Paris, 1914), and J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford, 1917). G. Yakchitch, *L'Europe et la Résurrection de la Serbie: 1804-1834* (Paris, 1917), gives an excellent account of how Europe was drawn into the Balkan difficulties; and Sir T. H. Holdich, *Boundaries in Europe and the Near East* (London, 1918), has summed up the territorial developments and

changes. The Near Eastern question is covered in detail by Debidour, and more summarily by Seignobos and the American textbook writers cited above. On particular phases of the question, among a host of volumes are worth singling out De Freycinet, *La Question d'Egypte* (Paris, 1905); D. G. Hogarth, *The Nearer East* (London, 1901); T. G. Djuvara, *Cent projets de Partage de la Turquie* (Paris, 1914); Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (London, 1917); H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future* (London, 1906); and R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London, 1917). Recent and present problems are treated by H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (New York, 1914); A. Mandelstam, *Le Sort de L'Empire Ottoman* (Lausanne, 1917); M. Jastrow, *The War and the Bagdad Railway* (Philadelphia, 1916); N. Buxton and C. L. Leese, *Balkan Problems and European Peace* (London, 1919); L. Maccas, *L'Hellénisme de l'Asia-Mineure* (Paris, 1919); P. Hibben, *Constantine I. and the Greek People* (New York, 1917); and H. A. Gibbons, *Venizelos* (in the Modern Statesmen Series, Boston, 1920). Three Balkan premiers have given personal testimony of recent events: I. E. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League* (London, 1915); E. Venizelos, *The Vindication of Greek National Policy: 1912-1917* (London, 1918), and T. Jonescu, *Origins of the War* (London, 1917), and *Some Personal Impressions* (New York, 1920).

THE FAR EASTERN QUESTION

(Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49)

The relations between Europe and the Far East are treated by Debidour and the other authorities given above, and the rôle of the different powers, including Japan and the United States, is discussed in the books listed under the foreign policy and colonial expansion of each of these powers. The outstanding work on the Far Eastern question is H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols. (London, 1918). T. F. Millard, *Our Eastern Question* (New York, 1916), and N. J. Bau, *The Foreign Relations of China* (New York, 1921), give the Chinese point of view. I have found of value K. S. Latourette, *The Development of China* (New York, 1918); and G. Maspero, *La Chine* (Paris, 1919). The last decade is summed up in B. L. Putnam Weale's *The Fight*

for the Republic in China (London, 1918). From the anti-imperialist point of view, the history of the last half-century is summarized and commented upon by H. M. Hyndman, *The Awakening of Asia* (London, 1919), and H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Asia* (New York, 1919). How China has tried to adapt herself to new conditions is explained in H. M. Vinacke's *Modern Constitutional Development in China* (Princeton, 1921).

FRENCH COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 4, 11, 15, 17, 43)

Singularly few books dealing specifically with French colonial expansion are accessible to the American reader. Reference must be made to chapters on the colonies in the various histories of France, especially A. Malet, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1916), and to the forthcoming volumes in the new French history now being published under the editorship of G. Hanotaux. There is a summary of the extension of the colonial empire under the Third Republic in W. S. Davis, *History of France* (Boston, 1919). O. Reclus, *Atlas de la Plus Grande France* (Paris, 1915), is useful, and the standard work is M. Dubois and A. Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale* (Paris, reissued at various dates). Care should be taken to secure the latest edition. I have not space to list the books that I have used for particular colonies. My own *The New Map of Africa* (New York, 1916) gives the development of the African colonies without much detail.

BRITISH COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 1, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 44, 47)

The indispensable work is C. P. Lucas, *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1922), with which ought to be read H. E. Egerton's brief and excellent introduction, *The Origin and Growth of Greater Britain* (Oxford, 1920), and his *Short History of British Colonial Policy* (5th ed., Oxford, 1919). I have used also W. H. Woodward, *A Short History of the Expansion of the British Empire: 1500-1911* (London, 1912); A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Howarth, *The Oxford Survey of the British Empire*, 12 vols. (Oxford, 1914); and J. P. Bulkeley, *The Brit-*

ish Empire: A Short History (Oxford, 1921). The most penetrating studies of colonial problems and imperial relations are: R. Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (London, 1905); and L. Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations* (London, 1916). Since 1911, *The Round Table*, published in London four times a year, has given the best critical commentary on events and tendencies within the British Empire. On particular phases, important works are: Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols. (London, 1908); Lord Milner, *England and Egypt* (London, 1904); Sir T. W. Holderness, *Peoples and Problems of India* (London, 1912); Lajpat Rai, *England's Debt to India* (New York, 1917); H. T. Turner, *The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth* (London, 1911); R. H. Brand, *The Union of South Africa* (London, 1909); A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, 3 vols. (London, 1912); B. Williams, *Cecil Rhodes* (London, 1921); General Smuts, *Speeches* (London, 1918); and P. S. Reinsch, *Colonial Government* (New York, 1902). S. Kennedy, *The Pan-Angles* (London, 1914), and A. G. Gardiner, *The Anglo-American Future* (New York, 1921), deal with the question discussed in Chapter XLVII.

RUSSIAN COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 32, 41)

F. H. Skrine, *The Expansion of Russia: 1815-1900* (Cambridge, 1904), and A. Krausse, *Russia in Asia: 1558-1899* (London, 1900), give the best and fullest accounts. The two monumental histories of Russia, however, should be consulted: A. N. Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie* (rev. ed., Paris, 1900), and A. Kleinschmidt, *Drei Jahrhunderte russischer Geschichte: 1598-1898* (Berlin, 1898), and the recent admirable short history: R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett, *Russia* (Oxford, 1918). Light on colonial policies is contained in *The Memoirs of Count Witte* (New York, 1921), trans. and ed. by A. Yarmolinsky; and in A. Iswolski's *Recollections of a Foreign Minister* (New York, 1921), trans. by C. L. Seeger. The Persian policy of Russia and the working out of the Anglo-Persian Agreement is given in W. M. Shuster's *The Strangling of Persia* (New York, 1912). The books cited under the Near East, the Far East, and Japanese expansion deal also with Russian colonial expansion and foreign policy.

GERMAN COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 7, 16, 17, 28)

The most comprehensive work is A. Zimmermann, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1914), but along with it should be read E. Tonnelat, *L'Expansion allemande hors d'Europe* (Paris, 1908), E. Lewin, *The Germans and Africa* (London, 1915), and A. F. Calvert, *The German African Empire* (London, 1916). As all the German colonies have changed hands, it is unnecessary to refer to specific works concerning their past status. But, as the question of German expansion was one that intimately affected the internal political growth and was as intimately the result of the internal economic growth of Germany since 1870, reference is advisable to: Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (rev. ed., London, 1916), trans. by M. A. Lewenz; P. Rohrbach, *German World Policies* (New York, 1915), trans. by E. von Mach; Count von Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik* (Berlin, 1915); C. Gauss, *The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances* (New York, 1915); K. Naumann, *Mitteleuropa* (Berlin, 1916); G. W. Prothero, *German Opinion and German Policy Before the War* (London, 1916). I have found illuminating: J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany: 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 1921); R. H. Fife, Jr., *The German Empire Between Two Wars* (New York, 1916); C. H. Herford, *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, 1915); K. Helfferich, *Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth: 1888-1913* (Berlin, 1915), and F. A. Ogg, *Economic Development of Modern Europe* (New York, 1917).

ITALIAN COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 19, 20, 25, 26, 36, 40)

The only satisfactory work I have found dealing with this subject is G. Assereto's *L'Italia e le sue Colonie* (Novara, 1913). There are special commercial and travel books on the Red Sea and Somaliland colonies, and an abundant literature has grown up on Tripoli. But one finds, even in Italian, singularly little about the military situation in the colonies, the past dealings of Italy with Abyssinia, and the attitude of Italy towards Tunisia, except what has been written for propaganda purposes.

JAPANESE COLONIAL EXPANSION

(Chapters 10, 11, 12, 28, 45, 47, 48, 49)

The facts of Japanese expansion are given fully in books dealing with the Far East and China, on European international relations, and on the conflicts between Russia and Japan. Count S. Okuma compiled a work called *Fifty Years of New Japan*, the English edition of which, in 2 vols., was edited by M. B. Huish (London, 1909). Since the incorporation of Korea in the empire there has been no special book, impartially written, on the Japanese colonies by a foreigner. The attitude of the Japanese people towards colonial expansion is given in K. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues* (New York, 1904); I. Nitobé, *The Japanese Nation* (New York, 1912); and K. Kawakami, *Japan in World Politics* (New York, 1917). W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan* (New York, 1916) and G. E. Uyebara, *The Political Development of Japan: 1867-1909* (London, 1910), give the background of Japanese expansion. The attitude of the United States is well described in P. J. Treat, *Japan and the United States: 1853-1921* (Boston, 1921). The best recent survey by a foreigner is A. S. Hershey, *Modern Japan* (New York, 1919), along with which should be read A. Gérard, *Ma Mission au Japon: 1907-1914* (Paris, 1919), and E. Hovelague, *Japon* (Paris, 1920). An invaluable study of Japan's position in world affairs is S. K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York, 1916).

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Chapters 29, 30, 31, 34, 46, 47, 49)

For reference, W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, 2 vols. (New York, 1916), is excellent, and beside it should be placed J. M. Mathews, *The Conduct of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1922), and J. B. Moore, *Principles of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1918). A. C. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, and J. H. Latané, *The United States as a World Power* (New York, 1907), were the pioneers in a new field that has not up to the present time been either exhaustively or comprehensively treated. On particular phases of American foreign policy we have: A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation* (Bos-

ton, 1916); A. T. Mahan, *Interest of the United States in the Sea Power* (New York, 1902); L. C. and P. F. Ford, *The Foreign Trade of the United States* (New York, 1920); E. N. Hurley, *The New Merchant Marine* (New York, 1920); J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (New York, 1920); and M. M. Kalaw, *Self-Government in the Philippine Islands* (New York, 1919) and *The Case for the Filipinos* (New York, 1916). Relations with Latin America have been brought into one volume by J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America* (New York, 1920), and with Japan by P. J. Treat, *Japan and the United States* (Boston, 1921). E. S. Corwin has written illuminatingly on *The President's Control of Foreign Relations* (Princeton, 1917), and the changes in America's international relations in the decade preceding the World War are given in F. A. Ogg, *National Progress: 1907-1917*, which is vol. XXVII of *The American Nation* (New York, 1918). Two suggestive books, critical and interpretative, are: W. E. Weyl, *American World Policies* (New York, 1917) and C. E. Merriam, *American Political Ideas* (New York, 1920). L. S. Rowe, *The United States and Porto Rico* (New York, 1904), raised questions which American public opinion has not yet passed upon. Still worth reading, in gathering up the threads of the past, are: J. W. Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy* (Boston, 1900) and *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (Boston, 1903); and Ugo Rabbeno, *The American Commercial Policy* (London, 1895).

ORIGINS AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

(Chapters 24, 25, 26, 31, 32)

Books that could be listed under this heading are legion, and more are appearing each month. I cite only books which I have found of service in making clear the influence of world politics upon the World War.

On the origins of the war, three Americans have written penetratingly and accurately: C. Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War* (New Haven, 1916); A. Bullard, *The Diplomacy of the Great War* (New York, 1916); and W. M. Fullerton, *Problems of Power* (New York, 1914—revised ed., 1920). An excellent book to be read with these three is J. Bakeless, *The Economic Causes of Modern Wars* (New York, 1921). The British, French, German,

and Austrian theses concerning the direct responsibility of the war are obtained in J. W. Headlam, *The History of Twelve Days* (London, 1915); J. Reinach, *Les Douze Jours* (Paris, 1917); E. von Mach, *Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (New York, 1916); and R. Goos, *Das Wiener Kabinet und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges* (Vienna, 1919). E. D. Morel, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy* (London, 1915); F. Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War* (New York, 1915); and Y. Guyot, *The Causes and the Consequences of the War* (New York, 1916), trans. by F. A. Holt, judge the work of European statesmen from the viewpoint of the layman. F. Delaisi, *La Guerre qui Vient* (Paris, 1911), is a startling prophecy of what was to be the result of the Morocco imbroglio. It was translated into English and published (Boston, 1915) under the title *The Inevitable War*. Professor G. Murray wrote a brief critical study, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey: 1906-1915* (Oxford, 1915). Viscount Haldane, *Before the War* (New York, 1920), and T. J. Ionescu, *Origins of the War* (London, 1917), have reviewed ante-bellum negotiations in which these statesmen took part.

The diplomatic history of the World War has not yet been written. I have had to rely upon the publication of documents and speeches and correspondence in newspapers and periodicals, and upon books and pamphlets that were circulated chiefly for propaganda purposes. Many of the secret treaties concluded during the war were published by the Petrograd *Izvestia* between December, 1917, and March, 1918, from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These were translated and published in England by the Manchester *Guardian*. In a long series of articles appearing weekly in the *New York Times*, and which will be published in book form in the autumn of 1922, R. S. Baker has been giving to the world the secret minutes of the Peace Conference, in which the existence of additional secret treaties is divulged. That there were such agreements was known long ago, and their general tenor also was suspected. For what I have written about the entry of Italy into the World War, the Balkan affairs, the relations among the powers from 1914 to 1918, and the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Turkish empires, I have had to rely primarily upon information derived from personal contact with events and statesmen.

**THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EFFORT TO FORM A LEAGUE OF
NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY SINCE
THE PARIS CONFERENCE**

(Chapters 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 48, 49)

The conference, its machinery, its problems, its treaties, and how they have been applied, are discussed in more or less detail in *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 5 vols. (London, 1920-1921), ed. by H. W. V. Temperley, and issued under the auspices of The Institute of International Affairs. This voluminous undertaking is informative rather than critical. Men who participated in the negotiations have written as follows: President Wilson, *Addresses Delivered on the Western Tour* (Senate Doc. No. 120, Washington, 1919); A. Tardieu, *The Truth About the Treaty* (Indianapolis, 1921); E. M. House and C. Seymour (editors), *What Really Happened at Paris* (New York, 1921); R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations and The Big Four and Others of the Peace Conference* (Boston, 1921); J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1920) and *A Revision of the Treaty* (New York, 1922); B. Baruch, *The Economic Sections of the Peace Treaty* (New York, 1920); and C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Boston, 1920). In addition to these narratives, which can not help being—even if only mildly—*ex parte*, we have the observations of three shrewd correspondents: H. Hanson, *The Adventures of the Fourteen Points* (New York, 1919); C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (New York, 1920); and E. J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (New York, 1920). A brief commentary on the treaties is A. P. Scott, *An Introduction to the Peace Treaties* (Chicago, 1920).

Among the notable books written on the post-treaty situation are: F. A. Vanderlip, *What Happened to Europe* (New York, 1919) and *What Next in Europe* (New York, 1922); A. Demangeon, *Le Declin de l'Europe* (Paris, 1920); F. C. Hicks, *The New World Order* (New York, 1920); N. Angel, *The Fruits of Victory* (New York, 1921); W. Rathenau, *The New Society* (New York, 1921); and ex-Premier Nitti, *Europe Without Peace* (London, 1922). E. Antonelli's *L'Afrique et la paix de Versailles* (Paris, 1921) is the most informative work on the African phases of the peace conference decisions.

The most penetrating European comment on the League of Na-

tions is to be found in J. L. Garvin, *The Economic Foundations of Peace* (London, 1919); G. Ferrero, *Problems of Peace* (New York, 1919); and M. Erzberger, *The League of Nations the Way to the World's Peace* (New York, 1919), trans. by B. Miall. A succinct account of the beginning of the experiment is given in G. G. Wilson, *The First Year of the League of Nations* (Boston, 1921); H. W. V. Temperley, *The Second Year of the League of Nations* (London, 1922). The entire subject of international organization is covered in P. B. Potter, *Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (New York, 1922).

The best collection of documents and speeches in connection with the diplomatic history of the war, the peace negotiations, the continuation conferences, and the post-bellum problems and experiments in international relations is contained in the *Documents of the American Association for International Conciliation*, Nos. 83-185 (New York, 1914-1922). This collection is rich in treaties, diplomatic correspondence, and speeches of the principal actors in the World War and the peace negotiations. It contains all the important treaties and agreements, not only of the Paris and the continuation conferences, but also the text of the agreements among the Entente powers and between the Entente powers and non-European states. With equal accuracy and completeness, but in less convenient form for reference, this same ground is covered by *Current History*, published monthly by the New York Times. *Littell's Living Age*, published weekly in Boston, reprints many important articles on world conditions by European writers, almost all of which are well worth reading. *The World's Work* (New York) has given excellent maps of territorial changes resulting from the World War. In conclusion, this bibliography would not be complete without calling attention to the unique service that has been rendered to the American public by the *Literary Digest* (New York), whose editors have published since 1919 informative special articles, giving concisely and impartially an account of political and economic conditions in small countries and contested provinces, with maps, and have devoted special numbers, with maps, to the larger states in turn. Reference to the *Literary Digest* index from 1919 to 1922 will lead the student to statistical data and maps illustrating virtually all the problems of international relations during the era of world reconstruction.

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
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